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 Abstract 
 
What  responsibilities  do  individuals  have  in  relation  to  global  injustice?    Iris 
Young  argues  that  all  agents  “connected”  to  global  structural  injustice  bear 
political responsibility, rather than moral responsibility; the difference being that 
political responsibility is non-blameworthy, shared and forward-looking, whereas 
moral responsibility entails blameworthiness, isolates particular agents for censure 
and is backward-looking.  Thus, individuals are not guilty of wrongdoing but they 
bear responsibility for global injustice.  Young’s argument is intuitively appealing 
and influential, however it is underdeveloped.  In this thesis, I aim to develop 
Young’s account into a coherent theory of individuals’ responsibilities for global 
injustice, by reconstructing her core insights and critically developing the aspects 
that lack clarity and coherence.   
 
Young does not sufficiently distinguish political from moral responsibility.  In 
Part One, I argue that there are two kinds of moral responsibility: relational moral 
responsibility, which refers to the traditional account of directly causing harm 
with  intent  and  knowledge  –  what  Young  calls  the  “liability  model”  of 
responsibility; and moral responsibility as virtue, of which political responsibility is 
a particular kind.  I strengthen Young’s argument that ordinary individuals cannot 
bear relational moral responsibility for global injustice, because they perpetuate 
structural  injustice  inadvertently,  unintentionally  or  unavoidably,  but  that  they 
should cultivate the virtue of political responsibility to participate in collective 
action for change.   
 
Young conceives of political responsibility as a responsibility for justice.  In Part 
Two, I assess this claim.  For Young, individuals’ behaviour reproduces unjust 
social-structural processes, thus individuals have a responsibility for justice.  I 
contrast  this  to  Rawlsian  “dualism”,  whereby  responsibility  for  justice  is 
institutional.    I  characterize  sweatshop  labour  as  a  form  of  global  structural 
exploitation.    Political  responsibility  is  triggered  by  “connection”  to  such  an 
injustice, which I define as the reproduction of unjust structures or dependency 
on oppression.   
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 Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
 
 
Iris Marion Young posed the question, ‘how should we as individuals think about 
our own responsibility in relation to social injustice?’
1  Young’s intuition was that 
individuals who participate in unjust political, social and economic processes by 
virtue of their everyday activities share responsibility for the unjust processes and yet 
should  not  be  blamed  of  wrongdoing.    Instead,  individuals  have  a  “political 
responsibility”  to  engage  in  collective  action  to  struggle  against  “structural 
injustice” to which they are “connected.”  This is the “social connection model” 
of responsibility. 
 
Young’s approach is an increasingly popular conceptual model for thinking about 
responsibilities  for  global  injustice.
2   However,  Young’s  model  was  relatively 
under-developed before her untimely death in 2006.  She never finished her book 
on the subject – Responsibility for Justice.  We have an unfinished book, two journal 
articles and two magazine articles of varying depth on the topic.
 3   Moreover, 
because of her critical methodology and the audience Young hopes to address – 
the “citizen-activist” – her insights are often overlooked or misunderstood by 
analytic political philosophers.
4   
 
                                                 
1 Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 15. 
2 At  the  time  of  writing  Young’s  2006  article  on  the  topic  has  been  cited  305  times  - 
"Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model," Social Philosophy and Policy 23, no. 
1  (2006).  And  her  2004  article  has  been  cited  241  times  -  "Responsibility  and  Global  Labor 
Justice," The Journal of Political Philosophy 12, no. 4 (2004).  While not all of these citations will be 
favourable to the approach, they suggest the wide reach and influence Young’s work currently has 
on the discipline. 
3 The acknowledgements page of Responsibility for Justice, written by Iris Young’s partner, discloses 
that she planned to spend six weeks editing the manuscript, making it more consistent, toning 
down  her  challenges  to  other  theorists,  and  developing  and  reworking  certain  sections.    The 
journal articles are "Responsibility and Global Labor Justice; "Responsibility and Global Justice: A 
Social Connection Model." The magazine articles are "From Guilt to Solidarity: Sweatshops and 
Political Responsibility," Dissent 2003; "Katrina: Too Much Blame, Not Enough Responsibility," 
Dissent 2006.  There is also an earlier lecture "Political Responsibility and Structural Injustice," in 
The Lindley Lecture (University of Kansas2003). And a book chapter Global Challenges: War, Self-
Determination and Responsibility for Justice  (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), Chapter 9. 
4 As Mathias Risse argues in his review of Young’s final book, "Review: Iris Marion Young's 
Responsibility for Justice," (Philosophical Reviews, 2011). Introduction 
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In this thesis, I aim to develop Young’s account of responsibility into a coherent 
political theory of individuals’ responsibilities for global injustice.  I will do this 
through  conceptual  analysis  of  the  concept  of  responsibility,  and  using  the 
method  of  reflective  equilibrium  to  compare  her  considered  judgments  with 
existing theories of responsibility.  In critically developing Young’s theory, I hope 
to  provide  a  new  normative  framework  for  thinking  about  individuals’ 
responsibilities in relation to global injustice, making an original contribution to 
the literature. 
 
This introductory chapter is divided into two sections.  In section 1.1, I give a 
brief overview of Young’s approach and contextualise it in relation to the most 
influential accounts of responsibility for global justice.  In section 1.2 I outline the 
structure of this thesis and how I will develop the social connection model of 
responsibility. 
 
1.1  Responsibility for Global Injustice 
 
1.1.1  The Youngian Approach 
 
Young  focuses  on  injustice  and  asks  what  responsibilities  individuals  have  in 
relation to global injustice.  She took the anti-sweatshop movement as her starting 
point.  These activists claimed that individual consumers have a responsibility 
towards exploited garment workers in developing countries, despite the fact that 
consumers  are  not  directly  harming  workers  and  have  no  control  over  the 
situation.    The  claims  of  this  social  movement  ‘struck  a  chord’  with  many 
individuals,  in  Young’s  view,  and  inspired  her  to  think  about  what  kind  of 
responsibility they were invoking.
5 
 
Young argues that when we ordinarily think about responsibility we assume a 
“liability model”.  On this model, specific individuals or collectivities are identified 
as legally or morally responsible for an isolated instance of wrongdoing.  This 
model  of  responsibility  cannot  make  sense  of  the  anti-sweatshop  movement’s 
                                                 
5 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 126. Introduction 
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claims,  however.    This  social  movement  does  seek  to  pinpoint  particular 
individuals or collectivities and to hold them legally or morally responsible for the 
harms involved in sweatshop labour, e.g. pressuring multinational corporations 
(MNCs) to pay better wages to workers; however, they also enjoin consumers to 
take responsibility for on-going structural processes in which they participate, to 
transform these processes for the better.  From this, Young infers that there is a 
different  kind  of  responsibility  at  play  in  the  claims  of  global  justice  social 
movements.  She calls this the “social connection model” of responsibility, which 
generates  a  forward-looking,  non-blameworthy  responsibility  to  participate  in 
collective action for change. 
 
Young  argues  that  individuals  have  a  political  responsibility  for  “structural 
injustice” to which they are connected.  She uses the term structural injustice to 
distinguish  the  kinds  of  problems  she  has  in  mind  from  both  individual  and 
institutional wrongdoing.
6  Structural injustice is not a wrong perpetrated with 
intent, rather it is the harmful, unintended, cumulative outcome of agents’ normal 
behaviour and activities.
 7 
 
The social connection model does not replace the liability model; it supplements 
it.
8  Young is advocating a two-tiered approach to thinking about responsibility:
9 
the first involves our legal and moral responsibilities for specific acts or omissions 
that  have  harmed  identifiable  others,  the  second  refers  to  our  on-going 
responsibility for unjust structures.  
 
If we want to overcome a particular structural injustice, such as sweatshop labour, 
we need to use both models of responsibility.  The liability model alone is not 
sufficient.  Sanctioning particular agents within these processes, such as factory 
owners, MNCs or states, will not solve the problem of sweatshop labour, ‘so long 
as that incentive structure is in place and sanction is not routine.’
10   
 
                                                 
6 Responsibility for Justice, 45. 
7 Responsibility for Justice, 52. 
8 "Responsibility  and  Global  Labor  Justice,"  368;  "Responsibility  and  Global  Justice:  A  Social 
Connection Model," 118. 
9 "Responsibility and Global Labor Justice," 382.   
10 "Responsibility and Global Labor Justice," 375. Introduction 
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The problem is with the background conditions.  Young writes, ‘When we judge 
that structural injustice exists, we are saying precisely that at least some of the 
normal  and  accepted  background  conditions  of  action  are  not  morally 
acceptable.’
11  The social connection model denotes the responsibility we have 
towards  unjust  structures  in  which  we  act.    It  entails  engaging  in  collective 
political  action  to  change  the  structures.
12   It  is  a  new  and  distinct  kind  of 
responsibility; it is a political responsibility for justice.  
 
One further distinct element of the social connection model is that individuals 
have political responsibility to different degrees.  The extent of an individual’s 
political  responsibility  depends  upon  their  social  position  and  on  how  much 
power, privilege, interest, or collective ability they have in relation to a particular 
structural injustice.
13   
 
1.1.2  Comparison to Mainstream Approaches 
 
The  Youngian  approach  diverges  from  several  of  the  leading  theories  of 
responsibility for global justice.  The aim of this thesis is to critically develop 
Young’s approach; in this section I merely seek to situate Young’s approach in 
relation to the more well-known approaches of Peter Singer, Thomas Pogge and 
Christopher Kutz, to establish some points of difference.
14  
 
Peter Singer’s seminal 1972 article “Famine, Affluence and Morality” focuses on 
the injustice of global poverty.  He argues that suffering and death from lack of 
food, medical care or shelter is bad and, ‘if it is in our power to prevent something 
bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral 
importance, we ought, morally, to do it.’
15  The weaker version of this principle is 
that if it is in our power to prevent anything of comparable moral significance from 
                                                 
11 "Responsibility and Global Labor Justice," 378. 
12 Responsibility for Justice, 111-13. 
13 Responsibility for Justice, 142-51. 
14 A  decision  was  made  to  focus  on  the  Youngian  approach  in  this  thesis  rather  than  to 
systematically compare and contrast her theory to other approaches in the literature.  The points 
of difference I raise here could potentially be rejected by the authors; my aim, however, is not to 
provide a nuanced and thorough appraisal of these theories in relation to Young’s, but simply to 
highlight where they appear to diverge.  
15 Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence and Morality," in The Global Justice Reader, ed. Thom Brooks 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008), 388. Introduction 
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happening,  we  ought  morally  to  do  it.    Singer  argues  by  analogy  that  if  an 
individual is walking past a shallow pond in which a small child is drowning, they 
ought to save the child, as they will not sacrifice anything of comparable moral 
significance by doing so.  This principle determines that individuals should donate 
any spare money they have to save the lives of those living in absolute poverty. 
 
Singer’s  approach  does  not  take  into  account  the  causes  and  background 
conditions that give rise to poverty.  Singer’s pond example presents a dis-analogy 
with  chronic  poverty  because  it  implies  there  is  a  straightforward  relationship 
between the victim and rescuer.  The duty to rescue the child makes sense in an 
emergency situation where there is a direct link between that particular victim and 
that particular rescuer, but this is not the case in an on-going structural problem 
with complex causes involving multiple agents with varying degrees of power and 
responsibility in relation to the problem.  Singer’s argument is that individuals’ 
moral  duty  in  relation  to  global  poverty  is  to  donate  to  aid  agencies;  but  as 
Andrew  Kuper  points  out  it  is  not  really  appropriate  to  ‘leave  it  to  Oxfam’, 
because  Oxfam  and  other  non-governmental  organisations  (NGOs)  cannot 
address the structural causes of poverty.
16  The Singer approach lacks an account 
of structure.  By contrast, Young’s approach is necessarily structural.  For Young, it 
is connection to unjust structures that generates political responsibility, not the 
capacity to alleviate suffering. 
 
Samuel Scheffler has criticized Singer’s theory on the grounds that a plausible 
ethical theory needs ‘at a minimum, to be capable of being internalized and of 
coming  to  function  as  a  guide  to  everyday  thought  and  action.’
17   Singer’s 
consequentialist approach fails to meet this standard, as it is “non-restrictive”; it 
doesn’t  seek  to  limit  our  moral  duties.    In  the  context  of  the  contemporary 
globalized economy, Scheffler argues that this non-restrictive theory ‘seems to 
many people to make wildly excessive demands on the capacity of agents to amass 
information about the global impact of the different courses of action available to 
                                                 
16 Andrew  Kuper,  "More  Than  Charity:  Cosmopolitan  Alternatives  to  the  "Singer  Solution"," 
Ethics  and  International  Affairs 16, no. 2 (2002): 110.  See also, Paul Gomberg, "The Fallacy of 
Philanthropy," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32, no. 1 (2002): 61. 
17 Samuel  Scheffler,  "Individual  Responsibility  in  a  Global  Age,"  in  Boundaries  and  Allegiances: 
Problems of Justice and Responsibility in Liberal Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 43. Introduction 
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them’.
18  Not only is it too demanding on the individual, but it also jars deeply 
with our “common-sense” conception of morality, which is premised upon roles 
and relationships rather than the overall good.
 19  There is a phenomenological 
aspect to common-sense morality; we see and experience the near-effects of our 
actions,  they  seem  real  to  us,  whereas  the  remote  effects  of  our  actions  are 
intangible and unknown.
20  The over-demandingness and the inability to know the 
consequences of all our actions in the contemporary world, render Singer’s theory 
non-internalizable. 
 
Scheffler  also  argues,  however,  that  the  common-sense  approach  to  ethics  is 
‘anachronistic’ and increasingly indefensible.
21  It may feel ‘natural’ to base ethical 
theories on specific actions or webs of close relationships, but due to advances in 
science  and  technology,  communication,  travel,  and  economic  and  political 
interdependence,  it  is  ‘more  difficult  than  ever  to  sustain  the  conception  of 
human social relations as consisting primarily in small-scale interactions among 
single individuals’.
22  Scheffler concludes ‘the net effects of these developments 
may  be,  not  to  encourage  the  substitution  of  a  non-restrictive  conception  of 
responsibility for more restrictive ideas, but rather to leave our thinking about 
responsibility in some disarray’.
23 
 
Young thinks that Scheffler has ‘identified a key problem in contemporary moral 
theory  and  practice’, 
24 but  she  disagrees  that  our  ethics  are  left  in  disarray.  
Instead, she argues that ‘we need a plausible way of conceiving responsibility that 
connects individual agency to structural processes.’
25  She aims to work towards 
this with the social connection model of responsibility.
26  Moreover, she thinks 
that  the  social  connection  model  is  internalizable  because  people  are  already 
acting  on  it;  she  drew  the  theory  from  the  already  existing  anti-sweatshop 
movement.    She  writes,  ‘If  we  listen,  I  think  that  we  can  hear  appeals  to 
                                                 
18 Ibid. 
19 "Individual Responsibility in a Global Age," 42. 
20 "Individual Responsibility in a Global Age," 43. 
21 "Individual Responsibility in a Global Age," 45. 
22 Ibid. 
23 "Individual Responsibility in a Global Age," 46. 
24 Young, "Responsibility and Global Labor Justice," 374. 
25 "Political Responsibility and Structural Injustice," 7. 
26 Ibid. Introduction 
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something like such a conception of responsibility voiced in political contexts 
even now… in the anti-sweatshop movement.’
27 
 
Thomas Pogge offers a structural account of global poverty.  According to Pogge, 
absolute poverty is caused by the coercive imposition of the ‘Global Economic 
Order’ (GEO) on the world’s poorest people.   The institutions of the GEO are 
made up of representatives of governments, and so the responsibility for poverty 
devolves to the citizens of the countries that make up the GEO.  This is because 
‘these governments are elected by us, responsive to our interests and preferences, 
acting in our name and in ways that benefit us.  This buck stops with us’.
28   
 
Pogge’s  argument  is  that  there  is  a  negative  moral  duty  not  to  participate  in 
institutions that cause harm.
29  The institutions of the Global Economic Order 
harm the world’s poorest people by imposing upon them rules and regimes that 
they cannot control, and which deprive them of access to the fulfilment of their 
basic  needs,  thus  violating  their  human  rights.    Because  citizens  in  affluent 
countries are participating in and upholding the governments that maintain the 
unjust GEO we are violating this negative moral duty; therefore ‘we share causal 
and moral responsibility’ for global poverty.
30  The responsibility of citizens in 
Western  countries  is  to  work  to  reform  these  coercive  institutions  or  to 
compensate the victims of poverty.
31   
 
Pogge’s argument potentially has counter-intuitive implications.  While all citizens 
of  industrialised  countries  benefit  from  the  opportunities  provided  by  those 
states, citizens have access to these opportunities to varying degrees depending on 
their position in social structures.  It is not the case that all citizens of affluent 
countries are themselves affluent.  Indeed the poorest members of these states are 
victims of unjust global economic processes.  There are also rich citizens within 
developing countries who are causally implicated in the perpetuation of the GEO 
in more direct ways than poor citizens in affluent countries.  As Debra Satz puts 
                                                 
27 Responsibility for Justice, 118. 
28 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms  
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 21. 
29 World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms  (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2005), 64. 
30 World Poverty and Human Rights, 116. 
31 World Poverty and Human Rights, 170. Introduction 
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it, ‘Is a laid-off American steelworker, for example, really more responsible for 
global poverty than a rich citizen of a poor country?’
32   
 
The elision of citizenship in affluent countries with moral responsibility for global 
injustice  is  problematic.    Why  are  poor  people  in  Western  countries  guilty  in 
relation to global poverty but rich people in the global South are not?  It could be 
argued that the rich/poor country dichotomy obscures the complexity of power 
relations at the intra-state, inter-state and trans-state levels in the contemporary 
global economy.  This approach has the potential to unfairly impose the burden 
of guilt on many individuals in Western countries who are powerless in relation to 
global  processes,  and  to  infantilize  the  citizens  of  poor  countries,  either  by 
assuming they are all poor or by assuming they are all powerless.  The problem 
with Pogge’s account is that it lacks a systematic analysis of kinds and degrees of 
responsibility.   
 
On what Young calls “the liability model” of responsibility, we seek guilty parties 
to pay for harms that have already occurred.  Pogge seems to argue that the guilty 
parties in the case of global poverty are the citizens of Western countries.  Young 
does  not  come  to  this  conclusion.    Young  thinks  that  ordinary  individuals  in 
Western countries are not guilty of wrongdoing for three reasons: because they do 
not intend to cause unjust structures, because they are acting within accepted rules 
and  norms  when  they  participate  within  these  structures,  and  because  these 
individuals are constrained by the system in which they act.
33   
 
Young recognises that particular agents will bear responsibility on the liability 
model for particular wrongdoings within unjust structures; however, all agents 
connected  to  unjust  structures  bear  political  responsibility  to  struggle  against 
those structures.  Ordinary Western individuals do not bear causal and moral 
responsibility for a structural injustice such as global poverty, but they do bear a 
different kind of responsibility – political responsibility – to challenge the unjust 
structures.  Young also differentiates degrees of political responsibility, arguing that 
individuals’ responsibilities vary according to their social position within unjust 
                                                 
32 Debra Satz, "What Do We Owe the Global Poor?," Ethics  and  International  Affairs 19, no. 1 
(2005): 51. 
33 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 170. Introduction 
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structures, and how much power, privilege, interest or collective ability they have 
in  relation  to  unjust  structural  processes.
34   Furthermore,  Young  does  not  tie 
responsibility  to  nationality.    If  the  degree  of  responsibility  depends  upon  an 
agent’s social position, a rich citizen in a poor country may well be better placed 
to alleviate poverty than a poor citizen in a rich country, and would thus bear 
more political responsibility in relation to that structural injustice. 
 
Christopher Kutz has a more subtle understanding of degrees of responsibility 
than Pogge.  He argues for a principle of ‘complicitous accountability: individual, 
intentional participation in a collective act warrants individual accountability for 
the  consequences  of  that  act.’
35   For  Kutz,  individuals  who  participate  in  a 
collective action are accountable for the harm done by virtue of the fact that they 
have intended to participate in the group.
 36  They may not have intended the 
outcome of the action, but by participating in the group they have demonstrated 
“participatory intent” and this grounds accountability.  For example, a pacifist 
who takes a job in a nuclear plant, when there are no other jobs available, does 
not intend to contribute to the collective’s ends, but does nevertheless participate 
in the group.
37  This intentional participation grounds accountability, not because 
of  the  difference  the  individual  makes  to  the  harm  done,  but  because  their 
intention  to  participate  in  the  group  links  them  to  the  consequences  of  the 
group’s activities.
38   
 
Kutz acknowledges that in the contemporary world, many harms are not caused 
by the concerted acts of collectivities, rather they result from the confluence of 
individuals’ behaviour.
39  He gives the example of pollution – ‘individual polluters 
are not intentional participants in a collective act of pollution.  So the usual basis 
for  applying  the  Complicity  Principle  does  not  obtain.’
40   In  the  cases  of 
“unstructured collective harms”, we must take a holistic approach to the problem, 
                                                 
34 Responsibility for Justice, 142-51. 
35Christopher Kutz, Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000), 15. 
36 Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 122. 
37 Complicity, 102. 
38 Complicity, 138. 
39 Complicity, 166. 
40Complicity, 166-67. Introduction 
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while  also  recognising  that  the  units  of  accountability  and  recompense  are 
ultimately individuals.  He writes,  
 
Each participant individually, and all participants together, must deliberate 
about what they owe in virtue of what they have done.  From the point of 
view  of  victims,  the  obligations  are  the  source  of  claims  against 
individuals,  but  claims  whose  basis  likewise  reflects  the  structure  of 
participation.  Responses of accountability, are owed ultimately by and to 
individuals,  but  the  content  of  those  claims  is  irreducibly  collective.  
Complicity is a property of agents, linking them to one another and to 
their victims.
41 
 
According  to  Young,  Kutz  is  relying  on  the  liability  model  of  responsibility 
because  complicity  theory  seeks  to  assign  responsibility  as  accountability  for 
wrongdoing; Young thinks that Kutz’s is the best attempt to extend the liability 
model  to  global  injustice,  but  that  ultimately  it  fails.
42   In  the  context  of 
unstructured collective harms – which many global injustices are – we cannot 
isolate particular perpetrators.  As Young puts it, ‘Because the causal connection 
of particular individuals or even organisations to the harmful structural outcomes 
is often impossible to trace, there is no point in seeking to exact compensation or 
redress  from  some  isolatable  perpetrators.’
43    Furthermore,  the  focus  on 
individuals’  complicity  in  causing  harm  obscures  the  role  of  the  background 
structures in which the harm occurred.
44  The social connection model places the 
focus  on  the  background  conditions.    Finally,  parcelling  out  blame  for 
wrongdoing may distract us from focusing on forward-looking change, creating 
division  where  we  need  unity.
45 Young  wants  us  to  conceptualise  individuals’ 
responsibilities for global injustice in a different way to the liability model.  She 
                                                 
41 Complicity, 202. 
42 Young, Responsibility for Justice, 101. 
43 "From Guilt to Solidarity: Sweatshops and Political Responsibility." 
44 Responsibility for Justice, 105. 
45 Responsibility for Justice, 116. In making this point, Young is assuming that complicity entails 
blame.  I do not think this is an unreasonable assumption, and Kutz himself is not very clear about 
what complicity does entail.  It might be objected, however, that there are nonblameworthy forms 
of complicity, in which case Young’s point would fail. Introduction 
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writes, ‘What we should seek is not a variation on a weaker form of liability, but 
rather a different conception of responsibility altogether.’
46   
 
Young’s social connection model of responsibility aims to address some of these 
perceived problems: it places the emphasis on structure, it aims to be internalizable, it 
differentiates degrees of individuals’ responsibilities according to social position, it 
removes blame from the equation, and it focuses on how to improve the situation 
rather than apportioning blame for past wrongs.  I think she is right to make these 
moves.    A  theory  of  responsibility  for  contemporary  global  injustice  should 
incorporate  political,  social  and  economic  structures  and  how  these  condition 
individuals’  actions  and  the  outcomes  of  those  actions.    It  seems  prudent  to 
distinguish kinds and degrees of responsibility.  It is desirable to try to establish 
when guilt and blame are appropriate, and when they are not.   
 
1.2  Thesis Outline 
 
I have suggested that Young’s approach to responsibility for global injustice is 
original and important, and that it departs from the more well-known theories of 
responsibility for global injustice in several potentially illuminating ways.  The 
identification  of  a  different  kind  of  responsibility  that  relates  individual 
responsibility  to  structural  injustice  is,  I  think,  imperative.    However,  there 
remains much developmental work to do on the social connection model. 
 
Young was a philosophical magpie.  She found the shiny bits in a diverse range of 
theories from analytic to continental philosophy, sociology and political science, 
and arranged them to create a fascinating picture, showing us new ways of looking 
at problems we thought we understood or finding problems we previously failed 
to see.  This was her greatest strength as a theorist; however, this strength is also a 
weakness.  For while she arrives at unique and illuminating insights, her theories 
can lack consistency and coherence.  This problem is exemplified in the social 
connection model of responsibility.   
 
                                                 
46 Responsibility for Justice, 104. Introduction 
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The  social  connection  model,  in  my  view,  hinges  on  the  distinction  between 
moral and political responsibility.  If the claim is that individuals are politically but 
not morally responsible for global injustice, we have to precisely distinguish these 
two concepts.  Young, unfortunately, did not do this.  She posits a traditional 
account of moral responsibility – that to be morally responsible an individual has 
to have directly caused harm, with knowledge and intent.
47  Yet she does not 
elaborate  on  this  idea  or  defend  it.    In  the  first  half  of  this  thesis,  I  do  this 
clarificatory work. 
 
In Chapter 2, I consider the idea that there can be responsibility without guilt.  I 
outline the background of this theory in Hannah Arendt’s distinction between 
legal, moral and political responsibility.  I show how Young adapts this distinction 
for her purposes.  I show how appropriating Arendt’s distinction has created 
problems  for  Young’s  social  connection  model,  the  most  difficult  being  the 
distinction between the moral and the political.   
 
In Chapter 3, I argue that there are two concepts of moral responsibility at play 
for Young – moral responsibility as virtue (being a moral person) and relational 
moral responsibility (the appropriate conditions for praise and blame).  I suggest 
that political responsibility is a form of moral responsibility as virtue – it is a 
forward-looking  and  non-blameworthy  form  of  moral  responsibility  aimed 
towards structures.  It is a way of being that ought to be cultivated in order to be a 
moral person in our complex, corrupted world.  
 
Young’s interest is in accounting for responsibility for “structural injustice”.  She 
argues that within unjust structures that all agents are “objectively constrained”.  
This is one of the reasons why individuals are not morally responsible for global 
injustice – because their involvement is to a large extent unavoidable.  But Young 
thinks this applies to almost all agents involved in social-structural processes.  In 
Chapter 4, I argue against this by developing a Youngian conception of power.  I 
argue that agents with sufficient power to be able to change unjust structures 
ought to do so, and bear relational moral responsibility – they are blameworthy – 
if they fail to do so.  
                                                 
47 Responsibility for Justice, 97. Introduction 
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By the end of the first half of this thesis, I hope to have established that there is a 
plausible and meaningful way in which we can distinguish moral from political 
responsibility.  Relational moral responsibility applies to what agents have done, 
and  powerful  agents  can  bear  relational  moral  responsibility  for  structural 
injustice.  Political responsibility, by contrast, is a kind of moral responsibility as 
virtue; it is forward-looking and does not entail praise or blame.   
 
Further problems remain, however.  If political responsibility is construed as a 
responsibility for injustice, we need to be clear about what we mean by injustice 
and responsibility for it.  Part Two of this thesis focuses on these questions. 
 
In Chapter 5, I look at how individuals can bear responsibility for injustice.  I 
situate Young’s work in relation to the debate on monism and dualism, which 
asks whether responsibilities for justice are institutional, or whether they apply to 
individuals.  I  compare  Young’s  understanding  of  structural  injustice  and 
individuals’ responsibilities in relation to it, to Rawls’s understanding of the basic 
structure as the subject of justice, for which only institutions bear responsibility.  I 
argue that Young does not separate out a sphere of justice in the same way as 
Rawls.    For  Young,  social-structural  processes  are  all  encompassing,  and  are 
constituted  by  the  attitudes,  habits  and  norms  of  individuals,  as  well  as 
institutional  rules  and  practices.    To  understand  individuals’  responsibilities  in 
relation to structure, Young adopts a unique understanding of dualism: individuals 
have to reason from two moral points of view – the interactional (how we treat 
others)  and  the  structural  (how  our  actions  and  attitudes  contribute  to  the 
reproduction of unjust structures). 
 
The social connection model generates political responsibility for global structural 
injustice, so in Chapter 6, I construct a Youngian account of global injustice.  
Young uses sweatshop labour as an example throughout her work on the social 
connection  model,  but  she  does  not  explain  why  it  constitutes  a  structural 
injustice.  I argue this is a form of global “structural exploitation”.  I use Young’s 
discussion of exploitation in Justice and the Politics of Difference and contrast this with 
Marxian and liberal/libertarian accounts of exploitation.  I argue that structural Introduction 
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exploitation is a form of oppression because it inhibits the self-development of 
some  social  groups  while  enabling  and  enhancing  the  status  of  other  social 
groups.   
 
Young’s  claim  for  the  social  connection  model  is  that  “connection”  to  an 
injustice, such as global structural exploitation in the form of sweatshop labour, 
generates political responsibility for that injustice.  Yet she does not define and 
defend a conception of connection.  In the final substantive chapter, Chapter 7, I 
identify three potential forms of connection in Young’s work – existential, causal 
and dependent connection.  I argue that by virtue of acting within unjust structures 
we cannot help but reproduce them or avoid dependency on the oppression of others.  
These  are  the  forms  of  connection  that  generate  political  responsibility  for 
structural injustice. 
 
* 
 
This thesis involves much reconstructive and developmental work on the social 
connection model of responsibility.  The aim is to not simply shore up the theory, 
but  to  improve  it  by  drawing  on  Young’s  body  of  work  and  other  relevant 
literature.  It may be that Young would not accept the direction that I have taken 
with the social connection model, but I will show why I think my conclusions 
follow logically from Young’s initial work on the model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Part One:  Moral Responsibility  
Chapter 2  Responsibility Without Guilt 
 
 
 
Iris Marion Young takes the distinction between “responsibility” and “guilt” from 
Hannah  Arendt.
1   Arendt  argues  that  “political  responsibility”  is  collective 
responsibility for a political community, but this is distinct from “guilt” which 
applies to individuals for their particular wrongful deeds.  Guilt is a function of 
legal and moral responsibility; political responsibility is something distinct.  Young 
adopts this distinction, with significant revisions, to develop her own distinction 
between the “liability model” of responsibility and the “social connection model”.   
 
In the first section of this chapter, I look at the distinction as argued for by 
Arendt.  I show how Young criticises Arendt’s distinction and seeks to change it 
for her own purposes, and I highlight the challenges this raises.  In sections 2 and 
3, I look in more detail at Young’s distinction between the liability model (legal 
and  moral  responsibility)  and  the  social  connection  model  (political 
responsibility).    Young  argues  that  the  liability  model  is  isolating  and  backward-
looking.    This  conception  of  responsibility  cannot  capture  individuals’ 
responsibilities for on-going structural injustice.  Young argues that we need a 
new model of responsibility – the social connection model – that generates a 
shared, forward-looking, political responsibility to engage in collective action to change 
unjust structures. 
 
I raise four problems with the model as it currently stands, that I seek to remedy 
in the rest of the thesis.  Firstly, the distinction between the liability model and 
social connection model cannot hinge on the backward-lookingness of legal and 
moral  responsibility,  compared  to  the  forward-lookingness  of  political 
responsibility, because some forms of moral responsibility are forward-looking.  
Secondly, we can use the liability model in conjunction with the social connection 
model  when  attributing  responsibility  for  structural  injustice.    Thirdly,  Young 
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needs to justify the idea that individuals can bear responsibility for justice, and 
fourthly, she needs to define connection. 
 
2.1  Arendt on “Responsibility” and “Guilt” 
 
In 1961 Arendt covered the trial of Adolf Eichmann for The New Yorker.  Her 
reflections on the case provoked widespread indignation and controversy, and 
Eichmann’s personality left a profound impression on her.  She spent much of 
the rest of her life grappling with ideas about responsibility and judgment.  One 
problem  that  occupied  Arendt  was  to  clarify  how  we  could  think  about 
responsibility for the crimes of the Nazi regime.   
 
She faced an extremely difficult task, because potentially millions of people bore 
responsibility towards the atrocities; indeed, it was commonly held that all the 
German people were guilty.  However, could an average German citizen, who 
probably knew about the concentration camps but did not know the extent of the 
killing, really be said to be guilty in the same way that Eichmann was guilty – the 
man  who  orchestrated  the  transport  of  millions  of  people  to  the  camps  and 
without  whom  the  ‘final  solution’  may  not  have  been  carried  out  with  such 
ruthless efficiency?  Arendt thought not. 
 
Arendt was not the only post-war philosopher who thought that attributing guilt 
to  the  “German  people”  was  unwise.    Karl  Jaspers  also  made  the  distinction 
between “criminal guilt” which applied to the perpetrators of actual crimes related 
to the genocide, and “political liability” which extended to German citizens – a 
responsibility  to  pay  for  the  crimes  of  the  regime  under  which  they  were 
governed.
2   
 
According to Jaspers ‘there can be no collective guilt of a people or a group 
within a people – except for political liability.  To pronounce a group criminally, 
                                                 
2 Jaspers unhelpfully uses the terms “political guilt” and “political liability” interchangeably.  But 
he makes it clear that when liability is “political” it is different in kind to moral or criminal guilt.  
He writes,  ‘Guilt… is necessarily collective as the political liability of nationals, but not in the 
same sense as moral and metaphysical, and never as criminal guilt’ Karl Jaspers, The Question of 
German Guilt  (New York: Dial Press, 2000), 55-56. Responsibility Without Guilt 
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morally or metaphysically guilty is an error akin to the laziness and arrogance of 
average,  uncritical  thinking.’
3   This  need  to  distinguish  guilt  from  political 
responsibility is a task that Young takes up for the contemporary world.  In order 
to understand the distinction, however, it is useful to look at its origins.   
 
2.1.1  Legal, Moral and Political Responsibility 
 
Arendt distinguishes between legal, moral and political responsibility in a response 
to Joel Feinberg’s essay “Collective Responsibility”.  Feinberg argues that, ‘Guilt 
consists in the intentional transgression of a prohibition.’
4  Thus ‘there can be no such 
thing  as  vicarious  guilt.’
 5   Only  the  individual  who  intentionally  transgressed  a 
prohibition (be it legal or moral) can be said to be “guilty”.  Arendt agrees with 
Feinberg, that legal and moral standards hold this criterion in common, that is, 
‘they always relate to the person and what the person has done.’
6   
 
Given  the  personal  responsibility  condition  for  legal  and  moral  responsibility, 
Arendt believed that “ordinary Germans” were not legally or morally responsible 
for  the  Holocaust  unless  they  themselves  committed  a  crime.    Singling  out 
particular Nazi officials and holding them legally responsible for the crimes was 
extremely  important;  however,  this  approach  misses  the  ways  in  which  many 
more people were involved in perpetuating the Nazi regime.  In what way can 
these  others  be  said  to  have  been  responsible?  What  can  we  say  about 
responsibility for the extraordinary circumstances in which Nazi crimes occurred?   
 
According to Arendt, Feinberg assumes that all issues can be subjected to moral 
or legal judgments rendering political issues no more than a ‘special case’ that can 
be judged according to these standards; Arendt, by contrast, argues that the term 
“collective responsibility” always refers to ‘political predicaments’, not legal and 
moral problems as these standards can only apply to individual conduct.
7  Arendt 
further points out that Feinberg assumes a hierarchy of values in his analysis – 
                                                 
3 The Question of German Guilt  (New York: Dial Press, 2000), 36. 
4 Joel Feinberg, "Collective Responsibility," The Journal of Philosophy 65, no. 21 (1968): 676. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Hannah Arendt, "Collective Responsibility," in Amor Mundi: Explorations in the Faith and Thought of 
Hannah Arendt, ed. James W. Bernauer (Dordrecht: Martinue Nijoff Publishers, 1987), 44. 
7 Ibid. Responsibility Without Guilt 
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that the strictest standards are moral, then legal standards are next, with ‘customs 
and manners’ coming in last.
8  In her writing on political responsibility, Arendt 
aims to rehabilitate the concept of political responsibility as a separate and distinct 
kind  of  responsibility  from  legal  and  moral  responsibility  –  it  is  a  collective 
responsibility shared by citizens. 
 
For Arendt there are important practical reasons for clarifying the roles of legal, 
moral and political responsibility.  Arguing that all German citizens of the time 
were morally responsible for the Nazis’ crimes was harmful because it obscured 
where guilt truly lies – with the people who actually committed immoral and 
illegal  acts.    Trying  to  extend  the  concept  of  moral  responsibility  in  this  way 
undermines its practical strength and obfuscates legal process.  Arendt describes 
the problem thus: 
 
Morally  speaking,  it  is  as  wrong  to  feel  guilty  without  having  done 
anything specific as it is to feel free of all guilt if one actually is guilty of 
something.    I  have  always  regarded  it  as  the  quintessence  of  moral 
confusion  that  during  the  postwar  period  in  Germany  those  who 
personally were completely innocent assured each other and the world at 
large how guilty they felt, while very few of the criminals were prepared to 
admit  even  the  slightest  remorse.    The  result  of  this  spontaneous 
admission  of  collective  guilt  was  of  course  a  very  effective,  though 
unintended, white-wash of those who had done something: as we have 
already seen, where all are guilty, no one is.
9 
 
This obfuscation of legal process is troubling for Arendt.  The aim of practicing 
legal responsibility is to protect the political community.  When assigning legal 
responsibility Arendt thinks that ‘it is irrelevant who is better off, the wrongdoer 
or the wrong-sufferer.  As citizens we must prevent wrongdoing since the world 
we all share, wrongdoer, sufferer, and spectator, is at stake; the City has been 
wronged.’
10   The  idea  that  legal  responsibility  should  preserve  the  political 
                                                 
8 "Collective Responsibility," 47. 
9 "Personal  Responsibility  under  Dictatorship,"  in  Responsibility  and  Judgment,  ed.  Jerome  Kohn 
(New York: Schocken Books, 2003), 28. 
10 "Thinking  and  Moral  Considerations,"  in  Responsibility  and  Judgment,  ed.  Jerome  Kohn  (New 
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community  is  not  particularly  controversial.    H.L.A.  Hart  has  a  similar 
understanding of the function of the law: we punish ‘to protect society from the 
harm  that  crime  does  and  not  to  pay  back  the  harm  that  they  have  done.’
11  
Arendt’s conception of moral responsibility, by contrast, is highly idiosyncratic.   
 
Arendt considers moral responsibility to be self-regarding.  We normally think of 
morality as referring to how our actions affect others; however Arendt argues that 
the most influential moral principles are self-referential – “love thy neighbour as 
thyself”, “Don’t do unto others what you don’t want to be done to yourself,” and 
Kant’s maxim, “Act in such a way that the maxim of your action can become a 
general law for all intelligible beings.”
12   All of these rules, she writes, ‘take as 
their standard the Self and hence the intercourse of man with himself.’
13 
 
Arendt thinks that individuals who retained their moral integrity under Nazism 
acted according to Socrates’ famous declaration: “It is better to suffer wrong than 
to do wrong.”
14  It is worse to do wrong because a person is in constant dialogue 
with oneself; they are ‘two-in-one’.
15  She interprets Socrates as implying that, ‘If I 
disagree with other people, I can walk away; but I cannot walk away from myself, 
and therefore I better first try to be in agreement with myself before I take all 
others into consideration.’
16  The ability to think for oneself and judge oneself is a 
non-technical, pre-philosophic ability, which all people possess, and is practiced in 
solitude.
17  The moral person is the person who learns to think for themselves.   
 
We tend to think that morality imposes a set of obligations, as does the law; but 
Arendt claims that, ‘The problem of making moral propositions obligatory has 
plagued moral philosophy since its beginning with Socrates.’
18  This is because, 
unlike  with  legal  responsibility,  moral  responsibility  imposes  no  real-world 
sanctions, and the threat of ‘future rewards and punishments’ in the afterlife is no 
                                                 
11 HLA Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
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longer a plausible philosophical foundation for moral theory, nor a motivation for 
moral action for many individuals.
19  
 
Arendt rejects thinking about morality in terms of obligations because she claims 
that one set of obligations can easily be exchanged for another.  This is how she 
interprets the collapse of morality in Nazi Germany.  She came to this conclusion 
in witnessing Eichmann’s trial.  She writes of this revelation:  
 
It was as though morality, at the very moment of its total collapse within 
an old and highly civilized nation, stood revealed in the original meaning 
of the word, as a set of mores, of customs and manners, which could be 
exchanged for another set with no more trouble than it would take to 
change the table manners of a whole people.
20   
 
Persons who hold fast to moral principles are not really to be trusted, according 
to Arendt, because they accept rules that are given to them; it is ‘the doubters and 
the skeptics’ who will constantly ask themselves whether they can live with what 
they are doing.
21  Arendt was galvanized in this opinion by the fact that after the 
fall of the Third Reich there was a ‘return to “normality”’ – ‘this must reinforce 
our doubts’ because the collapse of moral norms was witnessed twice.
22  
 
Arendt’s  account  of  moral  responsibility  poses  many  problems.
23    Peter 
Steinberger considers it nihilistic, creating ‘a certain kind of intellectual anarchy’ 
by  undermining  our  categories  of  coherence  and  knowledge.
24   Whatever  the 
validity or otherwise of Arendt’s position on moral responsibility, we need to 
understand it to consider her position on political responsibility.  
 
Arendt  is  arguing  that  moral  responsibility  is  not  the  definitive  kind  of 
responsibility that we often take it to be.  She is challenging Feinberg’s hierarchy 
of  responsibility:  moral  responsibility,  legal  responsibility,  customs  and  mores.  
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For Arendt, moral responsibility is not necessarily the highest form.  In her view, 
it is a matter of conscience, and those in possession of a conscience will act 
according to it.
25  
 
Arendt argues that there is another kind of responsibility that has been largely 
neglected in modern political philosophy – “political responsibility”.  This is a 
responsibility for the “world”.  For Arendt, ‘In the centre of moral considerations 
of human conduct stands the self; in the centre of political considerations of 
conduct stands the world.’
26   
 
The  “world”  means  something  specific  to  Arendt;  it  constitutes  the  humanly 
constructed public sphere, which makes political action possible; as opposed to 
the earth which is the realm of survival and necessity.  Only in the world can 
individuals  make  their  particular  views  known  through  speech,  and  realize 
themselves through political action, and humans can work collectively to create 
new  political  beginnings.    Arendt  likens  the  world  to  a  table  –  it  separates 
individuals from each other, yet allows them to communicate about common 
themes and to consider common concerns from each other’s point of view.
27  The 
world precedes our birth and outlasts our death.
28  It must be maintained in order 
that a space in which individuals can communicate continues to exist: 
 
Only  the  existence  of  a  public  realm  and  the  world’s  subsequent 
transformation into a community of things which gathers men together 
and relates them to each other depends entirely on permanence.  If the 
world is to contain a public space, it cannot be erected for one generation 
and planned for the living only; it must transcend the life-span of mortal 
men.
29   
 
What  Arendt  hoped  to  encourage  by  identifying  the  concept  of  political 
responsibility, was that all individuals would take up their responsibility for the 
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construction and maintenance of the world.  The end of the world is when the 
common world is seen from one perspective, which presents itself as the only 
perspective.
30    Many  people  in  Nazi  Germany  abdicated  their  political 
responsibility, allowing the evil of totalitarianism to take its place: dictators put 
their faith in absolutist ideologies that preached the inevitable outcomes of human 
history, people like Eichmann reduced themselves to ‘cogs in the machine’ who 
existed to obey orders, and, more controversially, ‘unpolitical Jews’ failed to rise 
up  and  fight  the  destruction  of  the  world  which  would  have  allowed  their 
viewpoints to be heard.
31  
 
As Andrew Schaap argues, the Arendtian world is a ‘contingent achievement that 
must be continually resought through partaking in the public business of judging, 
arguing and persuading over the significance of public events.’
32  Arendt’s political 
responsibility ‘involves “calling something into being which did not exist before,” 
that  is,  constituting  the  ends  of  the  new  political  community  through 
spontaneously responding to the world.’
33   
 
Political  responsibility  is  distinct  from  legal  responsibility,  because  legal 
responsibility entails obeying the law, regardless of whether the law is justifiable.  
Political  responsibility  enjoins  individuals  to  remain  vigilant  as  to  the  political 
system  under  which  they  live,  and  to  ensure  that  the  public/political/plural 
human world is maintained or reconstituted.  Civil disobedience, breaking the law, 
or revolution, may be the politically responsible thing to do when the human world is 
threatened.   
 
For  Arendt,  legal  and  moral  responsibility  attribute  “guilt”  to  individuals  for 
particular events and are judged according to the law or the self respectively; 
political “responsibility” is collective and is judged in relation to the world.  The 
aim of conceptualizing political responsibility is to find a form of responsibility 
that does not imply guilt but does imply some sort of responsibility for the world.  
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As Lilian Alweiss argues, Arendt ‘shows us why it is not incoherent to argue that 
our responsibility exceeds our own deeds and extends to events that have been 
neither intended nor necessarily caused by us.’
34  The aim is not to let ordinary 
individuals off the hook, but instead to more accurately determine the kind of 
responsibility  they  have.    Their  responsibility  is  not  legal  or  moral,  but  it  is 
political.  
 
2.1.2  Young’s Critique 
 
Young has a different question in mind.  Arendt sought to theorise responsibility 
for the past crimes of the Holocaust.  Young’s question is ‘how shall moral agents 
think  about  our  responsibility  in  relation  to  structural  social  injustice?’
35   She 
writes of Arendt’s distinction: 
 
I think that Arendt’s effort to distinguish guilt from political responsibility 
is important and, with several refinements, can contribute to an answer to 
my starting question.  I find highly unsatisfying, however, the meaning she 
gives to political responsibility.
36 
 
Young identifies two problems with Arendt’s conception of political responsibility 
– it is tied to citizenship and it is backward-looking.  Young’s criticisms highlight 
the direction in which she wants to take the concept of political responsibility, but 
they raise challenges for the concept that she is not aware of; Arendt has her 
reasons  for  conceptualising  political  responsibility  in  this  way  that  Young  too 
easily discounts.  For now, I merely raise these problems and seek to resolve them 
in  other  chapters.    I  also  raise  one  further  problem  with  adopting  Arendt’s 
distinction that Young does not raise herself; that Arendt’s conception of political 
responsibility is amoral.   
 
The  first  problem  that  Young  identifies  is  that  Arendt  ties  the  conception  to 
membership of a political community.  Young writes, ‘It is a mystification to say 
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that people bear responsibility simply because they are members of a political 
community, and not because of anything at all that they have done or not done.’
37 
 
Young  points  out  that  Arendt  is  inconsistent  on  this  point.    In  Eichmann  in 
Jerusalem, Arendt attributes political responsibility for the Holocaust not only to 
Germans, but also to the actions of supportive nation-states, to foreign nationals 
who facilitated deportations, and persons or groups who funded the Nazis or 
were sympathetic to their aims.
38  Thus Young thinks that political responsibility 
‘derives from something more specific and more active than mere membership.’
39  
She writes that, ‘On this interpretation, political responsibility entails doing things 
(and perhaps not doing things), but doing things that indirectly contribute to the 
enactment of crimes or wrongs.’
40  
 
Arendt,  however,  has  good  reasons  for  tying  political  responsibility  to 
membership of a political community.  Political responsibility, for Arendt, is a 
responsibility to maintain the “world”.  The world is something that citizens have 
in  common  –  it  is  the  public  sphere  which  allows  them  to  voice  their  plural 
perspectives  on  common  affairs  and  provides  a  space  for  enacting  new 
beginnings.  An individual can avoid legal and moral responsibility, but political 
responsibility  is  unavoidable.    The  only  way  in  which  we  can  avoid  political 
responsibility  is  to  leave  a  political  community.
41   But  for  Arendt,  leaving  a 
political community means no longer being able to participate in a public sphere, 
thus engaging in political action and realizing oneself as an individual.  Refugees 
and stateless people are the only persons who can avoid political responsibility, 
but  this  ‘innocence’  is  completely  undesirable:  ‘it  is  precisely  this  absolute 
innocence that condemns them to a position outside, as it were, of mankind as a 
whole.’
42  Tying political responsibility to membership is consistent with Arendt’s 
conception of political action in the world. 
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In transitioning from the Arendtian conception of political responsibility, which is 
tied to a conception of the “world”, Young needs to provide a new grounding for 
political  responsibility.    She  argues  that  political  responsibility  is  grounded  in 
“connection” to structural injustice.  But Young never gives a clear definition of 
connection.  She vacillates between the terms “participation”, “contribution” and 
“causation” as the relevant form of connection to unjust structures.  In Chapter 7, 
I take up this problem. 
 
The  second  issue  Young  has  with  the  Arendtian  conception  of  political 
responsibility is that it is “backward-looking”.  She writes, ‘In Arendt’s discussion, 
political responsibility seems to be a concept just as backward-looking as guilt.  
Her primary case is the Nazi Holocaust, whose events are in the past.’
43  Young 
wants to conceptualise political responsibility as “forward-looking”, in contrast to 
legal and moral responsibility which are backward-looking.  She writes, ‘One has 
the responsibility always now, in relation to current events and in relation to their 
future consequences.’
44 
 
Arendt was asking what responsibility ordinary Germans bore for the Holocaust, 
so she was necessarily considering responsibility for the past.  However, as I have 
argued, Arendt’s political responsibility is an on-going responsibility for the world 
and entails the constitution of a new world should the current world be under 
threat or corrupted.  Thus, Arendt’s conception, while founded in concern with 
responsibility for the past, is on-going and forward-looking.  Moreover, if we were 
to look back on the contemporary world in fifty years time, would we not say that 
people now had a political responsibility for contemporary structural injustice?  It 
is not contradictory to say that people bore political responsibility in the past, and 
claim that the orientation of that political responsibility ought to be the present 
and future.  This criticism, then, falls short. 
 
Arendt’s conception of political responsibility is embedded in her overall, very 
particular and idiosyncratic, philosophical project.  As Margaret Canovan points 
out, despite the fact that Arendt was against systematic thinking about politics, her 
political thought displays a remarkable consistency and internal coherence – it is 
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‘an elaborate spider’s web of concepts’ – and it is difficult to understand one 
concept without relating it to the rest.
45  And there is one particular aspect of 
Arendt’s distinction between moral and political responsibility that Young has 
failed to engage with, but which poses serious problems for her own use of it. 
 
Political  responsibility  is  sharply  distinguished  from  moral  responsibility  in 
Arendtian thought.  The morally responsible person will not do wrong, but the 
politically responsible person might have to.  Arendt often quotes Machiavelli 
who enjoined the Florentine Prince to learn “how not to be good” – to place the 
city’s needs above his own clean conscience.  She writes: 
 
The  political  answer  to  the  Socratic  proposition  would  be:  What  is 
important in the world is that there be no wrong; suffering wrong and 
doing wrong are equally bad.  Never mind who suffers it; your duty is to 
prevent it.
46 
 
Morality has no place in politics because the self is irrelevant, what matters is the 
world.  The morally responsible person may have to set aside their conscience in 
order to protect the world.  Moreover, permitting morality, in the form of moral 
emotions, into the political sphere is dangerous.  Arendt attributes the terror after 
the French revolution to the entrance of “pity”, a non-political emotion, into the 
public sphere.
47  As Lawrence Biskowski writes, ‘When our actions are inspired by 
pity or some other emotion, we begin to lose our bearings, precisely because such 
emotions take no account of, and are harmful to, the “in-between” that separates 
and relates human beings.’
48  The compassion or pity felt for others’ suffering 
pushes individuals to act directly on their emotions, rather than to discuss it and 
come to a political solution with others.
49 
 
Arendt  recognised  that  there  are  ‘extreme  situations’  in  which  political 
responsibility cannot be taken up.
50  This is because, ‘political responsibility always 
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presupposes  at  least  a  minimum  of  political  power.    Impotence  or  complete 
powerlessness is, I think, a valid excuse.’
51  In this state of emergency, morality is 
finally admitted into politics.  When action in the world is no longer possible, the 
self becomes the final reference point for political thinking and judgment.
52  The 
moral person retreats from the public sphere and no longer participates in public 
life, if participation entails committing acts which their conscience will not permit 
them to do.
53   
 
This sharp Machiavellian distinction between the moral and the political has been 
heavily criticised.
54  But the point is that within Arendtian thought, the distinction 
is  crucial.    Morality  is  self-regarding  and  political  responsibility  relates  to  the 
world.  Young, on the other hand, does not want to make such a distinction.  
Young’s starting question was how we, as ‘moral agents’, should conceptualise our 
responsibilities for justice, not how we as ‘political agents’ ought to relate to the 
world.   
 
Young explicitly cautions against a self-regarding interpretation of morality.  She 
argues that ordinary individuals who admit that they are to blame for their role in 
perpetuating injustice ‘become more focused on themselves, their past actions, the 
state  of  their  souls  and  their  character,  than  on  the  structures  that  require 
change.’
55   This  ‘self-indulgence’  is  a  distraction  from  the  real  task  of  getting 
involved in collective political action for change.
56  
 
Morality, for Young, concerns others.  She writes,  
 
a responsible person tries to deliberate about options before acting, makes 
choices that seem to be the best for all affected, and worries about how 
the consequences of his or her action may adversely affect others.
57 
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Arendt can make a sharp distinction between moral and political responsibility, 
but Young cannot help herself to such a conclusion.  Both moral and political 
responsibility are other-regarding in Young’s thought.  She needs an explanation, 
then, as to why political responsibility is not simply a form of moral responsibility.  
Young  hinges  this  distinction  on  the  backward-lookingness  of  moral 
responsibility  compared  to  the  forward-lookingness  of  political  responsibility.  
This  way  of  framing  the  distinction,  however,  is  questionable;  there  can  be 
forward-looking varieties of moral responsibility, as we shall see.  
 
Arendt  has  a  clear  explanation  of  the  distinction  between  moral  and  political 
responsibility; the latter is necessarily tied to political community – the world – 
and is amoral.  In divorcing political responsibility from the Arendtian world, 
Young loses the grounding of the concept.  In moralising political responsibility, 
she loses its sharp distinction from moral responsibility.  There is considerable 
work  to  do,  then,  in  developing  the  Youngian  conception  of  political 
responsibility.  In the following sections I explain how Young herself understands 
the distinction. 
 
2.2  The Liability Model 
 
Young’s  distinction  between  the  “liability  model”  and  the  “social  connection 
model” is inspired by Arendt’s distinction between legal and moral responsibility, 
which imply guilt, and political responsibility, which is collective.  Young sets up 
the liability model as the standard way in which we conceive of legal and moral 
responsibility, and the social connection model as something new, which we need 
to understand responsibility for structural injustice.  I think Young’s distinction is 
plausible but with significant revisions. 
 
Young argues that, ‘Practices of assigning responsibility in law and everyday moral 
life first try to locate “who dunnit”; for a person to be held responsible for a 
harm, we must be able to say that he or she caused it.’
58  She acknowledges that 
there  are  exceptions;  for  instance  Eichmann  was  more  blameworthy  than 
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individuals who directly caused harm to others, because he ordered and enabled 
the harm.
59  She claims, however, ‘This class of exceptions only proves the rule: it 
is necessary to connect a person’s deeds linearly to the harm for which we seek to 
assign responsibility.’
60 
 
Young claims that this model is inadequate to discuss responsibility for structural 
injustice because we cannot identify all the contributors and how much they have 
contributed.
61   Individuals’  or  groups’  activities  do  not  contribute  directly  to 
structural injustice, ‘but rather indirectly, collectively, and cumulatively.’
62  This 
necessitates a new understanding of responsibility. 
 
Is Young’s characterisation of the liability model correct, however?  In this section 
I suggest that grouping together legal and moral responsibility under the “liability 
model”  is  plausible  to  a  certain  extent,  but  that  not  all  forms  of  moral 
responsibility will fit in this model. 
 
I look, firstly, at legal responsibility.  Young argues that a person can be held 
legally responsible when a) their conduct has been faulty, b) the agent is causally 
connected  to  the  harm  and  c)  their  actions  were  voluntary  with  adequate 
knowledge of the situation.
63  This description coheres well with the concept of 
criminal responsibility.  It is a necessary condition for a criminal offence for there 
to have been fault.
64  Legal fault implies either that the individual failed to comply 
with a specified standard of conduct (negligence) or they did so with a certain 
state of mind (criminal responsibility).
 65   
 
This assumes that the accused has certain capacities.  For an individual to be held 
criminally responsible, they must meet the conditions for achieving “mens rea” in 
the case of intentional acts, or for meeting the “reasonable person” test in the 
case of negligence.  This capacity can be reduced in several ways.  Firstly, the 
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defendant must have ‘certain normal capacities,’ including reasoning, control of 
conduct and the ability to understand legal and moral rules.
66  Thus mental illness 
can ground claims of “diminished responsibility” and certain types of persons are 
excluded  from  criminal  responsibility  altogether,  such  as  children.    Secondly, 
responsibility  can  be  mitigated  due  to  “abnormality  of  mind”;  circumstantial 
factors such as emotional stress, financial pressure or addiction, ‘are thought to 
impair rational judgment and to affect self-control’.
67 Thirdly, unconsciousness or 
failure  of  muscular  control  can  render  a  person  incapable  of  meeting  the 
conditions for criminal responsibility.
68  
 
This link between capacity, blame and punishment underlies UK criminal law.
69  If 
a person does not have the relevant capacities, they cannot be punished.  The 
standards  are  high  because  a)  the  sanctions  are  serious  and  b)  a  criminal 
conviction carries significant social stigma.
70   
 
However, there does not have to be a direct link between an individual’s actions, 
fault and capacity, in order for an individual to be held legally responsible. There 
is another concept of legal responsibility – liability – responsibility without, or 
regardless of, fault.  Peter Cane suggests that it is a common mistake among 
philosophers to ignore this aspect of legal responsibility, the reason being that 
they  take  an  agent-focused  approach  to  thinking  about  responsibility.
71   In 
criminal law, the focus is on the agent – their acts or omissions and their state of 
mind.  In civil law, however, where the concept of liability is the core form of 
responsibility invoked, the focus is on both the agent who is liable and on the 
victims. 
 
The difference between criminal and civil law is that criminal law seeks to punish 
an agent for wrongdoings, whereas civil law focuses on achieving redress for the 
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victims.
72   So  where  criminal  law  placed  the  emphasis  on  “fault”,  civil  law  is 
interested in harm done whether or not there was fault.  Fault functions in civil 
law to determine the scope of the remedies, but does not determine whether or 
not remedies are justified.
73  The purpose of civil law is to protect individuals’ 
rights and to compensate for rights-infringements.
74 
 
Liability to pay damages in civil cases generally hinges on either negligence or 
strict liability.
75  The person liable to pay for the harm could be the person who 
caused the harm, even if they intended no wrongdoing in the case of negligence 
or recklessness.  Or liability can attach to a person or group that is legally liable 
for the harms done even if they didn’t commit them – this is strict liability.  Under 
strict liability laws, individuals can be held legally responsible for the activities of 
other human agents (employers’ bearing responsibility for an employee’s actions); 
the  actions  of  animals  (e.g.  a  dangerous  dog);  inanimate  objects  (a  building 
collapsing); or processes (fire).
76   
 
Some  legal  theorists  argue  that  the  difference  between  moral  and  legal 
responsibility hinges on liability.  Legal liability does not require fault; liability can 
be  strict.
77   But,  some  argue  that  moral  responsibility  depends  upon  fault.  
Consider Feinberg’s argument that Arendt drew on: ‘even when it is reasonable to 
separate liability from fault, it is only the liability that can be passed from one 
party to another.  In particular, there can be no such thing as vicarious guilt.’
78  Liability 
to pay for a harm can be transferable, but guilt implies culpability or blame and is 
inherently non-transferable.
79   
 
H.L.A. Hart argues that moral responsibility is narrower than legal responsibility, 
because in law a person can be held responsible for things they did by accident 
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(negligence) or that other persons connected to them had done (strict liability).
80   
Holding  individuals  morally  blameworthy  in  these  instances,  ‘for  doing  things 
which they could not have avoided doing, or for the things done by others over 
whom they had no control, conflicts with too many of the central features of the 
idea of morality.’
81   
 
On  this  view,  blame  is  integral  to  moral  responsibility,  but  not  to  legal 
responsibility.  To be held morally responsible the agent must be blameworthy – the 
agent  must  have  done  something  wrong.    As  with  legal  responsibility,  moral 
responsibility  is  also  intrinsically  linked  to  the  question  of  capacity.    As  Hart 
points  out,  the  debate  about  the  compatibility  of  moral  responsibility  and 
determinism points to the core of this problem: it asks whether the capacities that 
human beings are assumed to have in order to control their conduct would still 
exist and, thus, whether we could still blame them for their actions.
82   
 
Peter Strawson highlights the importance of capacity in the “reactive attitudes” we 
have towards others when we think they have done something morally wrong (or 
right).  There are two sets of cases in which resentment towards the wrongdoer 
could  be  mitigated  or  dissolved.    In  the  first  instance,  if  a  person  had  no 
alternative – “He couldn’t help it” because he didn’t know or had to do it – then 
we continue to see the agent as someone capable of being responsible for harm, 
but in this situation blame would be inappropriate, and the agent is excused.
83  In 
the second case, the agent either was “not himself” for some reason, which is 
similar to the “abnormality of mind” criteria in legal responsibility; or the agent is 
“morally undeveloped” due to mental illness or because they are a child.
84  In 
these cases the individual is exempt from moral responsibility.  In both cases, it is 
argued  that  the  agent  has  not  actually  done  something  wrong,  they  are  not 
blameworthy, because they did not have the capacity at that moment in time to 
make  a  moral  decision  (excuse)  or  they  do  not  have  that  capacity  in  general 
(exemption). 
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Young accepts the blameworthiness criterion for moral responsibility.  She writes, 
 
To say that an agent is responsible means that they are blameworthy for 
an  act  or  its  outcome.    The  conditions  for  holding  an  agent  morally 
responsible are similar to those of legal responsibility: we must be able to 
show that they are causally connected to the harm in question and that 
they  acted  voluntarily  and  with  sufficient  knowledge  of  the 
consequences.
85 
 
For Young, the difference between moral and legal responsibility, then, is the 
requirement  of  blameworthiness.    Young  also  acknowledges  that  there  are 
different  kinds  of  legal  responsibility,  including  culpable  negligence  and  strict 
liability.
86  Despite the differences, she groups all of these kinds of responsibility 
under the liability model.  She writes, 
 
Under what I call the liability model of responsibility, I include all such 
practices of assigning responsibility under the law and in moral judgment 
that  seek  to  identify  liable  parties  for  the  purposes  of  sanctioning, 
punishing, or exacting compensation or redress.  Despite their differences, 
these  practices  share  an  interest  in  identifying  particular  agents  as  the 
liable ones and are generally backward-looking in their purpose.
87 
 
For Young, moral and legal responsibility are backward-looking and isolating.
88  Legal 
responsibility is attributed to individuals for something that has happened and for 
which they personally bear responsibility, regardless of whether a person is being 
held  criminally  responsible  or  liable.
89   Moral  responsibility  applies  to  what  a 
particular person has or has not done in the past, and the action or omission is 
blameworthy.  In both cases, a capacity condition must be met.  In law, a person 
must have certain capacities, which mean that they achieve the legal status of 
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being  a  person.
90   In  morality,  a  person  must  meet  the  standard  of  being 
blameworthy, which again will depend upon the individual’s capacities and the 
circumstances  in  which  they  acted.    In  short,  the  core  concept  underlying 
conceptions of legal and moral responsibility is personal responsibility.
91  The aim is 
to  isolate  an  agent  and  to  attribute  to  that  agent  fault,  liability  or  blame  for 
something that has already occurred.  
 
For  Young,  the  significance  of  this  is  that  other  questions  pertaining  to 
responsibility, such as assessing the role of background conditions in which the 
harm occurred, or making future changes, are of secondary relevance.
92  For this 
reason,  she  thinks  that  we  need  the  “social  connection  model”  to  deal  with 
background conditions and forward-looking responsibility for their improvement.   
 
I think Young is correct in arguing that legal and moral responsibility are isolating.  
As she points out, there is good reason for this; ‘A concept of responsibility as 
guilt, blame, or liability is indispensible for a legal system and for a sense of moral 
right that respects agents as individuals and expects them to behave in respectful 
ways toward others.’
93  Arendt highlighted the importance of individualising guilt; 
the trial of Eichmann, she argues, ‘transformed the cog… into a man.’
94 
 
The idea that all forms of legal and moral responsibility are backward-looking, 
however, is more problematic.  It is a more fitting description of legal than moral 
responsibility.  The law has a forward-looking element – deterrence.
95  However, 
the primary purpose of legal responsibility is to attribute fault or liability for past 
actions.    As  Cane  argues,  the  law  generates  some  prospective  responsibilities, 
however, ‘the concern with historic responsibility is ineradicably built into the 
substance and structure of the common law; and so there is a limit to the extent 
to which legal liability rules can be used to achieve forward-looking goals.’
96   
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If  we  understand  moral  responsibility  to  mean  direct  causation  of  harm  with 
intent and knowledge, then the assumption is that the harm has already occurred.  
As George Sher argues, blaming an individual refers to a wish that, ‘the person not 
have done what he in fact did.’
97  However, not all forms of moral responsibility are 
backward-looking in this sense.  Parental responsibility towards children is an on-
going moral responsibility.  Our moral responsibilities for future generations are 
future-oriented.  These examples suggest that it is too quick to lump together 
moral responsibility with legal responsibility in the catchall idea of the liability 
model.    Moreover,  as  I  suggested  in  the  previous  section,  Youngian  political 
responsibility is a moralised form of responsibility; it is not the amoral political 
responsibility advocated by Arendt.  So it is not clear that she needs to exclude all 
forms of moral responsibility in formulating the social connection model; indeed 
the relationship between moral responsibility and the social connection model 
needs to be more clearly defined. 
 
In the next chapter I frame the distinction differently to Young.  I argue that there 
are  two  concepts  of  moral  responsibility  in  Young’s  work:  relational  moral 
responsibility  (the  appropriate  conditions  for  praise  and  blame)  and  moral 
responsibility as virtue (being a morally responsible person).  Relational moral 
responsibility is backward-looking, but moral responsibility as virtue is forward-
looking.  I suggest that political responsibility is a kind of moral responsibility as 
virtue.  I surmise, then, that the liability model does capture the essence of legal 
responsibility and relational moral responsibility, but that moral responsibility as 
virtue does not fall within the scope of the liability model. 
 
2.3  The Social Connection Model 
 
In  this  chapter,  I  have  shown  the  derivation  of  the  distinction  between 
responsibility and guilt.  Arendt sought to distinguish between the perpetrators of 
Nazi crimes and citizens who had a responsibility to maintain the world.  Young 
wants  to  use  the  distinction  to  contrast  the  legal  and  moral  guilt  of  isolated 
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individuals  for  backward-looking  wrongdoings;  in  comparison  to  the  non-
blameworthy responsibility individuals have for structural injustice. 
 
As we have seen, Young does not fully endorse the Arendtian distinction.  She 
divorces  political  responsibility  from  membership  of  a  political  community, 
emphasises  that  it  is  a  forward-looking  responsibility,  and  rejects  amorality  in 
politics.  She also conceptualises the social connection model in relation to the 
limitations  of  the  liability  model.    In  this  section,  I  outline  Young’s  positive 
understanding of the social connection model.   
 
I begin with a description of the distinction between “responsibility” and “duty”.  
Young  argues  that  responsibility  is  discretionary;  it  does  not  specify  particular 
actions.
98   Young  argues  that  there  are  four  further  features  of  the  social 
connection model: it is a shared responsibility, it can only be discharged through 
collective action, it is forward-looking and is a responsibility for background conditions.
99  I 
outline and problematize each aspect of the model. 
 
a)  Responsibility not duty 
 
Young uses the term political responsibility for a specific purpose.  She wants to 
distinguish “responsibility” from “duty”.  A duty requires that agents fulfil specific 
requirements, whereas responsibility is discretionary.  Young writes, ‘It is up to the 
agents who have a responsibility to decide what to do to discharge it within the 
limits of other moral considerations.’
100  In the contemporary world, if individuals 
had  duties  in  relation  to  all  unjust  structural  processes  to  which  they  were 
connected,  this  would  be  overwhelming.
101   Arguing  that  individuals  bear 
responsibility for structural injustice allows flexibility.  This distinction is not widely 
adopted in political theory; however, Young draws on several theorists who use it 
– Joel Feinberg, Robert Goodin and Henry Richardson.  
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The distinction first appeared in Joel Feinberg’s 1966 essay “Duties, Rights, and 
Claims,” where he argues ‘we should take care’ to distinguish responsibility from 
duty.
102 
 
A responsibility, like a duty, is both a burden and a liability; but unlike a 
duty it carries considerable discretion (sometimes called “authority”) along 
with it.  A goal is assigned and the means of achieving it are left to the 
independent judgment of the responsible party.
103 
 
H.L.A. Hart argues that responsibilities are tied to roles, which can be formally or 
informally  assigned:  ‘‘role’  in  my  classification  is  extended  to  include  a  task 
assigned to any person by agreement or otherwise.’
104  Within a role, an individual 
will have both duties and responsibilities, but these are distinct: 
 
what  distinguishes  those  duties  of  a  role  which  are  singled  out  as 
responsibilities is that they are duties of a relatively complex or extensive 
kind, defining a ‘sphere of responsibility’ requiring care and attention over 
a protracted period of time, while short-lived duties of a very simple kind, 
to do or not to do some specific act on a particular occasion, are not 
termed responsibilities.
105 
 
Hart’s example is a soldier who is detailed to keep the camp clean for the general’s 
inspection – this is his ‘sphere of responsibility’.  If, however, he was asked to 
remove a piece of paper from the approaching general’s path, this would be a 
duty.
106 
 
Both  Feinberg  and  Hart  express  the  idea  that  fulfilling  a  responsibility  is 
obligatory  but  discretionary,  whereas  fulfilling  a  duty  is  obligatory  but  non-
discretionary.    Robert  Goodin  analyses  this  idea  in  more  detail.    Both  a 
responsibility and a duty imply that A (agent) ‘ought to see to it’ that X (some 
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state of affairs).
107  A duty makes a further specification: ‘A does or refrains from 
doing Φ’.
108 
 
In the case of a duty, A has to do or not do a specific act (Φ) in order that some 
state of affairs, X, obtains.  In the case of a responsibility, A can use various 
means  so  long  as  they  see  to  it  that  X  occurs;  the  relevant  actions  are  not 
specified.  Both  responsibilities  and  duties  constrain  the  agent,  but  the  key 
difference is that responsibility is discretionary.
109  Goodin uses the example of the 
responsibility to feed the dog.  I can give the dog whatever food is available in the 
cupboards, or I can delegate the task to a child or neighbour; either way I am 
seeing to it that the dog is fed, thus fulfilling my responsibility.   
 
Furthermore, when it comes to responsibilities, the emphasis is on ‘the outcome 
and not the activity producing it.’
110  Goodin claims that, ‘Responsibilities are to 
consequentialist  ethics  what  duties  are  to  deontological  ones.    Duties  dictate 
actions.    Responsibilities  dictate  results.’
111   The  deontological  concept  of 
imperfect duties (as opposed to perfect duties) might imply a degree of discretion, 
which could render it indistinguishable from the concept of responsibility outlined 
here.  However, the emphasis is still on the agent and whether or not the agent 
fulfils their duty.  Goodin argues that in the case of duties, ‘A must Φ or refrain 
from Φing consciously, intentionally and purposively in order to have truly done 
his duty.’
112  The focus is on character.
113  When talking about responsibilities, the 
emphasis is on the outcome.  So long as the relevant outcome obtains, the agent 
can still be said to have fulfilled that responsibility, even if they have delegated 
tasks to others.  By contrast, if an agent passes a duty to another agent, then they 
as an individual have failed to fulfil that duty.   
 
Young takes up each of the ideas discussed so far.  She claims that she has role 
responsibility  in  mind  for  her  conception  of  political  responsibility,  with  its 
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emphasis  on  discretion.
114   She  argues  that  ‘responsibilities  carry  considerable 
discretion; one must carry out one’s responsibilities, but how one does so is a 
matter of judgment according to what the responsibilities are for, the capabilities 
of  agents,  and  the  content  of  action’.
115   She  also  emphasises  outcomes.    For 
Young, role responsibilities imply ‘carrying out activities in a morally appropriate 
way and seeing to it that certain outcomes obtain.’
116  On the social connection 
model  of  responsibility  we  are  concerned  with  the  consequences  of  overcoming 
structural  injustice.    An  agent’s  state  of  mind  when  enacting  their  political 
responsibility is not important.  The specific acts that an agent does to contribute 
to  overcoming  structural  injustice  are  also  not  particularly  important.    What 
matters is achieving the goals, and the means are variable and contestable.  
 
Goodin  identifies  further  differences  between  responsibilities  and  duties.    He 
argues that ‘the discharge of a duty is a binary variable, whereas the discharge of a 
responsibility is a scalar one.’
117  If a duty involves doing or not doing a specific 
act, then A either does what is required or not: ‘there is simply no scope for saying 
that A could ever have “more-or-less” discharged his duty.’
118  By contrast, if A 
achieves results similar to those specified, ‘Then he can be said to have discharged 
his  responsibility  more  or  less  completely,  depending  on  the  extent  of  the 
similarity between the results produced and those mandated.’
119  Goodin accounts 
for  this  difference  by  arguing  that  in  consequentialist  ethics  outcomes  can  be 
substitutable, whereas from a deontological perspective there is no substitute for 
fulfilling one’s duty.
120  
 
Furthermore, some responsibilities can be fully discharged, while others are not 
fixed.  The dog example is a ‘fixed-target responsibility’; it discharged fully when 
the dog is fed.
121  Other responsibilities are ‘receding-target responsibilities’; A 
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ought to see to it that X, where X is an ideal situation, which may not be fully 
attainable but can be approximated.
122  Goodin writes, 
 
Were responsibilities all-or-nothing propositions like duties, it would make 
no sense to enjoin the impossible.  But since responsibilities admit of 
more  or  less  complete  fulfilment,  it  makes  perfectly  good  sense  to 
describe our responsibilities by reference to some impossible ideal, and 
then to ask not whether A has discharged his responsibilities but rather to 
what extent he has done so.
123 
 
For Goodin, then, responsibilities are scalar and potentially unfulfillable.  This 
applies  to  Young’s  conception  of  political  responsibility  because  political 
responsibility is scalar – it can be fulfilled to a greater or lesser extent.  Ending 
structural injustice is a receding-target responsibility – it may not be fully achievable but 
we can aim towards its realisation.    
 
Goodin  argues  further  that  not  only  can  individuals  fulfil  responsibilities  to 
varying degrees, but individuals have responsibilities to different degrees.  Within a 
group it is common for individuals to share responsibility differentially: ‘There are 
ordinarily some people who are thought to bear rather more responsibility, and 
others  who  are  thought  to  bear  rather  less,  for  one  and  the  same  state  of 
affairs.’
124 
 
Goodin uses the example of a terrorist plot to bomb a shop.  Different agents in 
this  enterprise  have  different  tasks.
125   The  significance  of  an  ex-ante  task  will 
determine the degree of that individual’s ex-post responsibility.  For example, a 
decoy played a relatively inconsequential role in the attack; if the decoy failed to 
show up the operation would not have been severely affected.  The person who 
masterminded the plot, however, is more responsible, because without them the 
attack would not have occurred.
126  According to Goodin, we need a conception 
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of  ‘task-responsibility’  to  make  these  fine-grained  ex-post  responsibility 
assignments.   
 
On the social connection model of responsibility we are able to make these fine-
grained distinctions.  Young argues that the degree of an individual’s political 
responsibility will ‘derive in large measure from the social positions agents occupy 
in relation to one another within the structural processes they are trying to change 
in order to make them less unjust.’
127  Because individuals are situated in different 
positions  in  relation  to  structural  outcomes,  this  affords  them  ‘different 
opportunities and capacities for influencing those outcomes.’
128  Individuals have 
political responsibility in varying degrees depending on their position within social 
structures.  
 
Goodin is talking about responsibility for past events.  Young, on the other hand, 
is  thinking  in  terms  of  forward-looking  responsibility.    She  thinks  Goodin’s 
concept of task-responsibility is helpful in this respect: 
 
A concept of task responsibility highlights the fact that many people share 
responsibility for producing acceptable outcomes.  There is thus a division 
of  labour  in  political  responsibility;  each  of  us  must  look  to  our  own 
institutional positions, skills and capacities, and the other responsibilities 
that come to us, to assess our tasks that will most effectively coordinate 
with others to help bring about more just outcomes.
129 
 
Henry Richardson develops the concept of ‘forward-looking responsibility’.  He 
claims it is commonly used in everyday parlance.  If, for example, he says he will 
watch his nieces while they swim, he is ‘taking on’ a forward-looking responsibility 
for the care of his nieces.
130 
 
Richardson argues that thinking about responsibility in a prospective sense adds 
two elements to the concept: ‘first, orientation to a specific range of concerns (the 
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basic welfare, safety, and health of the children); and, second, an authorization of 
some kind to depart from stated rules in order to serve those concerns.’
131  For 
example, a babysitter has a specific range of concerns – to look after the children’s 
welfare for the evening – but this does not include the parent’s more extensive 
responsibilities in cultivating the child’s talents.  The parents ask the babysitter to 
ensure  the  children  stay  indoors.    Say,  however,  there  is  a  fire;  in  these 
circumstances  the  babysitter  will  have  to  break  the  rules.    The  person  with 
forward-looking responsibility for care of the children is authorized to change the 
terms of their responsibilities should the circumstances require it.  Richardson 
writes, 
 
The language of responsibility, here, is not a lazy shorthand that could be 
replaced  by  a  fuller  spelling  out  of  duties.    Because  the  future  always 
surprises  us,  and  because  concerns  and  rules  end  up  clashing  and 
harmonizing in ever-novel ways, it can be appropriate for the individual 
agent to revise his or her understanding of the pre-existing rules relevant 
to his or her responsibility.
132   
   
By focusing on forward-looking responsibilities, Richardson takes the concept a 
step  further  than  Goodin.    Because  the  future  is  unknown  the  “responsible” 
person may have to revise commonly held rules in certain circumstances.  If I tell 
the babysitter never to take the children outside, if there is a fire, the responsible 
babysitter would take them outside.  This goes beyond making sure one sees to it 
that X, to being able to critically respond to circumstances.  Responsibility implies 
not merely navigating options within a range of alternatives to see to it that X, but 
to be prepared to change the rules of the game should circumstances significantly 
change.   
 
Young incorporates this idea into her conception of political responsibility.  She 
argues that forward-looking task-responsibilities should not derive from existing 
formally  designated  institutional  roles.
133   This  is  because  structural  injustice  is 
partly the outcome of the way institutions are designed, and because there are 
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tasks that may need to be filled that are not yet established.
134  Individuals have to 
take up their political responsibility creatively, creating new task-responsibilities, 
or revising existing ones, when necessary.  Politically responsible persons stay alert 
to changing circumstances and revise tasks accordingly. 
 
In sum, Young’s conception of political responsibility is discretionary, outcome-
oriented,  scalar,  forward-looking  and  revisable.    Individuals  acquire  political 
responsibility by virtue of connection to unjust social-structural processes and the 
degree of an individual’s political responsibility depends upon their social position 
within these processes.  Unlike laws and moral duties, political responsibility is not 
prescriptive.  Instead, it is an on-going role that individuals can ‘take up’; it implies 
a ‘sphere of responsibility’ within which individuals can use their discretion.   
 
The problem with leaving political responsibility so open is that individuals will be 
at  a  loss  as  to  how  to  discharge  it.    Young  introduces  her  “parameters  of 
reasoning” to help with this problem.  She argues that individuals can reason 
about the degree of their political responsibility, and how to act on it, depending 
on how much power, privilege, interest or collective ability they have in relation to 
structural injustice.
135   
 
In Chapter 4, I challenge these parameters of reasoning.  I argue that a certain 
kind of power – the power to change unjust structures – confers relational moral 
responsibility on agents who fail to use their power to promote justice; therefore, 
we can use the liability model to hold these agents to account.  I agree with 
Young,  however,  that  privilege,  interest  and  collective  ability  ought  to  be 
understood as parameters of reasoning about political responsibility.  One thing 
Young does specify about political responsibility, however, is that it can only be 
discharged through collective action.   
 
b)  Discharged Only Through Collective Action 
 
I suggested in the first section of this chapter, that Young faced a problem in 
distinguishing  political  from  moral  responsibility  in  the  sense  that  Arendt 
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separates the moral and political realms, but Young does not.  The sense in which 
political responsibility is political, for Young, is that it entails public collective action.  
 
Young argues, that our shared responsibility for overcoming structural injustice 
can only be discharged through collective action because, ‘No one of us can do 
this on our own.’
136  Being political by oneself is not very useful; only collective 
action can change unjust social-structural processes.  She continues:  
 
Thus we can come around to Arendt’s idea that this is a specifically political 
responsibility,  as  distinct  from  privately  moral  or  juridical.    Taking 
responsibility  for  structural  injustice  under  this  model  involves  joining 
with others to organize collective action to reform the structures.  Most 
fundamentally, what I mean by “politics” here is public communicative 
engagement with others for the sake of organizing our relationships and 
coordinating our actions most justly.
137 
 
Here we can see the strong Arendtian undertones in the concept.  Participants in 
unjust social-structural processes need to ‘constitute a public for debating proposals 
for  change  and  coordinating  their  implementation’.
138   The  point  of  political 
responsibility is to constitute a public-political sphere in which all individuals can 
argue their points of view about what needs to be done to promote justice and to 
act on it.   
 
For Arendt this ideally meant participating in a directly democratic republic.  But 
Young  takes  her  starting  point  as  the  contemporary  world.    In  this  context, 
political  responsibility  could  be  construed  as  the  responsibility  to  constitute, 
appear in and participate in civil society.  For Young, civil society is the sphere in 
which  citizens  actively  engage  in  processes  of  contestation  with  the  state  and 
economy, in order to hold the powerful actors in these spheres to account.
139  
 
Young  argues  that  in  the  global  sphere  where  there  are  no  states  to  regulate 
economic activity, civil society should be strengthened to perform this function, 
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until  such  times  as  there  is  a  stronger  global  regulatory  framework.
140   All 
participants in unjust social-structural processes share political responsibility for 
them,  and  they  must  ‘take  up’  this  political  responsibility  collectively  by 
constituting and maintaining global civil society in order to effectively promote 
change.   
 
Young thinks this is already happening.  She cites the global protests against the 
war in Iraq as demonstrating that there is now a ‘transnational public sphere’, that 
‘public  discourse  and  criticism  is  transnational’.
141   She  theorises  the  anti-
sweatshop movement whose successes include raising consumer awareness of the 
injustice,  producing  a  ‘sense  of  connection’  between  workers  in  developing 
countries and consumers in Western countries, and causing extensive reputational 
damage  to  particular  corporations.
142   The  anti-sweatshop  movement  is  an 
example  of  people  taking  up  their  political  responsibility  and  engaging  in 
collective action in transnational civil society in order to promote change in unjust 
global social-structural processes. 
 
Perhaps  Young  is  correct  that  political  responsibility  can  only  be  discharged 
effectively through collective action, but I suggest that it entails more than collective 
action.    As  Serena  Parekh  points  out,  political  responsibility  implies  that 
individuals do at least three things.
143  Firstly, learning about our role in structural 
injustice.  The second is to convince others that they share this responsibility.  
And the third is to act together because structural injustice can only be undone by 
collective action.  If this is correct, the first two steps are things that individuals 
have to do themselves: learning about their role in perpetuating structural injustice 
and engaging with others.  Persons who do these things, I would argue, are taking 
up their political responsibility, even if they do not engage in meaningful collective 
action.   
 
There may be barriers to collective action that are beyond individuals’ and groups’ 
control, and it would be unfair to therefore say they have not taken up their 
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political responsibility when they have done the preparatory work.  In this sense, I 
think we can lessen the claim that political responsibility can only be discharged 
through  collective  action,  to  the  claim  that  individuals  should  take  up  their 
political responsibility with a view to engaging in collective action.   
 
c)  Not-isolating/Shared 
 
Young considers the liability model to be “isolating”: it picks out specific agents 
and holds them blameworthy or liable in relation to specific wrongs.  There are 
two  reasons  why  Young  insists  that  the  social  connection  model  generates  a 
shared responsibility rather than an isolating responsibility.  The first reason is 
that isolating particular agents for censure has the effect of absolving all other 
parties in the processes.
144  This is unacceptable in relation to structural injustice, 
because it is the cumulative outcome of many agents’ actions; if we single out a 
few “guilty” parties, all these others will be let off the hook. 
 
Secondly, isolating particular guilty parties is impractical: we cannot isolate specific 
actions as contributing in quantifiable ways to cumulative harms.  She writes, ‘it is 
not possible for any of us to identify just what in our own actions results in which 
aspects of the injustice that particular individuals suffer.’
145   
 
For these reasons, Young argues that we should not seek to isolate individual 
wrongdoers and hold them liable for structural injustice, but rather accept that all 
participants  in  the  processes  share  the  responsibility.    She  describes  shared 
responsibility as follows: 
 
As I understand it, a shared responsibility is a responsibility I personally 
bear, but I do not bear it alone.  I bear it in the awareness that others bear 
it  with  me;  acknowledgement  of  my  responsibility  is  also 
acknowledgement of the inchoate collective of which I am a part, which 
together produces injustice.
146 
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Young  borrows  the  idea  of  shared  responsibility  from  Larry  May.    May  is 
interested in problems such as race hate crimes, and how the racist attitudes of the 
surrounding community create an enabling environment for such harm to occur.  
May  also  thinks  that  legal  and  moral  theory  focus  too  much  on  personal 
responsibility and neglect the ways in which others can share responsibility for 
wrongdoing, even if they have no control over the event.
147  May describes shared 
responsibility as follows, 
 
unlike full individual responsibility, shared responsibility calls attention to 
the way in which the actions or attitudes of a group of people resulted in a 
harm; that is, attention is focused on the way in which each of us interacts 
with others, rather than on the individual person as an isolated agent.
148 
 
Young argues, however, that she and May have a different focus.  May is looking 
at  backward-looking  crimes  and  how  the  surrounding  community  created  an 
enabling  environment.    Young  is  not  looking  at  past  harms,  but  on-going 
injustice,  where  there  may  not  be  any  identifiable  guilty  parties.    In  these 
circumstances,  the  liability  model  is  not  appropriate.    She  argues  that,  ‘May’s 
application of the idea of shared responsibility is more backward-looking than 
forward-looking.’
149  In the context of structural injustice, she argues that we need 
to accept shared responsibility for forward-looking change.   
 
While I agree with Young that a conception of shared responsibility is necessary 
to understand responsibility for structural injustice, I disagree that it ought to be 
given absolute priority.  Young argues elsewhere that the liability model and social 
connection  model  are  complementary.
150   In  Chapter  4,  I  argue  that  powerful 
agents  who  have  the  capacity  to  change  unjust  structures  should  be  held 
responsible on the liability model for failing to do so.  In the context of structural 
injustice, then, there is the possibility of isolating some guilty parties. 
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d)  Forward-looking 
 
Young rejects using the liability model in relation to structural injustice because it 
is backward-looking, which has four implications.  Young describes these as ‘more 
rhetorical and practical limitations than philosophical ones.’
151  Firstly, isolating 
particular agents for blame is unproductive, as this will lead to defensiveness.
152  This 
is particularly salient in relation to structural injustice because so many agents are 
implicated in the perpetuation of structural injustice blame is easily, and often 
legitimately, passed from one agent to another.
153  This “blame-switching” paralyses 
efforts to make progressive changes.
154  The blame game also divides agents when 
they need to be united in working together for change.
155  Finally, it oversimplifies 
the  causes  of  injustice,  which  are  multiple  and  complex;  rarely  can  we 
straightforwardly distinguish between the guilty and the innocent in relation to 
structural injustice.
156 
 
When Young claims that political responsibility is ‘forward-looking’, then, the idea 
is quite simple: we should focus on the future and making changes, rather than 
arguing about what went on in the past.  She is suggesting that the emphasis of 
political responsibility is the future.  We have many sophisticated accounts of 
backward-looking  responsibility,  but  this  needs  to  be  supplemented  with  a 
conception of responsibility that is future-orientated.  Young seeks to fill this gap 
with political responsibility.  
 
As important as this is, what Young is ignoring is the fact that there can be 
forward-looking  forms  of  moral  responsibility.    As  discussed  above, 
responsibilities can refer to on-going role responsibilities, which are present and 
future-oriented, and can be moral.  In the next chapter, I argue that there are two 
concepts  of  moral  responsibility:  relational  moral  responsibility,  which  is 
backward-looking, and moral responsibility as virtue, which is forward-looking.  I 
conceive of political responsibility as a form of moral responsibility as virtue.  
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Thus,  while  Young  aims  to  conceptualise  political  responsibility  as  forward-
looking, this does not necessarily distinguish it from moral responsibility.  It may 
distinguish  political  responsibility  from  the  “liability  model”;  but  the  liability 
model does not encompass all the varieties of moral responsibility. 
 
e)  Judging Background Conditions 
 
The  final  reason  Young  rejects  the  liability  model  in  favour  of  the  social 
connection model when thinking about responsibility for structural injustice, is 
that  the  liability  model  focuses  on  ‘specific  deviation  from  an  acceptable 
baseline.’
157  She writes, 
 
We  assume  a  normal  set  of  background  conditions  that  we  consider 
morally acceptable, if not ideal.  A crime or an actionable harm consists in 
a morally and often legally unacceptable deviation from this background 
structure.  We usually conceive the process that brought about the harm 
as a discrete, bounded event that breaks away from the ongoing normal 
flow.  Punishment, redress, or compensation aims to restore normality, or 
to “make whole,” in relation to the baseline circumstances.
158 
 
The  social  connection  model,  by  contrast,  ‘brings  into  question  precisely  the 
background conditions that ascriptions of blame or fault assume to be normal.’
159  
Individuals’  habitual  and  non-blameworthy  behaviour  generates  cumulatively 
unjust outcomes – this is what constitutes structural injustice.  We cannot pick out 
discrete, bounded actions that contributed to structural injustice in a quantifiable 
way.  The social connection model, instead, argues that because we are connected 
to this background injustice we bear a shared, forward-looking responsibility to 
engage in collective action to change it. 
 
Within contemporary political theory there is a debate as to whether individuals 
can bear responsibility for justice, or whether this responsibility rests exclusively 
with the state.  For instance, John Rawls famously argues that, ‘Justice is the first 
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virtue  of  social  institutions.’
160   For  Rawls,  individuals  have  responsibilities  to 
uphold just institutions, but they themselves do not have direct responsibilities for 
justice.  This idea has been challenged by feminist theorists and G.A. Cohen, who 
argues that just institutions need to be supplemented by an “egalitarian ethos”, 
meaning that individuals do have a direct responsibility for justice.
161  Cohen’s is a 
monist  view:  there  is  no  difference  between  individuals’  and  institutions’ 
responsibilities for justice.  Rawls’ is a dualist view: there is a division of labour 
between institutions’ responsibilities for justice and individuals’ responsibilities to 
support those institutions.   
 
With the social connection model, Young is arguing that individuals have direct 
responsibilities  for  justice,  but  she  does  not  explicitly  defend  this  view.    In 
Chapter 5, I place Young’s view in the context of this debate and defend it.  I 
argue that Young has a different understanding of dualism; that individuals have 
two  kinds  of  responsibilities  –  interactional  and  structural  responsibilities.  
Political responsibility is the responsibility that individuals have for justice. 
 
2.4  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have traced the origins of the Youngian approach to Arendt’s 
distinction between “guilt” and “responsibility”.  I have situated the distinction 
within Arendt’s political thought, shown how Young criticises that, and noted the 
problems with Young’s critique.   
 
I then outlined Young’s distinction between the “liability model” of responsibility 
and  the  “social  connection  model”.    I  showed  how  Young  understands  the 
liability  model  as  isolating  and  backward-looking.    She  develops  the  social 
connection model in response to the limitations of the liability model, which she 
thinks is inadequate for helping us conceptualise individuals’ responsibilities for 
structural injustice.  The social connection model generates a shared, forward-
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looking  political  responsibility  for  justice  that  is  discharged  through  collective 
action. 
 
In outlining Young’s approach I have raised some problems.  I have highlighted 
the conceptual problems with Young’s understanding of moral responsibility.  I have 
suggested that not all forms of moral responsibility are backward-looking, and 
that Young has a moralised conception of political responsibility which requires 
further development.  In Chapter 3, I take up this problem and show that Young 
uses  two  concepts  of  moral  responsibility:  relational  moral  responsibility  and 
moral responsibility as virtue.  I show how this distinction can support the social 
connection model of responsibility. 
 
In Chapter 4, I address the problem of solely using the social connection model in 
relation  to  structural  injustice.    I  argue  that  powerful  agents  within  structural 
injustice – agents that have the power to change the structures – can be held 
responsible  on  the  liability  model  for  failing  to  do  so.    Thus  I  also  challenge 
Young’s idea that power is a “parameter of reasoning” about the degree of an 
agent’s  political  responsibility,  and  argue  that  powerful  agents  bear  moral 
responsibility for failing to improve unjust structures.   
 
In Chapter 5 I situate Young’s approach in relation to the debate on individuals’ 
responsibilities for justice.  In Chapter 7, I address the problem of the role of 
connection in the model.  I suggested that in removing political responsibility from 
Arendt’s conception of membership in a political community, and responsibility 
for the world, and tying it to “connection”, that Young has left a void in the 
concept.  I try to fill in what connection means in the social connection model.  
 
Chapter 3  Constructing a Youngian Conception of Moral 
Responsibility 
 
 
In the previous chapter, political responsibility was defined as a different kind of 
responsibility to legal and moral responsibility in that it is non-isolating, forward-
looking and entails collective action.  It is also different in kind in the sense that it 
does not entail blame.  Criminal responsibility seeks fault and moral responsibility 
attributes  blame.    Living  and  participating  in  an  unjust  political  or  economic 
system is not a crime and it is also, arguably, not something for which one can be 
said  to  be  blameworthy.    Young  argues  that  we  are  not  guilty  for  structural 
injustice;  instead  we  share  in  this  non-blameworthy,  forward-looking  political 
responsibility for change.  Young, however, does not expand upon the reasons 
why we are not guilty, and while it seems intuitive, it needs to be justified.  In this 
chapter I analyse in depth the necessary conditions for blame and show how 
individuals can be excused of moral responsibility for structural injustice.  
 
One  of  the  main  philosophical  problems  in  Young’s  account  of  political 
responsibility, in my view, is that she does not provide a clear enough distinction 
between moral and political responsibility.  This is because she does not offer a 
sophisticated enough description of moral responsibility against which we can 
posit a conception of political responsibility.   
 
In this chapter, I construct and defend an account of moral responsibility that fits 
with  and  develops  Young’s  claims  about  moral  responsibility.    I  argue  that 
political responsibility is, in fact, a form of moral responsibility.  In constructing 
this account I am necessarily interpreting Young’s work and it may be the case 
that if she had the chance to read it she would not agree with the argument.  I 
believe,  however,  that  we  cannot  proceed  much  further  in  our  quest  to 
understand  political  responsibility  without  at  least  some  more  work  on  the Constructing a Youngian Conception of Moral Responsibility 
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concept of moral responsibility.  My aim is to provide a plausible conception of 
moral responsibility grounded in the contemporary literature. 
 
In  section  3.1,  I  begin  with  Ronald  Dworkin’s  recent  discussion  of  moral 
responsibility in Justice for Hedgehogs.
  Dworkin argues that there are two kinds of 
moral  responsibility  –  moral  responsibility  as  a  virtue  and  relational  moral 
responsibility.  Dworkin’s account is illuminating for our purposes because in 
Young’s discussions of moral responsibility we find both of these ideas in play.  
My  interpretation  of  Young’s  distinction  between  moral  and  political 
responsibility is that the form of moral responsibility encompassed by the liability 
model  refers  to  relational  moral  responsibility  (the  appropriate  conditions  for 
praise and blame) and political responsibility refers to moral responsibility as a 
virtue (being a morally responsible person within unjust structures). 
 
After drawing out this distinction, the main focus of this chapter is on relational 
moral responsibility.  We saw in Chapter 2 that Young understands the conditions 
for moral responsibility as causal connection to harm, voluntariness and sufficient 
knowledge;
 1 but this conception of moral responsibility is contested.  I defend 
this  conception  of  relational  moral  responsibility.    I  argue  that  a  plausible 
Youngian definition of relational moral responsibility is that if an agent, who has 
the capacity to form beliefs about the world, and to cohere their behaviour with 
those beliefs, has epistemic possibilities open to them and chooses the blameworthy 
option, then they are morally responsible.  An agent can be exempt from moral 
responsibility if they do not have the capacity in general to know what they are 
doing.  An agent can be excused from moral responsibility if they lacked knowledge 
or physical capacity, or their normal deliberative processes were interfered with, at 
the particular time of acting; in these cases the agent does not meet the condition 
of voluntariness. 
 
The account of relational moral responsibility proposed is a normative one; this is 
to say, I do not engage debates about the truth or falsity of causal determinism, 
rather I engage with the literature on “reasons-responsive” accounts of moral 
responsibility.    Reasons-responsive  accounts  of  moral  responsibility  argue  that 
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rational adults have the capacity to deliberate about their actions based on the 
epistemic possibilities available to them, and to coordinate their acts with these 
choices.  I explain the reasoning behind this decision in section 3.2.1, I then argue 
in section 3.2.2 that to be a suitable candidate for ascriptions of relational moral 
responsibility, an agent must have the capacity for rational reflexive self-control.  
In section 3.2.3 I look at the circumstances in which an agent who possesses the 
capacity for rational self-control may be excused from moral responsibility, and 
then in section 3.2.4 I show how Young applies these excusing conditions to 
ordinary individuals in relation to global injustices.  In section 3.3, I engage with 
the current debate between attributivist views of moral responsibility (those who 
believe  moral  responsibility  can  be  attributed  to  an  agent’s  character)  and 
accountability views (that an agent ought to be held accountable for a particular 
act  but  it  does  not  necessarily  speak  to  their  character).    I  argue  that  when 
constructing a Youngian perspective on moral responsibility we are interested in 
holding individuals accountable for their actions, because in the context of large-
scale harms individuals may be committing wrongdoings within the context of a 
role that does not necessarily speak to their overall character.  The attributivist 
view collapses the distinction between moral responsibility as virtue and relational 
moral  responsibility,  which  is  central  to  Young’s  account.    A  Youngian 
conception  of  relational  moral  responsibility,  then,  is  a  reasons-responsive 
approach that holds individuals accountable for their voluntary acts. 
 
3.1  Two Concepts of Moral Responsibility 
 
Moral responsibility is an “essentially contested concept.”
2  Some theorists argue 
that it has plural meanings, while others insist that a unified account is plausible 
and desirable.
3  Throughout the long history of debate there have been two main 
strands of thought – one is to do with the appropriate conditions for praise and 
blame,  and  the  other  concerns  what  it  is  to  be  a  morally  responsible  agent.
4  
                                                 
2 Mark  Bovens,  The  Quest  for  Responsibility:  Accountability  and  Citizenship  in  Complex  Organisations  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 22.  Taken from Gallie (1962) 
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Traditionally,  legal  theorists  and  jurists  have  been  concerned  with  the  former 
question,  and  philosophers  and  theologians  with  the  latter.
5   An  increasingly 
popular view is that these two approaches are indicative of the fact that there are 
two  types of moral responsibility.
6  This is the approach that I will adopt here.  
Moreover, it can be argued that the two types of moral responsibility are not 
mutually exclusive, but rather are interdependent and reinforce one another.  This 
view coheres well with Young’s perception of moral responsibility.   
 
In his discussions of moral responsibility in Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin presents 
a version of the argument that moral responsibility contains two concepts.  He 
distinguishes between moral responsibility as a virtue, and moral responsibility as ‘a 
relation  between  people  and  events.’
7    When  we  use  the  term  ‘moral 
responsibility’ in the virtue sense, we are talking about whether ‘someone behaved 
responsibly’ or whether they are a ‘responsible person’.  When we talk about 
moral  responsibility  in  a  relational  sense,  we  are  interested  in  whether  or  not 
someone ‘is responsible for some event or consequence.’
8   
 
Responsibility as a virtue does not have to be moral; it can apply to performing a 
particular role in a responsible way.  For instance, a scientist who fails to check 
her calculations is intellectually irresponsible, and a writer who does not back up 
their files is practically irresponsible.
9  To be morally irresponsible in the virtue 
sense, on Dworkin’s account, is to lack ‘moral integrity and authenticity.’
10  The 
morally responsible person reflects on their values and ideals, and subjects them 
to intense scrutiny.  If it turns out that one holds incoherent views, then these 
must be adapted, changed or thrown out, until one comes to find internal moral 
consistency.  Someone would be morally irresponsible in the virtue sense if they 
were insincere, if they tried to rationalize incoherent views for poor reasons, if 
they hold to sincere abstract moral principles but when it comes to the crunch 
rely on self-interest, or if they are morally schizophrenic – picking and choosing 
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moral principles at random.
11  Of course, nobody holds entirely consistent and 
coherent views on all moral issues, and so ‘we must treat moral responsibility as a 
work always in progress: someone is responsible who accepts moral integrity and 
authenticity as appropriate ideals and deploys a reasonable effort toward achieving 
them.’
12   The reason why, for Dworkin, a person must cultivate the virtue of 
moral responsibility, to ‘try to act out of moral conviction in our dealings with 
others’, is because it is required by self-respect.
13  It is required by self-respect 
because  ‘we  cannot  consistently  treat  our  own  lives  as  objectively  important 
unless we accept that everyone’s life has the same objective importance.  We can 
– and do – expect others to accept that fundamental principle of humanity.’
14  In 
other words, having respect for oneself by trying to be a morally responsible 
individual demonstrates that one has respect for others. 
 
Mark  Bovens  gives  a  different  account  of  the  difference  between  moral 
responsibility as a virtue and relational moral responsibility as accountability.  He 
describes  this  as  the  difference  between  active  and  passive  responsibility 
respectively.  Passive responsibility is relational moral responsibility – it demands 
of an agent that they account for something that has happened.  Bovens writes, 
 
In the case of passive responsibility, one is called to account after the 
event and either held responsible or not.  It is a question of who bears the 
responsibility for a given state of affairs.  The central question is: ‘Why did 
you do it?
15 
 
Bovens contrasts this passive form of responsibility as accountability with active 
responsibility as virtue.  He writes, 
 
In the case of active forms, the emphasis lies much more on action in the 
present, on the prevention of unwanted situations and events.  Above all, 
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it is a question of responsible acting, of taking responsibility, of behaving 
responsibly.  The central question here is: ‘what is to be done?’
16 
 
Bovens justifies his use of these two conceptions of moral responsibility because 
they are both crucial to his project of understanding moral responsibility in the 
context  of  complex  organisations.
17   Accountability  is  the  most  commonly 
invoked  conception  of  responsibility  when  we  think  about  the  actions  of 
corporate agents, both individual and collective.  It is a backward-looking form of 
responsibility, that asks for an account of what has happened and may involve 
some form of retribution.  Moral responsibility as virtue, however, he believes to 
have been neglected.  It is essential, however, to include this aspect of moral 
responsibility when we think about the actions of individuals as agents acting 
within complex organisations.  Individuals must actively think about what they are 
doing  in  order  to  prevent  immoral  actions  on  their  own  behalf  or  their 
organisation’s behalf in the present and future.  Active moral responsibility as 
virtue is forward-looking; it requires agents to think about what must be done to 
prevent future harm. 
 
The distinction in this form is what we find in Young; she also considers moral 
responsibility as virtue to be active and forward-looking:  
 
a responsible person tries to deliberate about options before acting, makes 
choices that seem to be the best for all affected, and worries about how 
the consequences of his or her action may adversely affect others.
18   
 
Here we see that Young thinks ‘being responsible’ in the virtue sense implies 
thinking about others, not oneself.  Young thinks there are two forms of moral 
responsibility in the other-regarding sense.  Firstly, interactional – do not directly 
harm others.
19  If you do harm others you will be held morally responsible on the 
“liability model” of responsibility; that is, you will be held to account.  Secondly, 
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structural – do not harm others through structures in which you participate.
20  It is 
the second form that constitutes “political responsibility.” 
 
So if political responsibility is a form of moral responsibility as virtue, why is it 
not just moral responsibility?  Why can we not say that individuals are morally 
responsible for harm caused by structures?  The reason why Young wants to 
distinguish  “political”  from  “moral”  responsibility  is  as  follows:  political 
responsibility  is  a  responsibility  individuals  have  towards  structures,  moral 
responsibility is a responsibility in relation to direct interactions with others and it 
entails ascriptions of praise and blame.   
 
There are three reasons why Young thinks political responsibility does not entail 
blame.  The first reason is that we should not be blamed for the harm that we 
might be causing through structures, because we do not intend it.
21    Secondly, we 
have  reasons  to  believe  that  acting  within  the  accepted  rules  and  practices  is 
‘positively virtuous or useful.’
22  And thirdly, our options ‘are constrained by the 
very same structures to which we contribute.’
23  What Young is pointing to here is 
that the ascription of moral responsibility by others in the form of blame is only 
appropriate in circumstances where the individual intended to cause harm, when 
they actually and knowingly did something wrong.  Because these conditions are 
not  present  when  individuals  are  acting  normally  within  structures  that 
incidentally cause harm, they should not be blamed for it.  Inadvertently causing 
harm  or  acting  under  coercion,  duress  or  necessity  can  excuse  moral 
responsibility.  I will develop this idea in Sections 2.3 and 2.4.  
 
“Political responsibility” is a virtue that ought to be cultivated in order to ensure 
that  the  structures  in  which  one  participates  are  not  causing  harm.    Political 
responsibility, then, has roots in moral responsibility as a virtue – it is an active 
form of moral responsibility and is concerned primarily with the other, but the 
focus is on the ways in which structures harm the other, not one’s own deliberate 
actions.  It is forward-looking and other-regarding, but it is non-blameworthy.  It 
is  a  virtue  that  individuals  ought  to  cultivate  so  as  to  act  responsibly  within 
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structures.  The political nature of this form of moral responsibility as virtue is that 
it should aim towards collective political action.  It calls upon individuals ‘to take 
public stands about actions and events that affect broad masses of people, and to 
try to organize collective action to prevent massive harm or foster institutional 
change for the better.’
24   
 
In  the  rest  of  this  chapter,  I  focus  on  relational  moral  responsibility  –  the 
appropriate conditions for blame.  Under what conditions is it appropriate to say 
that an individual is blameworthy?  What does it mean when Young says that an 
individual  is  only  blameworthy  if  they  directly  caused  harm  with  intent  and 
knowledge? 
 
3.2  Relational Moral Responsibility 
 
So far I have distinguished between moral responsibility as virtue (what it is to be 
a morally responsible agent) and relational moral responsibility (the appropriate 
conditions for praise and blame).  I have argued that Young understands both 
forms of moral responsibility as other-regarding.  The difference I have identified 
is that moral responsibility as a virtue does not necessarily entail blameworthiness, 
but that relational moral responsibility does.  To understand this, we must look 
more closely at the appropriate conditions for praise and blame. 
 
In this section, I develop an interpretation of relational moral responsibility from 
the contemporary literature.  I defend the view that blameworthiness depends on 
causal  connection  to  harm  with  intent  and  knowledge  of  the  potential 
consequences.  I explain the conditions in which an individual can be deemed 
exempt or excused from blameworthiness.  
   
3.2.1  Bracketing Metaphysics and Science  
 
Aristotle was the first person to think through the appropriate conditions for 
praise and blame, and his reflections have proven to be remarkably resilient to this 
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day.
25  Aristotle claimed that there were two conditions that determined when we 
could hold an individual responsible: an epistemic condition and a control condition.
26  
The epistemic condition holds that an agent must know what they are doing when 
they act, otherwise they cannot be held responsible for it.  The control condition 
implies that an agent must have been able to control their action.  An agent is 
forced if he is ‘acted upon, e.g. if he were to be carried somewhere by the wind, or 
by men who had him in their power.’
27 
 
When  philosophers  became  interested  in  the  issue  of  causal  determinism,  the 
control  condition  came  in  for  heavy  questioning.    If  control  is  a  necessary 
condition for moral responsibility, and if causal determinism turned out to be true 
– so that causal antecedents necessarily determine all of our actions – then moral 
responsibility  is  impossible  because  we  cannot  exercise  free  will.    This 
metaphysical debate has gripped moral philosophers for centuries.  It continues to 
dominate discussions about moral responsibility today.  On the one hand, there 
are incompatibilists (usually libertarians), who argue that moral responsibility and 
causal  determinism  are  necessarily  incompatible.    On  the  other  hand  are 
compatibilists  who  argue  that  even  if  causal  determinism  were  true,  moral 
responsibility in some form would still be possible.  Historically this debate has 
centred  on  theories  within  physics,  but  nowadays  the  focus  has  shifted  to 
neuroscience,  with  philosophers  interested  in  whether  or  not  we  consciously 
control our actions.
28 
 
In  1967,  Peter  Strawson  made  a  significant  intervention  in  this  debate.    He 
claimed  that  what  was  important  about  moral  responsibility  was  not  the 
metaphysical issue as to whether or not we can control our actions, but what 
mattered  was  the  social  aspect  of  moral  responsibility.    We  hold  one  another 
morally responsible for our actions when we display “reactive attitudes” towards 
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them, such as blame and praise.
29  These practices do not depend on the truth or 
falsity of causal determinism; it is a fact of social life.  Philosophers fixated on 
causal determinism are over-intellectualizing the issues of moral responsibility.
30  
The philosophical interest lies in the ways in which we hold each other morally 
responsible; what are we doing this for?  And when do we do it?  When is it 
justified or not? 
 
Out  of  this  shift  of  focus  in  the  moral  responsibility  debate  has  emerged  a 
normative  literature  about  when  it  is  or  is  not  appropriate  to  blame  or  praise 
someone for what they have or have not done.  The question is: when ought we 
hold an agent morally responsible?  When is it fair to do so?
31  This normative 
debate is largely independent of the metaphysical one.  An incompatibilist could 
argue that the premise of the debate is implausible, because if causal determinism 
turned out to be true and moral responsibility was thus rendered impossible, then 
the debate is pointless.  But as Fischer and Ravizza have pointed out, we have 
strong independent reasons for wanting to develop a normative account of moral 
responsibility: 
 
Whether we are persons – whether we are morally responsible agents who 
can have deep personal relationships, friendships, and families – should 
not depend on whether causal determinism is true: our most basic views 
about  ourselves  –  and  our  most  fundamental  kinds  of  relationships  – 
should not be held hostage to the particular features of the best theories 
offered by current physics.
32 
 
Furthermore, theorists inspired by Strawson’s approach have found innovative 
ways of grounding moral responsibility that do not rely on causal control.  The 
guiding idea is that adult humans are “reasons-responsive”; that is they can reason 
about the world and base their actions on those reasons.  It is on this basis that 
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we  judge  individuals  to  be  morally  responsible  or  not.
33   Whether  or  not 
determinism  turned  out  to  be  true,  the  epistemic  options  that  appear  to  be 
available to individuals will remain, and we will continue to base our responsibility 
practices on the decisions that individuals make on the basis of their apparent 
options.   
 
Moreover, Dworkin argues that the debates about free will and determinism skip 
an argumentative step.  He invokes Hume’s principle – that facts about the world 
cannot determine normative principles – to suggest that whatever happens within 
physics and neuroscience, we will still be left with a normative debate about moral 
responsibility.
34  Facts about the world cannot tell us what we ought to do.  It is on 
this territory that reasons-responsive approaches to moral responsibility operate. 
 
I  situate  my  Youngian  conception  of  moral  responsibility  in  this  literature, 
because determinism in the sense of metaphysical or scientific causal determinism 
seems out of place in Young’s thought.  We saw in the previous chapter that 
central to Arendt’s conception of political responsibility was the idea that human 
collective action has the power to transform the man-made world.  Young’s work 
on responsibility is guided by a similar idea – that collective human political action 
can fundamentally change social structures.  She writes,  
 
To be sure, no person’s situation and action are determined by the past.  We 
are radically free in the sense that alternative possibilities that we invent 
out of nothing are always open to us.
35 
 
However,  Young’s  thoughts  on  determinism  are  more  ambiguous  than  this 
suggests.  What does interest her is the relationship of structure to agency, and the 
ways in which structures constrain individual agency.  Young is a determinist to 
some extent, not in the metaphysical sense, but in the sense that she thinks that 
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our  behaviour  and  attitudes,  and  the  choices  that  we  are  able  to  make,  are 
conditioned  by  the  social,  historical,  economic  and  cultural  circumstances  in 
which  we  find  ourselves.    This  is  why  Young  thinks  that  individuals  are  not 
morally responsible for structures; because we’re born into physical and social 
structures, and they condition our action to a large extent.  But there is a way in 
which we could change them – by engaging in collective political action.  Young 
describes this tension between individual “objective constraint” and the potential 
for change through collective action: 
 
Most of us are objectively constrained by the rules, norms, and material 
effects of structural processes when we try to act alone.  These processes 
can be altered only if many actors from diverse positions within the social 
structures work together to intervene in them to try to produce other 
outcomes.
36  
 
If we realise the radical contingency of our circumstances, we can collectively 
organise to change them.  Like Arendt, then, Young believes in the power of 
human  collective  political  action  to  change  the  structures.    The  relationship 
between structure and agency in her thought is not static; it is dynamic.  That is 
why she enjoins individuals to ‘take responsibility’ for structures, because they can 
be changed.  She defines social structures not as fixed entities, but as ‘social-
structural  processes.’
37   The  relationship  between  structure  and  agency  will  be 
discussed  further  in  the  next  chapter,  where  I  argue  that  theorising  this 
relationship requires an understanding of power.  
 
Young also is at pains throughout her work on responsibility to highlight that she 
does not reject the idea of moral responsibility on which she bases her “liability 
model”  of  responsibility.
38   It  is  crucial,  she  insists,  in  order  to  take  persons 
seriously and to show respect for persons, and for the purposes of maintaining a 
legal system.
39  What she wants to do is to limit the use of the model.  Instead of 
                                                 
36 Responsibility for Justice, 111. 
37 Responsibility for Justice, 52-64. 
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claiming that moral responsibility in the liability sense is somehow universalisable, 
she wants to restrict its domain.  She writes,  
 
Responsibility in that liability sense should be reserved for persons who 
can be specifically identified as causing the harm, usually knowing what 
they are doing.  I think Arendt is right that it is a bad idea to blur the 
conditions  for  saying  that  persons  are  guilty  or  at  fault.    It  is  often 
important to pin a wrong on someone who did something or was in the 
unique position to have prevented it.
40 
 
Young restricts the scope of moral responsibility and guilt to what an individual 
actually did with intent, or at least with negligence.  The appropriate conditions 
for praise and blame, then, are quite restricted. 
 
I  will  now  look,  then,  in  more  detail  at  a  normative  conception  of  moral 
responsibility which generates conditions for praise and blame, and coheres with 
Young thoughts on the concept.  I will argue that moral responsibility applies to 
the acts of agents that are exercised with a certain quality of will.  Certain actors 
can  be  exempted  from  moral  responsibility  because  they  lack  the  capacity  to 
display this quality of will and under certain circumstances agents can be excused 
from moral responsibility.   
 
3.2.2  The Capacity for Control 
 
For Young, the conditions for moral responsibility are causal connection to a 
harm, voluntariness and sufficient knowledge.
41  This is an Aristotelian conception 
of moral responsibility, dependent upon the epistemic and control conditions.  
This conception of moral responsibility, then, raises the kinds of metaphysical 
issues  I  highlighted  above.    If  we  focus  on  normative  conceptions  of  moral 
responsibility,  however,  there  are  still  some  problems.    Knowledge  and 
voluntariness presuppose that the agent had the capacity to acquire knowledge and 
to fit their actions in accordance with that knowledge; and so we need an account 
                                                 
40 Responsibility for Justice, 104. 
41 Responsibility for Justice, 97. Constructing a Youngian Conception of Moral Responsibility 
  74     
of the capacity to behave morally.  A second question is why is voluntariness 
important?  What makes voluntariness a condition of moral responsibility?
42  In 
this  section,  I  look  at  the  issue  of  capacity  as  Dworkin  and  Daniel  Dennett 
understand it.  In the following section I look at the conditions in which capable 
agents can be excused from moral responsibility.  I argue that we exempt agents 
who do not have the general capacity for control from moral responsibility, and we 
excuse agents who do not have the particular capacity for control from moral 
responsibility. 
 
Dworkin argues that accounts of moral responsibility that focus on causal control 
ignore the importance of ‘capacity control.’  He claims that an agent must have 
‘capacity control’ in order to be a candidate for ascriptions of praise and blame.  
For Dworkin, instead of taking a bird’s-eye view to look at the empirical causal 
history that brought an act into being (‘causal control’), we should understand an 
individual’s decisions as originating from their internal decision-making process 
and hold them responsible for the outcomes of that process (‘capacity control’).
43   
 
As  Dworkin  argues,  there  is  a  phenomenological  experience  with  regards  to 
decision-making.  He writes: 
 
Deliberative  behaviour  has  an  internal  life:  there  is  a  way  it  feels 
deliberately to act.  We intend to do something, and we do it…. That 
internal sense of deliberate action marks the distinction, essential to our 
ethical  and  moral  experience,  between  acting  and  being  acted  upon: 
between pushing and being pushed.
44 
 
What  we  are  interested  in  when  assigning  moral  responsibility,  according  to 
Dworkin, is not the causal question of whether or not the agent “could have done 
                                                 
42 I  have  resisted  saying  that  voluntariness  is  a  ‘necessary’  condition  for  moral  responsibility 
because  in  the  quote  above  Young  says  that,  ‘Responsibility  in  that  liability  sense  should  be 
reserved for persons who can be specifically identified as causing the harm, usually knowing what 
they  are  doing.’    In  some  cases,  Young  acknowledges,  culpable  negligence  would  entail 
blameworthiness.  If an individual is culpably negligent, they may not be voluntarily causing harm, 
but the harmful act can be traced to an earlier voluntary act.  The idea of tracing raises issues, but 
it is beyond the scope to deal with those here.  See Vargas for a good account of this problem, 
Manuel Vargas, "The Trouble with Tracing," Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXIV(2005). 
43 Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs, 229. 
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otherwise”,  but  the  question  as  to  whether  or  not  the  agent  has  the  general 
capacity to engage in this internal deliberative process.   
 
Dworkin breaks this down further and argues that internal deliberation requires 
two  kinds  of  capacity.    Firstly,  it  requires  a  ‘cognitive  capacity’.    This  is  the 
capacity to form logically coherent beliefs about the world through experience.  A 
young child cannot do this, and this is the reason why young children are not held 
morally  responsible  for  their  behaviour.
45   Secondly,  it  requires  ‘regulative 
capacity’.    This  is  the  capacity  to  conform  behaviour  to  one’s  values  and 
preferences derived from facts learned from one’s experience of the world.  For 
instance, someone suffering from severe mental illness, who thinks that they are 
God and therefore allowed to legitimately kill people, cannot do this, and it is for 
this reason that they would not be held morally responsible for their actions.
46  In 
criminal law in the UK and many other countries, the M’Naghten Rules follow 
this line of reasoning.  This law allows a defence of insanity if it can be proved 
that ‘at the time of committing the act, the party accused was laboring under such 
a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and 
quality of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know what he 
was doing was wrong.’
47  The party is exempted from responsibility if there is 
some  sort  of  underlying  condition  that  prevents  them  from  grasping  moral 
reasons or which prevents them from grasping the nature or wrongness of their 
act.
48  R. Jay Wallace describes these two capacities taken together as ‘the powers 
of reflective self-control.’
49 
 
Dennett  makes  a  similar  argument,  that  what  matters  for  the  purposes  of 
ascriptions  of  moral  responsibility  is  an  agent’s  epistemic  possibilities,  not  their 
metaphysical possibilities.  What we are interested in when we assess agents as 
candidates  for  moral  responsibility  is  whether  or  not  they  have  the  general 
capacity  to  be  able  to  recognise  and  conform  their  action  to  epistemic 
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possibilities.
50  Dennett argues that the metaphysical questions about free will and 
determinism are unanswerable.
51  But the question of whether or not an agent had 
epistemic  possibilities,  and  whether  or  not  the  agent  cohered  their  actions 
appropriately with their epistemic possibilities, is answerable.   
 
Epistemic  possibilities  are  contrasted  to  logical  and  physical  possibilities.   
‘Something is logically possible if it is consistently describable,’ e.g. that there is a 
unicorn  in  the  garden  is  logically  possible  but  not  biologically  or  physically 
possible.
52   Something  is  physically  possible  if  it  does  not  violate  the  laws  of 
physics.
53  Something is epistemically possible if it is consistent with everything an 
agent already knows.
54  We can understand the difference between these types of 
possibilities through the example of the game of Scrabble.  Scrabble is a word 
game, in which players pick seven letters out of a bag, find words within those 
letters and place them on a board.  The different possibilities work as follows: 
 
a)  Logical – I am limited to combinations of letters that correlate 
with words in the dictionary. 
b)  Physical – My choice of words will be constrained by the other 
letters on the board.  Factors about myself will also constrain my 
ability to play the game, such as my vocabulary, which will depend 
on  things  like  education,  background,  intelligence,  access  to 
reading  etc.    Other  physical  factors  that  could  constrain  my 
options  may  include  things  like  my  level  of  tiredness  and 
hydration. 
c)  Epistemic – The epistemic possibilities are the possibilities that 
seem available to me e.g. I might want to play the long impressive 
word to show off my vocabulary and superior powers of word-
finding, or I could play the short, simple word and get double or 
triple points.   
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It is the realm of epistemic possibilities that matter on Dennett’s account of moral 
responsibility.  Perhaps my epistemic possibilities are determined by something I 
do not know about (the hand of God or my brain chemistry) but they seem like 
live choices to me.  In this game, I choose the long word, leaving the triple word 
score open for my opponent who dually uses it and goes on to win the game.  I 
go to bed cursing myself for choosing the impressive word for bad reasons (as far 
as winning the game is concerned), and my opponent believes me to have made 
bad choices too and that she has made better ones based on her available options.  
The choices we have made based on our epistemic possibilities determine praise 
and blame. 
 
Dennett argues that epistemic possibilities are what agents want, and it is what we 
need, in order to assign moral responsibility.  What we want/need is room for 
manoeuvre, or “elbow room”.  There will always be physical constraints of some 
sort on our actions (e.g. I only have seven letters to generate a word), but that is 
unimportant when considering praise and blame.  What is important is that there 
is some room to manoeuvre within physical constraints.  When considering moral 
responsibility, ‘We want a margin for error; we want to keep our options open, so 
that our chances of maintaining control over our operations come what may, are 
enhanced.’
55  It is on the basis of how well we navigate these possibilities that we 
assign moral responsibility. 
 
Dworkin and Dennett’s assessments of moral responsibility as a form of capacity 
cohere  with  Strawson’s  argument  about  ‘exempting  conditions’  for  moral 
responsibility.
56   Strawson  argues  that  individuals  can  be  exempt  from  moral 
responsibility if the agent either was “not himself” for some reason or the agent is 
“morally undeveloped” due to mental illness or because they are a child.
57  In 
these cases, the demands of moral responsibility cannot be imposed upon that 
person.
58   In  these  cases,  the  agent  does  not  have,  in  Dworkin’s  terminology, 
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‘capacity control’: the ability either to form correct beliefs about the world or to 
base their actions upon those beliefs. 
 
However, Strawson considers another class of cases in which moral responsibility 
is inappropriate – if there are ‘excusing conditions’.  If an agent had no alternative 
– “He couldn’t help it” because he did not know or had to do it – then we 
continue to see the agent as someone capable of being responsible for harm, but 
in  this  situation  blame  would  not  be  appropriate.
59   As  Dworkin  pointed  out 
above,  there  is  a  difference  between  pushing  and  being  pushed.    And  so  an 
account that focuses exclusively on ‘capacity control’ misses a crucial piece of the 
puzzle.  Having epistemic possibilities and having the capacity to recognise and 
act on these are not sufficient conditions for moral responsibility.  I argue that 
having the capacity to be able to form beliefs about the world and cohere actions to those beliefs 
is a necessary condition for moral responsibility but it is not sufficient; moral 
responsibility  also  requires  that  the  agent  actually  did  something  wrong.    In  some 
instances where it appears that an agent has done something wrong, the agent 
may in fact be excused from moral responsibility.  What we now need to address, 
then, is the issue of voluntariness. 
 
3.2.3  Excusing Conditions 
 
Dennett claims that, when looking at one’s own deeds, ‘Who  cares whether, in 
exactly the circumstances and state of mind I found myself, I could have done 
something else?  I did not do something else, and it is too late to undo what I 
did.’
60  He argues further that,  
 
Some people will look for excuses like, “Can I help it what occurs to me 
and what does not?”, ‘but healthy self-controllers shun this path.  They 
take responsibility for what might be, very likely is, just an “accident,” just 
one of those things.  That way, they make themselves less likely to be 
“accident” victims in the future.
61 
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Is this really true?  Do we think there are no such things as accidents that can 
excuse an agent from moral responsibility?  As Aristotle was pointing out in his 
comment about force – ‘e.g. if he were to be carried somewhere by the wind, or 
by men who had him in their power’
62 – we do care about whether or not an agent 
actually did something wrong, or whether they were compelled or coerced into 
doing it.  In these circumstances, an otherwise capable individual can be excused 
from  moral  responsibility.  The  reason  why,  is  because  there  is  a  lack  of 
voluntariness. 
 
Let’s take a case of an “accident”; a scenario which Dennett thinks a ‘healthy self-
controller’ would take responsibility for.  Say I am driving home late at night on 
country roads in the winter.  It is icy, but I take all the relevant and reasonable 
precautions that I can.  Despite my efforts, I swerve on a patch of black ice and 
hit  a  cyclist  coming  up  behind  my  car,  who  was  not  clearly  visible.    In  this 
situation would it really be ‘healthy’, as Dennett suggests, to take responsibility for 
this accident?  I think it would be the opposite of healthy.   
 
In  the  first  place,  what  we  have  here  is  an  instance  of  causal  but  not  moral 
responsibility.    As  H.L.A.  Hart  points  out,  my  car  hitting  the  cyclist  may  be 
causally responsible for her death, in the same way that lack of rain is causally 
responsible for the drought.
63  But moral responsibility requires something more.  
In this particular instance, if I had not taken the reasonable precautions then I 
may have been reckless or negligent and this decision not to take precautions 
would have been culpable.  But when the necessary precautions were taken, it is 
not clear that I actually did anything wrong.   
 
Secondly, as Bernard Williams argues, this scenario inspires the emotion of ‘agent-
regret’  rather  than  remorse.    If  I  were  remorseful,  feeling  myself  to  be 
blameworthy, I would never do the same thing again.
64  However, in this kind of 
situation, I would probably do exactly the same thing in future because I did ‘all 
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the right things’.  The death of the cyclist was an accident, and while I may feel a 
special kind of regret because of my casual implication in the accident (‘agent-
regret’),  I  have  not  actually  done  anything  wrong.    Contra-Dennett,  blaming 
myself in this situation would more likely be the path to madness than the path to 
healthy self-control. 
 
Joel  Feinberg  describes  this  kind  of  situation  as  compulsion.    He  defines 
compulsion as follows: 
 
A person is sent reeling or flying by a hurricane wind or an explosion, or 
he is pushed off a cliff and falls to his death on the rocks below, or a more 
powerful person compels him to drop a knife by pulling his fingers apart 
and forcing open his grip on it.  In all these examples, either another 
person or an impersonal force makes one’s body move directly, without 
the cooperation, grudging or approving, of one’s own will.  One does not 
choose or decide or elect, in these cases, to move one’s own body; rather one’s 
body  is  moved  for  one,  and  there  is  no  role  whatever  for  one’s  will, 
whether resistant or acquiescent.
65 
 
If one is compelled to act in a certain way, this can excuse moral responsibility, as 
Aristotle  observed  all  those  centuries  ago.    Another  example  that  I  think 
undermines  Dennett’s  claim  that  we  should  only  be  concerned  with  ‘capacity 
control’ is Sophie’s Choice.  In William Styron’s novel, Sophie, a Polish-Catholic 
survivor of a concentration camp, is confronted with a tragic choice that shapes 
the rest of her life.  Upon arrival at the camp she is told that she must give either 
one or both of her children over to the camp doctor to be immediately gassed.  
Sophie decides to give up her younger daughter, in the hope that the older child 
will have more chance of survival in the camp. 
 
Is Sophie morally responsible for the death of her child?  She is wracked with guilt 
for the rest of her life until she finally decides to commit suicide.  But from an 
outside perspective, do we find her guilty?  Sophie’s choice is a clear instance of 
                                                 
65 Joel Feinberg, "Failures of Consent: Coercive Force," in The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law ed. 
Joel Feinberg (Oxford Scholarship Online: Oxford University Press, 1989), 190. Constructing a Youngian Conception of Moral Responsibility 
  81     
coercion, which Feinberg describes as the use of a threat backed up by credible 
evidence.  In cases of coercion he writes,  
 
You may choose X or you may choose Y, the coercer tells you, but you 
cannot choose the conjunction of X and Y.  The coercer has closed the 
conjunctive option by forcibly manipulating your alternatives.
66 
 
Sophie could choose to hand over one child or the other, but she could not 
choose to save them both.  The coercer closed off this option.  Wallace argues 
that in these cases the agent is not merely excused from moral responsibility but is 
exempt.
67  The agent cannot be considered a consenting, deliberating adult, which 
is a necessary condition to be held morally responsible, because of the threat that 
is held over their decision-making process.  This is because the agent’s powers of 
reflective self-control may well be impaired: ‘One’s ability to appreciate and focus 
on the moral reasons in favour of an obligatory course of action may be reduced 
(either  in  general,  or  for  a  limited  period  of  time);  or  internal  conditions  of 
emotion  and  desire  may  render  it  difficult  to  translate  one’s  moral  choices 
effectively into action.’
68 
 
Historically it has been argued that what matters in these cases is that the agent 
“could not have done otherwise”. It is the lack of “alternate possibilities” that 
excuses  the  agent  from  responsibility,  because  if  there  are  no  other  options 
available  to  the  agent,  they  lacked  “freedom”  or  “control”.
 69   Incompatibilists 
argue that if determinism is true, then we can never act otherwise, and so we can 
never be held morally responsible for anything that we do.  However, Wallace 
argues that what matters in these kinds of cases is not the ability to do otherwise, 
but the fact that the agents have not actually done anything wrong.
70  What he 
means by this is that there is not a moral obligation that we would expect the 
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agent to fulfil that they have failed to fulfil or actively violated in some way.  In 
the ice example, I have not deliberately harmed the cyclist thereby violating the 
duty of non-maleficence.  In Sophie’s Choice, Sophie did chose to give up one of 
her children to certain death, but under conditions that forced her to do so.  The 
agents have not done anything wrong in these examples because there is a lack of 
voluntariness.  Only if an agent voluntarily does something wrong do they deserve to 
be held morally responsible;
71 only then is the ascription of moral responsibility 
fair.  The agent must demonstrate a faulty ‘quality of will.’  Wallace calls this ‘the 
principle of no blameworthiness without fault.’
72 
 
Wallace broadens the scope of the excuses, arguing that there are four classes of 
excusing conditions.  Firstly, inadvertence, mistake or accident.  In these cases the agent 
does something of kind x, however it turns out that the agent does not know they 
were  doing  x.
73   This  is  important,  because  as  Wallace  argues,  ‘Intentions  are 
sensitive to beliefs.  To do something of a certain kind intentionally, one must 
know that one is doing something of that kind.’
74  For example, I go to the fridge 
to get a beer not knowing that I have stepped on someone’s hand.
75  In this case, I 
am responsible for my movements towards the fridge, but stepping on a person’s 
hand was not part of my intentional plan and I was not aware I was doing it: I was 
not doing something of the kind x that is knowingly wrong.  Although, if it was 
obvious that there were lots of people sitting on the floor and I should have 
looked and treaded carefully when going to the fridge, my ignorance and lack of 
care may have been culpable.  Recklessness can be a culpable quality of will, 
because it demonstrates a cavalier attitude to risk, and this is a choice controlled 
by reasons.
76  But if I have not been reckless, my inadvertent stepping on the hand 
would be excusable.  As Wallace writes, an excuse of the first kind ‘defeats a 
presumption that I did x intentionally, by showing that I did not know that I 
would be doing something of kind x at all when I chose to do whatever it was 
that turned out to be of kind x.’
77 
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The second class is unintentional bodily movements.  In these cases, the agent does not 
actually  do  anything,  in  the  sense  of  choosing  to  act.
78   Rather  their  body  is 
compelled, for example by fainting.  Alternatively, the body may move by way of 
reflex: being accosted by a swarm of bees.  Bodily movements can occur while 
unconscious, such as sleepwalking into a neighbour’s house.  Or another agent 
can compel your body to do something, such as a crowd pushing you into another 
person.    In  these  cases,  the  bodily  movements  do  not  result  from  an  agent’s 
deliberative choice.
79  However, unintentional bodily movements can also result 
from culpable negligence.  Consider cases in which a driver with epilepsy fails to 
inform  the  relevant  authorities  about  their  condition  and  has  a  seizure  at  the 
wheel, killing pedestrians or other drivers.
80  As Dennett highlighted above, what 
we want is ‘elbow room’ within constraints, and we have to take precautions or 
‘meta-level control planning and activity’ to maintain as much elbow room as 
possible.
81    Persons  with  known  medical  conditions  that  can  result  in 
unintentional  bodily  movements  may  have  obligations  to  control  for  these 
problems, such as not driving or taking medication correctly.  If there were no 
precautions the agent could reasonably take, e.g. if they did not know they had a 
medical condition that might cause unintentional bodily movements, then they 
would ordinarily be excused from moral responsibility. 
 
The third class is physical constraint.  In these cases the agent cannot act in a morally 
appropriate way because of physical constraint.
82  As Wallace argues, an omission 
can demonstrate a quality of will: you could choose to do x but decide to do 
something else instead, or you could be negligent or reckless in failing to take 
proper  precautions.
83   But  in  cases  of  physical  constraint  ‘one  is  physically 
constrained from moving one’s body in the way that is necessary to fulfil the 
obligation.’
84  For example, I am supposed to meet my friend at the airport, but 
am stuck in an enormous traffic jam.
85 
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The  final  class  is  coercion,  necessity  and  duress.    In  these  cases  the  agent  does 
something morally wrong, but they do it because their options are constrained in 
such a way as to force them into making this choice.  The act is intentional but it 
is done so as to avoid a threat.
86  The classic example is the bank teller handing 
over money to an armed thief.
87  In cases of coercion, Fischer and Ravizza argue 
that agents ‘are like marionettes and are not appropriate candidates for praise or 
blame.    These  factors  issuing  in  behaviour  are,  intuitively,  responsibility-
undermining factors.’
88  These cases can be contrasted to those where ‘there is the 
“normal,”  unimpaired  operation  of  the  human  deliberative  mechanism.’
89   As 
Wallace  points  out,  these  cases  will  be  controversial,  for  instance  it  may  be 
assumed morally permissible to steal a loaf of bread in order to prevent death by 
starvation, but would it be morally permissible to kill and eat another human?
90  
In  uncontroversial  cases,  he  writes,  ‘excuses  of  the  fourth  class  function  by 
showing  that  the  agent’s  action  did  not  express  a  choice  that  violates  our 
(considered) moral obligations.  In these cases, doing x because of a choice to do 
x-rather-than-y is not really a case of doing anything morally impermissible at 
all.’
91   
 
In these cases of excuse, I would argue, the agent’s ‘capacity control’ is interfered 
with.  In the first class of cases, the interference is caused by ignorance.  In the 
second and third classes, it is due to lack of physical capacity for bodily control.  
In the fourth class, it is due to interference with the normal deliberative processes.  
In  cases  where  we  exempt  individuals  from  moral  responsibility,  they  lack  the 
general capacity for control – they lack knowledge of what they are doing.  But in 
cases where we excuse an agent that ordinarily does have the general capacity for 
control, we say that their capacity for control was interfered with in those particular 
circumstances – their act was not voluntary.  We exempt agents who do not have the 
general capacity for control from moral responsibility, and we excuse agents who 
do not have the particular capacity for control from moral responsibility.  On this 
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account of relational moral responsibility, then, knowledge and voluntariness are 
necessary conditions for blameworthiness.
92 
 
As  Wallace  points  out,  agents  who  meet  the  excusing  conditions  may  have 
exercised reflexive self-control on those occasions, but conditions such as physical 
constraint or reflex muscular movements ‘interfere with the fully successful exercise 
of the powers of reflective self-control, insofar as they may prevent the translation 
of an agent’s choices into actions.’
93  Where an agent is prevented from translating 
their  choices  into  actions,  the  lack  of  voluntariness  for  their  actions  may 
potentially excuse them from moral responsibility. 
 
3.2.4  Young on Excuses and Moral Responsibility for Global Injustice 
 
Young argued that the conditions for moral responsibility on the liability model 
are voluntary causal connection to harm, with knowledge of the consequences.  If 
these conditions are not met, then the agent is not blameworthy.  I have shown 
that this view can be defended because there are conditions in which we excuse or 
exempt individuals from blameworthiness on the grounds that they did not know, 
could not know, or did not intend to cause harm.  This helps us to contextualise 
Young’s arguments about individuals’ responsibilities for global injustice. 
 
When  Young  argues  that  individuals  are  not  morally  responsible  for  global 
injustice, she is not arguing that they are exempt from responsibility.  Rather, she 
is arguing that they are excused from responsibility.  That is, these are agents that 
are candidates for moral responsibility – they have the capacity to reason and act 
on their reasons – but the conditions in which they act are such that they ought to 
be excused.  Let’s look at the three reasons why she excuses individuals from 
moral responsibility for global injustice. 
 
                                                 
92 As  acknowledged  in  footnote  43  of  this  chapter  it  may  be  too  strong  to  suggest  that 
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Firstly, global injustices are not the intended outcomes of individuals’ actions.
94  
This  lack  of  intention  undermines  the  condition  for  blameworthiness.    A 
consumer  when  purchasing  an  item  from  a  sweatshop  does  not  intend  to 
perpetuate the exploitation of workers.  A young couple buying a flat does not 
intend to contribute to an unjust property market that generates homelessness.  
Perhaps it could be argued that global injustices result from the recklessness of 
individuals – the failure to take precautions so that their actions do not cause 
harm to others.  But this is not feasible in the context of the global capitalist 
economy when we usually have no idea how many processes are involved in the 
production  of  the  goods  and  services  we  buy.    How  many  precautions  is  it 
reasonable to ask an individual to take?  Perhaps we could draw a line, but where 
would we draw it? 
 
Secondly,  individuals  think  they  are  doing  the  right  thing  when  they  follow 
accepted  rules  and  norms.
95   It  is  not  the  case  that  the  recent  graduate  who 
purchases a new suit for a job interview at Oxfam wants to exploit a child in a 
sweatshop;  on  the  contrary,  they  think  that  by  buying  the  suit  and  looking 
presentable  in  the  job  interview  will  give  them  the  opportunity  to  combat 
injustice.  By following the social convention of looking smart (usually considered 
the ‘right’ thing to do in a job interview), the graduate is inadvertently causing 
harm.    Inadvertence  is  an  excusing  condition  because  the  agent  is  not  doing 
something of kind x, that we would ordinarily assume to be morally wrong. 
 
Thirdly, individuals are objectively constrained by the system.
96  This excuse falls 
under the category of coercion, necessity or duress.  And I think here it is helpful 
to separate these three forms of constraint.  In terms of coercion, individuals may 
want to fight the system that perpetuates an injustice such as sweatshop labour, 
but oftentimes activists are arrested or imprisoned for taking direct action against 
corporations that use sweatshops.  State coercion, in the form of the police, can 
directly  prevent  individuals  from  fighting  injustice.
97   Duress,  if  understood  as 
lesser than coercion, in the sense that coercion requires threat by an agent(s)
98, 
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operates  within  society  in  the  sense  that  individuals  must  conform  to  certain 
standards, e.g. working a certain number of hours in order to have enough money 
to make ends meet, not ‘rocking the boat’ at work in order to keep their job etc.  
In terms of necessity, the graduate may not want to buy the suit from a company 
that uses sweatshops, but if they want the job they have to look a certain way.  
The graduate will probably have limited funds to buy a suit, and like everybody 
else, needs a job in order to earn money just to survive.  There are forms of 
participation  in  unjust  processes  that  seem  ‘necessary’  for  participation  in  our 
current socio-economic system. 
 
While Young thinks of these as three separate excuses, the excusing conditions 
from  moral  responsibility  for  global  injustice  can  be  better  understood  in  the 
framework  I  have  developed  here.  Individuals  are  excused  from  moral 
responsibility for global injustice because they do not intend to reproduce unjust 
structural  processes,  thereby  undermining  the  voluntariness  condition  for 
blameworthiness  (Wallace’s  principle  of  “no  blameworthiness  without  fault”).
 
This lack of intent can be demonstrated by meeting either the excusing condition of 
inadvertence,  or  of  coercion,  duress  or  necessity.    Wallace  argued  that  the 
presence of either of these excusing conditions would be sufficient to excuse an 
individual of moral responsibility.  Either excuse is sufficient to demonstrate lack 
of intent, which is necessary to avoid blameworthiness.
99   
 
For Young, moral responsibility requires causal connection to harm, knowledge 
and voluntariness.  These three conditions are necessary for blameworthiness.  
Ordinary individuals are not exempt from moral responsibility – they have the 
capacity  to  reason  and  to  act  according  to  those  reasons  –  so  they  meet  the 
knowledge condition.  Rather, Young argues that they are excused because they 
do not meet the voluntariness condition.  If it can be shown that an agent did not 
voluntarily cause harm, they can be excused from moral responsibility.  In the 
case of global injustices, individuals may demonstrate lack of voluntariness on the 
grounds  of  these  two  excusing  conditions.    Inadvertently  contributing  to  the 
perpetuation of unjust economic processes means that the agent is not doing 
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something  of  kind  x  that  we  consider  to  be  morally  wrong.
  100   External 
constraints, or what Young calls “objective constraint”, mean that agents may be 
forced due to coercion, duress or necessity into participation.
101  These excuses do 
not exculpate individuals from all forms of responsibility – their connection to the 
unjust processes generates political responsibility – but they can excuse individuals 
from moral responsibility.  
 
There  is  a  potential  flaw  in  this  line  of  reasoning,  however,  which  has  been 
highlighted by Arendt’s work on Eichmann.  Consider that Eichmann claimed he 
was not anti-Semitic and he did not want to kill Jews.  It seems that Eichmann 
lacks the relevant ‘quality of will’ that is necessary on this account to be found 
morally responsible.  Indeed, in the trial it was difficult to prove that Eichmann 
displayed  mens  rea,  which  was  necessary  in  order  to  find  him  criminally 
responsible.
102  So now we find ourselves in hot water, because we want to find 
Eichmann morally responsible for his acts but it appears to not be possible on 
this account of moral responsibility.  It is for this reason that Arendt argues we 
should not bother worrying about an agent’s quality of will when they acted; all 
that matters is what they did.
103 
 
I think, however, the Youngian account of moral responsibility can be rescued 
from Arendt’s powerful objection.  Consider first that Eichmann certainly does 
not meet the exempting conditions for moral responsibility: he was a normal adult 
with fully functioning mental capacities, as confirmed by several psychiatrists.
104  
So Eichmann cannot be exempted from moral responsibility.  Can he be excused? 
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Eichmann claimed that he did not intend to cause the suffering and deaths of 
millions of victims in the Holocaust.  Does this claim undermine the necessary 
condition for blameworthiness?  If Eichmann’s supposed lack of intention could 
be backed up by one of the excusing conditions then possibly it would.  The first 
kind of excusing condition is inadvertence, mistake or accident.  Eichmann did 
not organise transportation to concentration camps inadvertently, by mistake or 
by accident; rather it was a methodical, highly organised process that extended 
over many years, so this excuse is not open to him.  The second is unintentional 
bodily movements.  Again, as his work was methodical and long-term, it cannot 
be  explained  by  momentary  physical  incapacity.    The  third  excuse  is  physical 
constraint.  Eichmann was not physically constrained in any way or physically 
forced into carrying out his work. 
 
The final excuse that might prove lack of intent is the class of coercion, necessity 
or  duress.    This  may  plausibly  seem  available  to  Eichmann.    He  argued,  for 
example, that he had to do what he did.  But we know this to be false.  As Arendt 
argued, there was not a single case in which a member of the SS who refused to 
take part in an execution was himself executed.
105  Eichmann was able to ask for a 
transfer to a different job or department.  There was never a threat of death or 
physical harm to Eichmann.  And as he could simply have transferred to another 
‘well-paying job’ there is no excuse from necessity.
106 
 
Arendt’s objection to our interest in the quality of an agent’s will seems powerful.  
However, as I have been arguing it does seem that in ordinary circumstances, we 
are interested in whether someone meant to cause harm or not.  We care about 
whether or not an individual can be exempted or excused for what they did.  
Eichmann may have claimed to not intend what he did, but on closer inspection 
this  claim  seems  utterly  disingenuous.    None  of  the  excusing  conditions  are 
available  to  him  and  so  we  can  reject  his  claim  to  be  excused.    Thus,  this 
Youngian approach to moral responsibility that I have constructed still stands. 
 
On my Youngian definition of relational moral responsibility, if an agent, who has 
the capacity to form beliefs about the world and to act on those beliefs, has a range 
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of epistemic possibilities available and chooses the blameworthy option, then they 
are blameworthy.  An agent can be exempted from moral responsibility if they do 
not have capacity in the two senses described; if they do not know what they are 
doing.  An agent can be excused from moral responsibility on the basis of lack of 
knowledge  about  the  consequences  of  their  acts,  physical  incapacity,  or 
interference with their normal deliberative processes; in these cases they did not 
meet the condition of voluntariness. 
 
Doubtless  there  are  many  objections  to  such  a  construction  of  moral 
responsibility  and  the  ways  in  which  it  can  excuse  individuals  of  moral 
responsibility  for  global  injustice.    In  particular,  it  may  be  objected  that 
demonstrating individuals’ lack of intent to perpetuate global structural injustice 
because they contribute inadvertently, or out of coercion, duress or necessity, is 
letting ordinary individuals off the hook too easily.  Also, more investigation is 
required into whether either excuse is really sufficient in itself to demonstrate lack 
of  intent  and  thus  to  excuse  moral  responsibility.
107   However,  I  think  this 
reconstruction  of  Young’s  account  of  moral  responsibility  will  suffice  for  our 
purposes in that it coheres well with Young’s sketchy view of moral responsibility, 
as requiring causal connection to harm, voluntariness and sufficient knowledge, 
while cashing it out in more detail and situating it within the existing literature.  I 
want,  however,  to  make  one  further  step  in  the  argument.    Within  reasons-
responsive accounts of moral responsibility there is a contemporary debate over 
the  question  of  whether  moral  responsibility  can  be  attributed  to  an  agent’s 
character, or is a form of accountability for what they have done.  I want to 
suggest  that,  from  a  Youngian  perspective,  moral  responsibility  should  be 
understood as accountability for an act or omission, rather than as attributability.  
This  is  important  for  understanding  Young’s  account,  I  suggest,  because 
attributivist views collapse the distinction between relational moral responsibility 
and moral responsibility as virtue. 
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3.3  Accountability 
 
Bovens writes that, ‘The term ‘to be responsible’ suggests, both in its Germanic as 
in its Romance origin, the notion of giving an answer, respondere.’
108  It is not a 
request for information, ‘but an answer in the sense of giving account, justifying 
oneself, or defending oneself against an accusation.’
109  Graham Haydon argues 
similarly,  that  ‘the  root  notion  is  that  of  answering,  in  the  sense  of  rebutting 
charges… to be responsible is to be, in one way or another, in a position to give an 
account of one’s conduct.’
110 
 
This  sense  of  responsibility  as  accountability,  however,  has  been  forcefully 
challenged  in  recent  years.    Gary  Watson  argues  that  there  are  two  kinds  of 
reasons-responsive  accounts  of  moral  responsibility:  accountability  and 
attributivism.
111    Attributivists  have  a  deeper  understanding  of  moral 
responsibility.  Rather than requiring that an agent give an account of what they 
did, agents are morally responsible for acts or states of mind that can be attributed 
to that agent, in the sense that it reflects something about their character.  An 
agent’s  acts  reflect  their  deeply  held  attitudes  and  beliefs,  and  so  an  agent’s 
wrongful act can be attributed to the agent’s character.  And it is not merely 
voluntary actions that determine moral responsibility, but an agent can be held 
morally responsible for non-voluntary states of mind such as beliefs and attitudes.  
The reason is that, in the way that our actions are responsive to reasons, so too 
are attitudes and beliefs.  If attitudes and beliefs are morally objectionable, and 
they could be changed if the agent reflected on them, then the agent is morally 
responsible for those beliefs.  As Angela Smith puts it, attributivists ‘attempt to 
ground an agent’s responsibility for her actions and attitudes in the fact (when it is 
a fact) that they express who she is as a moral agent.’
112 
 
The  Youngian  account  of  moral  responsibility  that  I  have  developed  here  is 
clearly on the accountability side of this debate.  Agents only have to answer for 
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acts that have caused harm, which they did intentionally and with knowledge of 
what they were doing.  But a discussion of this debate, I think, will help to clarify 
her views on moral responsibility more fully.  Specifically, attributivists collapse 
the distinction between the ‘bad’ and the ‘blameworthy’ and in so doing they 
collapse  the  distinction  between  relational  moral  responsibility  and  moral 
responsibility as virtue, which is integral to Young’s account. 
 
3.3.1  Bad and Blameworthy 
 
One of the objections to attributivism is that it collapses the distinction between 
“bad” and “blameworthy”.  Neil Levy describes this problem as follows: 
 
That  people’s  actions  are  typically  expressions  of  their  judgments  and 
commitments ought to be common ground.  Equally, we ought to agree 
that some of these attitudes are bad – contemptible, abhorrent, malevolent 
and so on – and others good.  But it neither is, nor ought to be, common 
ground that we are responsible for everything that can be attributed to us.  
There is, after all, a natural alternative.  We can hold that assessment of 
attitudes is simply that:  the attribution of qualities to the agent that are 
good or bad, admirable or repugnant.  After all, prima facie there ought to 
be conceptual space for such assessment.  We ought to be able to say that 
something is bad without saying that it is blameworthy.
113 
 
On this view, we can describe people as “bad” without considering them to be 
“blameworthy”.  The idea is that there can be criticism without blame.  J.J.C. 
Smart describes this as ‘grading.’  In the same way that we grade a footballer’s 
abilities, we can grade an individual’s moral attributes.  He writes that, ‘Praise and 
dispraise, in this sense, is simply grading a person as good or bad in some way.’
114  
Michael Slote argues that in the same way that we might criticize a painting for 
not being very good, which does not imply any moral fault, we can criticize a 
person without implying that they are blameworthy.
115 
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T.M. Scanlon, however, thinks that this view denies the fact that moral criticism 
has  a  ‘special  force.’
116   He  claims  that  his  account  of  moral  responsibility  as 
attributability can account for this special force by doing two things.  Firstly, it 
differs from an assessment of a person’s personal attributes by questioning their 
‘judgement-sensitive  attitudes  and  calls  for  possible  revision  of  them.’
117   And 
secondly,  ‘moral  criticism  differs  from  other  criticism  of  judgment-sensitive 
attitudes because of the particular significance that this form of justifiability has 
for an agent’s relations with others.’
118  And so, what matters is that a person’s 
attitudes  and  beliefs  are  sensitive  to  reasoning,  and  if  those  beliefs  impinge 
negatively upon their relations with others, we blame them in order to persuade 
the agent to change their attitudes and beliefs. 
 
Wallace argues, however, that there is more to moral blame than the connection 
between a person’s views and the fact that these are open to reasoning.  This is 
because an individual’s aesthetic or scientific views are also open to reasons, and 
criticism might influence a person to change those views.
119 He writes that,  
 
criticism  of  a  person’s  opinions  in  terms  of  reasons  is  normally  very 
different  from  moral  blame  for  a  person’s  action  and  decisions…    the 
difference seems to consist in the fact that moral blame has a quality of 
opprobrium that is lacking in criticism of beliefs or opinions.  Hence we 
cannot  hope  to  account  for  this  special  force  solely  in  terms  of  the 
connection of moral blame and responsibility with justification.
120   
 
Wallace is arguing that moral responsibility only manifests itself in relation to acts 
and  decisions,  and  that  the  connection  between  moral  views  and  justification 
cannot account for the special force of moral blame because there is a connection 
between  other  types  of  views  and  justification.    What  Wallace  misses  in  this 
criticism is Scanlon’s second point – that moral justification applies to beliefs and 
attitudes that affect relations with others.  However, I would argue that Scanlon’s 
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second  point  still  does  not  hold,  because  a  person’s  scientific  or  aesthetic 
judgments can affect their relations with others too; for instance, a person may 
believe that climate change has not been sufficiently scientifically proven or may 
believe that all non-European art is necessarily aesthetically inferior.  These views, 
considered  as  scientific  or  aesthetic,  may  well  affect  relations  with  others  in 
potentially significant ways.  And so it cannot be that moral judgment-sensitive 
attitudes affect relations with others and that is what gives them their special 
force, when other kinds of judgment-sensitive attitudes (scientific or aesthetic) can 
affect relations with others too.  The facts of justification and affecting relations 
with others, then, do not lend moral views their special force.  
 
Smith thinks that Wallace’s association of moral responsibility and blame with 
actions is misguided, and that Scanlon is right – we can be blamed for anything 
for which a justification is owed, including beliefs and attitudes.  Smith’s concern 
is that considering a person to be “bad” but not “blameworthy” is to somehow 
objectify that agent, to treat them as a thing to be managed and controlled.  She 
writes, that if I assess an otherwise normal adult as “cruel”,  
 
I am (in part) making a demand of him, a demand that he justify the 
objectionable judgments his actions and attitudes express concerning the 
moral status of others.  This demand by its very nature implies responsibility, 
for it is directed at his judgmental activity, activity for which we must 
regard him as responsible if we are to regard him as a moral agent in any 
sense.  To say that a person’s judgmental activity is bad but that he is not 
responsible for it is, in effect, to say that he is not to be regarded as 
someone to be reasoned with, but merely as someone to be understood, 
treated, managed, or controlled.
121 
 
I have the opposite worry to Smith.  She is concerned that saying an agent has 
done something bad but that they are not blameworthy is to treat them as an 
object rather than a moral agent.  However, we also have circumstances in which 
“good people do bad things”.  We might want to say that what an agent did was 
wrong and blameworthy, and that they ought to be held to account for it, but they 
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are not necessarily a bad person.  For example, are all soldiers blameworthy people 
or  do  they  do  blameworthy  acts  (e.g.  killing  people)  as  part  of  their  role?  
Conceivably a soldier could act out of honourable motives (wanting to facilitate 
peace  by  ousting  corrupt  and  brutal  dictators,  for  instance),  whilst  doing 
blameworthy acts to achieve that goal (killing other humans).   
 
The attributivist view is too strong.  If someone does something morally wrong as 
part of their job, it would not necessarily be indicative of their character.  A “good 
person” might do “bad things” because of the role they are in.  There are many 
“bad” roles in the world but they are not necessarily filled by “bad” people.  This 
is how a non-bad person can carry out a blameworthy act, which is why the 
distinction between being bad and blameworthy is a useful one.  It might indicate 
weakness of will to be doing such a job, but that is a different kind of flaw to the 
moral fault being attributed to that person.  It may be that the agent can be excused 
for taking that role; for instance, they may have taken it out of necessity if there 
are  no  other  jobs  available  to  them.    We  would  still  want  to  hold  the  agent 
accountable for particular wrongful acts or omissions committed within that role, 
however.  So making the distinction between bad and blameworthy is not about 
seeing  someone  as  needing  to  be  ‘treated,  managed  or  controlled’,  but  about 
understanding the context and circumstances of the act; understanding that the 
person is not necessarily of a blameworthy character because of what they did.  
 
Another reason for maintaining this distinction is that the blameworthiness of a 
person’s  character  is  a  different  question  as  to  whether  or  not  the  agent  did 
blameworthy acts.  This problem can be brought out in the comments of another 
attributivist, Robert Adams.  He rejects the view that ignorance is culpable only if 
it arises from negligence, e.g. a graduate of Sandhurst or West Point who did not 
realise the duty to non-combatants as humans would be negligent, but an officer 
brought up on Hitler’s Jugend would not be.
122  He thinks this view is wrong for 
the following reason:  
 
The beliefs ascribed to the graduate of the Hitler Jugend are heinous, and it 
is morally reprehensible to hold them (even if one has no opportunity to 
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act on them).  No matter how he came by them, his evil beliefs are a part 
of who he is, morally, and make him a fitting object of reproach.  He may 
also be a victim of his education; and if he is, that gives him a particular 
claim to be regarded and treated with mercy – but not an exemption from 
blame.
123 
 
This  directly  contradicts  what  Arendt  has  to  say  about  moral  responsibility.  
Arendt  was  not  interested  in  who  an  individual  was  as  a  person  –  she  was 
interested in what they did.  Whether or not it is expressive of a person’s character 
is not pertinent to the question of whether or not they are morally responsible for 
that act.  This gets to the heart of Arendt’s point that an ordinary German citizen 
during  the  Nazi  era  bore  a  different  kind  of  responsibility  to  someone  like 
Eichmann.  Consider this: do we really want to argue that a German citizen, who 
internalized Nazi anti-Semitic attitudes but who did not actually harm any Jews, 
was  morally  responsible  in  the  same  way  as  Eichmann,  a  person  whose  acts 
facilitated the murder of millions of Jews?  We might think that the anti-Semitic 
German citizen was a bad person, but we think that Eichmann was blameworthy.   
 
As  Levy  has  pointed  out,  this  distinction  is  fundamental  and  is  lost  in  the 
attributability account of moral responsibility.  What was wrong with the German 
citizen’s attitudes, according to Arendt, was that it contributed to an environment 
that made the evil acts of others possible, but as that person did not commit evil 
acts  themselves,  then  the  attribution  of  moral  responsibility  to  that  person  is 
unjustified.    What  kind  of  responsibility  that  individual  bears  is  a  different 
question to the one of what constitutes moral responsibility.  Relational moral 
responsibility applies to what someone did, and so it is Eichmann and others like 
him, not ordinary Germans, who were morally responsible for the crimes of the 
Holocaust.  The German soldier, in Adams’ case, is probably both “bad” and 
“blameworthy” – bad in the sense of having a poor character, and blameworthy in 
the  sense  of  acting  on  it.    However  it  is  not  his  character  that  makes  him 
blameworthy, but his acts. 
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The motivation for Arendt’s argument that moral responsibility applies to what a 
person actually did, is to undermine the excuse “I was just doing my job.”  The 
attributivist view cannot give a good account of this problematic.  Here the agent 
is arguing, “I’m not a bad person, but I did something blameworthy as part of my 
job, for which I should not be held responsible.”  Arendt is arguing that the agent 
is accountable for that wrongdoing, regardless of whether or not it was committed 
as part of the agent’s job.  But as for the question of whether or not that agent is a 
“bad” person, she does not care.  That is not what we are interested in when 
assessing whether an agent bears relational moral responsibility for an act, but it is 
something on which the agent can reflect on in private. 
 
3.3.2  Two Concepts of Moral Responsibility 
 
Young  picks  up  on  this  idea  by  agreeing  that  we  should  only  hold  agents 
responsible (in the sense of being accountable) for their blameworthy acts and 
omissions.  The question of being a “bad” person is separate.  However, this 
brings us full circle to the start of this chapter, when I argued that there are two 
concepts  of  moral  responsibility  in  Young’s  account  –  relational  moral 
responsibility and moral responsibility as virtue.  Attributivists not only collapse 
the distinction between the bad and the blameworthy, but they also collapse the 
distinction  between  relational  moral  responsibility  (accountability  for  harm  to 
others) and moral responsibility as virtue (character).   
 
This distinction is crucial to Young’s account.  Consider one aspect of Young’s 
distinction between moral responsibility and political responsibility: that moral 
responsibility  is  ‘backward-looking’  and  political  responsibility  is  ‘forward-
looking.’  For attributivists, moral responsibility is forward-looking.  The aim in 
holding someone morally responsible for their attitudes or beliefs is to get them 
to  change  them.    On  the  accountability  view,  which  Young  adopts,  moral 
responsibility is backward-looking.  The aim is to be held to account, which may 
include the further step of being made to pay or being punished, for something 
that has happened. 
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As  Bovens  argues,  however,  if  we  accept  that  there  are  two  forms  of  moral 
responsibility – accountability and virtue – then the relationship between the two 
is dynamic.  Accountability can be reformist; it goes hand-in-hand with moral 
responsibility  as  virtue,  because  it  encourages  the  cultivation  of  virtue  in  the 
future.
124   In  the  Nuremberg  trials,  new  norms  were  created  in  terms  of 
functionaries having to take responsibility for their wrongdoings within complex 
organisations instead of citing the excuse “I was just doing my job.”  In the 
process of holding individuals to account for past acts: 
   
Active  notions  of  responsibility  are  thus  created,  made  explicit,  or 
discarded in the process of calling someone to account.  These notions, 
however, also cast their shadows ahead, they set the norms for future 
conduct and can thus play an independent role in the control of conduct.  
The knowledge (or probability) that we shall be held to account for things 
that go wrong often forces us to seek new ways of preventing such a 
situation from arising.
125 
 
Recall  that  Young  argues  that  moral  and  legal  responsibility  are  “primarily 
backward-looking”.    She  acknowledges  the  forward-looking  elements  (e.g. 
deterrence  and  reform)  but  she  is  describing  the  fact  that  they  are  primarily 
backward-looking,  which  on  the  accountability  view  of  moral  responsibility  is 
true.  The forward-looking/backward-looking distinction is not a sharp normative 
dichotomy, but a description of how these practices function and interact with 
each other.  This claim can be made sense of once we understand the two forms 
of moral responsibility as accountability (primarily backward-looking) impacting 
on moral responsibility as virtue (forward-looking). 
 
The attributivist can respond that it is the virtue notion that is core to moral 
responsibility, in the sense that it is a protection against blameworthy behaviour.  
Adams writes,  
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The ever present possibility of internal conflict is not only a vexation and 
a potential hindrance to resolute action; it is also a wellspring of vitality 
and sensitivity, and a check against one-sidedness and fanaticism.
126 
 
As Arendt argues, however, this is not pertinent to relational moral responsibility 
and what individuals ought to be held accountable for. What matters for relational 
moral responsibility is how our voluntary acts affect others.  Internal conflict is 
pertinent to the question of virtuous character, which is not within the realm of 
appropriate moral criticism by others.  And as we have already seen, Young agrees 
with Arendt on this, when she writes: 
 
Responsibility in that liability sense should be reserved for persons who 
can be specifically identified as causing the harm, usually knowing what 
they are doing.  I think Arendt is right that it is a bad idea to blur the 
conditions  for  saying  that  persons  are  guilty  or  at  fault.    It  is  often 
important to pin a wrong on someone who did something or was in the 
unique position to have prevented it.
127 
 
There  is  a  further  concern  here  in  collapsing  relational  and  virtue  moral 
responsibility.  Adams argues further, ‘We ought not only to try to have good 
motives and other good states of mind rather than bad ones; we ought to have 
good ones and not bad ones.’
128  So if we do not have good states of mind, we are 
blameworthy.  However, who is the judge of what constitutes a good or bad state 
of mind?  Consider, for example, that for centuries in the UK homosexuality was 
outlawed and considered to be a “bad” thing.  If homosexuality was considered to 
be bad by society, a homosexual person, even if they did not act on their desires, 
would have been considered blameworthy on this view.  A retort could be that 
homosexuality  is  like  height  or  hair  colour  –  something  outside  the  realm  of 
judgment-sensitive  attitudes.
129   But  this  was  not  the  prevailing  view;  it  was 
considered to be something that could be reflected on and changed, and indeed in 
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some parts of the world still is considered that way.  The accountability view has 
better  resources  here;  it  can  simply  say  that  unless  a  blameworthy  act  was 
committed  (something  that  was  actually  wrong)  then  the  individual  is  not 
blameworthy.    In  short,  the  attributivist  approach  is  too  contingent  on  social 
context; it can render people blameworthy when their only fault is to have some 
sort of disposition that is considered to be bad by that particular society.   
 
Young’s understanding of virtue is other-regarding.  So can we blame each other 
on her view for having a certain character?  Let’s consider a harder case, where 
the  attributivist  view  of  moral  responsibility  seems  appealing,  and  one  which 
Young would be sensitive to – a misogynist in a misogynistic society.  We might 
find the misogynist’s belief that women are second-class citizens, objects for his 
amusement, and objects of justifiable hatred, contemptible.  We might think he is 
a “bad person”.  But on this accountability view, that I am proposing is Young’s 
view of moral responsibility, it is only when the misogynist acts on these views is 
he  blameworthy.    Say,  for  example,  the  misogynist  is  an  employer  who 
consistently hires men over women, or that he commits rape.  In these instances, 
we can say that he has actually done something wrong and is morally responsible, 
and therefore he ought to be held to account.   
 
Even  though  the  misogynist’s  beliefs  are  embedded  in  a  wider  misogynistic 
society,  the  attributivist  can  say  that  the  misogynist’s  views  themselves  are 
blameworthy.  This seems appealing from a feminist perspective.  Do not we 
want to be able to say that his views are blameworthy, despite the fact that they 
are characteristic of the society he lives in, and even if he fails to act on them?  
Young’s approach has the resources to deal with this objection.  On Young’s 
view, individuals bear a political responsibility to ensure that their actions and 
attitudes  are  such  so  as  not  to  perpetuate  injustice  in  society.    So,  while  the 
misogynist  is  only  morally  responsible,  i.e.  guilty  and  blameworthy,  when  he 
commits a harmful act; he is failing in his political responsibility for justice when 
he holds these kinds of beliefs.  The politically responsible person would reflect 
on their attitudes and beliefs, and on how these reflect and affect wider society, 
and change those beliefs should they be perpetuating injustice.  An individual who 
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the world around them, would reflect on these views and change them once they 
realise that they contribute to structural injustice in the form of gender inequality.   
 
The misogynist is not morally responsible for his beliefs; he should not be blamed 
because he has not acted on them, and his views are indicative of the society he 
lives in as much as his character.  But he can be criticised.  Political responsibility, 
remember, is a form of moral responsibility as virtue and it is non-blameworthy.  
We  can,  however,  have  criticism  without  blame.
130   We  can  criticize  the 
misogynist’s beliefs, arguing that they are reprehensible; this criticism, however, 
falls short of blame, which should be reserved for cases where he has actually 
done something wrong.  Moreover, political responsibility has a social element.  
Criticising and holding one another to account when we have done something 
wrong, is one way to discharge political responsibility and to generate recognition 
of it in others.  Taking up political responsibility is a social process and part of 
that process involves enjoining others to recognise their responsibilities.  We can 
criticize others until they begin to understand that they have this responsibility.  
As Young argues, we have ‘a right and an obligation to criticize the others with 
whom we share responsibility.’
131 
 
In sum, relational moral responsibility on the Youngian approach ought to be 
interpreted  as  accountability  for  past  wrongful  acts  or  omissions,  which  were 
committed with knowledge and voluntariness.  The agent has to give an account 
of what they did, and if no exemptions or excuses are available, the agent is 
blameworthy  and  morally  responsible.    The  Youngian  approach  resists  the 
attributivist  challenge,  which  argues  that  non-voluntary  states  of  mind  are 
blameworthy and that a wrongful act is indicative of a blameworthy character, 
because this cannot account for how otherwise ‘good’ people can do blameworthy 
acts as part of their job.  It also is too contingent on social circumstances, with the 
potential  to  blame  individuals  for  states  of  mind  that  are  not  blameworthy.  
Rather,  on  the  Youngian  approach,  there  is  a  separate  category  –  moral 
responsibility as virtue – which as a political responsibility enjoins individuals to 
constantly reflect on how their actions and views affect wider society.  This active 
form of responsibility can be encouraged by holding people to account for their 
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blameworthy acts.  It can also be fostered by criticising, but not blaming, those 
who hold views that are disrespectful of others.  This distinction between the two 
concepts of moral responsibility is fundamental to Young’s approach. 
3.4  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have attempted to flesh out and, to some extent, construct a 
Youngian  account  of  moral  responsibility.    I  argued  firstly  that  Young 
acknowledges two types of moral responsibility – relational moral responsibility 
and  moral  responsibility  as  virtue.    I  then  focused  on  relational  moral 
responsibility.    I  have  argued  that  Young’s  comments  on  moral  responsibility 
imply  that  she  favours  a  normative  reasons-responsive  account  of  moral 
responsibility.  This implies firstly, that for an agent to be a suitable candidate for 
ascriptions of praise and blame that they must have the capacity to form beliefs 
about the world and make decisions on the basis of those beliefs.  Secondly, an 
agent  can  be  excused  from  moral  responsibility  if  they  meet  certain  excusing 
conditions which imply that they did not actually do anything wrong.  If the agent 
acted through accident, mistake or inadvertence; if the agent acted as a result of 
reflex bodily movements; if the agent omitted to act because of physical restraint; 
or if the agent acted under coercion, duress or necessity, then the agent can be 
excused  from  blame.    I  showed  how  these  excusing  conditions  apply  to 
individuals acting in the context of the global capitalist economy.  Finally, I argued 
that relational moral responsibility should be understood as accountability rather 
than attributability, because we want to maintain both the distinction between the 
bad and the blameworthy, and the distinction between backward-looking moral 
responsibility as accountability and forward-looking moral responsibility as virtue. 
 
What we can conclude from this is that Young’s “liability model” of responsibility 
seems to adopt a traditional version of what it is to do something wrong (the need 
for intent to violate some sort of moral expectation) and thus for an agent to be 
an appropriate candidate for an ascription of blame.  From this starting point 
evolves a traditional Aristotelian account of the appropriate conditions for praise 
and blame: lack of voluntariness in doing something wrong can excuse the agent 
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is perhaps surprising given Young’s status as a critical theorist.  But I think what 
Young  is  arguing  is  that  this  Aristotelian  story  plays  a  significant  role  in  our 
everyday moral lives.  As a critical theorist, Young starts from what is, in order to 
theorize what could be from this starting point.
132  The view of moral responsibility 
outlined  here  is  the  dominant  one  in  contemporary  Western  societies;  it  is  a 
common-sense understanding of moral responsibility.   
 
It is, however, only one part of a much bigger picture.  In this bigger picture we 
contribute to the harming of social groups, or masses of distant people, or to the 
background harm that disadvantages certain people and privileges others; but we 
contribute  unintentionally  and  in  a  causally  indirect  or  negligible  way.  
Nonetheless, we are somehow connected to and involved in this harm.  As Young 
writes,  
 
If social philosophy assumes that intended and deliberate action is the 
primary focus of moral judgment, it risks ignoring or even excusing some 
of the most important sources of oppression.  Only moral judgment that 
extends  to  habitual  interaction,  bodily  reactions,  unthinking  speech, 
feelings,  and  symbolic  associations  can  capture  much  about  such 
oppression.
133   
 
However, the lack of direct causal connection, knowledge of what we are doing, 
and lack of intent, means that holding each other blameworthy or accountable for 
this kind of harm is inappropriate.  This does not deny the fact that there is harm 
that needs to be acknowledged and remedied; rather, it shows that the common-
sense framework is not equipped to deal with forms of harm or oppression that 
arise through unintentional actions or attitudes.  And so, it is essential to create a 
supplementary framework that can deal with these kinds of harm.  That is what 
Young seeks to achieve with her “social connection model” of responsibility and 
the political responsibility that it generates.  She distinguishes between blaming 
and holding responsible.  She writes,  
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It is inappropriate to blame people for actions they are unaware of and do 
not intend.  People and institutions nevertheless can and should be held 
responsible  for  unconscious  and  unintended  behaviour,  actions,  or 
attitudes  that  contribute  to  oppression…  Calling  on  agents  to  take 
responsibility  for  their  actions,  habits,  feelings,  attitudes,  images,  and 
associations… is forward-looking; it asks the persons “from here on out” 
to submit such unconscious behaviour to reflection, to work to change 
habits and attitudes.
134 
 
And so we arrive at Young’s conception of political responsibility – a forward-
looking responsibility to think about how one’s actions, attitudes and habits can 
contribute to structural injustice and to engage in collective action for change.  In 
the  next  chapter  I  question  Young’s  assumption  that  political  responsibility 
applies to all agents within unjust structures and argue that powerful agents may 
in fact bear relational moral responsibility on the liability model for structural 
injustice.  
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In  the  previous  chapter  I  argued  that  there  are  two  conceptions  of  moral 
responsibility in Young’s theory – relational moral responsibility (the appropriate 
conditions  for  praise  and  blame)  and  moral  responsibility  as  virtue  (being  a 
morally responsible person).  I have suggested that political responsibility is a 
form of moral responsibility as virtue.  In the context of the contemporary world 
where individuals are embedded in multiple forms of what Young calls “structural 
injustice”,  such  as  sweatshop  labour  or  extreme  poverty,  we  can  excuse 
individuals  of  relational  moral  responsibility  on  the  grounds  that  they  are 
inadvertently,  unintentionally  or  unavoidably  connected  to  these  structural 
processes.  However this does not let individuals off the hook.  To be morally 
responsible in the virtue sense, individuals ought to cultivate a sense of political 
responsibility; individuals ought to be politically responsible persons who engage 
in collective action to challenge unjust structural processes. 
 
I suggested that Young is a determinist about moral responsibility to some extent.  
This is because one reason why Young argues that individuals are not morally 
responsible for global injustice is that individuals are “objectively constrained” 
within structures.  Young argues that all agents within structural processes are 
objectively constrained and so do not bear moral responsibility for the structures.  
She has been criticised for this argument, on the grounds that it not only lets 
individuals off the hook of moral responsibility,
1 but also powerful agents within 
structures, such as multinational or transnational corporations (MNCs/TNCs).
2  
In this chapter, I take up this critique. 
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I critique Young by arguing that powerful agents – agents with the capacity to 
effect structural change – can bear relational moral responsibility on the liability 
model for failing to do so.  I show this through a conceptual analysis of power.  I 
briefly  sketch  Young’s  understanding  of  structural  injustice,  then  I  analyse 
Young’s  use  of  the  term  “power”,  and  I  develop  an  account  of  the  role  of 
powerful agents within structures.  Drawing on the conception of relational moral 
responsibility that I developed in Chapter 3, I claim that powerful agents with 
dispositional capacity within structures have the “elbow room” to be able to make 
choices  that  affect  the  structures,  and  if  they  actively  and  with  intent  and 
knowledge  choose  to  perpetuate  unjust  structural  processes,  they  are  doing 
something wrong.  Thus, these agents can bear relational moral responsibility for 
structural processes on the liability model – they are blameworthy. 
 
My argument departs from Young, because she argues that power ought to be a 
“parameter  of  reasoning”  to  help  individuals  decide  how  to  discharge  their 
political  responsibility.    On  my  account,  power  can  change  the  kind  and  not 
merely the degree of an agents’ responsibility for structural injustice.  However, I 
defend and develop Young’s other “parameters of reasoning” – collective ability, 
privilege and interest.  I do this by critically engaging with the literature on each of 
these topics. 
 
In the literature on collective ability, Virginia Held and Larry May argue that if 
individuals could become collectively organised in relation to an injustice then 
they bear moral responsibility for that injustice; meaning that they are blameworthy 
if they fail to organise.  I distinguish collective ability from dispositional power, 
arguing that agents with collective ability have the capacity to influence powerful 
actors to change structural processes, but that they themselves do not have the 
dispositional power to effect structural change.  It is this difference that means 
agents with collective ability bear political responsibility for structural injustice; 
they bear a responsibility to try to change it but they are not blameworthy.  
 
In the literature on benefit, Robert Goodin and Christian Barry, and Daniel Butt, 
argue that individuals who benefit from injustice bear a moral responsibility to 
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I argue that privileged agents bear political responsibility for injustice in that they 
do not have the dispositional power to effect structural change.  The fact that 
privileged  agents  benefit  from  certain  structural  injustices  provides  a  decision 
method  for  determining  which  injustice  to  focus  on,  rather  than  conferring 
blameworthiness on these agents.  
 
Finally, the victims are agents that are positioned so as to be powerless in relation 
to structural injustice and they do not benefit from structural injustice; to the 
contrary,  they  are  disadvantaged.    It  is  usually  assumed  that  victims  bear  no 
responsibility for injustice.  I argue, in support of Young, that they bear political 
responsibility to collectively organize in relation to structural injustice.  I draw on 
literature  from  what  Angela  Davis  calls  ‘The  Black  Freedom  Movement.’
3  
Following Frederick Douglass and bell hooks in particular, I argue that there is a 
pragmatic  reason  for  victims  to  take  up  political  responsibility  for  structural 
injustice – because their involvement will be the most effective in pressuring the 
powerful  for  structural  change;  and  a  normative  reason  –  they  have  a 
responsibility to stand up for themselves.  
 
In this chapter, then, I both support and challenge Young.  I challenge her on the 
grounds that I think there are agents who can bear relational moral responsibility 
for unjust background conditions, an argument which hinges on power.  And I 
support her in arguing against those who think that collective ability or privilege 
within  structures  confers  relational  moral  responsibility  upon  agents,  arguing 
instead that these social-structural positions confer political responsibility because 
these agents do not have the capacity to effect structural change, so should not be 
blamed for failing to do so. 
 
4.1  Responsibility Within Structures 
 
Young  argues  that  individuals  have  a  political  responsibility  for  “structural 
injustice”  to  which  they  are  connected.    Structural  injustice  is  distinct  from 
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intentional individual and institutional wrongdoing.
4  Structural injustice is not a 
wrong perpetrated with intent; rather it is the outcome of multiple actions and 
processes,  enacted  by  diverse  agents,  occurring  at  different  times,  in  different 
places, all for the most part acting within accepted rules and norms.
5  Structural 
injustice is the unintended, cumulative result of ordinary and accepted behaviour. 
 
Structural  injustice  is  the  outcome  of  what  Young  calls  “social-structural 
processes”.  These have four features.  Firstly, we experience the circumstances 
we  live  in  as  “objectively  constraining”;  that  is,  the  material  circumstances 
(buildings,  infrastructure),  the  institutional  set-up  (laws,  government),  and  the 
social norms into which we are born or live, constrain our options.
6  Secondly, 
these processes situate individuals in different social positions, higher or lower in 
the  social  hierarchy,  and  thus  more  or  less  susceptible  to  domination  or 
oppression.
7    Thirdly,  these  structural  processes  are  reproduced  through 
individuals’  actions;  we  act  as  though  social  structures  exist  thus  perpetuating 
them.
8  Finally, the structures resulting from these processes often run counter to 
the intentions of any of the individual participants.
9  The cumulative outcomes of 
individuals pursuing their own ends create unintended structures.  The resulting 
structures are unjust if they constrain the options of many, while enabling some 
individuals or groups to benefit from their constraint.
10   
 
The example of structural injustice that Young uses throughout her work on the 
social connection model of responsibility is sweatshop labour.  Nobody intends 
sweatshop labour.  It exists because of a range of circumstances and behaviours 
that enable it to occur.  All the participants in the process are objectively constrained 
(although in different ways and to different degrees): the garment workers often 
face  the  choice  between  gruelling  subsistence  living  in  the  countryside  or  a 
salaried job in a garment factory under terrible working conditions; the factory 
owners keep wages low to compete with other local factories; governments fail to 
enforce labour standards to compete with other countries where labour is cheaper 
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and because they lack the public sector infrastructure;
 11 and consumers of “fast 
fashion” feel that they “need” a range of clothing in order to present themselves 
in a socially acceptable way in their societies.
12  The process is enabled because of 
different social positions: there are billions of people in the world living in poverty, 
desperate for secure employment, large corporations who are able to exploit their 
vulnerability,  and  consumer  demand  for  cheap  clothing.    The  processes  are 
reproduced by consumers continually demanding new clothes, transnational clothing 
companies  profiting  and  expanding,  governments  failing  to  implement  labour 
standards,  and  the  constant  need  for  employment  in  developing  countries.  
Finally, the cumulative outcome of all of these processes and behaviours is the 
perpetual exploitation of garment workers in diverse geographical locations.
13 
 
To be sure, Young argues that there are agents acting in ways that ought to be 
subject to legal and moral sanction.  For instance, factory owners and managers 
can and ought to be held legally responsible for human rights violations.
14  States 
ought to be blamed for failing to maintain a human rights floor.
15  However, 
sanctioning a few factory owners or blaming states will not solve the problem of 
sweatshop labour, ‘so long as that incentive structure is in place and sanction is 
not routine.’
16  The point of talking about structural injustice as opposed to the 
wrongdoings  committed  by  particular  individual  or  institutional  agents  is  to 
highlight a problem with the background conditions.  Young writes, ‘When we 
judge that structural injustice exists, we are saying precisely that at least some of 
the  normal  and  accepted  background  conditions  of  action  are  not  morally 
acceptable.’
17  Her aim is to work out how we can be judged responsible for these 
background conditions. 
 
In Chapter 6 I show how sweatshop labour constitutes a form of “structural 
exploitation.”  In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Young defines exploitation as 
the transfer of energies from disadvantaged groups to advantaged groups in a way 
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that inhibits the self-development of the former and enhances the status of the 
latter.    The  inhibition  of  self-development  is  what  Young  argues  constitutes 
oppression, and so sweatshop labour is a form of oppression. 
 
We  saw  in  the  previous  chapter  the  reasons  why  ordinary  individuals  can  be 
excused from relational moral responsibility for structural injustice like sweatshop 
labour: they do not intend to cause it, they are inadvertently implicated in the causal 
perpetuation of sweatshop labour, and they are objectively constrained by the system.  
The problem of sweatshop labour is a problem of unjust background conditions, 
which are not directly caused with intent or knowledge by individuals.  Indeed, 
individuals  are  themselves  constrained  by  the  system.  Individuals  cannot  be 
blamed for structural exploitation. 
 
There  is  an  element  of  determinism  in  this  argument  – individuals  cannot  be 
blamed because they cannot freely choose their actions due to the fact that they 
are  ‘objectively  constrained’.      Young  defines  objective  constraint  as  the 
accumulation of material infrastructure and resources, and institutional and social 
norms that create the circumstances in which we act.
18  Objective constraint does 
not ‘eliminate freedom,’ but it does generate a range of options for action.
19  It 
will be often be experienced, however, as constraining: 
   
Individuals experience social structures as constraining, objectified, thing-
like.  Even relatively privileged individuals will often say that they “have 
no choice” about doing or not doing certain things because of the way 
that they experience structural processes.
20 
 
Young thinks that collective agents, including powerful collective agents, can also 
experience social-structural processes as objectively constraining.  In the context 
of sweatshop labour, she argues that even though factory owners can and ought 
to be blamed and held liable for egregious working conditions that they will try to 
mitigate  their  responsibility  by  arguing  that  there  are  ‘factors  outside  their 
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control.’
21   She agrees that ‘there is a good measure of truth to the claim that the 
employers themselves operate under serious structural constraints.’
22  Employers 
would be forced to comply with human rights standards if these were enforced by 
the state.  However, states in developing countries argue that they operate under 
constraints preventing the improvement of working conditions; such as the need 
to create jobs, lack of a strong public sector, inability to strengthen the public 
sector because of the low tax base, and because of pressures for reduced public 
spending from the IMF.
23   She writes,  
 
When these agents claim that they operate under constraints beyond their 
control and must submit to the pressures of more powerful institutions, 
and  that  these  leave  them  few  options  to  operate  factories  differently, 
there is some basis for their excuses.
24   
 
Young,  however  does  not  tell  us  what  the  responsibilities  are  of  these  ‘more 
powerful institutions.’  She also seems inclined to lessen the responsibilities of 
individuals within powerful organisations.  For instance, she claims that corporate 
executives become indignant and ‘scoff at the absurd extremism’
25 of the anti-
sweatshop  movement,  because  they  think  it  misunderstands  how  structural 
processes  work.    The  concept  of  political  responsibility  removes  rhetorics  of 
blame and finger-pointing, thus making it more likely that corporate executives 
will get on board.
26   
 
It is my view, however, that Young is too quick to let certain agents off the hook 
of moral responsibility by invoking the concept of objective constraint.  All actors 
may be objectively constrained by the processes of the global capitalist economic 
system; structural exploitation is built into global capitalism.  And yet, I contend 
that some agents still have sufficient room to manoeuvre within those constraints 
to  be  held  morally  responsible  on  the  liability  model  for  the  perpetuation  of 
unjust background conditions.  In the previous chapter I argued, following Daniel 
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Dennett, that agents need “elbow room” to make decisions based on a range of 
options, which will always occur within some constraints.  We can hold agents 
morally  responsible  on  the  basis  of  how  well  they  navigate  these  options  for 
action,  provided  the  agents  are  not  either  exempt  or  excused  from  moral 
responsibility.    I  argue  in  this  chapter  that  within  unjust  social-structural 
processes, some agents have more elbow room than others – powerful agents, 
defined as agents with the dispositional power to effect structural change – and it 
is on that basis that they can be held morally responsible for a structural injustice 
like sweatshop labour.   
 
Indeed, Steven Lukes argues that we are interested in understanding how power is 
exercised  within  structures  precisely  for  the  purposes  of  assigning  (moral) 
responsibility  within  structures:  ‘The  point…  of  locating  power  is  to  fix 
responsibility  for  consequences  held  to  flow  from  the  action,  or  inaction,  of 
certain specifiable agents
.’27 He argues that, 
 
although  the  agents  operate  within  structurally  determined  limits,  they 
none  the  less  have  a  certain  relative  autonomy  and  could  have  acted 
differently.    The  future,  though  it  is  not  entirely  open,  is  not  entirely 
closed either (and, indeed, the degree of its openness is itself structurally 
determined).  In short, within a system characterized by total structural 
determinism, there would be no place for power.
28 
 
As Young herself argues, objective constraint is not a theory of ‘total structural 
determinism’; it does not eliminate freedom – it creates a range of options for 
action.    Powerful  agents  presumably  have  a  wider  range  of  options  than  less 
powerful or powerless agents.  I argue that this will change not only the degree of 
their responsibility, but the kind of responsibility.  This may continue to raise the 
problem of pointing-the-finger and blaming certain individuals or institutions for 
structural injustice; but if the blame is appropriately assigned then I do not take 
this to be a problem.  We certainly should not remove blame, if it is appropriate, 
merely for the purposes of making powerful agents feel less guilty and thus more 
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amenable to changing the situation.  The argument that certain powerful agents 
can  bear  moral  responsibility  for  structural  injustice  hinges  on  a)  how  we 
understand  power,  and  b)  how  much  we  take  structures  to  constrain  agents’ 
options.   
 
4.1.1  What is Power? 
 
Young suggests power as a parameter of reasoning for thinking about how to 
discharge political responsibility, for the following reason: 
 
An agent’s position in structural processes usually carries with it a specific 
degree  of  potential  or  actual  power  or  influence  over  processes  that 
produce the outcomes.  Where individuals and organizations do not have 
sufficient energy and resources to respond to all of the structural injustices 
to which they are connected, they should focus on those where they have 
a greater capacity to influence structural processes.
29 
 
Power here is equated with ‘capacity to influence structural processes.’  Because 
Young  considers  power  as  a  way  of  parcelling  out  political  responsibility,  as 
opposed  to  relational  moral  responsibility,  having  the  capacity  to  influence 
structural processes is considered as one way of thinking about where to direct 
individual or organizational energy to combat structural injustice.   
 
Of course, power is a deeply contested – potentially “essentially contested”
30 – 
concept.  It is far beyond the scope of this chapter to cover all the various and 
competing theories of power in normative political theory.  However, we do not 
need to go so far.  There is ambiguity in Young’s work in her use of power, which 
I will explore here. 
 
Young’s  brief  comment  that  power  is  the  ‘capacity  to  influence  structural 
processes’ is a capacity definition of power, or in commonly used terminology in 
power debates it is a conception of ‘power to’ (as opposed to ‘power over’).  One 
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of the most influential capacity theories of power is Arendt’s.  She defines power 
as follows: 
 
Power  corresponds  to  the  human  ability  not  just  to  act  but  to  act  in 
concert.  Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to a 
group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps together.
31   
 
Young  describes  Arendt’s  conception  of  power  as  ‘the  capacity  for  collective 
action.’
32  While Young admires Arendt’s discussion of power, she thinks it is 
‘incomplete’  because  it  ‘tends  to  ignore  structural  social  relations,  and  their 
manner  of  channeling  power  to  the  systematic  advantage  of  some  and  the 
disadvantage of others.’
33 
 
Another capacity theory of power that does just that is C. Wright Mills’ The Power 
Elite.  Unlike Arendt, Mills does not think that power depends on numbers.  He 
argues  that  power  is  a  capacity  that  individuals  have  because  of  their  social 
position within institutions, specifically within the government, military and big 
business.  For Mills, social structures determine who has got power as capacity 
and who does not.     
 
Mills does not see those individuals in positions of power – the leadership in 
government, corporations or the military – as objectively constrained.  Rather, 
they are the ones doing the objective constraining.  We can see the distinction 
between  those  individuals  who  are  objectively  constrained  by  the  system,  and 
those who do the constraining, in Mills’ enigmatic opening paragraph: 
 
The powers of ordinary men are circumscribed by the everyday worlds in 
which  they  live,  yet  even  in  these  rounds  of  job,  family,  and 
neighbourhood  they  often  seem  driven  by  forces  they  can  neither 
understand nor govern… But not all men are in this sense ordinary.  As 
the means of information and of power are centralized, some men come 
                                                 
31 Hannah Arendt, On Violence  (London: Harcourt, 1970), 44. 
32 Iris Marion Young, Global Challenges: War, Self-Determination and Responsibility for Justice  
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), 84. 
33 Global Challenges: War, Self-Determination and Responsibility for Justice  (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2010), 91. Moral Responsibility, Power and the “Parameters of Reasoning” 
  115     
to occupy positions in American society from which they can look down 
upon, so to speak, and by their decisions mightily affect, the everyday 
worlds of ordinary men and women.
34  
 
The power elite are the decision-makers in society, who are positioned to be able 
to determine the options of ordinary people: ‘The power elite is composed of 
men  whose  positions  enable  them  to  transcend  the  ordinary  environments  of 
ordinary men and women; they are in positions to make decisions having major 
consequences.’
35   
 
Moreover, what is unique and distinct about the position of the power elite is 
their ability to change structures and their positions within structures: 
 
It  is  also  true  that  if  most  men  and  women  take  whatever  roles  are 
permitted to them and enact them as they are expected to by virtue of 
their position, this is precisely what the elite need not do, and often do not 
do.  They may call into question the structure, their position within it, or the way in 
which they are to enact that position.
36 
 
For  Mills,  the  power  elite  are  ‘role-determining’,  determining  the  options  of 
ordinary people and choosing their own roles.
37  In other words, individuals who 
are positioned in social structures in positions of power have the capacity to be 
able to shape social structures.  Mills argues that we need to understand where 
power lies in order to understand responsibility for social structures.  He argues, 
 
To  pretend  that  ‘we’  are  all  history-makers  is  politically  irresponsible 
because  it  obfuscates  any  attempt  to  locate  responsibility  for  the 
consequential  decisions  of  men  who  do  have  access  to  the  means  of 
power.
38 
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The politically responsible person will try to ascertain where power lies and hold 
those  individuals  to  account.
39   To  argue  that  social  structures  are  necessarily 
beyond any individuals’ or groups’ control, ‘is largely a fatalist projection of one’s 
own feeling of impotence and perhaps, if one has ever been active politically in a 
principled way, a salve of one’s guilt.’
40 
 
There are, of course, problems with Mills’ account of power, which I will come to 
in a moment.  But what is illustrative for our purposes is the idea that a) there are 
individuals or collectivities with the power to change structures and affect the 
lives of millions of people, and that b) these agents can bear relational moral 
responsibility for their decisions in this respect.  Indeed, part of being a politically 
responsible  individual  is  to  try  to  work  out  where  power  actually  lies  within 
structures in order to be able to hold these agents to account. 
 
In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Young critiques ‘distributive’ theories of power, 
such as Mills’, from a feminist and anti-racist perspective.  A capacity theory of 
power, like Mills’, assumes that ‘power, like wealth, is concentrated in the hands 
of  a  few.’
41   This  is  an  inadequate  understanding  of  power  in  contemporary 
welfare-industrialised societies where ‘many widely dispersed persons are agents 
of power without “having” it, or even being privileged.’
42 
 
In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Young adopts a Foucauldian conception of 
power – that power is diffused across society, that it is everywhere, it is relational 
and is productive.
43  She argues that ‘power is a relation rather than a thing.’
44  It is 
not ‘a kind of stuff possessed by individual agents in greater or lesser amounts.’
45  
Rather, power is a relationship between the exerciser and others upon whom it is 
exercised,
46 and it ‘exists only in action.’
47  Moreover, power does not have to be a 
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dyadic  relationship  between  ruler  and  subject.
48    An  agent  can  have 
institutionalized power over another only with the support of the actions of many 
third parties.  For example, a judge has power over a prisoner only insofar as the 
prison wardens, lawyers, and parole officers support them.  Young equates power 
with domination and conceives of domination as structural.
 49 
 
This conception of power would seem to clash with Young’s understanding of 
power as the ‘capacity to influence structural processes’ in her work on the social 
connection  model  of  responsibility,  because  in  this  instance  Young  thinks  of 
power as a capacity for ‘power to’ that can influence structural processes for the 
good.    The  implication  is  that  power  is  not  always  equivalent  to  domination 
(‘power over’); it can be used for positive change.  It also changes the meaning of 
power from its association with exercise to a capacity.  
 
These  different  conceptions  of  power  need  not  be  contradictory  if,  following 
Mark Haugaard, we understand power as a “family resemblance concept” rather 
than an “essentially contested concept”.
50  Given these competing views of power 
that Young seems to subscribe to, it makes sense to assume that she thinks there 
are  different,  non-exclusive  conceptions  of  power,  rather  than  one  definitive 
conception.  Haugaard distinguishes at least three members of the conceptual 
family: 
 
Episodic power refers to the exercise of power that is linked to agency.  
Dispositional power signifies the inherent capacities of an agent that the 
agent may have, irrespective of whether or not they exercise this capacity.  
Systemic power refers to the ways in which given social systems confer 
differentials or dispositional power on agents, thus structuring possibilities 
for action.
51 
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Such a typology is implicit in Young’s discussions of power.  In Justice  and  the 
Politics of Difference she writes: 
 
Domination  must  be  understood  as  structural  precisely  because  the 
constraints that people experience are usually the intended or unintended 
product of the actions of many people, like the actions that enable the 
judge’s power.  In saying that power and domination have a structural 
basis,  I  do  not  deny  that  it  is  individuals  who  are  powerful  and  who 
dominate.  Within a system of domination some people can be identified 
as  more  powerful  and  others  as  relatively  powerless.    Nevertheless  a 
distributive understanding misses the way in which the powerful enact and 
reproduce their power.
52 
 
Here  there  is  a  conception  of  systemic  domination  –  the  structuring  of 
possibilities for action.  There is also a conception of episodic power – individuals 
do the dominating.  And a conception of dispositional domination – agents are 
situated within social structures so as to have the capacity for domination whether 
or not they act on it.   
 
In her work on the social connection model, when Young describes power as the 
‘capacity  to  influence  structural  processes’,  Young  is  emphasising  dispositional 
power – the capacities that agents have to change structures whether or not they 
use this capacity.  This is the power emphasised by C. Wright Mills – the ‘power 
elite’ are structurally positioned to have the capacity to question and change the 
structures or their position within structures.  The problem with Mills’ account is 
not  that  he  was  wrong,  but  that  he  restricted  his  conception  of  power  to 
dispositional power.  Young does not need to do that.  But the problem is that 
Young does not fully acknowledge the significance of dispositional power.  What is 
also missing from Young’s account is a discussion of the episodic power exercised 
by the agents that have dispositional power within structures.  That is, she does not 
tell us what it means when powerful agents exercise their power within structures.  
We need to know whether agents can exercise episodic power within structures 
and what it means when they do. 
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4.1.2  Power and Responsibility within Structures 
 
Structure and responsibility are often opposed.  It is assumed that if there are 
structures that determine power relations then the actors are constrained to the 
extent that they cannot bear responsibility within those structures.  As Haugaard 
writes,  
 
In the normative language game, power is seen in evaluative terms.  Thus, 
for instance, it can be argued that in opposing power to structure, the 
former entails responsibility, while the latter does not.  In many normative 
language games, structure entails an inability to do otherwise.  At trial, a 
Nazi may wish to plead that they had no power to do otherwise, that the 
structures of the situation made any other action impossible and, thus, they 
were powerless.  Hence, power and structure are opposites divided from each 
other based on responsibility.
53 
 
Here Haugaard is arguing that responsibility within structures depends upon an 
ability ‘to do otherwise.’  I argued in Chapter 3 when discussing relational moral 
responsibility, that it is not the ability to do otherwise that determines whether or not 
an agent has done something wrong.  What is required is that the agent have 
“elbow room”, or a range of options within constraints, and the ability to choose 
within those options; if they choose to do something wrong and are not exempt 
from moral responsibility, or they do not meet any of the excusing conditions for 
moral responsibility, then that agent is blameworthy.  The reason why ordinary 
individuals are excused from moral responsibility for structural injustice is because 
they are not doing anything wrong.  I outlined R. Jay Wallace’s excusing conditions 
and showed how they applied to ordinary individuals.  In going about their daily 
business ordinary individuals a) do not intend to contribute to unjust background 
conditions, they do so inadvertently; b) they think they are doing the right thing by 
following accepted rules and norms, so are not doing something of kind x that we take 
to  be  morally  wrong,  and  c)  they  are  constrained  by  the  system  in  which  they 
participate, often acting out of necessity or duress.   
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It is not the case, however, that all agents are so constrained.  As C. Wright Mills 
has suggested, some agents create the structures, or at least have the power to 
change  the  structures.    These  agents  have  dispositional  power  within  structures.  
These agents are not objectively constrained, because agents with dispositional 
power within structures, in relation to the structures, have the elbow room to 
make decisions that could change unjust structural processes for the better.  The 
fact that they choose not to act to change the structures for the better, I suggest, is 
an exercise of episodic power and confers relational moral responsibility on these 
agents for these unjust structures. 
 
For  instance,  we  saw  in  the  previous  chapter  how  a  powerful  individual  – 
Eichmann – claimed that he did not intend to cause harm and so should not have 
been held morally responsible for the Holocaust.  Yet, on closer examination, we 
found  this  claim  to  be  disingenuous.    None  of  the  excusing  conditions  were 
available  to  Eichmann  –  he  did  not  organise  transportation  to  concentration 
camps  through  inadvertence,  mistake  or  accident;  he  did  not  do  so  out  of 
unintentional bodily movements, physical constraint, or due to coercion, necessity 
or duress. 
 
In the context of structural injustice, like sweatshop labour, we should be critical 
of claims to excuse, and reluctant to take them at face value; because while these 
excusing  conditions  may  be  available  to  ordinary  individuals,  they  are  not 
necessarily  available  to  powerful  collectivities  or  powerful  individuals.    For 
example, TNCs or MNCs may argue that they do not intend to exploit garment 
workers, but they cannot be said to meet the excusing conditions for relational 
moral responsibility in the way that ordinary individuals can.  
 
Consider the first excusing condition for moral responsibility – inadvertence, mistake 
or accident.  In these cases the agent does something of kind x that we consider to 
be morally impermissible, but it turns out they did not know they were doing 
something of kind x.  If an agent does not know they are doing something of kind 
x, then they are not acting intentionally.  Wallace’s example is I walk to the fridge 
and accidentally step on someone’s hand – I wasn’t aware I was doing something Moral Responsibility, Power and the “Parameters of Reasoning” 
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wrong.    The  idea  that  large  transnational  or  multi-national  corporations  are 
engaged in exploitative working practices due to inadvertence, mistake or accident 
is disingenuous.  These corporations are aware of the conditions in the factories 
that produce their products but they choose to ignore it.  Or if they are not aware, 
presumably it is within the realm of responsibility of certain agents within these 
organisations  to  be  aware  or  become  aware  of  where  their  goods  are  being 
produced – the ignorance is not excusable.  In fact, corporations actively seek out 
countries and factories with the lowest wages and lowest overheads in order to 
increase  profits.    They  are  not  employing  workers  in  sweatshop  conditions 
inadvertently, accidentally or mistakenly; they do so with intent.   
 
The next two excusing conditions are physical incapacity or physical constraint; neither 
of  which  apply  to  corporate  agents.    The  final  excusing  condition  is  coercion, 
necessity or duress.  The excuse from coercion is not available because TNCs and 
MNCs are not acting so as to avoid a physical threat.  The excuse from duress – 
that society is organised so that there is no option but to participate – is more 
plausible.  Robert Mayer argues that businesses in the competitive global garment 
industry  are  avoiding  the  threat  of  going  bust;  that  they  must  participate  in 
sweatshop labour for this reason.
54  I argue that this depends on the size of the 
corporation.  There is no need for a corporation like Nike to pay Michael Jordan 
more than the income of 30,000 Indonesian workers to advertise their shoes, or 
to pay their CEO $35.2 million in 2012.
55  The role of business is to maximise 
profit,  and  they  owe  this  to  their  shareholders;  but  profligate  spending  on 
individuals is not part of that role – that money could be redirected to workers 
(more on these arguments in Chapter 6).  The same applies to the excuse from 
necessity  –  whether  this  excuse  is  available  will  depend  on  the  size  of  the 
corporation and how they are spending their money.  In the case of TNCs or 
MNCs, this excuse will rarely be available. 
 
What we are talking about here, however, is whether or not these powerful agents 
can  bear  relational  moral  responsibility  for  unjust  background  conditions,  not 
specific  transgressions  of  moral  principles  or  specific  transactions  between 
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corporations and workers.  According to Young, structural injustice is not caused 
by particular agents; rather it is the cumulative outcome of multiple agents’ actions 
within  accepted  rules  and  norms.    No  agent  can  be  held  blameworthy  for 
structural injustice because no agents directly cause it with intent and knowledge.  
But  I  suggest  that  agents  with  dispositional  power  within  structures  can  bear 
relational  moral  responsibility  on  the  liability  model  for  the  background 
conditions; they are blameworthy.  This is because they are positioned within the 
system to be able to change the background conditions if they wanted, as Mills 
pointed out.   
 
There are examples of this happening in practice.  The Ethical Trading Initiative 
(ETI) is a consortium of corporations, NGOs and trade unions that works to 
improve labour standards in global supply chains.
56  Members sign up to a labour 
code of practice, committing them to improving wages and working conditions 
across their supply chain.  The problem with the ETI is that it is not legally 
binding; signing up to it can be a PR exercise for corporations.   
 
Following a factory collapse in Dhaka, Bangladesh in 2013 in which over 1,100 
people  died,  150  corporations  from  20  countries  have  signed  up  to  the 
Bangladesh  Accord  on  Fire  and  Building  Safety.
57   This  is  a  legally  binding 
agreement  over  five  years,  which  requires  signatories  to  agree  to  independent 
inspections  of  factories,  to  remedy  any  faults  that  have  been  found,  and  to 
provide fire and building safety training to staff.
58  Such an agreement costs large 
corporations very little.  Allowing for inspections, making one-off investments in 
building infrastructure in developing countries, and giving staff basic fire safety 
training are not financially onerous tasks.  So the question is why has this not 
happened sooner?  Also why does this agreement only apply in Bangladesh and 
not other countries with high numbers of sweatshops?  And why does it only 
apply for five years?  It is not threatening to the existence of global corporations 
to sign up to agreements such as this, yet if there were fire and building safety 
agreements  that  were  legally  binding  and  applied  globally,  it  would  effect 
structural change insofar as it improves worker safety across the board.   
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By reaching joint, binding, global agreements on working conditions, and also on 
wages,  TNCs  and  MNCs  have  the  capacity  to  alleviate  the  worst  aspects  of 
sweatshop labour – the race to the bottom that sacrifices workers’ wages and 
safety for the sake of increased profits.  This is what I mean by saying that they 
have the dispositional power to effect structural change.  These agents have the 
power to change the rules of the game.  The large TNCs and MNCs always had 
the capacity to implement these sorts of changes, but until 2013 when they were 
forced by the worst industrial disaster in the history of the apparel industry, and 
the  subsequent  media  attention  and  consumer  pressure,  they  failed  to  do  so.  
They  are  continuing  to  fail  to  implement  these  basic  structural  changes  in  all 
countries apart from Bangladesh.  And there are global corporations operating in 
Bangladesh who have still failed to sign the Accord.
59   
 
Omitting  to  make  these  basic  changes  is  an  exercise  of  episodic 
power; corporations with the capacity to be able to effect structural change are 
choosing not to do so and this choice is inexcusable according to the excusing 
conditions for moral responsibility outlined here.  Thus, large corporations are 
doing  something  morally  wrong  and  it  follows  that  they  ought  to  be  found 
blameworthy.    It  is  too  weak,  and  an  inadequate  assessment  of  the  power 
structures involved in structural injustice, to claim that they merely bear political 
responsibility.    That  claim  is  only  available  to  agents  who  do  not  have  the 
dispositional  power  to  change  the  structures.    Those  agents  who  have 
dispositional power within structures have the required elbow room to choose 
whether or not to act morally and change the structures.   
 
I  suggest,  then,  that  there  may  be  many  more  instances  of  backward-looking 
liability in relation to background conditions, where powerful agents had options 
and  could  have  improved  the  structures,  but  chose  not  to.    These  agents  with 
dispositional power within structures are exercising episodic power for ill.  These 
choices  are  made  intentionally  and  knowingly;  therefore  these  agents  are 
blameworthy and ought to be held to account.  Thus, there are potentially more 
                                                 
59 Jasmin Malik Chua, "15 Major Retailers That Haven't Signed the Bangladesh Safety Agreement," 
Ecouterre,  http://www.ecouterre.com/15-major-retailers-that-havent-signed-the-bangladesh-
safety-agreement/. Moral Responsibility, Power and the “Parameters of Reasoning” 
  124     
instances where responsibility can be assigned on the liability model, and more 
agents to whom it can be assigned, than Young admits to.   
 
Note that it is not only collective or corporate agents that will be held morally 
responsible  on  my  account.    There  will  be  powerful  individuals  within 
organisational structures who are the decision-makers with the capacity to effect 
change in the structures.  As Mills pointed out, part of the task of the politically 
responsible person is to work out which agents are exercising power and to hold 
them to account.   
 
In some cases it may be appropriate to hold a corporate entity responsible.  Peter 
French distinguishes between an “aggregate” and a “conglomerate” collectivity.  
An aggregate collectivity is, ‘merely a collection of people’ – the identity of the 
group changes when individuals join or leave.
60  A conglomerate collectivity is an 
organisation that will not be affected by changes in specific personnel; it also has 
an internal decision-making structure and an enforced standard of conduct for its 
members.
61    French  argues  that  conglomerates  can  be  organized  so  that 
responsibility for the failure of projects does not fall on individual members.
62  
We can ascribe responsibility to a conglomerate collectivity qua collectivity, rather 
than as applying to individual members of the group; for instance when it is 
argued that Nike is responsible for sweatshop labour, the responsibility is not 
necessarily  distributed  or  distributable  among  the  individual  members  of  the 
group.  As Virginia Held argues, when a person decides to boycott a company for 
moral reasons, they may make the judgment “Corporation Z should not have 
done A”.
63   
 
From the perspective of the corporation’s employees, however, they may want to 
know  who  made  the  relevant  decisions.    We  then  find  ourselves  in  a  “Many 
Hands” situation.  Dennis Thompson coined this phrase in relation to political 
decision-making:  when  ‘many  different  officials  contribute  in  many  ways  to 
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decisions and policies of government, it is difficult even in principle to identify 
who  is  morally  responsible  for  political  outcomes.’
64   Therein  follows  an 
assessment of the different ex ante task responsibilities of different agents within 
the organisation to determine their degree of responsibility.  As interesting as it 
would be to pursue this topic here, it is beyond the scope of this chapter.  What it 
serves  to  highlight,  however  is  that  even  within  the  “Chinese  box”
65 of  a 
corporation  or  government  – complex  institutions  that  contain  many  internal 
decision-making units – we can differentiate kinds and degrees of responsibility.  
An analysis using both the liability model and the social connection model would 
be appropriate. 
 
My view deals with the objection that Young fails to take seriously the role of 
corporations  in  actively,  intentionally  and  knowingly  perpetuating  unjust 
background conditions.  As Gould points out, this is surprising given Young’s 
earlier work.
66  And it is a clear omission in her account given that she criticizes 
Thomas Pogge for failing to give a sufficient account of the role of corporations.
67  
I have shown that an analysis of power within Young’s writing can demonstrate 
how  agents  positioned  so  as  to  be  powerful  within  structures  and  who  are 
exercising power for ill ought to be held blameworthy even if they are operating 
within constraints.  Drawing on my construction of a Youngian conception of 
relational moral responsibility, I have used this to show that agents such as global 
corporations  can  bear  moral  responsibility  on  the  liability  model  for  unjust 
background  conditions  in  the  global  garment  industry,  because  they  have  the 
elbow room to be able to make moral decisions to change unjust structures and 
none of the excusing conditions for moral responsibility are available to them.
68  
These agents can be blamed. 
 
Young  does  not  want  to  go  down  the  route  of  blaming  powerful  agents  for 
structural injustice on the grounds that it creates a division between ‘powerful 
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wrongdoers and those who are innocent’, which in the case of structural injustice 
is  disingenuous  because  all  are  implicated  in  the  processes  that  reproduce 
injustice.
69   However,  I  think  we  can  maintain  that  powerful  agents  who  can 
change structures are morally responsible for failing to do so, while also arguing 
that individuals have a political responsibility in relation to structural injustice to 
try  to  improve  it.    In  the  framework  I  have  developed,  agents  that  have  the 
dispositional  capacity  to  effect  structural  change  can  bear  (relational)  moral 
responsibility  on  the  liability  model  for  failing  to  do  so;  agents  lacking 
dispositional power can bear political responsibility (moral responsibility as virtue) 
to work collectively for structural change.  Young always intended the liability 
model  and  social  connection  models  to  be  complementary.
70   And  as  Young 
herself points out, the powerful cannot be trusted to fulfil their responsibilities of 
their own accord.
71  It is up to other agents connected to injustice to pressure 
them to so do.  Part of what political responsibility entails is individuals engaging 
in collective action to pressure the powerful to act in the interests of justice.  
Agents  with  collective  ability,  privilege  or  interest  in  overcoming  structural 
injustice, need to push the powerful for change.  
4.2  “Parameters of Reasoning” 
 
Young’s “parameters of reasoning” are designed to help individuals think about 
how to discharge their political responsibility for structural injustice in practice.  
Young considers power to be one of the parameters of reasoning, but in this 
chapter  I  have  shown  that  power  is  more  significant  than  that;  agents  with 
dispositional  power  within  structures  can  be  held  morally  responsible  for 
structural processes on the liability model if they have the capacity to change the 
structures and fail to do so.  The analysis of power developed in the previous 
section will be threaded through the discussion of the other three parameters of 
reasoning  –  collective  ability,  privilege  and  interest.    I  outline  how  Young 
understands these three parameters of reasoning and then I develop each concept 
more fully, comparing it to the existing literature.  In so doing, I consolidate the 
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idea  that  each  parameter  is  a  way  for  discerning  how  to  discharge  political 
responsibility,  as  opposed  to  a  way  of  generating  moral  responsibility  for 
structural  injustice  in  the  case  of  collective  ability  and  privilege,  or  no 
responsibility at all in the case of victims. 
 
4.2.1  Collective Ability 
 
Young argues that collective ability ought to be a parameter of reasoning about 
political responsibility because, 
 
I have asserted that the shared responsibility for undermining injustice can 
be discharged only through collective action.  Agents who participate in 
processes that produce injustice often need to reorganize their activities 
and relationships to coordinate their action or coordinate it differently.  
Getting individuals and institutions organized in a new way, however, is 
often rather difficult.  When I name “collective ability” as a parameter that 
agents might use to think about what to do about a structural injustice, I 
have the following in mind.  Some agents are in positions where they can 
draw on the resources of already organized entities and use them in new 
ways  for  trying  to  promote  change.    Unions,  church  groups,  and 
stockholder  organizations,  to  name  just  a  few,  sometimes  can  exercise 
significant power not because they can coerce others to do what they 
decide, but because they have many members who act together.
72 
 
There are three separate claims here.  One is a pragmatic argument that it makes 
sense to use pre-existing organisations to promote structural change because they are 
already organised and have resources.  The second claim is that taking up political 
responsibility requires collective action.  And the third claim is that collectivities with 
collective ability are only powerful in the sense that they have large numbers of 
people; they do not necessarily have the capacity for coercion.  Each of these claims 
needs to be assessed separately. 
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The pragmatic argument makes sense insofar as Young wants time- and resource-
poor individuals to act on their political responsibility.  Joining or becoming more 
active within pre-existing organisations is a convenient way of doing this.  It can 
also be effective.  Young cites student anti-sweatshop activists who target their 
universities.
73  As bulk buyers of clothing for sports teams or for sale, getting 
universities to buy fair trade clothing has made an impact.  These campaigns also 
raised awareness of the issue on campuses, including among students and staff 
who may not otherwise have been aware, interested, or supportive.  As a result of 
these  campaigns,  many  universities  have  pledged  support  to  the  Fair  Labor 
Association or the Workers Rights Consortium.
74  Student anti-sweatshop groups 
now are pressuring universities to cancel contracts with corporations that have 
not signed the Bangladesh Accord.
75 
 
Utilizing pre-existing collectivities as a way of discharging political responsibility is 
convenient and can also be effective.  However, as Young herself has pointed out, 
there are issues with this approach.  Convenience, ‘is not always a reason to give 
priority to that issue, for such ease of organization may be a sign that the action 
makes  little  structural  change.’
76   If  an  organisation  already  exists  and  has 
collective ability in relation to a particular structural injustice, it may indicate that 
participating in that organisation is not a way to effect structural change.  As 
Young  also  points  out,  the  existing  institutional  set-up  may  be  the  thing  that 
needs to change.
 77   
 
Sometimes,  then,  taking  up  political  responsibility  will  involve  creating  new 
collectivities.  This leads us to Young’s second claim that challenging structural 
injustice requires collective action.  This raises the question as to whether or not a 
“putative  group”  can  bear  responsibilities,  and  what  kinds  of  responsibilities 
individuals  will  have  when  they  are  organised  into  groups.  The  dominant 
argument in the literature is that putative groups can bear moral responsibility for 
injustice. 
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Larry May describes a “putative group” as a group of people who are capable of 
acting  in  concert,  but  currently  lack  decision-making  apparatus  or  a  formal 
institutional  structure.
78 A  putative  group  can  be  found  guilty  of  “collective 
inaction”: this ‘refers to the failure to act of a collection of people that did not 
choose as a group to remain inactive but that could have acted as a group.’
79  
 
Virginia Held gives the example of three pedestrians walking down a street when 
a building collapses, trapping a man’s leg.  The three people know that they need 
to apply a tourniquet to the man’s leg but they disagree over how to move the 
debris.  They also know that any of the suggested actions would be better than no 
action yet they fail to come to a decision.  She argues that, ‘the random collection 
can be held morally responsible for failing to make a decision on which action to 
take – for failing, that is, to adopt a decision method.’
80  She claims that moral 
responsibility can be ascribed to this group of individuals, ‘when it is obvious to 
the reasonable person that action rather than inaction by the collection is called for.’
81 
 
Joel Feinberg offers the beach example.  A man is swimming by a public beach 
where there is no lifeguard.  He gets into difficulty and shouts for help.  There are 
one  thousand  capable  swimmers  lying  on  the  beach  and  nobody  attempts  to 
rescue him.   In this case, common law would not impose any kind of liability 
(neither criminal nor civil) on the group.  The common reasoning is that liability 
will be imposed on the whole group which causes complications: either everyone 
will try to rescue the man creating chaos, or everyone will try to avoid the chaos 
leading to tragic omission.
82  Feinberg rejects this traditional rationale, however, 
claiming that the group should be blamed and liability distributed: 
 
everyone should use his eyes and his common sense and cooperate as best 
he can.  If no one makes any motion at all, it follows that no one has done 
his best within the limits imposed by the situation, and all are subject at 
least to blame.  Since all could have rescued the swimmer, it is true of each 
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of them that but for his failure to attempt rescue in the circumstances that 
in fact obtained, the harm would not have occurred.
83 
 
For  Feinberg,  then,  like  Held,  the  failure  to  cooperate  is  what  generates  the 
group’s liability.  May takes a different view about the distribution of liability.  He 
argues in relation to the beach example that an individual’s share of responsibility 
will depend upon the role that they could have played in the rescue.  An individual 
with leadership or persuasion skills could have organised the group sufficiently to 
act.  He argues, ‘When collective inaction occurs, responsibility will vary based on 
the  roles  people  could,  counterfactually,  have  played  in  bringing  the  putative 
group to act.’
84  
 
Feinberg discussed the beach example to highlight a flaw in the law.  But Held 
and May are interested in these arguments in relation to global moral and political 
problems.  Held argues, 
 
If a reasonable person judges that the overthrow of an existing political 
system is an action that is obviously called for, he may perhaps consider 
himself morally responsible for the failure of the random collection of which 
he is a member to perform this action.  If he thinks some action to change 
an  existing  political  system  is  called  for,  but  is  not  clear  about  which 
action, he may consider himself morally responsible for the failure of the 
random collection of which he is a member to perform the quite different 
action of transforming itself into a group capable of arriving at decisions 
on such questions.
85 
 
Held argues that individuals are morally responsible for failing to create a group 
decision-making  procedure  for  deciding  how  to  deal  with  systemic  political 
problems.  Larry May argues in relation to the beach example that in this instance 
there may not have been any of the necessary features of a putative group that 
would  render  it  capable  of  action,  such  as  leadership,  solidarity  or 
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communication.
86  So while there may have been culpable individual omissions, 
(on the part of individuals who could have taken a leadership role) the beach 
example  does  not  necessarily  constitute  collective  inaction.
87   In  relation  to 
something like a famine, however, which is an on-going situation, where there is 
the time to get organised, where there are people who know how to take on 
leadership roles, and there is a precedent for how to organise, then the putative 
group would be morally responsible for failing to act.
88 
 
Peter  French  thinks  that,  whatever  the  merits  of  the  small-scale  emergency 
examples,  of  the  collapsed  building  or  the  beach,  that  these  are  simply  not 
analogous to global problems.  He asks, ‘Could some group, if only they would 
organize, control an African famine in the way the sunbathers could rescue the 
child?’
89  How could we apply Held’s reasonable person test in relation to global 
problems, or how do we know that there are individuals with May’s leadership or 
persuasion skills on the global stage?
90  He asks us to suppose that Upper- and 
Middle- Class People from the Western Industrial Democracies (UMCPWIDs) 
are morally responsible for world hunger: 
 
To be held morally responsible for it, however, the UMCPWIDs must be 
in a position to override the actual causal factors and either perpetuate the 
hunger or relieve it.  And how is so nebulous a group as the UMCPWIDs 
to do anything like what is required?  It makes little sense to say that they 
can unless they are transformed radically.  But transformed into what?  
The  UMCPWIDs  must  be  turned  into  a  corporation-like  entity  (or 
entities) in the fullest sense of the term, with vast powers on the global 
scene.  But is such a corporate entity actually formable?  What would it 
look like?  How would it function?  As these questions become more and 
more intractable, the sense of the original responsibility ascription fades.  
In their disorganized states, fictive inaction groups certainly do not have 
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the  requisite  control  for  moral  responsibility.    Inaction  is  all  one  can 
expect from a group gathered only in the moralist’s imagination.
91 
 
From  the  Youngian  perspective,  putative  groups  do  not  bear  relational  moral 
responsibility for global structural injustice, but political responsibility; she is not 
suggesting that they are blameworthy.  This seems to me to be a more plausible 
suggestion than Held or May’s argument that in these global cases individuals who 
fail to organise are blameworthy for situations that could have been alleviated had 
they collectively organised, and this is precisely for the reason that French points 
out  –  even  if  individuals  do  collectively  organise  they  do  not  have  the 
dispositional power to effect the required structural change.  Martha Nussbaum 
draws attention to the problem in Young’s solution, that if individuals are never 
held morally responsible for failing to organise ‘they get a free pass indefinitely, 
since no task they have failed to shoulder ever goes onto the debit or guilt side of 
their ledger.’
92   
 
Young’s  response  is  that  individuals  cannot  be  blamed  for  failing  to  act 
collectively to challenge structural injustice, but they can be criticised for failing to 
act or for taking inappropriate action.
93  In Chapter 3, following J.J.C Smart and 
Michael Slote, I argued that criticism does not necessarily invoke blame but can be 
a form of ‘grading’; it can entail non-moral judgment.  Part of being a politically 
responsible,  politically  engaged  person,  involves  working  together  to  improve 
collective action so that it is more effective.  This could involve calling out other 
individuals on their failure to act or drawing attention to how the group action 
could be improved.  It is a process of constructive criticism rather than moral 
chastisement.  Perhaps there are individuals who will take advantage of this and 
not  engage.    In  this  case,  however,  these  individuals  will  be  free-riders.    In 
Arendtian terms, they may want to think for themselves about whether or not 
their actions are moral; but it is not up to the group to blame them for their lack 
of political action. 
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But French’s comment raises another issue.  He asks what would happen if the 
UMCPWIDs turned into ‘a corporation-like entity… with vast powers on the 
global scene.’  What happens when individuals take up their political responsibility 
and form into groups?  Would this kind of collectivity be blameworthy for failing 
to remedy global structural injustice?  This is where my distinction between agents 
with the dispositional power to affect structures, and agents lacking this kind of 
power comes into play.  The reality is that if UMCPWIDs did organise, they 
would not have dispositional power on the global scene.  It is more likely that 
they will organise into a social movement, which is a group that has collective 
ability, which is a form of power, but it is not the same as dispositional power to 
change  social  structures.    Perhaps  if  the  group  was  sufficiently  large  it  could 
become a revolutionary group, in which case it could have the power to effect 
structural change.  But most such groups will not grow to this size and capacity.  
And even if individuals did organise into a global revolutionary force, they would 
not  bear  backward-looking  moral  responsibility  for  structural  injustice  on  the 
liability model, because there was nothing they could have done about it until that 
point. 
 
We  arrive,  then,  at  the  third  issue  with  Young’s  opening  paragraph  about 
collective ability.  She suggested that there is a difference between groups with 
collective ability and groups with the potential for coercive power.  But she says 
nothing more about this.  Young is unreflectively hinting at the distinction I have 
developed and that I think is very important for the social connection model.  As 
I  have  been  arguing,  groups  with  the  dispositional  power  to  effect  change  in 
structures bear relational moral responsibility for failing to make changes.  But I 
suggest further that groups with collective ability but not dispositional power, 
only bear political responsibility for change.   
 
To return to the debates around power, I am suggesting the Arendtian definition 
of power – a capacity that depends on numbers – accords with “collective ability”.  
Some  groups  may  have  collective  ability  but  not  dispositional  power  within 
structures.  This would render them politically responsible but not blameworthy 
for structural injustice.  Consider trade unions, for example.  Trade unions are 
organisations  of  workers.    They  do  not  have  the  power  in  the  sense  of  the Moral Responsibility, Power and the “Parameters of Reasoning” 
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dispositional capacity conferred by structural position to change the rules of the 
game, but they have the numbers to be able to bargain with employers, through 
the use of threats like withdrawal of labour, to be able to pressure the powerful.  
Collective ability is distinguished from dispositional power, in that dispositional 
power  implies  a  structural  position  that  confers  the  capacity  to  change  the 
structures,  whereas  collective  ability  generates  the  capacity  to  pressure  or 
influence  the  powerful.  Influence  can  coincide  with  dispositional  power  (e.g. 
business  lobbies),  but  there  are  many  agents  with  collective  ability  but  not 
dispositional power (e.g. trade unions, social movements). 
 
This distinction is latent and implicit in Young’s writing.  She suggests that, 
 
The problem with power as a parameter of responsibility in relation to 
structural injustice is that those agents with significant power in relation to 
the unjust structures usually have an interest in their perpetuation.
94 
 
Here she hints that there is something different about agents that have power 
within structures – they have an interest in perpetuating those structures.  In my 
schema, the reason why powerful agents have an interest in perpetuating the status 
quo  is  because  the  existing  structures  position  them  to  have  the  dispositional 
capacity for power to change structures and power over other agents.  This is 
something they want to maintain because it is a means to achieving their ends 
and, perhaps for some agents, being powerful is an end in itself. 
 
I am less squeamish than Young about suggesting that these agents bear moral 
responsibility  for  structural  injustice.    As  I  have  argued,  if  an  agent  has  the 
dispositional  capacity  to  effect  change  in  unjust  structures  because  of  their 
position within the structure, they are morally responsible for failing to do so.  
Agents  with  collective  ability,  but  not  dispositional  power,  have  a  political 
responsibility to pressure powerful agents to do more. 
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4.2.2  Privilege  
 
The third parameter of reasoning about political responsibility is privilege.  Young 
writes: 
 
Where  there  are  structural  injustices,  these  usually  produce  not  only 
victims,  but  also  persons  with  relative  privilege  in  relation  to  the 
structures.    Most  agents  who  occupy  positions  of  power  with  respect  to  unjust 
structures also have privilege that coincides with this power.  In most situations of 
structural injustice, however, there are relatively  privileged  persons  who  have 
relatively little power as individuals or in their institutional positions, at least 
with respect to that issue of justice.
95 
 
Young argues that privilege is distinct from power in the sense that it refers to 
agents who occupy privileged positions within social structures with respect to a 
particular structural injustice; nevertheless they are relatively powerless to change 
the  structures.    Their  privilege  consists  in  the  fact  that  they  benefit  from  the 
injustice in some sense.  Young’s argument is that if an agent benefits from a 
structural injustice, this could be the structural injustice towards which the agent 
should direct their political responsibility. 
 
In  the  context  of  sweatshop  labour,  she  claims  that  middle-class  clothing 
consumers ‘benefit from the large selection and affordable prices that retailers 
offer them.’
96 And ‘As beneficiaries of the process, they have responsibilities.’
97  
Privilege as benefit is also significant because agents in positions of privilege are 
more able to resist structural injustice than less privileged agents.  So while low-
income shoppers also benefit from this structural injustice, they are positioned so 
as to not have the resources to be able to pay more for their clothing.  This 
greater capacity, in terms of resources or time, is not the same as power to effect 
structural change, but it does give these agents more scope to struggle against 
structural injustice.  Young writes,  
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Their  being  privileged  usually  means,  moreover,  that  they  are  able  to 
change  their  habits  or  make  extra  efforts  without  suffering  serious 
deprivation.  Lower-income clothing consumers, for example, whether in 
the  developed  or  the  developing  world,  may  be  less  able  than  more 
affluent consumers to spend more for clothing in order to ensure that the 
workers who make it are fairly treated.
98 
 
In  terms  of  thinking  about  degrees  of  political  responsibility,  then,  privileged 
agents have a greater degree of responsibility to resist structural injustice because 
a) they benefit from it and b) they have more capacity to engage because they do 
not suffer the risk of deprivation from so doing.   
 
Young departs from the literature on benefit in making this argument.  There has 
been a recent resurgence of interest in the topic of benefiting from injustice in 
relation  to  global  and  historic  injustice.    Several  authors  argue  that  benefit 
generates  moral  responsibility  to  make  amends  rather  than  political 
responsibility.
99 
 
Goodin and Barry try to establish the responsibilities that an individual who has 
benefited from a wrongdoing has towards the victim.  They offer the example of 
an  individual  who  was  admitted  to  Harvard  because  his  father  bribed  an 
admissions officer, and his life turns out significantly better for it.
100  The man 
discovers evidence of the bribe fifty years later when clearing out his father’s 
estate.  He tracks down the person who lost their place at Harvard, who it turns 
out was distraught at his rejection, became a car mechanic, has been in and out of 
jail ever since, and has generally led an unhappy life.  As Goodin and Barry point 
out, the innocent beneficiary in this case cannot simply ‘give back’ thirty years of 
life.
101  But they argue that the beneficiary should ‘make up’ the loss, and that this 
person has more reason to do so than someone who was an innocent beneficiary 
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of a clerical error.  It is the fact of benefitting from wrongdoing that generates the 
obligation.  They write, 
 
Even  innocent  beneficiaries  of  wrongdoing  should  therefore  disgorge 
what  they  have  wrongly  received.    They  have  committed  no  wrong 
themselves, to be sure.  Nonetheless, they have what they have as a result 
of a wrong.  They are wrongly enriched, and it would be wrong for them 
to keep those riches.
102 
 
They argue that the cost to the beneficiary should be no more than the benefit 
they have received.
103  If the victim incurred further costs, these will have to be 
covered by some other mechanism – perhaps out of the public purse.
104  If the 
innocent beneficiary fails to disgorge the benefits, then they are doing something 
wrong.
105 
 
The  aim  of  establishing  what  in  principle  an  innocent  beneficiary  has  a 
responsibility to do, is to be able to scale this up to questions of historic injustice.  
They argue that many people today are innocent beneficiaries (or victims) from 
the lingering, on-going effects of historic injustice.  They suggest, ‘If we can figure 
out,  through  far-fetched  stories  about  Harvard  admissions,  what  the  right 
response is to benefiting from wrong-doing, then we will have a better grip on 
what morally we ought to do about wrongs of much greater moment.’
106 
 
My concern, however, is that it is not possible to scale up from an example of a 
discrete, bounded wrongdoing (a one-off bribe) to cases of structural injustice, 
whether it be historical or contemporary.  In the case of sweatshop labour, it 
could be argued that clothing consumers are beneficiaries of the injustice, but I 
would suggest that this does not mean that they should disgorge the benefits 
derived from the practice.  Scaling up from the Harvard example cannot help us 
understand  the  responsibilities  that  derive  from  benefitting  from  a  structural 
injustice for the following reasons. 
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The first difference is that structural injustice is on-going, whereas the Harvard 
bribe is a past, bounded event.  In the Harvard example, the wrongdoer and the 
bribed officer are no longer around.  In the case of sweatshop labour, there are 
agents who could be considered wrongdoers and, therefore, they should be the 
first point of compensation.  I take this to be uncontroversial – Goodin and Barry 
agree  that  if  the  wrongdoer  is  around,  they  should  compensate  the  victim.
107  
Multi-national clothing corporations are not only benefiting from the practice of 
sweatshop  labour,  but  perpetuate  it  and  enable  it  by  continuing  to  support 
sweatshops through the purchasing of goods.  Governments are at fault for failing 
to implement labour standards.
108  By contrast, consumers are not doing anything 
wrong by buying clothes; they are benefiting from the unjust practices of more 
powerful  agents  and  it  is  these  powerful  agents  who  ought  to  do  the 
compensating.  The question is, then, if there are wrongdoers around who bear 
primary  responsibility  to  compensate  the  victims,  do  beneficiaries  still  bear 
responsibility  to  disgorge  their  benefits?    Or  if  there  is  an  agency  that  bears 
primary responsibility for compensating victims of injustice, such as the state, do 
innocent beneficiaries still bear any responsibilities?  Do innocent beneficiaries 
have a moral responsibility to disgorge their benefits if the victims have been 
compensated by either of these parties?  If not, perhaps benefit only becomes 
morally relevant if there are no other agents around to do the compensating. 
 
The second difference is a question of scale.  In the Harvard example, there are 
identifiable perpetrators, victims and beneficiaries (even if we raise the number of 
victims or beneficiaries).  In relation to structural injustice there is a mass of 
disorganised beneficiaries and a mass of disorganised victims.  And they benefit 
and are victimised to different degrees.  On the beneficiary side, some consumers 
buy large amounts of cheap clothing even when they could afford to buy fair-
trade  clothing,  thus  taking  advantage  of  the  situation,  while  other  consumers 
infrequently buy clothing but are still benefiting.  How do we work out how much 
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any individual beneficiary owes?  Also, there is not a ‘thing’ that has been given to 
the consumers instead of the garment workers; I assume the garment workers do 
not want consumers to return the clothes to them.  Goodin and Barry argue that 
when there is no ‘thing’ to give back, that the beneficiary should give ‘the cash 
equivalent of the subjective value of the thing they received.’
109  But even if we 
could work out what that cash equivalent is given the different degrees of benefit, 
we are still left with the question of to whom would it be given? 
 
There is a high turnover of staff in sweatshops – some will have worked for short 
periods of time, others for years.  Perhaps the fact that some people cannot get 
long-term jobs is part of the injustice and they should be compensated more.  Or 
should those who have worked more be compensated more because they have 
suffered this particular injustice for longer?  How do we work out what each 
victim is entitled to?  How do we know who the victims are if staff records are 
not routinely kept? If the consumers do not know who the victims are and the 
victims do not know who the beneficiaries are, can the claim to disgorge the 
benefits be enforceable?  The scale of the problem means that cash transfers 
directly from beneficiaries to victims is not plausible. 
 
A third difference between the example of benefiting from a discrete wrongdoing 
and  from  structural  injustice  is  that  in  the  latter  case  there  is  a  chain  of 
beneficiaries.  MNCs benefit to a much greater extent from sweatshop labour 
than do consumers.  By charging large sums of money for clothing that cost very 
little to produce, or selling vast amounts of cheap clothing, they amass millions of 
dollars in profit.  Another actor in the chain of benefit are governments that 
benefit from increased employment and economic growth.  Even if consumers 
can be said to benefit from sweatshop labour in the sense of having a range of 
clothing at affordable prices, this is a marginal benefit compared to the macro 
gains of MNCs and governments.  We can ask, then, do the agents that benefit 
most bear the responsibility to disgorge the benefits, or do all beneficiaries have 
to  disgorge  their  benefits  even  if  they  only  benefit  in  marginal  ways?    What 
difference does it make that there are intermediary beneficiaries, and agents that 
benefit to different degrees, and how does that change agents’ responsibilities?   
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These differences of on-going harm, scale and chains of beneficiaries are not just 
practical difficulties.  These issues point to an underlying, fundamental difference 
–  injustice  is  structural  and  requires  a  structural  solution,  whereas  a  discrete 
wrongdoing could be remedied through compensation.  Goodin and Barry are 
adopting  the  liability  model  to  deal  with  the  responsibility  of  an  innocent 
beneficiary from a discrete wrongdoing, but the problems I have highlighted in 
scaling this up to structural injustice bears out Young’s argument that the liability 
model cannot successfully deal with structural injustice. 
 
Butt  argues  that  there  are  independent  moral  reasons  for  expecting  the 
beneficiaries to give up their benefits accrued from injustice.  He argues, ‘They 
represent the ‘fruits of injustice,’ they may be seen as distortions within the overall 
scheme of distribution.’
110  If beneficiaries care about injustice, they should be 
prepared to rectify distortions in the scheme of fair distribution.
111  This is the 
fundamental  reason  why  benefit  generates  a  moral  duty  on  the  part  of  the 
beneficiaries.  He argues, ‘We are right to feel guilty at benefiting from others’ 
misfortune,  precisely  because  this  suggests  that  we  have  not  fulfilled  our 
compensatory obligations.’
112 
 
My concern, however, is that the fruits of injustice – contemporary and historical 
– are everywhere in everything that we do.  Consider the Harvard example again.  
The man admitted to Harvard not only benefited from the bribe, but also from 
structural sexism and racism that meant that the majority of those admitted were 
white men.  Should the beneficiary then disgorge his benefits to all the women 
and  African-Americans  who  might  have  been  admitted  had  it  not  been  for 
structural sexism and racism? 
 
Many  people  are  beneficiaries  from  multiple  structural  injustices.  Some  will 
benefit from some structural injustices and be victims of others.  How do we 
determine, then, who are the victims and who are the beneficiaries?  Do we find 
an algorithm for determining privilege in relation to structural injustice and ask 
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people to pay in cash according to how privileged they are?  Who would they pay 
it to?  There are so many structural injustices in the world from which people 
benefit – and not just people in Western industrialised countries, there are historic 
injustices, class inequalities, sexism, racist, homophobic laws or social practices in 
all  countries  –  that  it  would  crippling  to  suggest  that  any  one  individual  has 
compensatory moral obligations in relation to all of these problems.   
 
Moreover,  whatever  the  validity  of  paying  compensation  to  the  victim  of  a 
discrete wrongdoing from which one innocently benefits, this does not apply to 
structural injustices because it is not a structural solution.  The literature that 
originally raised the issue of benefit was on affirmative action in the 1970s.  The 
affirmative action literature did not argue that individual beneficiaries of injustice 
had moral duties to rectify injustice or compensate the victims.  For instance, 
Judith Jarvis Thomson claimed that affirmative action was justifiable because the 
political community bore a responsibility towards women and African-Americans 
for their structural disadvantage.  Her argument was not that white men had a 
moral duty to accept the hiring of women and African Americans because they 
benefited from injustice.  She writes, 
 
Of course the white male is asked to give up his equal chance at the job.  
But  that  is  not  something  he  pays  to  the  black  or  woman  by  way  of 
making amends; it is something the community takes away from him in 
order that it may make amends.
113 
 
The claim is that the political community ought to revoke the privileges of some, 
not the ‘rights’ of some, in order to restore a balance of equal social relations 
among community members.  This is almost an Arendtian justification as to why 
white  men  should  accept  affirmative  action  –  if  an  individual’s  political 
community is acting wrongfully citizens are collectively responsible for seeing to it 
that the wrongdoing stops.  This responsibility is political, not moral, and will 
affect some individuals more than others – the privileged will have to relinquish 
some of the benefits they have come to expect.  Bernard Boxhill argues from the 
same premise as Thomson, 
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Preferential hiring does not require young white males to pay over, at 
additional costs to themselves, the price of their advantages.  It proposes 
instead to compensate the injured with goods no one yet has established a 
right  to  and  in  a  way,  therefore,  which  imposes  no  unfair  losses  on 
anyone.
114 
 
It could be objected that while the white man may not have a right to a job, he 
does have a right to fair competition.  Boxhill responds that ‘on the contrary, by 
refusing to allow him to get the job because of an unfair advantage, preferential 
hiring makes the competition fairer.’
115  If the white male applicant cares about 
fairness, then, he should support the policy of preferential hiring because it levels 
the playing field without imposing unfair losses on him.
116 
 
These older arguments are closer to Young’s; we should all work to ameliorate 
structural injustice, which will inevitably mean that some people will lose certain 
privileges, but it is their political responsibility to support that in the name of 
justice.  Burdening individuals with guilt for the benefits they receive over which 
they have no control is unhelpful.  It makes more sense to say that we have a 
forward-looking political responsibility to try to improve unjust structures than 
that we have moral duties to make recompense for all the injustices from which 
we benefit.  When considering benefit from structural injustice, the focus should 
be on structural solutions rather than individualised moral atonement. 
 
4.2.3  Interest 
 
The final and most controversial parameter of reasoning is interest.  This mainly 
applies to the victims of structural injustice.
117   Young argues that the victims, 
‘have  unique  interests  in  undermining  injustice,  and  they  ought  to  take 
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responsibility for doing so.’
118  This counteracts the tendency of the preceding 
parameters of reasoning to place all the responsibility for change on privileged 
actors  within  structural  processes.    This  is  important  to  Young  because  the 
victims are best placed to know what to do about injustice.  She writes, 
 
It is they who know the most about the harms they suffer, and thus it is 
up to them to broadcast their situation and call it injustice.  Unless the 
victims  themselves  are  involved  in  ameliorative  efforts,  well-meaning 
outsiders may inadvertently harm them in a different way, or set reforms 
going in unproductive directions.
119 
 
Young cites some of the ‘ineffective or paternalistic’ interventions of the anti-
sweatshop movement, such as campaigning to shut down factories, or pushing for 
inspections of factories without guaranteeing safeguards that the workers who 
participate will be free from intimidation or negative repercussions.
120  Taking up 
political responsibility in a responsible way requires dialogue with victims; finding 
out what they want and need, and how those in privileged positions can support 
that.  Throughout  her  career  Young  has  stressed  the  necessity  of  inclusive 
decision-making  procedures  over  paternalistic,  top-down  approaches.    But  if 
inclusive  democracy  is  going  to  work,  there’s  a  responsibility  for  everyone  to 
participate in it; for the under-privileged to take part, no matter how hard that 
might be, and for the more-privileged to listen to how they can remove barriers to 
inclusivity. 
 
In the framework developed here, I have suggested that the powerful be defined 
as the agents with the dispositional capacity to effect change in the structures.  
Agents with collective ability are collectivities that do not necessarily have power 
to  effect  change  in  the  structures  but  can  put  pressure  on  powerful  agents.  
Privileged agents are those that benefit in some way, but again do not have the 
dispositional power to effect structural change.  The victims not only do not have 
power, they do not benefit from the injustice.  They are structurally situated so as 
to be powerless in relation to a particular injustice – this is why they are victims.  
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They are victims only in the sense of being powerless in relation to a particular 
structural injustice.  Victims are not just “victims” – they are agents and they 
could have collective ability if they organise. 
 
It  is  important  to  note  that  including  the  victims  in  shared  responsibility  for 
structural injustice is not tantamount to ‘victim-blaming’.  On the liability model 
of  responsibility,  including  the  victims  would  be  victim-blaming,  ‘because  the 
isolating logic of liability then absolves others of responsibility.’
121  On the social 
connection  model,  however,  they  share  in  the  non-blameworthy  political 
responsibility to struggle against unjust structures because of their knowledge of 
injustice,  and  in  order  to  avoid  ineffectual  paternalism  on  the  part  of  the 
privileged. 
 
The responsibility to stand up and resist comes up time and again in the literature 
from,  what  Angela  Davis  calls,  ‘The  Black  Freedom  Movement’;  which 
encompasses everything from emancipation from slavery, to reconstruction, Civil 
Rights, struggles against colonialism and critical race theory and practice today.
122  
The first reason why victims should get involved corresponds with Young’s idea 
that it will make interventions in structural injustice more effective.   
 
In relation to feminist struggles to end structural sexism, bell hooks argues that 
the most marginalized women in the USA – African-American women – must 
make their voices heard within the movement.  This is because they speak from a 
unique vantage point, and this means they share in responsibility to make the 
feminist movement stronger.  She writes, 
 
It is essential for continued feminist struggle that black women recognize 
the special vantage point our marginality gives us and make use of this 
perspective to criticize the dominant racist, classist, sexist hegemony as 
well as to envision and create a counter-hegemony.  I am suggesting we 
have  a  central  role  to  play  in  the  making  of  feminist  theory  and  a 
contribution to offer that is unique and valuable.  The formation of a 
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liberatory feminist theory and praxis is a collective responsibility, one that 
must be shared.
123 
 
As hooks argues, the vantage point of those structurally positioned so as to be 
powerless  offers  unique  and  valuable  insights  into  the  ways  in  which  power 
operates and as to how structural injustice manifests itself.  The responsibility of 
victims, therefore, should not be perceived as the ‘reaching out’ of the privileged; 
it is crucial to any movement that aims to end structural injustice that the most 
structurally disadvantaged get involved. 
 
The  philosopher  and  former  slave  Frederick  Douglass  also  argues  that  the 
resistance of victims of injustice is crucial to undermining injustice.  He argued 
that,  ‘Power  concedes  nothing  without  a  demand.    It  never  did  and  it  never 
will.’
124  He claims that the abolition of slavery by Britain was an act of the British 
government, but that ‘a share of the credit of the result justly falls to the slaves 
themselves.’
125  By engaging in rebellions and outbreaks of violence, the rebelling 
slaves created fear and danger, forcing the government to act.  He argues that 
‘The combined action of one and the other wrought out the final result.’
126 
 
Carol Gould, however, is wary of Young’s assertion that victims share political 
responsibility for justice.  In relation to sweatshop labour, she argues: 
 
The  implication  that  the  exploited  workers  share  responsibility  for  the 
systems that oppress them seems counterintuitive, at least from a view that 
takes seriously the fact of their exploitation itself.  It seems that here Young goes 
too far in her claim that everyone is responsible for these systems.  We 
can grant that this might be the case on a very abstract level, and also that 
oppressed  people  have  some  residual  freedom  of  choice  within  even 
dismal  surroundings,  and  moreover,  that  they  are  participants  in  the 
systems by which they are oppressed.  But her overly broad view seems to lose 
the very point of the critique of oppression and domination in the first place – namely, 
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that those who are dominated or exploited specifically lack access to the conditions that 
they need and further that because of the power of these systems they cannot change 
them.    So,  holding  them  responsible,  while  perhaps  not  amounting  to 
“blaming the victim” as on the liability model Young criticizes, seems unfair 
to them, since the systems that dominate them are not of their choosing.  And they 
“participate” in them only in an equivocal sense of being in some sense 
coerced to do so.
127 
 
Gould highlights the lack of an analysis of power in Young’s account, which I 
agree with and have tried to rectify here to some extent.  She is also right that 
within a global structural injustice like sweatshop labour that the victims do not 
have the capacity to effect change in the structures.  However, it does not follow 
that they have no responsibility at all.  And it is not just for the pragmatic reason 
discussed above. 
 
Frederick Douglass argued further in relation to slavery that there is a normative 
reason  for  slaves  to  participate  in  struggles  against  slavery  –  they  had  a 
responsibility to stand up for themselves.  He argued, 
 
It is a natural incident of the war, and I trust I am to a certain degree 
prepared for it; but the stolid contentment, the listless indifference, the 
moral death which reigns over many of our people, we who should be all 
fire, beats down my little flame of enthusiasm and leaves me to labor, half 
robbed of my natural force.  This indifference, in us, is outrageous.
128 
 
The Black Panthers asserted in their 10-Point Program that it was a ‘duty’ for 
African-Americans  to  fight  for  revolution:  ‘when  a  long  train  of  abuses  and 
usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them 
under  absolute  despotism,  it  is  their  right,  it  is  their  duty,  to  throw  off  such 
government, and to provide new guards for their future security.’
129 
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The psychiatrist and revolutionary Frantz Fanon discusses a patient who told him 
of a dream where he was in a room with white men and he realised that he was 
white too.
130  Fanon argues that the man is suffering from an ‘inferiority complex’, 
and that he has to do two things.  One is to work on himself to overcome his 
internal predicament and the other is to struggle against the social structures that 
generate the complex in the first place.  He writes, 
 
What emerges then is the need for combined action on the individual and 
on the group.  As a psychoanalyst, I should help my patient to become 
more  conscious  of  his  unconscious  and  abandon  his  attempts  at 
hallucinatory whitening, but also to act in the direction of a change in the 
social structure.
131 
 
I have suggested that victims are victims in so far as they are rendered powerless 
by their position within social structures.  But as bell hooks argues, it is a mistake 
to say that victims are powerless in general.  She argues that women who are 
oppressed do not want to think of themselves as ‘victims’ because they want to 
focus on what they can do.  She argues that, ‘Women, even the most oppressed 
among  us,  do  exercise  some  power.’
132    Marginalized  women  should  be 
encouraged to exercise power that is ‘creative and life-affirming’.
133  She writes, 
 
Feminist movement is not advanced if women who can never be among 
those who rule and exercise domination and control are encouraged to 
focus on these forms of power and see themselves as victims.  The forms 
of  power  that  these  women  should  exercise  are  those  that  will  enable 
them  to  resist  exploitation  and  oppression  and  free  them  to  work  at 
transforming society so that political and economic structures will exist 
which benefit women and men equally.  Feminist activists must emphasise 
the forms of power these women exercise and show ways they can be 
used for their benefit.
134 
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The typology of power used so far in this chapter – episodic, dispositional and 
structural  –  does  not  take  into  account  this  more  positive  sense  of  power  as 
‘empowerment.’  Including individual empowerment shows how victims can be 
included in sharing political responsibility.  Because while victims of structural 
injustice lack dispositional power to effect structural change, and thus do not 
exercise episodic power in relation to structures; they do have the capacity to 
become empowered.  This is what Fanon was suggesting his patient do – to work 
on one’s internal sense of inferiority and to engage in resistance to unjust social 
structures.    One  way  of  becoming  individually  empowered  is  to  engage  in 
collective action – to join a collectivity with collective ability, such as the feminist 
movement, the Black Panthers, slave rebellions, or other movements for justice.  
This then also contributes to collective empowerment. 
 
Hye-Ryoung  Kang  gives  an  account  of  the  variety  of  transnational  women’s 
collectivities that have arisen in relation to exploitative supra-national economic 
processes.  Examples include the Coalition for Justice in the Maquiladoras with 
members in Mexico, the USA and Canada, and the Asian Women’s Immigrant 
Advocates.    She  argues  that  through  engaging  with  others  who  are  also 
experiencing oppression victims become empowered and feel more able to call 
their situation injustice – individual empowerment.
135  And collectivities are more 
able to broadcast and vocalise justice claims than isolated individuals – collective 
empowerment.
136   
 
The desire to absolve victims of political responsibility to stand up for themselves 
and get involved in movements for justice corresponds to a tendency identified by 
post-colonial feminists – the tendency to ‘objectify’ victims.
137  Chandra Mohanty 
argues that the group ‘Third world women’ are constructed in Western feminist 
literature, ‘as a homogenous, ‘powerless’ group often located as implicit victims of 
particular  cultural  and  socio-economic  systems.’
138   Categorising  Third  World 
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women as inherently powerless victims ‘robs them of their historical and political 
agency.’
139  Valerie Amos and Pratibha Parmar argue that when feminists talk about 
women from ‘traditional’ cultures, they ‘portray us as politically immature women 
who  need  to  be  versed  and  schooled  in  the  ethos  of  Western  feminism.’
140  
Victims tend to be seen as non-agents in need of rescue, rather than as agents 
who could be engaged in acts of resistance.  Recognising that as agents, victims 
have  the  capacity  for  individual  or  collective  empowerment,  is  important  to 
overcome this pernicious tendency. 
 
Ultimately,  as  bell  hooks  forcefully  argues,  oppressed  people  know  they  are 
oppressed and are often already engaged in resistance.  She argues, 
 
Frequently, white feminists act as if black women did not know sexist 
oppression existed until they voiced feminist sentiment.  They believe they 
are providing black women with “the” analysis and “the” program for 
liberation.    They  do  not  understand,  cannot  even  imagine,  that  black 
women, as well as other groups of women who live daily in oppressive 
situations, often acquire an awareness of patriarchal politics from their 
lived experience, just as they develop strategies of resistance (even though 
they may not resist on a sustained or organized basis).
141 
 
Contra  Carol  Gould,  then,  I  argue  that  Young’s  assertion  of  the  political 
responsibility of victims is one of the most important and significant aspects of 
her  work  on  responsibility.    It  is  recognition  of  the  fact  that,  pragmatically 
speaking,  real  structural  change  will  be  effected  by  mass  organisation  of  the 
oppressed, rather than waiting around until the conscience of the powerful and 
privileged has been sufficiently pricked to take action.  And normatively speaking, 
it is a recognition of the agency of victims; who are victims only in the sense that 
they are structurally positioned so as to have no dispositional power or privilege in 
relation to social structures. 
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Gould argued in relation to sweatshop labour, that it is precisely the exploitation 
of victims that makes it wrong to hold them responsible for the injustice.  As I 
write this, however, an estimated 30,000 workers at Nike and Adidas factories in 
China are on strike.  This sees an increase of one third in strike action in China on 
the previous two years.
142  Garment workers in Cambodia engaged in mass protest 
in January this year.  The government responded with a brutal crackdown and a 
ban on public gatherings of more than ten people.
143  The restriction on collective 
organising  suggests  that  collective  organising  was  indeed  having  an  effect  on 
structural injustice.  Cambodian workers have responded to this prohibition on 
protest with stay-at-home strikes.
144 
 
This wave of strike action in China and Cambodia is demonstrating that collective 
empowerment of victims can initiate structural change.  There is only so much 
that consumers as beneficiaries can do – it is up to victims to organise and fight 
back.  One of the best things the privileged can do is to support movements of 
the  oppressed  in  whatever  way  they  can  (donations,  writing,  getting  directly 
involved  with  skill-sharing  or  participation,  giving  a  platform  to  grassroots 
activists, advocating on their behalf in their home countries etc.). 
 
Demonstrations  of  support,  however,  can  be  fleeting  and  unsustained.
145  
Solidarity  requires  more  sustained  commitment.
146   One  way  of  demonstrating 
solidarity with the victims of structural injustice is to stand prepared to renounce 
the benefits one gains from injustice, for the sake of more justice.  In the same 
way that young, white men had a political responsibility to accept the removal of 
privileges in relation to job opportunities for the sake of restoring equality in their 
communities, if the current wave of sweatshop union organizing, protesting and 
rioting leads to higher prices for clothing in Western countries, consumers have a 
political responsibility to accept this as a renunciation of their privileges for the 
sake of justice for garment workers.  This is going to be more useful to the goal of 
structural change than giving up cash equivalents of the benefits one has received 
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to unspecified victims; as widespread acceptance to pay higher prices for clothing, 
to ensure decent wages and working conditions for garment workers, is a long-
term structural solution. 
 
4.3  Conclusion 
 
Young  argues  that  all  agents  connected  to  structural  injustice  share  a  non-
blameworthy political responsibility to try to make the structures more just.  On 
my  understanding,  there  are  powerful  agents  –  defined  as  agents  with  the 
dispositional power to effect change in the structures – acting within structural 
injustice who ought to be held morally responsible for actively, knowingly and 
intentionally perpetuating unjust structures; that is they are morally responsible – 
blameworthy – on the liability model of responsibility.  Here I have discussed 
large global corporations, but this could also apply to nation-states.  Part of the 
role  of  politically  responsible  individuals,  or  collectivities  that  have  collective 
ability but not the dispositional power to effect structural change, is to seek out 
these morally responsible agents and to hold them to account.  My view is thus 
more confrontational than Young’s and makes more use of the liability model 
within structural injustice.  This also means that on my view the parameters of 
reasoning are narrowed down to collective ability, privilege and interest.  Through 
an analysis of power within structural injustice, I support Young’s argument that 
these three parameters of reasoning are ways of thinking about how to discharge 
political responsibility rather than ways in which relational moral responsibility 
can be conferred upon individuals or collectivities for structural injustice. 
 
This concludes my discussion of moral responsibility and the liability model.  In 
the second part of the thesis I concentrate on political responsibility and the social 
connection  model.    I  look  at  what  Young  means  when  she  says  political 
responsibility is a responsibility for justice; I construct a Youngian account of global 
injustice; and I discuss how connection generates political responsibility.  
 
 
 
 
Part Two: Political Responsibility 
 
 
 
    
Chapter 5  Individuals’ Responsibilities for Injustice 
 
 
Young conceives of political responsibility as a responsibility that individuals have 
for  justice;  so  the  question  I  address  in  this  chapter  is  what  can  it  mean  for 
individuals to have a responsibility for justice.  To answer this, I situate Young in 
relation to the “division of labour” debate, in which theorists question whether 
responsibilities  for  justice  fall  exclusively  on  institutions  (dualists),  or  on 
individuals too (monists).  For dualists, individuals and institutions have different 
kinds  of  responsibilities  in  relation  to  justice;  monists  do  not  make  this 
distinction, responsibility for justice is a continuum.  Young’s position is unique; 
she agrees with monists that individuals have responsibilities for justice, but she 
adopts a distinct form of dualism.  According to Young, individuals’ responsibilities 
should be understood along dualist lines; individuals have two kinds of moral 
responsibility  –  interactional  and  structural.  The  latter  constitutes  political 
responsibility. 
 
The most influential structural account of justice is John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice.  
Rawls argued that justice applies to the “basic structure” of society, conceived of 
as  “the  major  social  institutions.”    The  basic  structure  is  governed  by  two 
principles of justice, and individuals’ responsibility for justice is to support the just 
institutions of the basic structure.  
 
The similarity between Young and Rawls’ work on justice is that they both focus 
on structure: on how social structures determine people’s life chances, how they 
shape individuals and how they enable and constrain individuals’ options.  The 
differences, however, are numerous, and have significant implications for how we 
are to conceive of individuals’ responsibilities for justice.  In this chapter, I draw 
out the differences between Rawls and Young, and use this to construct a positive 
Youngian account of individuals’ responsibilities for injustice. 
 Individuals’ Responsibilities for Injustice 
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In the first section of this chapter, “The Basic Structure Reconsidered”, I consider 
the idea that the basic structure contains more than “the major social institutions” 
of society.  I do this by looking at the intra-Rawlsian debate over the position of 
the family in Rawls’ basic structure.  I argue, following G.A. Cohen and Clare 
Chambers, that if the family is included in the basic structure then Rawls’ reasons 
for making the basic structure the primary subject of justice fall apart.  I outline 
Young’s understanding of “social-structural processes”, which are not separate 
from  society  but  in  fact  constitute  it,  and  show  how  this  understanding  of 
structure can include justice within the family. 
 
While Young’s understanding of structure can better accommodate the family, she 
is engaged in a different form of critique to the internal critics of Rawls.  For what 
these  critics  have  in  common  is  an  assumption  that  justice  involves  the 
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.  One of Young’s 
most significant contributions to justice theory is her critique of the “distributive 
paradigm”  of  justice,  which,  in  a  nutshell,  is  the  idea  that  certain  forms  of 
oppression that are pervasive in late capitalist welfare societies, such as sexism and 
racism, cannot be solved using the logic of distribution.  Theories of justice for 
our times must encompass distributions of resources and critical understandings 
of power relations that condition individuals’ attitudes, habits and norms, and 
how all of this affects groups and not merely individuals.  I conclude this section 
by taking up Susan Moller Okin and Charles Mills’ points that once we include the 
family in discussions about justice we are no longer engaging in ideal theory.   
 
I add to this by arguing that once we engage in critical theorising about actually 
existing power relations and group oppression, that we cannot be doing ideal 
theory.  Central to the Rawlsian project is the idea that in order to work out the 
principles of justice for the separate sphere of the basic structure, we must engage 
in ideal theory that abstracts away from historical contingencies.  I explore the 
debate between Mills and Zofia Stemplowska over the value of ideal theory, and 
show that Young’s theorising about justice entails a rejection of ideal theorizing.   
 
I contend that this analysis shows that Young’s understanding of structure is more 
expansive  and  necessarily  historically  situated,  compared  to  Rawls’  restricted Individuals’ Responsibilities for Injustice 
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scope of the basic structure, which depends on ideal theory for its elucidation.  In 
Section 2, I show what implications this has for individuals’ responsibilities for 
justice.  Rawls adopts a “dualist” approach; institutions bear primary responsibility 
for  justice  and  individuals’  responsibilities  are  derivative  of  institutional 
responsibilities.  I argue that Young’s approach implies that individuals have a 
distinct responsibility for justice – political responsibility.  As argued in Part One 
of  this  thesis,  political  responsibility  is  a  non-blameworthy,  forward-looking, 
moral responsibility as virtue, and entails engaging in collective action to challenge 
structural injustice.  
 
5.1  The Basic Structure Reconsidered 
 
Rawls’ theory of justice is the most influential of our times.  As both Rawls and 
Young adopt a structural approach to justice, I explore how they think about 
structure and individuals’ responsibilities in relation to it.  Young herself was not 
particularly clear on the relationship of her work to Rawls’.  She veers from being 
stridently critical of Rawls in Justice and the Politics of Difference (1990), where she 
opposes  the  “distributive  paradigm”  of  justice,  arguing  that  it  cannot  include 
issues  that  involve  power  relations,  like  oppression  and  domination  of  social 
groups.
1  Then in her in her review of Political  Liberalism  (1995), she criticises 
Rawls for moving too far in the direction of dealing with culture to the neglect of 
political  economy.
 2   In  one  of  her  final  essays  –  “Taking  the  Basic  Structure 
Seriously”  (2006)  –  Young  argues  that  she  endorses  Rawls’  argument  that 
structure is the subject of justice, so long as we reconfigure the idea of the basic 
structure; she writes, ‘This work means less shifting away from Rawls’ theory than 
deepening  some  of  its  central  elements.’
3   In  this  section  I  argue  that  the 
differences between Rawls and Young are more significant than Young’s final 
statement on the matter suggests, because when we take her understandings of 
structure, distributive justice and ideal theory seriously, we have moved away from 
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the project of Rawlsian justice.  This will then have implications for how we 
conceptualise individuals’ responsibilities for justice. 
 
5.1.1  Family 
 
What  Young  and  Rawls  agree  on  when  it  comes  to  structure  is  the  issue  of 
“counter-finality”.
4  That is, that the outcomes of many individuals’ ordinary, legal 
and nonblameworthy activities, can result in harmful structural outcomes.  For 
Rawls, justice means the regulation of these structural outcomes, borne out of the 
accumulation of private individual transactions in the economy.  As Rawls writes, 
while the social conditions in which agreements take place initially might be fair, 
 
the accumulated results of many separate and ostensibly fair agreements, 
together with social trends and historical contingencies, are likely in the 
course of time to alter citizens’ relationships and opportunities so that the 
conditions for free and fair agreements no longer hold.
5   
 
Young  also  has  this  in  mind  when  considering  the  justice  or  injustice  of 
structures.  She writes: 
 
Many large-scale social processes in which masses of individuals believe 
they are following the rules, minding their own business, and trying to 
accomplish  their  legitimate  goals  can  be  seen  to  result  in  undesirable 
unintended consequences when looked at structurally.
6 
 
Rawls argues that this kind of structure is the “basic structure”, which must be 
regulated by the principles of justice.  The basic structure can be separated out 
from private associations and private transactions.  It is the background pattern of 
institutional rules and resources against which private associations and persons 
act.  But Young does not separate structure from the rest of society.  In this 
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section I look at the Rawlsian debate over the place of the family in the basic 
structure, as this demonstrates the difficulty of conceiving of structure as separate 
from society.  I then look at how Young conceives of structure and how this can 
better accommodate the family. 
 
In A Theory of Justice Rawls argues that the “basic structure” is ‘the primary subject 
of justice.’
7  The basic structure constitutes ‘the way in which the major social 
institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of 
advantages from social cooperation.’
8  The ‘major social institutions’ include the 
political constitution, the legal protection of freedom of thought and conscience, 
competitive markets, private property and the monogamous family.
9  The reason 
why the principles of justice apply to the basic structure so conceived is that: 
 
Taken together as one scheme, the major institutions define men’s rights 
and duties and influence their life prospects, what they can expect to be 
and how well they can hope to do.  The basic structure is the primary 
subject of justice because its effects are so profound and present from the 
start.
10  
 
As Susan Moller Okin points out, including the family in the basic structure is 
surprising, given that the distinction between the public and private spheres has 
been assumed throughout the history of political thought; however, as she further 
points out, ‘it is necessary, given Rawls’ stated criteria for inclusion in the basic 
structure.’
11  Disappointingly, however, ‘the family is to a large extend ignored, 
though  assumed,  in  the  rest  of  the  theory.’
12   Given  the  ambiguity  of  Rawls’ 
statements on the family, a debate over the place of the family in Rawls’ basic 
structure has ensued. 
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G.A. Cohen argues that if Rawls includes the family in the basic structure, he has 
to abandon ‘his insistence that it is to the basic structure only that the principles 
of  distributive  justice  apply.’
13   Cohen  attributes  the  ambiguity  in  Rawls’ 
conceptualisation of the basic structure to the lack of clarity over whether it only 
applies to coercive institutions or also to non-coercive institutions and personal 
choices and behaviour.
14  According to Cohen, the most common understanding 
of  the  basic  structure  is  ‘the  broad  coercive  outline  of  society.’
15   The  second 
understanding  of  the  basic  structure,  ‘can  depend  far  less  on  law  than  on 
convention, usage, and expectation: a signal example is the family.’
16  But ‘once 
the line is crossed’ from coercive to non-coercive institutions, then ‘the ambit of 
justice can no longer exclude chosen behaviour, since the usages which constitute 
informal structure… are bound up with the customary actions of people.’
17  So 
once the family is included in the basic structure, the actions of individuals are a 
concern for justice because, ‘behaviour is constitutive of non-coercive structure.’
18 
 
Cohen focuses specifically on the application of Rawls’ “difference principle.”
19  
The difference principle is one of Rawls’ principles of justice.  It is the idea that 
economic inequality is arranged so as to advantage the most disadvantaged people 
in society.
20  Cohen argues that he too is concerned with ‘the pattern of benefits 
and burdens in society.’
21  This leads him to be primarily concerned neither with 
structure itself, nor with individuals’ personal choices, ‘but the upshot of structure 
and choices alike.’
22  The interaction of structure and individuals’ personal choices 
generates distributive outcomes.  Cohen claims that, ‘To the extent that we care 
about coercive structure because it is fateful with regard to benefits and burdens, 
we  must  care  equally  about  the  ethi  that  sustain  gender  inequality,  and 
inegalitarian incentives.’
23  Justice requires, then, not merely a just basic structure 
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but also an egalitarian ethos, if the outcomes of the interaction of structure and 
personal behaviour are to result in distributive justice. 
  
Defenders of the basic structure argue that while Cohen’s critique is powerful, it is 
not conclusive.  Samuel Scheffler argues that there are good reasons for restricting 
the  principles  of  justice  to  the  basic  structure.    It  boils  down  to  Rawls’ 
‘methodological modesty.’
24  Rawls proposes an “institutional division of labour” 
between ‘social forms that are required to ensure background justice and those 
that directly regulate individual economic transactions.’
25  The difference principle 
controls for background justice on a macro-level, whereas rules such as those 
relating to fraud and duress can apply to individual economic transactions.
26  This 
leaves individuals free to pursue their own ends instead of constantly trying to 
correct for macro-economic injustice.
27  As Rawls points out, this would be ‘an 
excessive if not an impossible burden.’
28 
 
Rawls  also  advances  a  “moral  division  of  labour”  between  ‘the  principles  of 
justice that apply to the basic structure of society and the values and principles 
that apply to other areas of life.’
29  This moral division of labour responds to 
Rawls’ commitment to value pluralism.
30  The principles of justice cannot regulate 
individuals’ choices and behaviour because this would conflict with the idea that 
individuals ought to pursue their own comprehensive conceptions of the good.  
Scheffler argues that Cohen does not speak to these important reasons for Rawls’ 
argument that the basic structure is distinct.
31 
 
Clare  Chambers  thinks  that  these  debates  are  focusing  on  the  wrong  issues, 
namely the coercive/non-coercive institutions distinction and an over-emphasis 
on  the  application  of  the  difference  principle.    On  the  first  issue,  the  textual 
evidence in Rawls reveals that the relevant distinction is not over whether the 
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basic structure institutions are coercive or not.  Chambers picks up Rawls’ quote 
in Justice as Fairness Revisited: “Since justice as fairness starts with the special case of 
the basic structure, its principles regulate this structure and do not apply directly to or 
regulate internally institutions and associations within society”.
32  Here there are two 
things that the principles of justice do to basic structure institutions – they “apply 
directly” and “regulate internally”– but they do not do this to non-basic structure 
institutions. 
 
Chambers first looks at the claim that the principles of justice “internally regulate” 
the institutions of the basic structure, and how this applies to the family.  She 
argues  that  while  Rawls  makes  many  references  in  his  work  to  the  principles 
applying directly to the basic structure, that she can find no other references to 
the idea that the principles internally regulate the basic structure institutions.
33  So 
when Rawls says that the principles do not apply internally to non-basic-structure 
institutions like churches or universities he introduces a ‘red herring’ because, 
‘The principles of justice do not apply to the internal life of any institutions.’
34 
 
So if the fact of internal regulation of institutions is not the thing that makes 
basic-structure  institutions  unique,  the  alternative  must  be  the  idea  that  the 
principles “apply directly” only to these institutions.  One way of interpreting this 
is that they apply “essential constraints” on the institutions; for instance husbands 
cannot prevent their wives from voting.
35  However, as Chambers argues, this 
cannot be what makes the basic structure distinct, because no institution, basic-
structure or otherwise, is permitted to violate the first principle of justice – the 
equal basic liberties – of its members.  Churches and universities cannot remove 
peoples’ right to vote either.
36   
 
The over-emphasis on the difference principle in this debate is a mistake, because 
the difference principle is the lowest-ranked principle of justice, preceded by the 
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principles  of  equal  basic  liberties  and  equal  opportunity.    These  principles,  as 
argued  by  Rawls,  must  apply  to  all  institutions.
37   He  writes,  “the  principles 
defining the equal basic liberties and opportunities of citizens always hold in and 
through  all  so-called  domains.”
38   The  equal  basic  liberties  ought  never  to  be 
violated,  and  the  equal-opportunity  principle  must  “apply  directly”  to  at  least 
some non-basic structure institutions, such as businesses.
39  Scheffler’s moral and 
institutional divisions of labour break down, then, when the other principles of 
justice are considered.  The institutional division of labour might make sense for 
the difference principle, but it does not apply so neatly to the equal basic liberties 
or equal opportunity.  Scheffler contended that the moral division of labour was 
necessary to allow for value pluralism in people’s personal lives, but Rawls argues 
that the principle of equal basic liberties is a fundamental constraint even in this 
domain. 
 
One response to this argument is the “whole-structure view”, that contends that 
the principles of justice do not apply directly to the particular institutions that 
constitute the basic structure, but to the basic structure taken as a whole.   Miriam 
Ronzoni  challenges  Cohen,  arguing  that  he  misinterprets  what  constitutes  the 
basic structure.  Consider Cohen’s claim that, ‘sexist family structure is consistent 
with sex-neutral family law.’
40  This is only true, Ronzoni claims, if we understand 
the basic structure by determining which legally coercive institutions are part of the 
basic structure and making sure these institutions are constrained by the principles 
of justice.  Once this has been achieved then the basic structure is just and hence 
the society is just.
41 
 
Ronzoni argues, however, that a more sophisticated understanding of the basic 
structure is as follows.
42  Firstly we determine which social conditions need to be 
achieved for us to be able to claim a society is just.  Then we build the institutions 
needed to bring about these social conditions.  Once the institutional framework 
is such that the social conditions are achieved then the basic structure is just and 
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hence  the  society  is  just.    When  we  adopt  this  understanding  of  the  basic 
structure, it leaves space for considering the role of family law in the context of 
the whole society.
43  We may then discover that sex neutral family law is simply 
too  thin  an  interpretation  of  the  basic  structure,
44 and  that  once  the  social 
conditions are taken seriously it might be decided that family law is not the right 
target when tackling sexist culture.
45   
 
Chambers  concedes  that  this  is  an  important  view  when  considering  the 
difference principle, which necessitates taking a whole-structure approach, but it 
does not work when we consider all the principles of justice.
46  She argues, ‘The 
two more important principles are not secured by taking an overview approach 
that ignores the justice of individual institutions.’
47  And the principle of equal 
basic liberties and of equal opportunity apply not only to the internal workings of 
basic-structure institutions but to non-basic-structure institutions also.
48 
 
Chambers sums up by arguing that, ‘The basic-structure distinction is doomed 
because the family must be part of the basic structure, and because Rawls allows 
no way for the principles to apply “directly” to the family that he does not also 
allow for non-basic-structure institutions such as churches and universities.’
49  The 
family must be part of the basic structure according to Rawls’ own reasoning – 
because of its profound and pervasive effects.  But when we consider in what way 
either  the  principles  of  justice  can  be  said  to  “apply  internally”  to  the  basic 
structure institutions like the family, or to “apply directly” to these institutions, 
there is no special function of the principles when we include the principle of 
equal basic liberties and equal opportunity, that does not also count for non-basic-
structure institutions.  Thus, there is nothing distinct about the basic structure. 
 
Rawls aimed to show, ‘why the basic structure has a special role and why it is 
reasonable to seek special principles to regulate it.’
50  But the debate over the place 
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of  the  family  in  Rawls’  basic  structure  reveals  the  difficulties  of  trying  to 
conceptualise structure as something separate and distinct from the rest of society.  
As Clare Chambers puts it, ‘the specific case of the family illustrates deep-seated 
difficulties with Rawlsian justice as a whole.’
51  Young conceives of structure in 
such a way that she avoids these kinds of difficulties. 
 
For  Young,  institutions  are  an  important  part  of  structure,  but  structure  is  a 
broader concept.  What Young and Rawls have in common is the emphasis on 
counter-finality: the importance of institutions for redressing the unforeseeable 
fallout of the accumulated acts of individuals.  There are three further features of 
Young’s conception of “social-structural processes”, however, that distinguish her 
understanding of structure from Rawls.  
 
Young  argues  that  structures  place  individuals  and  (importantly)  groups  of 
individuals in different social positions.  Both Rawls and Young agree that the 
ways in which structures position individuals is the main concern of social justice.  
But Rawls thinks that once the basic structure is just that social positions will also 
be just.  Young starts from the assumption that existing structures are unjust, and 
she wants to understand the ways in which they are unjust.  Part of contemporary 
injustice is due institutional rules and practices, but she argues that social positions 
are also reproduced through the attitudes, habits and norms that govern private 
associations or personal transactions.   
 
Young  invokes  the  sociologist  Pierre  Bourdieu’s  concept  of  the  “habitus”  to 
describe  how  individuals  situated  in  different  positions  in  the  social  structure 
reproduce the behaviour associated with that social position, excluding those who 
don’t  embody  those  behavioural  traits.
52   Social  markers  are  exploited  by 
advertising and big business, pandering to the tastes and attitudes of various social 
groups; she suggests that this kind of positioning is so powerful and exploitable 
because it is unconscious.
 53  She also invokes sociologist Peter Blau’s analysis of 
social structures as a “multi-dimensional space” where individuals are placed in 
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different positions, and their unconscious embodiment of the habitus serves to 
reinforce their position. 
 
It  follows  from  this  that  social  structures  are  reproduced  through  individuals’ 
actions.
54  Individuals’ actions within structures that reproduce the structures are 
unreflexive  –  they  are  routine  and  habitual.
55   Drawing  on  Anthony  Giddens’ 
work on structuration, she argues that when individuals try to achieve a certain 
intention, they are at the same time reproducing the positional rules and resources 
upon which they draw for those actions.
56  In this way, structural inequalities of 
race, sex and class are reproduced.   
 
Finally, Young argues that these structural processes that position individuals and 
groups in relation to one another are experienced as “objectively constraining”.  It 
is not just the institutions of the basic structure – the major social institutions – 
that constrain or enable individuals’ action, but social norms and practices too.  
These  are  experienced  as  constraining  because  ‘others  behave  as  though  they 
are.’
57  Added to the constraints imposed by institutional rules and practices, and 
social norms, habits and attitudes, is the material context in which individuals act, 
which will determine what they can or cannot do.
58  To take an obvious example, 
country-dwellers  are  likely  to  be  excluded  from  participation  in  municipal 
decision-making.
59  These material constraints are borne out of a particular socio-
historical context.  For instance, the history of racial segregation in America has 
led to ghettoization of African-Americans today.
60 
 
The basic structure, then according to Young, should not be conceptualized as a 
separate  sphere  that  we  can  understand  once  we  abstract  away  from  the 
complexities of the real world.  Instead, we should start from the real world and 
conceptualize all the different and complicated manifestations of structure, part of 
which will of course be institutional; but if we focus solely on institutions we will 
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fail to understand how social positions are reproduced through the unconscious 
behaviour of individuals, and we will miss other obvious forms of structure like 
material  infrastructure,  which  have  arisen  out  of  specific  socio-historical 
circumstances.  In my view, then, the most significant difference between Rawls 
and Young over the question of the basic structure is that Young rejects the idea 
that the basic structure can be identified and separated out from the operations of 
the rest of society.   
 
When  we  apply  the  Youngian  account  of  structure  to  the  family,  we  can 
understand more clearly how some families may be considered unjust and what 
responsibilities individuals might have to make them more just.  The issue of 
counter-finality is perhaps only relevant when we take a macro-view of the role of 
the  family  in  society  –  how  the  repetition  of  the  traditional  nuclear  family, 
predicated upon the gendered division of labour, perpetuates gender inequality in 
terms of resources and in the workplace.  But when we consider the other forms 
of social-structural processes we can look inside the family unit.   
 
Social  positions  are  reproduced  within  the  family  through  the  habitus.    Parents 
inhabit different gender roles – wife as primary caregiver and domestic labourer, 
husband  as  breadwinner.    The  daily  reconstruction  of  these  roles,  and  the 
attendant  attitudes  and  habits  that  accompany  them,  will  be  perceived  and 
internalized by the children within the family.  Okin cites a sociological study of 
the gender division of labour within the household.  It found that in traditional 
families – with a male wage-earner and female housewife – that boy and girl 
children do approximately the same amount of household chores, but the chores 
are  divided  according  to  gender  roles.    In  “drudge  wife”  households,  where 
women work but also do twice as much domestic labour as their husbands, that 
girl children do 25% more housework than their brothers, and the boys do a third 
less of the chores of boys in traditional families.  In this way, she argues, ‘the boys 
are learning the pattern of family injustice established by their own fathers... And 
the daughters are falling, at a young age, into an even more exaggerated version of 
the “drudge-wife” model established by their mothers.’
61 
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These social positions, then, are reproduced through the actions of individuals within the 
family, rather than the institutional framework in which the family exists.  Persons 
within  the  family  experience  familial  attitudes  and  behaviours  as  objectively 
constraining  –  determining  their  ranges  of  options  for  action.    If  the  range  of 
options is more restricted for girls than for boys, or if the options are gender 
stereotyped for any children resulting in unfairly limited choices, then this is what 
constitutes  the  injustice  within  the  family.    Or  if  the  options  of  women  are 
restricted because of the unequal share of domestic and childcare commitments, 
then this also constitutes injustice.   
 
Moreover, these structural processes cannot be understood in abstraction.  They 
are  the  product  of  social  and  historical  circumstances.    The  downgrading  of 
women to second-class citizens, relegated to the private sphere, is an historical 
fact that continues to be played out in the gendered division of labour today.  The 
material circumstances that have built-up cities in Western industrialised countries 
around these gender norms make it difficult to overcome the gendered division of 
labour.  Young discusses the American suburbs where women stay and take care 
of the household, and men vacate to go to work.  This makes it difficult for 
women to enter the workplace because of the time it takes to travel and the 
inaccessibility of childcare.
62   
 
The special status of women within the family, or the material constraints that 
have  arisen  through  this  structural  positioning  of  women,  will  depend  on  the 
socio-historical context; so the constraints imposed on the suburban housewife in 
the United States will be different to the constraints that apply in other cultural 
contexts.  This includes working-class women within the US, who are more likely 
to  be  African-American  adding  further  considerations  of  structural  inequality 
related to race and the history of racial oppression.   
 
To understand injustice within the family then, we do not need to apply abstract 
principles of justice to the family and to question whether or not various families 
live up to these standards.  Instead, we look at patterns of behaviour predicated 
on gendered social relations that exist in wider society, and how these play out in 
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different family set-ups, to assess whether or not practices within the family are 
unjust. 
 
The drawback of Young’s account of structure is that it is rather sketchy and 
perhaps too vague.  It is worth pointing out, however, that the reason why there 
has been so much controversy over Rawls’ conception of the basic structure is 
that he was never completely candid and clear about what actually constitutes the 
basic structure.  It is also worth mentioning that Young’s Responsibility for Justice 
was never completed, and so perhaps she would have refined her approach had 
she had the opportunity.  Aside from this speculation, Young suggests, following 
William Sewell, that theorising about social structure will perhaps be a never-
ending process as it is something of a metaphorical concept.
63  She quotes: “no 
formal  definition  can  succeed  in  fixing  the  term’s  meaning:  the  metaphor  of 
structure continues its essential if somewhat mysterious work in the constitutions 
of social scientific knowledge despite theorists’ definitional efforts.”
64 
 
The advantage of Young’s approach is that it moves away from the understanding 
of structure as ‘a part of society’ and reconceptualises it as ‘a way of looking at 
society.’
65   Looking  at  society  in  a  structural  way  enables  the  theorist  to  see 
‘patterns in relations among people and the positions they occupy relative to one 
another.’
66  Even if Young’s characterization of structure is incomplete, therefore, 
it is this insight that is of value.  As the discussion of the family has demonstrated, 
trying to separate out particular institutions as “basic” and as embodying different 
principles  to  the  rest  of  society  is  a  doomed  project.    This  more  complex 
Youngian  picture,  which  draws  on  sociological  influences  as  well  as  political 
theory, is more persuasive and can better account for the kind of “structure” 
embodied  in  the  power  relations  within  the  family.    Once  we  conceive  of 
structure in this way, we have moved away from the idea that the basic structure is 
something  distinct.    It  provides  us  with  the  resources  for  conceptualizing 
structural injustice within the family and across other domains of society. 
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5.1.2  The Distributive Paradigm 
 
I have argued that Young’s account of structure is different to Rawls in that it 
encompasses a way of looking a society, rather than identifying a set of relevant 
institutions to which the principles of justice ought to apply.  This account of 
structure can better accommodate claims about injustice within the family – a 
problem  that  has  dogged  Rawlsian  justice.    However,  there  is  a  background 
assumption within these debates about the family and the basic structure, which 
pertains to another element of Young’s account of injustice.  All of the critiques 
of Rawls based on the inadequacy of his account of the basic structure to deal 
with the family assume, with Rawls, that the point of justice is to achieve just 
distributions across individuals in society.  Defences of the basic structure argue 
that this can best be achieved by an institutional division of labour where just 
institutions  regulate  the  background  justice  of  society,  correcting  for  the 
accumulated economic fallout of individual or private transactions.  
 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls discusses four reasons why he emphasises the role of 
the basic structure in correcting for background injustice and why this involves a 
set of rules – the principles of justice – that apply to the basic structure.  He 
argues, firstly, that we cannot look at the actions of individuals in the immediate 
timeframe  to  know  if  the  agreements  are  fair,  ‘For  this  assessment  depends 
importantly  on  the  features  of  the  basic  structure,  on  whether  it  succeeds  in 
maintaining background justice.’
67   
 
Secondly,  even  if  all  individuals  believe  they  are  acting  fairly  in  making 
agreements,  this  is  not  sufficient  to  preserve  background  justice  because,  ‘the 
tendency is rather for background justice to be eroded even when individuals act 
fairly: the overall result of separate and independent transactions is away from and 
not toward background justice.’
68  Because of this tendency, ‘we require special 
institutions to preserve background justice, and a special conception of justice to 
define how these institutions are to be set up.’
69 
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Thirdly, Rawls argues that ‘there are no feasible and practicable rules that it is 
sensible to impose on individuals that can prevent the erosion of background 
justice.’
70  Rules that apply to individuals’ transactions ‘will not exceed the capacity 
of individuals to grasp and follow them with sufficient ease, nor will it burden 
citizens with requirements of knowledge and foresight that they cannot normally 
meet.’
71 
 
Finally, Rawls emphasises the ‘division of labour between two kinds of social 
rules.’
72  The rules of the basic structure apply to the basic structure institutions, 
‘as  well  as  those  operations  that  continually  adjust  and  compensate  for  the 
inevitable  tendencies  away  from  background  fairness,  for  example,  such 
operations as income and inheritance taxation designed to even out the ownership 
of  property.’
73   The  legal  system  generates  another  set  of  rules  that  apply  to 
individual transactions or between private associations, ‘(the law of contract, and 
so on).  The rules relating to fraud and duress, and the like, belong to these rules, 
and  satisfy  the  requirements  of  simplicity  and  practicality.’
74   The  aim  of  this 
division  of  labour,  as  Scheffler  emphasised,  is  ‘to  leave  individuals  and 
associations free to act effectively in pursuit of their ends and without excessive 
constraints.’
75 
  
To summarise, Rawls’ reasons for specifying principles that apply to the basic 
structure are as follows.  We cannot know whether individuals’ transactions are 
fair without an assessment of background justice.  Even if all transactions are fair, 
background justice can still be eroded and we need institutions to correct for that.  
The  mechanisms  and  rules  for  achieving  this  are  beyond  the  capacities  of 
individuals  both  intellectually  and  in  terms  of  being  overly  burdensome.  
Therefore, we need a set of rules for background institutions and another set for 
individual transactions, that allow individuals to be free to pursue their own ends 
against a background of just institutions. 
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Underlying this argument is the assumption that justice entails the regulation of 
the  distributions  of  the  benefits  and  burdens  of  economic  transactions.   This 
assumption is carried through the debate that we just discussed on the role of the 
family.  For instance, Cohen, Rawls’ most famous critic on this, is concerned 
about non-coercive structure and personal behaviour insofar as they affect the 
distribution of benefits and burdens across society.  The content of his critique of 
Rawls is that if Rawls is genuinely concerned with justice so understood, then he 
too must be concerned with informal structures.   
 
Defenders  of  the  basic  structure  distinction  also  maintain  this  background 
assumption.  For instance, when Okin discusses Rawls’ take on gender equality, 
she shows that he appeals to Lincoln’s principle of equality used to condemn 
slavery.  She claims that this is ambiguous because it can be interpreted in two 
ways – as formal equality or as an anti-caste principle.  The latter involved the 
substantive  project  of  Reconstruction,  which  was  abandoned  by  Lincoln’s 
successor after his death.  Okin argues that gender equality has to be understood 
in the latter sense because even when legal subordination of women has ended, 
‘the  social  structures  based  on  them  have  remained,’  including  the  gendered 
division of labour in the household, and women’s primary responsibility for care 
and dependency work.
76  She argues, 
 
Some of what women need, beyond formal equality, in order to overcome 
a castelike history, has parallels in what the freed slaves needed (but did 
not get, except sporadically and temporarily) after abolition.  For example, 
just as they needed the material provision of land if they were not to be 
forced from a barbaric form of exploitation – slavery – into a somewhat 
less barbaric one – unregulated wage labour under racist conditions – so 
do we now need the material provision of parental leave and subsidized 
child  care  so  that  women,  like  men,  can  work  for  pay  without  being 
exploited because they are parents.
77 
 
Here Okin is suggesting that substantive equality for women requires a better 
distribution of the benefits of economic accumulation – provision of childcare 
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and parental leave.  Ronzoni similarly argues that if a society exhibits sexist social 
conditions, then we should design institutions so as to ameliorate that: ‘in a sexist 
society, institutions take extra care to ensure to the needs of women, and gives 
them special protections and resources to counteract society’s sexist threats.’
78 
 
In Justice and the Politics of Difference, Young started with the claims of the new left 
social  movements  of  the  1960s-80s.    These  movements  did  argue  for  better 
provision of resources for disadvantaged social groups.  But they argued for more 
than that – they demanded the equal status of previously subordinated groups, 
including an end to violence against women, people of colour, non-heterosexual 
people,  and  end  to  cultural  imperialism  of  white,  heterosexual  men,  and  a 
recognition of their differences but also their inherent equality.  Young opens the 
book with the question, ‘What are the implications for political philosophy of the 
claims of new group-based social movements associated with left politics – such 
movements as feminism, Black liberation, American Indian movements, and gay 
and lesbian liberation?’
79  She argues not that their claims are wrong because they 
do not fit in with the “distributive paradigm” of justice, but that contemporary 
conceptions of justice are wrong because they cannot accommodate these non-
distributive claims.   
 
The content of the critique of the distributive paradigm of justice is that the 
injustice  of  oppression  cannot  be  overcome  by  distributions  of  any  particular 
resource – there is no thing that can be distributed that can undermine sexism, 
racism or other forms of status inequality.  Distributions help, and are important, 
in the sense that if oppressed groups have equal shares of material resources they 
will  be  more  able  to  be  fully  self-determining  agents.    However,  forms  of 
oppression  like  violence  or  cultural  imperialism  may  remain.    The  structural 
power relations that maintain these forms of oppression cannot be fully dealt with 
and  captured  by  better  distributions  of  resources.    Young  argues  that,  ‘The 
concepts  of  domination  and  oppression,  rather  than  the  concept  of  distribution, 
should be the starting point for a conception of social justice.’
80 
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The distributive paradigm has created two problems in justice theory, according 
to Young.  Firstly, it ‘reifies social relations and institutional rules’
81 and secondly, 
it ‘must conceptualize all issues of justice in terms of patterns.’
82  Young thinks 
that the distributive paradigm fails to critique the institutional context in which 
distributions take place, reifying these institutions.  And that it looks at patterns of 
distributions at any given time, rather than looking at how these patterns are 
reproduced over time.
83  Now Rawls is not necessarily guilty of these criticisms.  
The point of Rawlsian justice is precisely to critique the institutional context in 
which distributions take place.  The Rawlsian principles of justice are rules to 
govern the institutional processes that correct for unjust distributions of resources 
over time.  So however much other theorists might commit these sins, Rawls 
himself has an institutional, rule-oriented approach to justice.  So the difference 
between Rawls and Young lies elsewhere.  Young argues that: 
 
many  aspects  of  social  structure  and  institutional  context  cannot  be 
brought into view without examining social processes and the unintended 
cumulative consequences of individual actions.
84 
 
This  is  reminiscent  of  Rawls’  claim  that  the  basic  structure  corrects  for  the 
accumulated outcomes of private economic transactions, which no matter how 
fair  in  and  of  themselves,  may  nevertheless  accumulate  to  cause  background 
injustice.    But  what  Young  is  arguing  is  that  it  is  not  exclusively  economic 
transactions  that  have  this  effect.    The  accumulation  of  social  processes  also 
contributes to a form of background injustice that leads to the oppression of 
social groups.  And these social processes must be foregrounded if we are to 
understand the kinds of oppression experienced by social groups that are not the 
result of economic processes. 
 
If we continue with the example of the family, we need not only ensure that 
resources and opportunities are evenly distributed across family members, or that 
social institutions distribute resources to women – like childcare or parental leave, 
or exit options from marriage.  Enablement and constraint of women within the 
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family  refers  also  to  damaging  stereotypes  that  maintain  women’s  subordinate 
status; achieving gender justice within the family requires that attitudes towards 
women change.
85  As Young writes, 
 
A person has opportunities if he or she is not constrained from doing 
things, and lives under the enabling conditions for doing them.  Having 
opportunities  in  this  sense  certainly  does  often  entail  having  material 
possessions,  such  as  food,  clothing,  tools,  land,  or  materials.    Being 
enabled or constrained refers more directly, however, to the rules and 
practices that govern one’s action, the way other people treat one in the 
context of specific social relations, and the broader structural possibilities 
produced by the confluence of a multitude of actions and practices.
86   
 
It might be argued that once the correct rules are established to govern a just 
basic structure and resources are justly distributed, then changes in attitudes will 
follow.  Rawls argues this point: ‘once suitable principles are found to govern 
them and the requisite institutions are established, the problem of how to regulate 
other inequalities can be much more easily resolved.’
87   
 
Scheffler also presses this point against Cohen.  He argues against Cohen’s point 
that sex-neutral family law can co-exist with sexist family structure: ‘the extent to 
which the two can in fact coexist is an empirical issue, which Cohen does not 
investigate.’
88  But he then goes on to argue that the chances are that if there was a 
just basic structure, then sexism would not persist in the way Cohen imagines: 
 
If family law were thoroughly egalitarian, and if norms of gender equality 
pervaded  other  areas  of  the  law  that  have  served  to  enforce  gender 
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differences, it is far from obvious to me that the egregious sexist patterns 
that Cohen cites could indeed survive and flourish.
89 
 
The evidence, however, points more in Cohen’s direction.  The World Economic 
Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2013, assesses the level of gender equality 
attained by a country according to four indicators: economic participation and 
opportunity,  educational  attainment,  health  and  survival,  and  political 
empowerment.
90  According to this report, Denmark ranks eighth in the world.
91  
And yet, the European Agency for Fundamental Rights 2014 Report on gender-
based violence, found that ‘in Denmark 55% of women have experienced physical 
and/or sexual violence or threat from a partner or a non-partner since the age of 
15.’
92  
 
Thus,  I  would  suggest  that  it  is  not  sufficient  for  those  who  espouse  the 
distributive paradigm of justice to respond that if there were just distributions then 
these issues will be resolved, because this is based upon a questionable empirical 
assumption, and as I have suggested, there is evidence to the contrary, considering 
that  one  of  the  most  institutionally  gender-equal  countries  in  the  world 
experiences high levels of violence against women.  And contra-Cohen, we are 
not concerned with gender inequality insofar as it results in unjust distribution of 
the benefits and burdens of economic cooperation, we are concerned with gender 
inequality as an injustice in and of itself.  Gender inequality is an injustice because 
it  signals  relations  of  oppression  and/or  domination.    These  are  functions  of 
power rather than of distributions of resources.  A lack of resources may leave an 
individual or social group vulnerable to oppression and domination, but it does 
not in itself constitute oppression or domination. 
 
Rainer Forst argues that theories of justice have evolved along two broad lines.  
The first looks at the goods people receive in a distributive scheme compared 
with  what  others  have,  or  what  they  need  or  deserve.    In  this  distributive 
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paradigm,  the  focus  is  on  end-state  patterns  and  the  material  well-being  of 
individuals.  In the second, justice attends to the relationships between the people 
involved and their standing in the scheme of exercising power.  In this political 
justice  paradigm,  the  focus  is  on  the  legal,  political  or  social  standing  of 
individuals or groups in a legitimate political community.
93  The danger of the first 
approach is that it neglects the issue, ‘not of what  you  have but of how  you  are 
treated.’
94   Young’s  ‘deepest  and  most  productive  thought’  was  to  critique  the 
distributive paradigm along these lines.
95 
 
If  we  return  to  Rawls’  reasons  for  finding  principles  that  apply  to  the  basic 
structure to regulate background injustice, and keep Young’s criticisms in mind, 
we can see why Rawls is mistaken about the division of labour.  The governing 
idea for Rawls is that background injustice refers to the correction of accumulated 
economic transactions and that it would be too difficult and burdensome for 
individuals  to  correct  for  that.    But  according  to  Young,  justice  should  be 
concerned with not just what individuals have but how they are treated.  So justice 
goes beyond the correction of accumulated economic transactions to dealing with 
attitudes,  habits  and  norms  that  lead  to  the  unequal  and  unjust  treatment  of 
people from oppressed social groups.   
 
This will affect individuals’ responsibilities for injustice in the following ways.  
Firstly, it is not clear that the problem of unjust or unequal treatment can be 
resolved  by  remedying  economic  injustice  alone;  thus  it  is  not  clear  that  the 
problem can be solved by background institutions alone.  It is more likely that 
individuals’ behaviour will enter the realm of what we are concerned with when 
we talk about justice.  We can still say that when talking about justice we are 
concerned with structure, but in the previous section we saw that institutional 
structure cannot capture the whole of social structure, and thus cannot capture all 
we are talking about when we are talking about social structural injustice. 
 
Secondly, it is not clear that it would be overly burdensome to expect individuals 
to try to correct for these kinds of injustice.  Within the family, it is not overly 
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burdensome to expect male family members to negotiate the division of domestic 
labour,  rather  than  assume  it  is  the  female’s  responsibility.    So  the  idea  that 
considerations  of  background  injustice  are  too  burdensome  to  place  upon 
individuals is only true if the only injustice we consider is economic.  It is not 
necessarily  true  if  we  expand  what  we  mean  by  injustice  to  include  actually 
existing forms of oppression within social relationships. 
 
Finally, Rawls talks about the need for “practicable rules” and argues that there 
are none that can be applied to individuals to prevent background injustice.  But 
why do there need to be “rules”?  Young’s argument is that individuals have a 
“responsibility” for justice, not a set of rules that must be strictly adhered to.  A 
responsibility, as I have argued, is obligatory but discretionary, and is revisable to 
respond to ever-changing circumstances.  It does seem practicable to assert that 
individuals  should  not  behave  in  a  discriminatory  way  (either  consciously  or 
unconsciously – so there is a responsibility to think about whether or not one’s 
acts are in fact discriminatory), so as not to perpetuate the oppression of social 
groups.  Political responsibility is not overly burdensome in the sense that it is up 
to individuals to decide how to discharge it and it does not require specialised 
knowledge to think about how one’s actions and attitudes may be perpetuating 
discriminatory attitudes towards oppressed social groups. 
 
I have argued using the example of the family, that the Rawlsian idea that there is 
something distinctive about the basic structure is flawed.  I have suggested that 
Rawls’  distributive  understanding  of  justice  is  more  complex  than  Young’s 
criticisms suggest.  Nevertheless, he is concerned with establishing the correct 
institutional framework insofar as it affects end-state patterns and material well-
being; not insofar as it effectively mitigates relations of oppression or domination.  
Thus, on Forst’s distinction, Rawls is working in the distributive paradigm of 
justice.  When we think that justice entails status equality as well as distributive 
equality, then we must bring individuals’ behaviour into the realm of critique.  We 
can do this without imposing a set of rules, but by arguing that individuals have a 
political responsibility for justice. 
 Individuals’ Responsibilities for Injustice 
  179     
The implication of this is that we have rejected another tenet of Rawlsian theory, 
which is that in order to theorise about injustice in the present, we must have an 
ideal theory of justice that we have in mind as a benchmark to which we are 
aiming.  If we take seriously the concerns that Young has about the distributive 
paradigm of justice, then we find ourselves no longer in the realm of ideal theory, 
because in order to understand the power relations that lead to status inequality, 
we must consider power relations in our theorising, as they actually exist.   
 
Note, however, that including the family in considerations of justice has already 
interrupted the project of ideal theory.  As Okin points out, once we include sex 
in the Original Position as a way of including considerations of the family in the 
principles of justice, then the particular perspective of women will need to be 
included, ‘since their knowledge of “the general facts about human society” must 
include  the  knowledge  that  women  have  been  and  continue  to  be  the  less 
advantaged sex in a great number of respects.’
96  This means that awareness of 
socio-historical conditions of the subordination of women is admitted into the 
original position.  She argues that members of historically subordinated groups 
will  have  an,  ‘importantly  different  perspective,  bearing  on  the  questions  of 
justice.’
97   This  perspective  will  derive  from  experiences  of  oppression.    As 
Charles Mills points out, once these kinds of empirical inputs are included in 
theorising about justice, ‘the theory ceases to be ideal.’
98  So I now look at the final 
difference between Rawls and Young, over the role of ideal theory. 
 
5.1.3  Ideal Theory 
 
I have suggested that once we include the family, and once we move away from 
the focus on distributions of resources to an assessment of the oppressive or 
dominating power relations between social groups, that this has implications for 
another feature of Rawlsian theory – the idea that in order to do non-ideal theory 
we must have an ideal theory in mind.   
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The  relationship  between  ideal  theory  and  the  basic  structure  is  crucial  to 
Rawlsian theory.   He argues that, ‘the special role of the basic structure affects 
the conditions of the initial agreement and necessitates that this agreement be 
understood  as  hypothetical  and  nonhistorical.’
99   Only  when  we  abstract  away 
from historical contingencies and engage in the hypothetical thought experiment 
of the Original Position, can we work out the principles that ought to regulate a 
just basic structure.
100  Rawls asserts the importance of doing this in order to 
create an independent standard of justice: 
 
In the absence of such an ideal form for background institutions, there is 
no  rational  basis  for  continually  adjusting  the  social  process  so  as  to 
preserve background justice, nor for eliminating existing injustice.  This 
ideal theory, which defines a perfectly just basic structure, is a necessary 
complement to nonideal theory without which the desire for change lacks 
an aim.
101 
 
Not only do we need an independent standard of justice, otherwise ‘the desire for 
change lacks an aim’; but only ideal theory can provide the relevant standard.  As 
Rawls points out, however, discussion about the principles of justice does not 
occur  in  actuality,  because  there  is  no  possible  scenario  in  which  real-world 
individuals  could  sufficiently  achieve  the  conditions  imposed  by  the  Original 
Position.  In order to be considered as ‘free and equal moral persons’, participants 
in the original position have to reason as though they know ‘very little about 
themselves’  as  per  the  restrictions  of  the  ‘veil  of  ignorance’:  ‘For  to  proceed 
otherwise is still to allow the diverse and deep contingent effects to influence the 
principles  that  are  to  regulate  their  social  relations  as  such  persons.’
102   Real 
individuals cannot abstract away from social and historical contingencies to agree 
upon the ideal principles of justice that set the independent standard.  Instead, the 
problem is solved by the political philosopher.  As Rawls writes:  
 
There  exists  no  practicable  way  to  actually  carry  out  this  deliberative 
process  and  to  be  sure  that  it  conforms  to  the  conditions  imposed.  
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Therefore, the outcome cannot be ascertained by pure procedural justice 
as  realized  by  deliberations  of  the  parties  on  some  actual  occasion.  
Instead the outcome must be determined by reasoning analytically.
103 
 
As  A.  J.  Simmons  argues,  ideal  theory  is  ‘the  political  philosopher’s  first 
concern.’
104  Ideal theory is designed to formulate the principles of justice for the 
basic structure.  Once the correct principles of justice have been found for the 
basic  structure,  the  remaining  issues  of  justice  will  be  easier  to  identify  and 
resolve.  Simmons argues that Rawlsian non-ideal theory only makes sense in 
relation to ideal theory; non-ideal theory is transitional and has an integrated goal 
– Rawlsian ideal theory:   
 
Because the object of Rawls’ nonideal theory is the eventual achievement 
of the ideal of perfect justice, not simply the elimination of particular or 
salient  injustices,  I  take  nonideal  theory’s  requirements  of  political 
possibility  and  likely  effectiveness  to  be  best  understood…  as 
requirements that policies be practically possible and likely to be effective 
as parts of a strategy for the complete elimination of all societal injustices.  
This means that we must understand Rawlsian nonideal theory as both 
strongly transitional (as opposed to simply comparative) in character and 
offering us an integrated, not a piecemeal, goal as our target (for assessing 
policies’ possibility and effectiveness).
105 
 
Charles Mills argues that this kind of ideal theorising is deeply problematic.  He 
distinguishes two types of ideal model.  Firstly, ‘ideal-as-descriptive-model’, which 
is a representation of a phenomenon in the natural or social world and makes 
some simplifying assumptions about its nature and how it works.
106  Secondly, the 
‘ideal-as-idealized-model’,  which  is  an  exemplar  of  the  phenomenon.
107   This 
derives from Onora O’Neill’s distinction between abstraction and idealization.  
According to O’Neill, abstraction means ‘bracketing’, which is ‘theoretically and 
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ethically unavoidable’.
108  Idealization, by contrast, means assuming rather than 
establishing  certain  ideals.
109   The  ‘free  and  moral  persons’  in  the  Rawlsian 
Original  Position  are  an  ideal-as-idealized-model  of  human  beings,  because  as 
Rawls himself points out, there are no actual circumstances in which an individual 
would be able to conform to the restrictions imposed by the veil of ignorance in 
the original position.  
 
Mills argues that ‘what distinguishes ideal theory is not merely the use of ideals… 
What distinguishes ideal theory is the reliance on idealization to the exclusion, or 
at least marginalization, of the actual.’
110  Idealising to the point of marginalising 
the actual has two implications.  Firstly, that the ideal-as-idealized-model of justice 
will never be achieved.
111  And secondly, that it can only serve the interests of 
those  who  come  close  to  achieving  the  ideal  in  practice.    For  example,  the 
creators  of  the  principles  of  justice  in  the  Original  Position  –  rational, 
autonomous, self-interested, heads of households – will come up with principles 
that best suit these kinds of individuals.  In the real world these are most likely to 
be  white  men,  people  who  do  not  experience  status  or  identity  oppression; 
privileged people ‘have an experience that comes closest to that ideal, and so 
experience the least cognitive dissonance between it and reality.’
112  This functions 
to  promote  the  interests  of  the  privileged  in  the  ideal-as-idealized-model  of 
justice, and to obfuscate the needs of actually oppressed social groups.  In order 
to include the needs of oppressed groups in theories of justice, we should use 
ideal-as-descriptive-models.  Mills points to ‘global concepts like patriarchy and 
white supremacy.’  He argues that, ‘These terms are abstractions that do reflect the 
specificities  of  group  experience,  thereby  potentially  generating  categories  and 
principles that illuminate rather than obfuscate the reality of different kinds of 
subordination.’
113 
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It  has  been  argued,  by  analytic  political  philosophers  who  are  sympathetic  to 
Rawls’ reasons for doing ideal theory, that Mills’ argument misunderstands Rawls’ 
reasoning.  A.J. Simmons describes his critique as ‘simpleminded’.
114  However, I 
think that the clash between Mills and Rawlsians over the function of ideal theory 
is indicative of the ways in which critical theorists and analytic philosophers have 
difficulties talking to one another.  It is worth pausing to look at this debate, 
because Mills articulates the critical theory critique of ideal theory in a way that 
maps on to Young’s methodology for theorising about justice. 
 
Zofia Stemplowska characterizes Mills’ arguments as follows.  Mills thinks that we 
engage  in  idealization  when  we  build  models  based  on  ‘significantly  false 
assumptions.’
115  She argues that ‘according to Mills, ideal theory cannot illuminate 
normative problems precisely because it involves assuming what is significantly 
false.’
116  Stemplowska argues that a theory does four things: it uses assumptions 
(inputs) to come up with principles (outputs), it uses a method for deriving outputs 
from inputs, and it may generate some recommendations.
117  Stemplowska interprets 
Mills  as  arguing  that  unless  a  theory  produces  achievable  and  desirable 
recommendations  (“AD-recommendations”),  then  it  is  ‘useless’  as  a  theory.
118  
Stemplowska makes three claims: that a) the main focus of Mills’ critique pertains 
to the lack of recommendations from ideal theory, b) that he is against the use of 
generalising inputs and, c) he thinks that the outputs derived from generalising inputs 
will be useless.  This is not what Mills is arguing, however. 
 
The first point can be dismissed quite easily.  Mills is not arguing that theory is 
useless unless it generates AD-recommendations.  What he is arguing is that the 
kinds of input assumptions made by ideal theorists are problematic, thus resulting 
in problematic outputs.  The issue of recommendations is not discussed by Mills. 
 
If we focus on the kinds of inputs used by ideal theory, then, Stemplowska thinks 
that  Mills  takes  issue  with  the  fact  that  these  inputs  are  generalizations.  
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Stemplowska argues that we need approximations, and we need to pretend that 
certain difficulties do not exist; otherwise the complexity of real world problems 
will be too great to deal with.
119  She thinks that the objection to this line of 
argument is that, 
 
Problems that cannot be tackled in their full complexity, the objection 
goes, should not be tackled at all: generality and incompleteness at the 
expense of the specific and the concrete is not a price worth paying for 
gaining an overall (but necessarily skewed) sense of where we stand vis-à-
vis a given problem.  The plausibility of this view clearly depends on a 
certain picture of meta-ethical reality that denies the validity of normative 
generalizations.
120 
 
Mills explicitly argues, however, that we do need generalizations.  The issue is 
whether they are of the ideal-as-idealized-model, or the ideal-as-descriptive model.  
Generalizations such as patriarchy, white supremacy or class inequality, are of the 
latter  kind.    These  concepts  constitute  abstractions  rather  than  idealizations 
because, ‘they map accurately (at least arguably) crucial realities that differentiate 
the statuses of the human beings within the systems they describe; so while they 
abstract, they do not idealize.’
121 
 
Mills  is  not  arguing  that  if  a  theory  makes  ‘significantly  false  assumptions’  (a 
phrase he does not use himself) that it is ‘useless’ (also not a term that Mills uses 
in talking about ideal theory); rather he is arguing that ideal-as-idealizing inputs 
will  generate  problematic  status  quo  reinforcing  outputs.    To  use  the  Original 
Position  again,  the  kinds  of  problems  that  concern  critical  theorists  –  power 
relations among different social groups along the lines, not only of class, but also 
race, gender, sexuality and ability – are not included in the deliberations and so the 
co-creators of the principles of justice do not come up with principles of justice 
that deal adequately with these sorts of inequalities.  And so when translated into 
the real world we find that we have a set of principles that match the interests of 
the non-oppressed, rather than the interests of the oppressed.  In order to deal 
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with the injustice of status inequality, lived forms of oppression, characterized in 
general ideal-as-descriptive models, such as patriarchy or white supremacy, must 
be included in deliberations about justice. 
 
Stemplowska defends the outputs of ideal theories on two grounds. Firstly they 
serve an evaluative function; reflection on justice in the ideal can ‘alert us to the 
presence of previously undiagnosed vices and virtues… This is important since 
there is no good reason to expect that all of the requirements of justice should 
present themselves to us as obvious just as soon as we correctly identify all of our 
constraints.’
122  The second important function of ideal theory is that it can serve 
as  a  benchmark  of  justice;  it  ‘allows  us  to  test  our  grasp  of  values  against 
situations in which our judgements are less fallible.’
123   
 
In terms of the evaluative function, ideal theory may serve to highlight problems 
of injustice that we have previously failed to see.  However, Mills’ object was to 
point out that ideal theory can also work in the opposite direction – by focusing 
too much on the ideal we can miss real-world constraints.  For instance, he argues 
that Rawls and Nozick, who lived in the most race-conscious society in the world, 
both  completely  ignored  race  as  a  form  of  oppression.
 124   In  terms  of  the 
benchmark of justice, a critical theorist like Mills does not have to disagree with 
Stemplowska.  He can posit what “emancipation” looks like and judge existing 
situations against it.  The idea that we can use counterfactuals to think about what 
an ideal world might look like is unproblematic for the critical theorist, who may 
argue, for example, that in a just society no one would hold racist attitudes.  The 
argument is that if we are going to theorise about emancipation, however, we 
should start from ideal-as-descriptive-models that describe group oppression in 
the here and now rather than ideal-as-idealized-models that most closely resemble 
the dominant groups in society, in order to generate emancipatory outputs that 
incorporate the interests of oppressed groups. 
 
In  sum,  Mills  is  not  arguing  that  a  theory  that  uses  generalising  inputs  will 
generate useless outputs because it lacks recommendations.  He thinks that we 
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need to use abstracted, rather than idealising, inputs in order not to obfuscate 
real-world injustice.  Whether or not the theory provides recommendations is 
beside the point. 
 
This debate between Mills and Stemplowska leads us to Young, because Young’s 
description of her method resembles Mills’ arguments.  In the introduction to 
Justice and the Politics of Difference, she argues that she is not going to attempt to write 
a theory of justice, which she describes as follows: 
 
The theory of justice is intended to be self-standing, since it exhibits its 
own foundations.  As a discourse it aims to be whole, and to show justice 
in its unity.  It is detemporalized, in that nothing comes before it and 
future events will not affect its truth or relevance to social life.
125  
 
I would suggest this is not a caricature of Rawlsian theory in the sense that Rawls 
does intend his theory to be self-standing, a unified theory, and detemporalized.  
But Young thinks that such theorising has two significant problems.  Firstly,  
 
If  the  theory  is  truly  universal  and  independent,  presupposing  no 
particular social situations, institutions, or practices, then it is simply too 
abstract to be useful in evaluating actual institutions and practices.
126 
 
This echoes Mills’ argument that the ideal-as-idealized-model idealises to the point 
of abstracting away from real-world injustice, specifically group oppressions that 
have  not  been  inputted  into  the  theory  in  the  first  place.      Young’s  second 
criticism of this kind of project is that is ‘conflates moral reflection with scientific 
knowledge.’
127   The  aim  is  to  generate  a  theory  through  observation,  and  the 
problem  with  this,  is  that  it  precludes  listening  to  the  claims  that  real-world 
individuals are making about issues that constitute injustice.  As Young argues, 
‘The call to “be just” is always situated in concrete social and political practices 
that  precede  and  exceed  the  philosopher.’
128   We  do  not  need  a  fully-fledged 
theory of justice in order to listen to and evaluate the claims of injustice that are 
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situated in concrete political, socio-historical circumstances: ‘This critical distance 
does not occur on the basis of some previously discovered rational ideas of the 
good and the just.’
129 
 
Stemplowska  argued  that  the  two  things  for  which  ideal  theory  is  particularly 
valuable are that ‘these theories help us to identify which goals we should set 
ourselves and how we should evaluate where we find ourselves.’
130  But the critical 
theorist does not have to abandon these functions of political theory.  In terms of 
the evaluative function, the argument of critical theorists like Mills and Young is that 
we can produce evaluative categories without having an overarching theory of 
justice.  The evaluative categories are more likely to be categories of injustice 
rather  than  categories  of  justice.    An  ideal-as-descriptive-model,  such  as 
patriarchy, can make generalizations that help us to understand present injustice 
more clearly.  
 
Indeed, Young’s explicit aim is to theorise injustice and to think about how those 
injustices can be remedied, not to theorise justice and to think about how we can 
work towards it.  As a critic of contemporary political theory, she forces us to 
think about what idealized theories of justice leave out.  She wants us to engage 
with this complexity by theorising injustice as it arises.  She writes, 
 
While I pledge loyalty to no doctrine, and expect no oaths to mine, I have 
tried  to  sort  out  what  is  right  and  useful  about  many  theories  and 
positions at the same time that I aim to expose some of their failings and 
limitations  as  tools  for  illuminating  or  promoting  a  liberatory  politics.  
This is the method Claude Levi-Strauss called “bricolage”.
131 
 
In engaging in “bricolage”, Young looks at a problem exposed by contemporary 
social movements, or from an issue within political theory, and she works out 
what injustice constitutes from that vantage point and how political theory can 
develop a conceptual framework for dealing with that.  In Justice and the Politics of 
Difference, she started from the new left social movements of her era and looked at 
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what they were calling injustice.  From this she established that there were five faces 
of  oppression  in  the  contemporary  United  States  –  exploitation,  marginalization, 
powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence.
132  She saw her job as a theorist 
to clarify what these forms of oppression are, which can then inform public-
political debate about how to address those problems in practice.  This is, then, a 
different interpretation of the evaluative function that political theory can play.   
 
This method will necessarily be more vague than the Rawlsian approach, as we 
cannot specify certain principles of justice, build a theory around them and then 
work on fine-tuning the principles into the best ideal and detemporalized theory 
of justice possible.  As a theorist of real-world power relations and inequalities, 
Young’s work will be vaguer and less precise because lived power relations and 
inequalities  are  necessarily  deeply  complex  and  resist  perfect  analytical 
categorisation.    But  this  does  not  mean  that  the  categories  of  injustice  she 
identifies do not serve an evaluative function. 
 
What it does mean is that Young does not have a fixed benchmark of ideal justice in 
mind.  A.J. Simmons argues that we need a benchmark in mind, which has to be 
worked out in ideal theory; otherwise our activism in the real world to challenge 
injustice will be inconsistent and perhaps counter-productive: 
 
As activists in the cause of justice, ideal theory may come to seem to us 
simply  irrelevant.    But  it  is  important  to  remember  that  even  most 
nonphilosophers who are active in the cause of justice do in fact have in 
mind, however vaguely, an ideal of justice toward which they take their 
campaigns  to  be  ultimately  directed.    While  some  of  us  may  become 
preoccupied with particular targeted injustices that seem to us especially 
grievous, none of us in the end forgets that justice is an integrated goal 
and that activism in one domain has the potential to affect adversely the 
achievement of justice in another.  That is all, really, on which Rawls’ 
model of the ideal-nonideal distinction insists that we focus.  The political 
philosopher’s first job, on this model, is to refine and argue for an ideal of 
justice, to say as clearly as possible what goal(s) we must attend to and 
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how we must weigh various factors in our efforts to eventually reach that 
goal.
133 
 
Perhaps it is true that nonphilosopher activists do have some sort of benchmark 
in mind, but I doubt that it is the Rawlsian basic structure.
134  It is more likely to 
be the elimination of the kinds of general categories of oppression that Young 
and Mills have identified; not least because they base their theorising on claims 
made by actually existing social movements.  Moreover, as bell hooks argues, 
oppressed people know they are oppressed.
135  People experiencing injustice do 
not need a political philosopher to tell them what a more just scenario would look 
like according to a perfectly thought-through ideal theory; instead they develop 
strategies  of  resistance  based  upon  their  particular  circumstances.
136   For  the 
critical theorist or activist, the benchmark we are aiming for can be the end of 
particular forms of injustice, such as patriarchy or white supremacy. 
  
Young’s project was to look at the claims of injustice made by social movements 
in the real world, to try to clarify the injustice in question, thus giving these social 
movements tools to strive towards particular benchmarks of justice.  Simmons’ 
point is that this piecemeal approach can lead to conflict.  But this is partly the 
point of the critical theorist’s work – to be politicized.  She describes this method 
as follows: 
 
Rejecting a theory of justice does not entail eschewing rational discourse 
about justice.  Some modes of reflection, analysis, and argument aim not 
at building a systematic theory, but at clarifying the meaning of concepts 
and issues, describing and explaining social relations, and articulating and 
defending ideals and principles.  Reflective discourse about justice makes 
arguments, but these are not intended as definitive demonstrations.  They 
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are addressed to others and await their response, in a situated political 
dialogue.
137 
 
The lack of a fixed benchmark in Young’s work has led to confusion as to what 
she was aiming for, however; questions such as is she a liberal/a socialist/a radical 
democrat?  Using Mills’ idea of the ideal-as-descriptive-model, Young’s method 
was to take a problem – be it a problem highlighted by a social movement or a 
problem she identified in political theory – and to develop an ideal-as-descriptive-
model  to  try  to  understand  the  problem,  which  sometimes  results  in 
recommendations and sometimes does not.  As I have suggested, this method will 
not deliver a detemporalized benchmark of ideal justice, but what Young does 
provide is an evaluative framework and particular benchmarks: if particular social 
groups  in  a  society  are  experiencing  domination  or  oppression,  then  there  is 
injustice, and we need to think about what the injustice is and how it can be 
overcome. 
 
To  conclude,  I  think  it  would  be  wrong  to  suggest  Young  is  doing  nonideal 
theory, because I agree with Simmons that the ideal/nonideal distinction should 
be understood within the Rawlsian framework.  Young is instead doing critical 
theory, and this will have implications for individuals’ responsibilities for injustice. 
 
5.2  Individuals’ Political Responsibility for Injustice 
 
In  this  chapter,  I  have  tried  to  identify  the  ways  in  which  Young  is  thinking 
differently  about  justice  to  Rawls  in  order  to  ascertain  what  it  means  for 
individuals to bear responsibility for justice.  I have argued that she has a different 
conception of structure to Rawls; the basic structure as a separate sphere requiring 
special  regulatory  principles,  to  social-structural  processes  as  constituted  by  a 
confluence of institutional rules and everyday interaction and behaviour.  I have 
looked at Young’s critique of the distributive paradigm of justice, arguing that 
justice is a broader area of concern than the effects of accumulated economic 
transactions, to also encompass the accumulated effects of social and historical 
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processes and actually existing power relations.  Finally, I made the link between 
Rawls’  basic  structure  and  ideal  theory,  and  Young’s  broader  conceptions  of 
structure and justice and critical theory.  Now I will outline what this means in 
terms of individuals’ responsibilities for injustice.   
 
I  have  already  suggested  three  implications  of  the  move  from  emphasising 
economic distributive justice to social forms of injustice; that this will necessarily 
bring individuals’ behaviour into the realm of critique, that this will not necessarily 
be  overly-burdensome  and  that  it  does  not  have  to  imply  a  set  of  rules  for 
individuals’ behaviour.  In this section I develop these ideas a bit further, by 
looking at the debate over monism and dualism about justice, and then outlining 
what political responsibility for justice means on the Youngian approach. 
 
5.2.1  Monism/Dualism 
 
Rawls advocates a moral and institutional division of labour: in a just society, the 
principles of justice govern the basic structure, leaving individuals free to pursue 
their own ends and conceptions of the good.  Individuals’ responsibilities for 
justice consist in adhering to a principle of fairness in our voluntary interactions.  
Individuals also have a natural duty of justice, which requires us “to support and 
comply with just institutions” or to further the establishment of just institutions if 
they do not exist, if this is not too costly to ourselves.
138 
 
Liam Murphy describes this as “dualism”, which is ‘the idea is that the existence 
of  institutions  gives  rise  to  a  special  kind  of  normative  problem,  one  that 
institutions are responsible for, but people are not.’
139  Murphy and Cohen reject 
this  view  in  favour  of  “monism”,  which  ‘holds  that  people  have  direct 
responsibility for justice.’
140   
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I  have  argued  that  Young’s  position  on  structure  and  justice  implies  that 
individuals’ have responsibilities for justice.  In Responsibility for Justice, Young states 
that she agrees with Cohen and Murphy: 
 
I think that both Cohen and Murphy are right to insist that individual 
actors have responsibilities in relation to justice.  The central project of 
this book is to conceptualize such responsibilities.  Cohen is completely 
right, moreover, to claim that many everyday social conventions, practices, 
and habits that individuals enact and re-enact contribute to producing and 
reproducing social injustice.
141  
 
Nevertheless, Young describes herself as a dualist.  How can this be?  We can 
make sense of this once we place the monism/dualism debate in context.   
 
The  monism/dualism  debate  shares  certain  features  with  the  basic  structure 
debate – an emphasis on the difference principle in the context of ideal theory.  We 
have already seen how Rawls and Cohen are engaged in the debate on these 
terms.  To recap, Rawls thinks that the principles of justice discovered in ideal 
theory ought to govern the basic structure, but that these rules would be overly-
burdensome  for  individuals,  as  they  cannot  correct  for  economic  background 
injustice.    Cohen  agrees  with  Rawls  that  we  should  be  concerned  about 
distributive injustice, so focuses on the difference principle, but he argues that this 
requires an egalitarian ethos, so he rejects dualism even in ideal theory. 
 
Thomas Pogge defends Rawlsian dualism as follows.  He argues that to sort out 
this debate, we need to imagine a society that is ‘fully just by Rawlsian lights’; that 
is a society whose tax regime fulfils the difference principle.
142  He writes: 
 
Committed to the difference principle narrowly understood, its members 
are  firmly  disposed  politically  to  support  any  adjustments  of  the  tax 
regime that raise the lowest socioeconomic position.  Is there reason to 
subject  their  personal  economic  choices  and  dispositions  to  additional 
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demands of a more expansively understood difference principle, as Cohen 
suggests?
143 
 
Pogge  argues  that  it  would  be  ineffective,  unfeasible,  counterproductive  or 
morally implausible for individual behaviour to adhere to the difference principle 
in such a society, because it would be overly-burdensome.
144   
 
As Jessica Payson points out, however, Pogge is making two mistakes.  Firstly, 
‘He does not consider the possibility that responsibility has a different meaning for 
individuals.’
145  Why would the difference principle apply in exactly the same way 
to  individuals’  behaviour  as  to  institutions?    And  secondly,  he  discusses 
individuals’ responsibilities in a context that is already just.  She writes: 
 
Pogge has written out the urgency of responsibilities for justice by placing 
the individuals (whose demands of justice we are to consider) in a context 
that is already just.  People have already done the work of creating and 
maintaining just institutions; they have altered current unjust structures (or 
perhaps have never known them?) and continue to support egalitarian 
policies.
146 
 
The questions, then, are can responsibilities for justice be different for individuals 
and  institutions?    And  what  do  these  responsibilities  entail  in  a  situation  of 
injustice rather than a situation of justice?  Murphy argues that it is precisely the 
second question that is dualism’s downfall, because in nonideal circumstances it 
provides implausible solutions.  He argues: 
 
The point is clearest in the international context.  Here a dualist would 
believe,  following  Pogge,  that  justice  requires  an  egalitarian  set  of 
institutions  to  replace  the  mostly  informal  and  decidedly  inegalitarian 
institutions  that  currently  prevail.    But  it  could  not  be  right  that  an 
individual rich First Worlder is required to devote her resources to the 
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Quixotic task of promoting just international institutions.  Such a person 
could clearly do so much more to alleviate suffering or inequality by doing 
what she can on her own – by giving money to humanitarian aid agencies.  
With a stark example like this, dualism starts to seem fetishistic.
147 
 
Young has a different answer to this question, however.  The key lies in her 
understanding  of  structure.    Murphy  separates  structure  from  the  actions  of 
individuals.    When  we  understand  structure  along  Youngian  lines  –  that  it  is 
reproduced through the actions of individuals – then we can hold that individuals’ 
have a responsibility to think about how their behaviour is reproducing unjust 
social structures.   
 
If we return to the example of the family, Cohen points out that sexism has been 
alleviated  in  some  family  contexts  because  of  the  actions  of  individuals.    He 
writes: 
 
It is a plain empirical fact that some husbands are capable of revising their 
behaviour, since some husbands have done so, in response to feminist 
criticism.    These  husbands,  we  could  say,  were  moral  pioneers.    They 
made a path which becomes easier and easier to follow as more and more 
people follow it, until social pressures are so altered that it becomes harder 
to stick to sexist ways than to abandon them.  That is a central way in 
which a social ethos changes.
148 
 
This echoes what Young describes as “cultural revolution” in Justice and the Politics 
of Difference: 
 
Saying that certain habitual and unconscious actions, manners, forms of 
response, ways of speaking, and so on should be judged unjust means that 
the  people  who  perform  these  actions  should  be  asked  to  take 
responsibility,  to  bring  to  their  discursive  awareness  the  meaning  and 
implications of these habitual actions.  But why consider this an issue of 
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social  justice  rather  than  simply  of  individual  moral  action?...  The 
behaviour, comportments, images, and stereotypes that contribute to the 
oppression  of  bodily  marked  groups  are  pervasive,  systemic,  mutually 
generating,  and  mutually  reinforcing.    They  are  elements  of  dominant 
cultural  practices  that  lie  as  the  normal  background  of  our  liberal 
democratic  society.    Only  changing  the  cultural  habits  themselves  will 
change the oppressions they produce and reinforce, but change in cultural 
habits can occur only if individuals become aware of and change their 
individual habits.  This is cultural revolution.
149 
 
What is lacking in Cohen’s account, which we find in Young’s work, is an analysis 
of  collective  action;  the  social  movement,  which  pushed  for  these  cultural 
changes.    Cohen  suggests  that  male  ‘moral  pioneers’  made  changes  due  to 
‘feminist  criticism.’    What  this  occludes  is  the  mass  movement  of  feminist 
organising, debating, ‘conceptual labour’ (as Mills describes it), and protesting that 
generated  the  feminist  critique  of  traditional  family  structure.    The  ‘feminist 
criticisms’ emerged from a mass movement.  Thus Young criticises Murphy, who 
in the quote above suggested that individuals can promote international justice 
“directly.”  She argues that ‘the promotion of justice requires collective action, 
and that requires organization.’
150  Individuals’ political responsibility for justice, 
then, in a context of injustice, involves being part of collective organising against 
injustice.   
 
In focusing on individuals’ responsibilities for injustice in the real-world context, 
rather  than  in  ideal  theory,  Young  has  identified  a  kind  of  responsibility  that 
individuals  bear  for  justice  that  does  not  apply  to  institutions.    Given  these 
premises of Young’s argument, she interprets dualism differently to the traditional 
debate, with its focus on the difference principle and ideal theory. 
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5.2.2  Youngian Dualism 
 
For Young, dualism refers to two ways of moral thinking in which an individual 
must engage, rather than a division between individual and institutional moral 
principles.  She argues,  
 
Just as it is appropriate to distinguish moral judgment about individual 
interaction  from  moral  judgment  about  social-structural  processes  and 
their  effects,  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  a  conception  of  individual 
responsibility in relation to each.
151  
 
Young  argues  that,  ‘as  individuals  we  should  evaluate  our  actions  from  two 
different irreducible points of view.’
152  We should think about ‘how we treat the 
persons we deal with directly’ (an interactional view), and ‘how we contribute by 
our actions to structural processes that produce vulnerabilities to deprivation and 
domination for some people’ (a structural view).
153  Dualism for Young, then, 
does  not  refer  to  one  set  of  rules  for  institutions  and  another  for  individual 
behaviour; it refers only to individuals and to the ways in which individuals should 
reason morally about their actions in the context of injustice. 
 
Young uses the example of the “family man” to bring out this difference in kind.  
She draws on Hannah Arendt’s discussion of how the Nazis manipulated the 
family man mind-set to mobilize millions of men to participate in genocide.
154  A 
family man like Eichmann, according to Arendt, was concerned first and foremost 
with providing for his family, working conscientiously in his job, and advancing 
his career.  He did not think about how his actions were affecting the wider 
world;  he  insulated  himself  from  this  by  concentrating  on  his  personal 
responsibilities.  Young writes, 
 
The  “family  man”  is  a  man  oriented  primarily  to  private  life  and  to 
ensuring the personal and economic security of those who depend on him 
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for support.  In his society, the family man is the epitome of virtue.  He is 
concerned for his career, not so much because he is ambitious for himself, 
and certainly not because he is after fame or great power, but because he 
takes  his  primary  duty  to  be  to  protect  his  family  and  himself  from 
distress.  People who fall into the family man type are people who do their 
jobs  conscientiously  and  expect  compensation  for  that,  but  otherwise 
mind their own business and try not to call attention to themselves.  They 
and their families and friends keep to themselves, and on the whole are 
indifferent to others outside their private circle.  They expect the same 
from others.
155 
 
On  the  one  hand,  it  is  commonly  thought  that  fulfilling  one’s  social  roles 
assiduously  is  the  ‘epitome  of  virtue’,  and  this  corresponds  with  Young’s 
conception  of  interactional  morality.    On  the  other  hand,  from  Young’s 
perspective,  it  is  unacceptable  to  exclusively  focus  on  oneself  and  closest 
counterparts  at  the  expense  of  wider  society  and  wider  relations  of  injustice.  
Instead, individuals must take a structural view when assessing their actions; that 
is, an individual must factor in the consequences of their actions, attitudes and 
habits, for society as a whole.   
 
On Young’s understanding of what it takes to be a moral person, then, merely 
looking out for one’s own and supporting political institutions is not enough; 
individuals must also assess their roles and actions in society in relation to the 
overall justice of those structures.  If an individual realises that in performing their 
social  and  institutional  roles  they  are  contributing  to  injustice,  then  the 
responsibility is to work with others to reform those structures.  The “family 
man” considers morality solely from the interactional point of view.  But to be a 
moral  person  in  complex  societies  requires  considering  how  one’s  behaviour 
reproduces structures that dominate or oppress others.  Responsibility for justice, 
then,  cannot  be  deferred  exclusively  to  institutions  with  individuals’ 
responsibilities derivative of institutional responsibilities; rather responsibility for 
justice is a virtue that ought to be cultivated by individuals. 
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Here we can see that Young thinks we must distinguish moral judgment about our 
behaviour in relation to others, and our behaviour in relation to structures.  This 
is  why  I  construe  political  responsibility  as  a  form  of  moral  responsibility  as 
virtue.    Young’s  conception  of  “political  responsibility”  is  individuals’ 
responsibility to think about how their behaviour affects unjust social-structural 
processes, to encourage others to think critically about their behaviour in relation 
to social structures, and to engage in collective action for change.  The upshot is 
that when we judge our relationship to social structures from a moral perspective, 
we will find that change is necessary.  It is not that we are to be blamed for our 
previous  behaviour,  because  we  were  likely  engaged  in  these  processes 
unintentionally, inadvertently or unavoidably.  But when we critically reflect we 
will find that we must collectively change these unjust structures.  The politically 
responsible  person  is  a  morally  virtuous  person  because  they  recognise  their 
implication  in  the  reproduction  of  unjust  social-structural  processes  and,  for 
moral reasons – for the sake of others – seek to change those structures. 
 
It might be objected that Young’s interpretation of dualism is implausible.  Young 
argues that we require a dualist approach to morality because ‘failing to distinguish 
a level of social structure from a level of individual interaction means that we 
cannot  bring  under  normative  evaluation  the  aggregate  consequences  of  a 
combination  of  individual  actions.’
156   Rawls’  reason  for  adopting  dualism, 
however,  was  that  individuals  cannot  know  what  the  aggregate  results  of  all 
society’s individual interactions are; we need the institutions of the basic structure 
to correct for that.  Also, it would be over-burdening to expect individuals to 
directly engage in this corrective process – they need space to get on with their 
own lives.  So is it plausible, as Young suggests, that individuals should consider 
their actions from a structural perspective? 
 
It would be implausible if we considered the only structure that was important 
from the perspective of justice to be the economy, because individuals cannot 
correct for macro-economic harms.  Indeed the point of social justice from the 
Rawlsian point of view is that all private transactions within the economy could 
be fair but they can still result in unintended, harmful structural outcomes – so 
                                                 
156 Responsibility for Justice, 67. Individuals’ Responsibilities for Injustice 
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there  is  nothing  individuals  could  do  to  correct  for  that.    It  would  also  be 
overburdening to expect individuals to think about all of their economic choices 
in terms of how it will affect the overall economy.   
 
However,  it  becomes  plausible  if  we  understand  structure  in  the  broader 
Youngian sense of social structure, which is reproduced through the actions of 
individuals  and  through  their  unconscious  habits,  attitudes  and  norms.  
Individuals’ behaviour is already implicated in the reproduction of injustice, from 
the Youngian perspective, and so must be brought into the realm of critique when 
discussing responsibility for injustice. 
 
Does this suggest that there is a set of rules that govern economic injustice, which 
is the responsibility of institutions, and a responsibility that individuals have for 
injustice  in  the  form  of  status  inequality?    I  think  this  would  be  an  over-
simplification.  Overcoming status inequality between groups requires changes in 
individuals’ behaviour, but also institutional reform, and economic redistribution.  
Economic  injustice  cannot  be  separated  out  from  the  structural  inequality  of 
social groups.  As Linda Martín Alcoff argues, from the perspective of social 
movements, effective organising for redistribution is often, and sometimes only 
can  be  done,  along  identity  lines  because  economic  injustice  is  tied  to  status 
inequality  of  social  groups.
157   The  two  spheres  are  inseparable.    An  adequate 
assessment of responsibility for injustice must have an account of dealing with 
oppressive  social-structural  processes  as  well  as  economic  processes.    Social 
movements must push for social and economic change. 
 
Individuals’  responsibilities  for  justice  are  burdensome  –  considering  one’s 
actions, habits and attitudes from a structural perspective, discussing these with 
others,  and  engaging  in  collective  action  are  energy-  and  time-consuming 
activities.  But taking up political responsibility is not burdensome in the way that 
troubles Rawls or Pogge; it does not require individuals to consider the effects of 
                                                 
157 Linda Martín Alcoff, "Fraser on Redistribution, Recognition, and Identity," European Journal of 
Political Theory 6(2007): 260. This is obviously a very complex and contested area, which I cannot 
go into here.  For Young’s position see her debate with Nancy Fraser: Nancy Fraser, "Recognition 
or Redistribution? A Critical Reading of Iris Young's Justice and the Politics of Difference," The 
Journal of Political Philosophy 3, no. 2 (1995); "A Rejoinder to Iris Young," New Left Review (1997); Iris 
Marion Young, "Unruly Categories: A Critique of Nancy Fraser's Dual Systems Theory," ibid. Individuals’ Responsibilities for Injustice 
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all of their economic transactions from the perspective of the difference principle.  
Individuals are free to live their own lives, but political responsibility requires 
individuals to be self-reflexive about their position in unjust social structures and 
how their behaviour reproduces these structures, and to take action in whatever 
way they can. 
 
Finally, another worry about suggesting that individuals bear responsibilities for 
justice is that it will impose a set of constricting rules on their behaviour.  As we 
have seen in this thesis, however, political responsibility is distinct from duty.  It 
does not impose a list of specific actions that individuals must perform; rather it 
implies a sphere of responsibility, or a way of being in the world.  It is a form of 
virtue.  The morally responsible person, in the context of structural injustice, will 
accept  and  act  on  their  political  responsibility  for  justice  in  whatever  way  is 
appropriate for them given their social position and other moral demands.   
 
5.3  Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have explored the link between Rawls’ conception of structure 
(the basic structure), the distributive paradigm of justice, and ideal theory.  I have 
contrasted this to Young’s conceptions of structure (social-structural processes), 
the  political  justice  paradigm,  and  critical  theory.    I  have  explained  the 
implications  of  these  different  approaches  for  individuals’  responsibilities  for 
justice.  In ideal Rawlsian justice, there is a division of labour – the principles of 
justice apply to the basic structure and individuals’ responsibilities are to support 
just institutions or work towards establishing just institutions.  In Young’s account 
of existing unjust social-structural processes, which are constituted by individuals’ 
behaviour as well as institutional rules, individuals have a responsibility to engage 
in collective political action for change. 
 
This  debate  has  implications  for  global  justice.    Theorists  that  think  that 
institutions bear responsibility for justice tend to argue that there are no global 
justice duties, because there is no global state – no ‘agent of justice’ – to whom 
those duties apply.  Theorists who argue that individuals can bear responsibilities Individuals’ Responsibilities for Injustice 
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for justice, by contrast, can claim that there are global justice duties and that these 
are  incumbent  on  individuals.    I  have  shown  that  Young  does  think  that 
individuals can bear responsibilities for justice.  In the next two chapters, I explain 
how  Young  conceptualises  global  injustice  and  individuals’  responsibilities  in 
relation to it. 
 
  
Chapter 6  Constructing a Youngian Account of Global Injustice 
 
 
Readers who have only encountered Young’s essays on the “social connection 
model” of responsibility would be forgiven for thinking that Young had a limited 
contribution  to  make  to  the  debates  on  global  justice.
1   In  these  essays,  she 
situates  herself  schematically  in  relation  to  the  familiar  cosmopolitan/statist 
debate.  This, I believe, was a mistake.  One of Young’s major contributions to 
contemporary  political  philosophy  was  to  focus  our  attention  on  injustice,  as 
opposed  to  justice,  specifically  by  focusing  on  relations  of  domination  and 
oppression,  as  we  saw  in  the  previous  chapter.    Young’s  body  of  work  has 
considerable  resources  to  help  us  think  about  global  injustice,  as  opposed  to 
global justice, in terms of domination and oppression, which could offer a fresh 
and illuminating perspective on these tired debates.  Indeed, Young had begun 
this work in other essays, namely her book Global Challenges: War, Self-Determination 
and Responsibility for Justice, and in the final chapter of Inclusion and Democracy.  In this 
chapter I aim to resituate Young in the global justice debate in a way that I hope is 
more in-keeping with her general body of work, rather than the late global justice 
essays; and, more ambitiously, in a way that illuminates a new path for research 
into  global  injustice.    My  contribution  is  not  only  this  reconfiguration  of  a 
Youngian approach to global injustice, but to develop a Youngian conception of 
global structural exploitation. 
 
In the first section I outline Young’s thoughts on the mainstream global justice 
literature,  and  suggest  a  different  approach  –  focusing  on  global  relations  of 
domination and oppression.  I briefly outline Young’s thoughts on tackling global 
relations of domination via democratization in Global Challenges, and show how it 
ties in with a burgeoning critical theory literature on global democracy. 
 
                                                 
1 Iris Marion Young, "Responsibility and Global Labor Justice," The Journal of Political Philosophy 12, 
no. 4 (2004); "Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model," Social Philosophy and 
Policy  23,  no.  1  (2006);  Global  Challenges:  War,  Self-Determination  and  Responsibility  for  Justice  
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The majority of this chapter focuses on relations of global oppression.  I have 
chosen to focus on exploitation (one of the “five faces of oppression” identified 
by Young).  I do this because the example of global injustice upon which Young 
focuses  –  sweatshop  labour  –  can  be  construed  as  a  problem  of  globalized 
exploitation.  Firstly, I look at contemporary liberal definitions of exploitation.  I 
argue  that  these  “transactional”  accounts  of  exploitation  cannot  help  us 
understand exploitation in global context.  I then offer a definition of “structural 
exploitation”  drawing  on  Marxian  definitions  of  exploitation  and  Young’s 
discussion  of  exploitation  in  Justice  and  the  Politics  of  Difference.    I  argue  that 
structural  exploitation  constitutes  the  transfer  of  energies  from  disadvantaged 
social  groups  to  advantaged  social  groups,  in  a  way  that  inhibits  the  self-
development of the former and enhances the status of the latter.  The inhibition 
of self-development constitutes oppression, for Young.  Structural exploitation is 
therefore a form of oppression, which is why it is an injustice.  I show why 
sweatshop  labour  is  an  example  of  structural  exploitation,  and  briefly  look  at 
responsibility for global structural exploitation. 
 
6.1  Young on Global Justice 
 
6.1.1  The Global Justice Essays 
 
In  her  essays  on  responsibility  and  global  justice,  Young  tries  to  situate  her 
understanding of global justice in relation to contemporary mainstream theories – 
statism and cosmopolitanism.  She begins with statism and summarises the statist 
positions of Rawls and David Miller as follows.
2  Rawls argues that justice applies 
to closed societies and that there are duties of assistance, but not of justice, to 
outsiders.    David  Miller  agrees,  but  thinks  that  state  borders  are  becoming 
increasingly porous, with the potential to render distributive justice a historically 
specific idea whose time has passed.  Young argues that the core of the statist 
position is that relations of justice can only be said to exist within the context of 
shared institutions. 
 
                                                 
2 Global Challenges, 160-61. Constructing a Youngian Account of Global Injustice 
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Young criticises statism, so understood, on two grounds.  The first is that ‘it is 
arbitrary to consider state membership as the source of obligations of justice’
3; 
this  is  because  states  ‘have  evolved  in  contingent  and  arbitrary  ways  more 
connected  to  power  than  moral  right.’
4   The  second  problem  with  the  statist 
position is that it ‘makes prior what is posterior from a moral point of view.  
Ontologically  and  morally  speaking,  though  not  necessarily  temporally,  social 
connection is prior to political institutions.’
5  Young thinks that social connections 
exist regardless of whether or not states exist.  In the contemporary world, there 
are  trans-national,  inter-national  and  sub-national  relations  between  agents  – 
individuals and collectives – that are not adequately theorised in the statist model 
of global justice.   
 
While  Young  errs  towards  cosmopolitanism  then,  she  finds  cosmopolitan-
utilitarian theory wanting.  Peter Singer and Peter Unger argue that moral agents 
have identical moral obligations to all other agents.  She agrees with critics of this 
position that it is too demanding, and that it ‘flies in the face of moral intuition.’
6  
She wants to retain a space for personal relationships, and also for the idea that 
obligations  of  justice  ‘require  more  and  are  based  on  more  than  common 
humanity.’
7  Young argues that people can exist in relationships with others within 
political  communities  or  outside  of  political  communities,  but  that  these 
relationships can produce conflict or cooperation, and thus require fair terms for 
adjudicating such interactions.
8   
 
Young  is  aiming,  then,  to  establish  a  middle-ground  between  the  statist  and 
cosmopolitan  positions,  stressing  the  need  for  relationships  to  generate 
obligations of justice but insisting that such relationships do not have to exist 
within  the  parameters  of  the  nation-state.    She  draws  inspiration  from  social 
contract theory in defending this middle-ground.  She writes: 
 
                                                 
3 Global Challenges, 161. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Global Challenges, 162. 
6 Global Challenges, 161. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Global Challenges, 161-62. Constructing a Youngian Account of Global Injustice 
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A society consists in connected or mutually influencing institutions and 
practices  through  which  people  enact  their  projects  and  seek  their 
happiness, and in doing so affect the conditions under which others act, 
often profoundly.  A social contract theory like that of John Locke argues 
that the need and desire for political institutions arises because socially 
connected persons with multiple and sometimes conflicting institutional 
commitments recognize that their relationships are liable to conflict and 
inequalities of power that can lead to mistrust, violence, exploitation, and 
domination.    The  moral  status  of  political  institutions  arises  from  the 
obligations  of  justice  generated  by  social  connection,  as  some  of  the 
instruments through which these obligations can be discharged.
9 
 
Young  draws  further  support  for  the  idea  that  social  connections  generate 
obligations  of  justice  from  Charles  Beitz.    In  Political  Theory  and  International 
Relations, Beitz argued that, ‘If social cooperation is the foundation of distributive 
justice, then one might think that international economic interdependence lends 
support to a principle of global distributive justice similar to that which applies 
within domestic society.’
10  Global economic interdependence generates benefits 
and burdens, which requires a principle to determine a fair distribution of the 
products of social cooperation.
11  Young interprets Beitz as defending the idea 
that  there  are  sufficient  global  relationships  to  generate  obligations  of  justice, 
rather  than  supposing  that  the  existence  of  institutions  presupposes  the 
generation of the obligations.
12 
 
Young  also  draws  on  Onora  O’Neill’s  argument  that  the  scope  of  ethical 
consideration extends to all those the agent assumes in conducting their activities 
– ‘to the extent that our actions depend on the assumption that distant others are 
doing certain things, we have obligations of justice in relation to them.’
13  She also 
                                                 
9 Global Challenges, 162. 
10 Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 2nd edition ed. (Princeton: Princetone 
University Press, 1999), 144. 
11 Political Theory and International Relations, 2nd edition ed. (Princeton: Princetone University Press, 
1999), 152. 
12 Young, Global Challenges, 162. 
13 Global Challenges, 163. Constructing a Youngian Account of Global Injustice 
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references  Thomas  Pogge  as  a  theorist  that  describes  ‘transnational  social 
structures’ and how obligations of justice arise in relation to those structures.
14 
 
While I think Young offers a correct diagnosis of the failings of the extreme 
cosmopolitan and statist positions, I think she should look elsewhere for the basis 
of her own theory of global injustice.  The problem of invoking Beitz and Pogge 
as  supporting  her  position  is  that  they  are  operating  within  the  Rawlsian 
distributive paradigm of justice.  Young acknowledges that distributive issues may 
be even more pressing in the international context than the domestic context; yet 
focusing on distributions without analysing the global institutional power relations 
that determine distributions, and without an analysis of the global division of 
labour  and  cultural  norms,  ‘moral  theorists  fail  to  touch  important  issues  of 
international  justice.’
15   Beitz  and  Pogge  (at  least  in  their  earlier  works)  were 
arguing that to be consistent, Rawls should conceptualise a global basic structure 
and that the difference principle should apply globally.
16  There is a literature on 
whether or not there is a global basic structure, or if there ought to be one,
17 but 
as I argued in the previous chapter, Young is not working within this Rawlsian 
framework.   
 
Onora  O’Neill  is  operating  within  a  neo-Kantian  framework.    While  I  think 
O’Neill has more to offer Young than Beitz and Pogge, the point is that all of 
these theorists are basing their claims about social connection on broader theories 
of justice.  Drawing out the common point that connections can give rise to 
obligations of justice is useful, but it is not enough to ground a new theory of 
global  justice.    Developing  a  Youngian  theory  of  global  justice  would  require 
much deeper analysis of the similarities and differences between these different 
theoretical perspectives.   
 
Moreover, I believe this would be the wrong approach because Young does not 
want to be tied to a particular theory of justice.  Tying herself to Beitz, Pogge or 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 Justice and the Politics of Difference  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 257-58. 
16 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations; Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls  (London: Cornell 
University Press, 1989). 
17 See for instance  Miriam Ronzoni, "The Global Order: A Case of Background Injustice? A 
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O’Neill, I think, on closer inspection would prove to be a misguided project.  This 
is because one of Young’s main philosophical drives was to expose injustice.  I 
interpret  the  social  connection  model  of  responsibility  as  arguing  that  if  an 
individual is connected to relations of injustice then they have a responsibility to 
engage in collective action try to remedy it in some way.  While I understand 
Young’s decision to try to situate her work in relation to existing theories of 
global justice, I believe that it would be much more interesting and illuminating 
for her to stick to her critical theory roots and to theorise global injustice.  As 
Amy Allen argues, the most significant contribution of Young’s Justice  and  the 
Politics of Difference was,  
 
to analyse justice first and foremost in terms of injustice.  With this simple 
move, Young turned existing accounts of justice on their heads, and, in 
the process, revealed what makes them woefully inadequate: their lack of 
attention  to  extant  injustices,  a  lack  that  results  in  their  inability 
successfully to envision how such injustices can be ameliorated.
18 
 
Indeed, Young had already begun to do this elsewhere.  In the epilogue of Justice 
and the Politics of Difference Young makes the first step toward thinking about global 
injustice.  She argues that the aim of that book was to theorise injustice (relations 
of domination and oppression) within the contemporary United States and that 
such a theory will probably be of use to other welfare industrialised societies.
19  
However, she suggests that there are different axes of injustice within different 
nation-states, and different relations of injustice between nation-states.
20  Theories 
of injustice need to be tied to social theory and so other theories of injustice 
ought to be developed in other contexts including the international sphere; for 
instance, she claims that the “five faces of oppression” may not apply so well in 
the Southern Hemisphere where oppressor groups may be more overt than in 
welfare  industrialised  societies,  and  where  one  of  the  main  oppressed  group’s 
experiences – peasants – will be different to the experiences of oppressed groups 
in  the  United  States.
21   She  does  suggest,  however,  that,  ‘The  five  faces  of 
                                                 
18  Amy  Allen,  "Power  and  the  Politics  of  Difference:  Oppression,  Empowerment,  and 
Transnational Justice," Hypatia 23, no. 3 (2008): 156. 
19 Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference, 257. 
20 Ibid. 
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oppression I have explicated may apply more easily to relations among nations in 
the  total  world  context,  and  especially  relations  between  advanced  industrial 
societies and the rest of the world.’
22 
 
I would argue, then, that to give an adequate Youngian account of global injustice, 
we would need to look at the ways in which domination and the five faces of 
oppression  (exploitation,  marginalisation,  powerlessness,  violence,  and  cultural 
imperialism) – or a revised set of oppressions more suitable for the context – 
manifest themselves both between states and within states. 
 
As  Hye-Ryoung  Kang  points  out,  however,  we  need  to  distinguish  between 
international  justice,  which  deals  with  relations  between  nation-states,  and  global 
justice, which applies to global trade and other regulatory regimes coordinated by 
global institutions, such as the IMF, WTO and World Bank.
23  This is a sphere of 
activity  that  cannot  be  captured  by  an  analysis  of  international  dealings  and 
agreements.    Kang  argues,  ‘Given  the  institutionalized  nature  of  globalization, 
discourse about the justice of global institutions and structures should be different 
from discourse about the justice of relationships among nations.’
24 
 
If  Kang  is  correct,  there  are  at  least  three  spheres  of  injustice:  domestic, 
international and global.  In order to construct a Youngian account of injustice we 
would need an analysis of domination and the different forms of oppression at 
the domestic, international and global levels.  This is clearly far beyond the scope 
of this chapter (or, indeed, this thesis).  To narrow it down I am going to focus on 
the global level (as opposed to the international level).  In the next section I very 
briefly outline what Young herself has argued about global domination and how 
this  relates  to  a  burgeoning  critical  theory  literature  on  this  topic,  and  in  the 
following  section  I  develop  a  conceptual  analysis  of  one  form  of  global 
oppression – exploitation – using Young’s case study of sweatshop labour.     
 
                                                 
22 Ibid. 
23 Hye-Ryoung Kang, "Transnational Women's Collectivities and Global Justice," in Gender  and 
Global Justice, ed. Alison M. Jaggar (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 42. 
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6.1.2  Global Domination 
 
In Justice and the Politics of Difference and Inclusion and Democracy, Young argues that 
justice is co-extensive with democracy insofar as democracy is instrumentally the 
best  way  of  preventing  domination.    In  Global  Challenges,  she  extends  this 
argument and outlines a vision of global democracy.  Using her usual method of 
drawing on social movements to theorise about contemporary injustice, she looks 
at transnational social movements of indigenous peoples, feminist and workers 
rights, and the global protests against the war on Iraq and assesses how they are 
challenging relations of domination in the global sphere. 
 
Even though Young leans towards cosmopolitanism – the belief that justice is 
global in scope – she also recognises and affirms a right to the self-determination 
of  peoples.
25    Self-determination  is  ordinarily  conceived  of  as  granting 
autonomous  political  communities  sovereignty  over  a  territory,  presuming  a 
principle of non-interference.  Young looks at the claims of indigenous peoples 
who argue for self-determination, but not in terms of having sovereignty over a 
contiguous  territory.    Instead  indigenous  rights  movements  have  argued  for  a 
principle of self-determination as non-domination – as the right not to be subject 
to the arbitrary interference of a dominant nation-state.
26  Young uses a working 
definition  of  domination  taken  from  Philip  Pettit,  which  she  describes  as 
follows:
27 
 
An agent dominates another when he or she has power over that other 
and  is  thus  able  to  interfere  with  the  other  arbitrarily.    Interference  is 
arbitrary  when  it  is  chosen  or  rejected  without  consideration  of  the 
interests or opinions of those affected.  An agent may dominate another, 
however, without ever interfering with that person.  Domination consists 
                                                 
25 Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 236-37. 
Young argues she shares suspicions about cosmopolitanism on the grounds that it does not take 
self-determination  seriously  enough,  paving  the  way  for  cultural  homogenization  as  well  as 
domination. 
26 Global Challenges, Chapter 1. 
27 I am aware that there is a large literature on Pettit’s theory of non-domination.  My aim is not to 
engage with these debates here, but simply to outline how Young thinks about non-domination in 
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in standing in a set of relations which makes an agent able to interfere 
arbitrarily with the actions of others.
28  
 
Young argues that this way of thinking about self-determination should help us 
reconceive not just the self-determination of indigenous peoples, but should make 
us reconsider the Westphalian state system in general.
29  It is no longer plausible, 
she  argues,  to  conceive  of  nation-states  as  entirely  separate  and  independent 
entities.  The reality of contemporary global interdependence means that states 
can no longer be conceived of as “sovereign selves” but should be understood as 
“relational selves.”
30  Because the activities of groups within the global sphere can 
adversely affect others, other groups have a right to make claims on the group and 
negotiate the terms of their relationship.
31  Such negotiations require settled global 
regulatory regimes and global institutions.
32  Self-determining peoples have a right 
to participate in the design and implementation of these institutions aimed at 
minimizing global domination.
33  Young argues, ‘Just as promoting freedom for 
individuals involves regulating relationships in order to prevent domination, so 
promoting  self-determination  for  peoples  involves  regulating  international 
relations to prevent the domination of peoples.’
34 
 
The  vision  that  Young  has  in  mind  she  calls  “decentred  diverse  democratic 
federalism”.  She writes, ‘I imagine a global system of regulatory regimes to which 
locales, regions, and states relate in a nested, federated system.  The global level of 
governance is “thin,” in the sense that it only lays down rather general principles 
with  which  all  jurisdictions  must  comply.’
35   The  areas  governed  by  global 
regulatory regimes are problems that are now necessarily global in scope: peace 
and  security,  the  environment,  trade  and  finance,  investment  and  capital 
utilization,  communications  and  transport,  human  rights  (including  socio-
economic rights and workers’ rights), citizenship and migration.
36  Global civil 
                                                 
28 Young, Global Challenges, 48. 
29 Global Challenges, 32. Young also draws on feminist arguments of relational autonomy.  See p.47-
48 
30 Global Challenges, 33. 
31 Global Challenges, 51. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Global Challenges, 34. 
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society should also be an area of political contestation,
37 and non-state actors such 
as corporations should also be subject to regulation.
38 
 
It should be clear that this is not a fully developed philosophical project.  I read 
Global  Challenges  as  a  series  of  essays  for  activists.
39   Nonetheless,  this  brief 
exegesis of Young’s interpretation of the problem of global domination shows 
that she has a story to tell and the direction in which it was going.  Her thoughts 
tie in with a burgeoning critical theory literature that emphasises global democracy 
as the counterpoint to global domination, and stresses these areas as the main 
concerns for global justice. 
 
For  instance,  Rainer  Forst  criticises  the  global  justice  literature  using  Young’s 
critique of the distributive paradigm of justice.  He argues that theories of global 
justice that assume the view of justice as suum  cuique  (“To each his own”) are 
overly concerned with who gets what.
40  This ignores the production of goods, the 
structures of production and distribution of goods, and obscures injustice in how 
inequalities in resources came about.
41  Forst argues that ‘the first question of 
justice is the question of power.’
42  And the way of dealing with asymmetrical 
power relations is to provide processes of justification.  He writes,  
 
the  first  task  of  justice  is  to  create  structures  of  justification  in  which 
arbitrary rule is banished, even against national and international lines of 
force – structures in which those who are subjected to rule or domination, 
whether  of  an  economic,  political,  or  legal  kind,  can  bring  the  “force 
                                                 
37 Global Challenges, 10. 
38 Inclusion and Democracy, 268. 
39 For  instance  she  writes  in  the  Introduction,  ‘The  essays  in  this  volume…  are  inspired  by 
contemporary  social  movements  that  call  multinational  corporations  to  accountability  and 
question the global military hegemony of the United States.  They aim, however, not merely to 
applaud the anger and hope of these movements, but more importantly, to offer concepts for 
analyzing a range of events and issues that these movements address and to give arguments for 
some of their specific claims.’ Global Challenges, 2. 
40 Rainer Forst, "Transnational Justice and Democracy: Overcoming Three Dogmas of Political 
Theory," in Political Equality in Transnational Democracy, ed. Eva Erman and Sofia Nasstrom (New 
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toward the better argument” to bear against those who exercise such rule 
or domination.
43 
 
Forst argues that the global sphere is not really one of “interdependence”, but 
rather  ‘what  emerges  is  a  complex  system  of  one-sided  and  largely  coerced 
cooperation and dependency rather than interdependence.  In other words, one 
sees a context  of  force  and  domination.’
44  From the perspective of the dominated, 
moreover, they are often subject to “multiple domination”, being dominated by 
their own governments, elites or warlords as well as global actors.
45  Women and 
children are further dominated within the family and community.
46  In order to 
counteract  multiple  dominations,  there  should  be  a  principle  of  transnational 
“minimal  justice”  which  requires  that  states  have  equal  influence  in  decision-
making,  the  realization  of  internal  and  external  democratization,  and 
redistribution in order to enable participatory parity.
47  
 
Young argued that peoples who are affected by other peoples’ activities should 
have a right to negotiate the terms of their relationship.  This could be interpreted 
as  a  version  of  the  “all-affected  interests”  principle  –  the  ideal  that  anyone 
affected by a decision should have the opportunity to participate in making it.
48  
Nancy Fraser argues instead for the “all-subjected interests” principle.  She argues 
that ‘what turns a collection of people into fellow members of a public is not 
shared  citizenship,  or  co-imbrication  in  a  causal  matrix,  but  rather  their  joint 
subjection  to  a  structure  of  governance  that  set  the  ground  rules  for  their 
interaction.’
49  All those subjected to these governance structures should be able 
to participate in the corresponding public sphere, and if they cannot then these 
structures are illegitimate.
 50  
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Cécile Laborde has sketched a critical republican view of global justice.  Laborde 
adopts a revised version of Pettit’s account of domination, whereby domination 
means  the  ability  of  agents  to  arbitrarily  interfere  with  others.    She  modifies 
Pettit’s account arguing that domination can refer to systemic power structures 
that deny or threaten the subordinate’s basic interests.
51  She argues, then, that ‘the 
priority of global justice should be to reduce forms of global domination which 
grant one set of agents the potential to deny basic capabilities to others.’
52  This 
entails systemic change in the form of restructuring global governance institutions 
to give poor countries a voice and the effective means to challenge dominating 
powers.    Because  domination  is  systemic  many  agents  are  implicated  in  its 
perpetuation, thus, ‘there is a joint political responsibility to curb the dominating 
impact of existing global structures.’
53  Moreover, republicanism has an account of 
citizen virtues, thus Laborde incorporates a virtue-account of individuals’ political 
responsibility: ‘civically minded citizens will be motivated to make sure that they – 
or their state – do not dominate others.’
54 
 
Young then has something to say about global domination, and her thoughts tie 
in with a burgeoning critical theory literature in this area.  Pursuing this line of 
inquiry, I argue, would have been a more constructive intervention in the global 
justice debate than working within the distributive paradigm.  Moreover, in her 
essays on global justice, Young focuses on the problem of sweatshop labour.  
This, I argue, is a problem of oppression rather than domination.  In particular it 
is a problem of exploitation, but Young does not couch it in these terms nor 
develop a theory of exploitation.  The rest of this chapter will be devoted to 
developing a Youngian conception of global exploitation. 
 
6.2  Global Exploitation 
 
In her essays on the social connection model of responsibility, Young looks at the 
problem of sweatshop labour as a problem of global injustice.  She argues that 
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many  individuals  and  corporations  find  the  claims  of  the  anti-sweatshop 
movement “absurd” because they have nothing to do with the unjust processes – 
they  are  not  causing  harm  in  the  way  that  factory  owners  and  managers  are 
causing harm.
55  Yet the claims of the movement have also ‘struck a chord’ with 
many others, and it is this realisation that they are invoking a new and relevant 
kind of responsibility that led Young to identify the social connection model of 
responsibility.
56  However, Young does not offer a thorough analytic account of 
what is wrong with sweatshop labour.  In this section, I argue that sweatshop 
labour is a form of structural exploitation.  Exploitation is identified by Young as 
a  form  of  oppression,  and  oppression  is  a  form  of  injustice,  meaning  that 
sweatshop labour is a form of global injustice. 
 
The  intuition  in  adopting  this  argumentative  strategy  is  that  analysing  actually 
existing forms of exploitation in the global sphere is a better starting point for 
thinking about global injustice than the ideal liberal theories of distributive justice, 
or the utilitarian theories, that as we saw in the first section, Young takes as her 
starting point.  Sweatshop labour is one example of a structurally exploitative 
process that occurs on a global scale; as such it is a useful way of thinking about 
what might constitute global relations of structural oppression. 
 
Margaret Moore argues that while all global justice theorists allude to exploitation 
as  a  problem,  there  is  no  clear,  independent  account  of  what  constitutes 
exploitation.
57  The upshot of this is that trying to tie a theory of global injustice 
to a theory of exploitation is a mistake.
58  Moore is right that there is no real 
consensus as to what constitutes exploitation in the literature.  As Ruth Sample 
puts it, ‘It might be thought that an account of the badness of exploitation is 
beyond  our  current  moral  knowledge.’
59   Only  Marxian  literature  has  a  highly 
developed account of exploitation, around which there is some consensus – at 
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least on the technical meaning of exploitation (described below).  But I think 
Moore is wrong to argue that this means there is no scope for tying a theory of 
global injustice to global exploitation.  Indeed, we can find in Justice and the Politics 
of  Difference  a  schematic  account  of  exploitation,  which  I  believe,  with  further 
development and elaboration, could provide a useful way of conceptualising what 
I will call “structural exploitation”.   
 
In  this  section,  firstly  I  look  at  contemporary  efforts  to  define  exploitation, 
focusing on the most influential accounts of Alan Wertheimer, Ruth Sample and 
Robert Goodin.  I argue that these “transactional exploitation” accounts fail to 
acknowledge  the  structural  dynamics  of  exploitation  by  focusing  only  on 
transactions between individual exploiting and exploitee parties.  By doing this, 
they  will  necessarily  fail  to  understand  what  is  exploitative  about  sweatshop 
labour.  In Young’s discussion of exploitation in Justice and the Politics of Difference, 
she draws on Marxian accounts of exploitation, that conceive of exploitation as a 
relationship between groups embedded in an economic system.  I outline her 
account in relation to the Marxian literature.  I then apply this conception of 
“structural  exploitation”  to  the  problem  of  sweatshop  labour.    I  look  at  the 
existing  normative  literature  on  sweatshop  labour  and  show  that  in  using  the 
transactional account of exploitation they will fail to uncover what is wrongfully 
exploitative about sweatshop labour, which I argue is necessarily a problem of 
structural exploitation. 
 
6.2.1  Defining Exploitation 
 
Exploitation was a key Marxian debate in the 1970s-80s, but with the decline of 
analytic Marxism following the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the rising hegemony of 
liberal  political  philosophy  in  the  1990s-2000s,  the  Marxian  approaches  have 
more-or-less been forgotten and theorists have started to investigate liberal and 
libertarian accounts of exploitation.  
 
For  Marx,  exploitation  is  primarily  a  technical  concept.    Richard  Arneson 
describes the technical Marxian sense of exploitation as, ‘the appropriation by a Constructing a Youngian Account of Global Injustice 
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class of nonworkers of the surplus product of a class of workers.’
60  Classically, 
the technical Marxian conception of exploitation is tied to the labour theory of 
value.
61  The value of a product is determined by the amount of labour that has 
gone into it.  As workers are paid a salary, they are not properly remunerated for 
all of the labour that has gone into the products.
62  The surplus-value they have 
created  is  appropriated  by  the  capitalist  class.    This  is  what  constitutes  the 
exploitation  of  one  class  (workers)  by  another  class  (capitalists).    As  Arneson 
further points out, however, we generally think of exploitation as an evaluative 
concept,  and  even  in  Marx  it  is  not  clear  that  he  was  using  the  term  in  an 
exclusively  technical  sense.
63   The  Marxian  debates  around  exploitation  in  the 
1970s-80s  revolved  around  whether  or  not  exploitation  constituted  a  moral 
wrong, and if so what was wrong with it.    
 
During this period, liberal and libertarian theorists tended to avoid discussions of 
exploitation.    Alan  Wertheimer  attributes  this  lack  of  attention  to  Marxist 
domination of the territory and that non-Marxists didn’t want to be associated 
with it.
64  He also attributes the focus among liberals on ideal theory and macro 
social justice as a reason for ignoring exploitation, which he characterises as ‘a 
micro-level  wrong  to  discrete  individuals  in  distinct  relationships  and 
transactions.’
65 
 
Wertheimer’s 1996 book, Exploitation, has largely been credited with reviving the 
dormant  liberal  tradition  of  analysing  exploitation  between  individuals.
66   He 
argues  that  there  is  a  common  core  to  all  theories  of  exploitation,  including 
Marixan  accounts.    For  Wertheimer,  the  ‘lowest  common  denominator’ 
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understanding of exploitation is that ‘A exploits B when A takes unfair advantage 
of B.’
67   
 
The crux of the issue for liberal and libertarian accounts of exploitation is that we 
need to say what is unfair about the transaction.  It cannot simply be a case of 
harm, e.g. A violates B’s rights, because that is a straightforward wrong upon 
which theorists of all stripes can agree.  Harm is not a necessary condition of 
exploitation.
68   
 
Instead, transactional exploitation is a more subtle and complex concept.  Joel 
Feinberg famously argues that exploitation can constitute a kind of “free-floating 
evil”.
69  It can constitute merely a form of “harmless parasitism”, e.g. B following 
A’s taillights in dense fog.
 70  It might be unfair to expect A to do all the heavy-
lifting in terms of careful driving in dangerous conditions, but no one is harmed 
and no punishment or sanction would be justifiable. 
 
There is also the problem of mutually beneficial exploitation.  Wertheimer gives 
the  example  of  a  snowstorm.    A  hardware  store  owner  doubles  the  price  of 
shovels from $15 to $30.  B buys the shovel because he needs it – both parties 
gain – ‘But B feels exploited because B gains less (or pays more) than B thinks 
reasonable.’
71 
 
So theorists working in the transactional paradigm of exploitation have sought 
other sources of the unfairness.  Harm is out.  Force or coercion is also ruled out by 
these theorists.  As Robert Goodin argues, ‘Exploitation implies some measure of 
co-operation,  unwilling  or  involuntary  though  it  may  be,  on  the  part  of  the 
exploited.’
72  Wertheimer argues that if we focus on cases of exploitation where 
coercion  is  involved,  our  moral  concern  is  with  the  coercion  rather  than  the 
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exploitation  itself;  exploitation  can  be  consensual  and  that  is  where  the  real 
philosophical interest lies.
73   
 
Another contender is the lack  of  reciprocity involved in exploitative transactions.  
However, as Goodin points out, giving a gift is a non-reciprocal transaction, but 
that does not make it exploitative.
74  Unequal benefits are also not sufficient, because 
as  Sample  points  out,  almost  all  transactions  would  be  exploitative  on  these 
grounds.
75 
 
There seems to be some consensus around the idea that using people is a necessary 
condition for exploitation.
76  Sample asserts that, ‘Yes; the exploited person is in 
some sense a means to the exploiter’s ends.’
77  But the issue is the way in which 
the person is being used.
78  As Goodin argues, standing in the shadow of a large 
spectator in a crowd to avoid the sun is using that person, but it is not unfairly 
using that person.
79  So what counts as unfair using? 
 
Goodin argues that what constitutes unfair using is when the used party is already 
vulnerable.  He argues that the concept of exploitation is parasitic upon a duty to 
protect the vulnerable.
80  According to Goodin, ‘It is the flagrant violation of this 
duty – playing for advantage when morally you are bound not to do so – which 
we call exploitation.’
81  Goodin suggests four circumstances in which this might 
occur: where others have renounced the opportunity to play for advantage (e.g. 
friends or lovers), where others are unfit to play (e.g. dealers pushing to drug 
addicts), where there is vastly disproportionate bargaining power (e.g. a monopoly 
supplier), or taking advantage of others’ grave misfortunes (e.g. circuses using 
severely physically deformed persons as attractions).
82 
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Wertheimer disagrees that the exploitee has to be vulnerable.  For instance, in the 
snow shovel example, the customer might be much richer than the hardware store 
owner, yet charging twice the going rate for the shovel can still be considered 
exploitative.
83  He posits the following solution: when considering transactions 
between  individual  agents,  they  should  refer  to  a  “hypothetical  market”.    To 
assess whether or not a transaction is exploitative, ‘we evaluate the parties' gains 
by what they would have received under relatively perfect market conditions.’
84  
The  normative  baseline  for  judging  whether  or  not  specific  transactions  (and 
Wertheimer specifies that his theory is transaction-specific) are exploitative is the 
hypothetical market price – what the parties could be expected to gain under fair 
market conditions.
85 
 
Ruth Sample criticises both solutions.  Against Wertheimer, she argues that it 
leads to counterintuitive results.  For instance, why shouldn’t a market trader in a 
developing country charge an affluent foreigner twice the market price for some 
fruit when it is pennies to the foreigner and makes a significant difference to the 
trader?
86  Moreover, Wertheimer’s solution is too conservative.  Conceiving of the 
normative  baseline  as  a  fair  market  price  relies  too  heavily  on  adherence  to 
convention which divests exploitation of its critical bite.
87   
 
Against both Goodin and Wertheimer, she argues that they cannot adequately 
account  for  exploitation  in  intimate  relationships.    Sample  understands 
exploitation in a neo-Kantian sense.  Instead of focusing on the unfairness of 
transactions,  she  invokes  the  utilization  of  people  as  means  to  an  end  in  a 
degrading  way.    In  exploitative  transactions,  ‘The  badness  stems  from  the 
degradation  of  one  or  more  of  the  agents  in  a  transaction  for  advantage.  
Degradation is, on my view, treating someone or something as having less value 
than that person or thing actually has.’
88 
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Defining  exploitation,  then,  as  Moore  and  Sample  pointed  out,  is  a  tricky 
business.  But I am not sure that constructing a Youngian account of exploitation 
requires  solving  these  conceptual  problems.    My  complaint  with  these 
“transactional” accounts of exploitation is that they focus on transactions between 
individuals.    What  has  been  lost  in  these  accounts  of  exploitation  is  the 
fundamental  Marxian  insight  that  exploitation  can  occur  between  groups.  
Moreover,  exploitation  is  not  necessarily  a  conscious  agreement  between 
transacting parties, instead exploitation is a structural phenomenon built into the 
economic system.  One does not have to adopt a classical Marxist understanding 
of exploitation in order to accept that exploitation can occur between groups and 
that it can be structural, as I will demonstrate shortly. 
 
A structural account of exploitation will not deal with the kinds of concerns that 
liberal  theorists  have  expressed  about  exploitation.    It  will  not  deal  with  the 
‘micro-level’  transactions  that  Wertheimer  has  identified,  or  the  problem  of 
exploitation  in  intimate  relationships,  that  motivates  Sample’s  theory  of 
exploitation.  I would argue that what this shows, however, is not that there is no 
place for a conception of structural exploitation, but that there is not one core 
conception  of  exploitation.    I  propose  that  the  search  for  such  a  concept  is 
fruitless. 
 
Wertheimer, Goodin and Sample all agree that the core of exploitation is the idea 
of ‘taking advantage’ whether this involves unfairness or degradation.  Goodin 
argues, however, that what lies at the heart of the idea of ‘taking advantage’ is ‘an 
abuse of power.’
89  In all of the examples we can see the involvement of ‘power 
over’ another person.  In Wertheimer’s snow shovel example, the hardware store 
owner has power over the customer insofar as she has something he desperately 
needs.  In Goodin’s definition of exploitation, if the potentially exploited agent is 
vulnerable in relation to potential exploiter, then the potential exploiter necessarily 
has power over them.  In Sample’s example of the market trader, they have power 
over the customer insofar as they have something the customer wants and local 
knowledge, which the tourist lacks.  The tourist can buy fruit from someone else 
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and withdraw from the transaction, but in the transaction itself, the trader holds 
the cards.
90   
 
Being able to ‘take advantage’ of a person or a situation means having power to be 
able  to  take  advantage.    Exploitation  is  related  to  power.    Contra-Goodin, 
exploitation is not parasitic on the duty to protect the vulnerable but it is parasitic 
on power.  As I argued in Chapter 4, power is a “family resemblance” concept.  
Allow me to quote again the three forms of power identified by Mark Haguuard: 
 
Episodic power refers to the exercise of power that is linked to agency.  
Dispositional power signifies the inherent capacities of an agent that the 
agent may have, irrespective of whether or not they exercise this capacity.  
Systemic power refers to the ways in which given social systems confer 
differentials or dispositional power on agents, thus structuring possibilities 
for action.
91 
 
Just as power is a family resemblance concept, so too is exploitation.  Having 
power as a trader, a lover or a class means different things; exploitation in those 
situations  means  different  things  too.    I  think  that  it  is  more  productive  to 
understand exploitation as a family resemblance concept, and admit that there 
may  be  different  kinds  of  moral  wrong  at  play  when  exploitation  occurs  in 
intimate relationships, market transactions or within economic, social or political 
systems.    The  need  to  find  a  “core”  to  exploitation  that  can  cover  all  these 
importantly different cases seems to me a mistaken approach.  Let me map a 
sketch of what exploitation would look like in relation to different kinds of power: 
 
Episodic exploitation refers to taking unfair advantage of another in a 
transaction – it is necessarily linked to agency. 
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Dispositional exploitation means having the capacity to exploit another 
whether or not that capacity is exercised – this means being in a position 
of strength in relation to another’s vulnerability. 
 
Systemic  exploitation  refers  to  the  way  a  social  system  extracts  the 
energies of one group for the benefit of another group, thus structuring 
possibilities for action. 
 
Understanding  exploitation  as  a  family  resemblance  concept  related  to  power, 
allows  us  to  understand  and  explain  why  exploitation  can  occur  between 
individuals, why vulnerability generates the possibility for exploitation, and allows 
us to retain the crucial Marxist insights that exploitation can be systemic and 
occur between groups. 
 
I  contend  that  we  cannot  understand  global  exploitation  –  phenomena  like 
sweatshop labour – without some understanding of systemic exploitation, or what 
I will call “structural exploitation.” Transactional, or micro-level exploitation, is of 
course of interest.  But when we are considering global structural injustice, our 
interest should be with structural exploitation.   
 
Clearly this is what Young has in mind when she discusses exploitation.  In Justice 
and  the  Politics  of  Difference,  Young  considers  exploitation  to  be  a  form  of 
oppression which is necessarily structural, and when considering global issues, 
such as sweatshop labour, the issue is not one of transactions between particular 
corporations and particular workers, but the structures that constrain sweatshop 
workers and enable corporations and consumers.  On the Youngian perspective 
developed in this thesis, transactional exploitation would constitute a form of 
interactional wrongdoing – a wrong between individuals which is a concern for 
interpersonal  morality.    But  structural  exploitation  is  a  structural  relationship 
between groups – it is a concern for justice.  Thinking about sweatshop labour in 
terms of transactional exploitation would miss the point as to why sweatshop 
labour constitutes an injustice.   
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6.2.2  Structural Exploitation 
 
I  have  established  what  kinds  of  accounts  of  exploitation  will  not  help  to 
construct a Youngian conception of exploitation – transactional accounts – and I 
have  established  what  kind  of  exploitation  we  are  interested  in  –  structural 
exploitation.  But I have not yet established what structural exploitation is and 
what’s wrong with it.  In order to do this I will return to the Marxian debates 
around exploitation, as the Marxian approach takes it as given that exploitation is 
a structural relationship between groups.   
 
We  have  seen  that  there  is  a  technical  conception  of  exploitation  in  Marxian 
theory – the extraction of surplus value by capitalists from workers.  But there are 
competing theories as to why this is normatively problematic.  Some theorists 
suggest there is, in fact, nothing normatively problematic about exploitation.  It is 
merely a technical term without evaluative content.
92  John Roemer has argued 
that once the labour theory of value has been debunked then, ‘there is no logically 
compelling  reason  to  be  interested  in  exploitation  theory.’
93   However,  many 
others reject that claim and maintain that from a Marxian perspective exploitation 
is wrongful. 
 
Richard Arneson suggests that while Marx was inconsistent in using the term 
exploitation  in  the  technical  and  evaluative  senses,  it  is  clear  from  his  ‘side 
comments’  that  he  did  think  that  exploitation  was  wrongful.
94   It  is  wrongful 
because nonproducers (capitalists) have power over producers (workers) that they 
use  for  the  purposes  of  technical  exploitation,  which  results  in  an  unequal 
distribution of economic advantages that the nonproducers do not deserve.
95  The 
deservingness  proviso  in  Marx  is  demonstrated  by  the  principle  “From  each 
according  to  his  ability…”,  which  suggests  that  if  economic  agents  produce 
according to their ability, they ought to be remunerated equally.
96 
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Nancy  Holstrom  cautions  against  distributive  understandings  of  wrongful 
exploitation.  She argues that the following part of the Marxist principle, “…to 
each according to his needs”, means that even in communist society producers 
will  not  be  remunerated  according  to  what  they  produce  –  that  some  of  the 
proceeds of labour will be devoted to meeting social needs and for maintaining 
the collectively owned means of production.
97  Unpaid labour is not a sufficient 
condition for claiming that workers are wrongfully exploited.
98  Unpaid labour is a 
necessary condition for exploitation, but there are three further conditions – it 
depends on surplus labour, which is appropriated from workers and is forced.
99  
Holstrom writes, 
 
When x exploits y, y is forced to do unnecessary, unpaid labour and does 
not control the product of that labour.  Force, domination, unequal power 
and  control  are  involved  in  exploitation  both  as  preconditions  and  as 
consequences.  This is why Marx thinks exploitation an evil.
100 
 
Jeffrey  Reiman  calls  this  a  “force-inclusive”  definition  of  exploitation  and 
develops it further.  He argues that the force involved in exploitation is structural 
rather than overt.  He argues, 
 
The invisibility of exploitative force in capitalism results from the fact 
that, in capitalism, overt force is supplanted by force built into the very 
structure  of  the  system  of  ownership  and  the  classes  defined  by  that 
system.  Because there is the human institution of private ownership of 
the means of production by a small class of people, the members of the 
class  of  nonowners  are  forced  to  work  for  those  people  –  though  not 
necessarily forced by those people – in order to get a crack at a living at all.  
Accordingly, I take it that the force in our definition must apply not only 
to overt violence, but to force that is “structural,” both in its effects and in 
its origins.
101 
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Reiman distinguishes between the effects and the origins of structural force.  The 
effects are that it positions groups so that they ‘have an array of fates’.
102  He 
likens this to a bottleneck in the road that forces the majority of cars to slow 
down, while chance and other factors may allow some cars to slip through.
103  
Force is structural in origin because, ‘Though the force works to transfer labour 
from one class to another, it is not the benefiting class that forces the losing one – 
rather the structure of the ownership or class system itself forces the transfer.’
104 
 
Structural force, according to Reiman, reflects some of the recognisable features 
of individual, agential force.  Firstly, this limits people’s options by making the 
alternatives unacceptable or too costly, e.g. “your money or your life”.  He argues, 
 
With  a  structural  force,  people’s  options  are  limited  by  their  social 
position to a range of things they can do, with options outside this range 
unacceptable or prohibitively costly.  So, by virtue of occupying a social 
position defined, say, by lack of access to means of production, a person 
will be limited to a range of ways in which he can achieve a living, because 
alternatives outside this range (such as starvation or begging or crime) are 
unacceptable or prohibitively costly.
105 
 
The second feature is that ordinarily force is intentionally exercised by agents.  
The social structure, such as the property system or caste, is reproduced by the 
actions  of  individuals,  ‘So,  while  structural  force  need  not  be  exercised 
intentionally, there is no doubt that it is exerted by human beings.’
106  Structural 
force is not intentional, but it is something that individuals could become aware 
of and could change.
107 
 
We can see in Reiman’s understanding of force and structural exploitation, themes 
that have been present in Young’s understanding of structural injustice.  Social 
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groups  are  positioned  within  structures  with  ranges  of  options  for  action 
determined by social position.  However, these structures are reproduced through 
the actions of individuals and so could be changed.  Reiman adds the important 
point that structural force operates to make the decisions of individuals within 
those structures appear rational and uncoerced.  He writes, ‘a person can be said 
to be forced to do something even if he has rationally chosen that thing from 
among other acceptable alternatives, provided that the whole array of alternatives 
can be said to be forced upon him.’
108  This is why Marx argues that the wage-
worker “is compelled to sell himself of his own free will”.
109  Force in capitalism is 
invisible and only becomes visible when “if, instead of taking a single capitalist 
and a single labourer, we take the class of capitalists and the class of labourers as a 
whole”.
110 
 
In  Young’s  discussion  of  exploitation  in  Justice  and  the  Politics  of  Difference,  she 
adopts a structural force-inclusive definition of exploitation.
111 She departs from 
Reiman, however, in that he retains the analytic relationship between exploitation 
and the labour theory of value.  According to Reiman, the labour theory of value 
explains the ‘quasi-moral nature of the concept of exploitation.’
112  He argues that, 
‘People give themselves in labouring; they literally use themselves up.  Labour done, 
however willingly or even joyously, is life itself spent.  I suspect that it is this natural fact 
that accounts for the lingering appeal of the labour theory of value.’
113 
 
Instead, Young bases her understanding of structural exploitation on a Marxian 
account  that  retains  the  structural  and  force-inclusive  understanding  of 
exploitation but in a way that does not rely on the labour theory of value.  It 
depends upon the idea of forced “transfers” from exploited groups to exploiter 
groups, but this transfer does not have to consist in surplus value created through 
labour. 
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Young draws on C.B. Macpherson’s argument that what is involved in capitalist 
economic relations is a transfer of power from producers to non-producers.  He 
distinguishes between developmental power – ‘a man’s ability to use and develop 
his capacities’, and extractive power – ‘the ability to extract benefit from others.’
114  
In a capitalist society, non-owners have no extractive power.
115  Non-owners have 
to continuously sell their productive power to owners, and their wage ‘goes to 
replenish the energy which makes their capacities saleable next week,’
116 which 
necessarily inhibits their developmental power.  So having no extractive power in 
capitalist society necessarily inhibits developmental power. 
 
Macpherson argues that the measurable transfer from non-owners to owners is 
labour-power; the work of the labourer and the product of the work are owned by 
the capitalist.
117 However, the non-owners’ powers ‘are diminished by more than 
the amount of the transfer.’
118  The use of a man’s labour power (‘his energies and 
capacities  in  the  production  of  material  goods’)  affects  his  “extra-productive 
power” – ‘his ability to use his energies and capacities for all other purposes, that 
is, his ability to engage in activities which are simply a direct source of enjoyment 
and not a means of material production.’
119  Macpherson argues that, 
 
For  the  presumption  is  that  the  way  one’s  capacities  are  used  in  the 
process of production will have some effect on one’s ability to use and 
develop one’s capacities outside the process of production.  A man whose 
productive labour is out of his own control, whose work is in that sense 
mindless, may be expected to be somewhat mindless in the rest of his 
activities.  He cannot even be said to retain automatically the control of 
whatever energies he has left over from his working time, if his control 
centre, so to speak, is impaired by the use that it made of him during his 
working time.  Any such diminution of a man’s control over his extra-
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productive activities is clearly a diminution of his power over and above 
the amount of the transfer.
120 
 
The  underlying  problem  for  Macpherson  is  that  the  diminution  of  men’s 
developmental powers, or extra-productive powers, undermines democracy.  This 
is because ‘the egalitarian principle inherent in democracy requires not only ‘one 
man,  one  vote’  but  also    ‘one  man,  one  equal  effective  right  to  live  as  fully 
humanly as he may wish’.’
121  As the transfer of labour power from workers to 
capitalists diminishes not only their ability to use their labour power for their own 
ends, but also their extra-productive power, to engage in whatever activities they 
enjoy as ‘a doer, an exerter and developer and enjoyer of his human capacities, 
rather than merely a consumer of utilities,’
122 capitalism impedes democracy.   
 
For  Young,  oppression  is  defined  as  ‘the  institutional  constraint  of  self-
development’.
123  Justice requires that individuals have the opportunity for self-
development.
124   If  groups  are  institutionally  or  structurally  prevented  from 
realising self-development, they are oppressed.  She infers the following from 
Macpherson’s argument: 
 
Justice, then, requires eliminating the institutional forms that enable and 
enforce this process of transference and replacing them with institutional 
forms that enable all to develop and use their capacities in a way that does 
not  inhibit,  but  rather  can  enhance,  similar  development  and  use  in 
others.
125 
 
The injustice of structural exploitation, for Young, consists in the fact that ‘the 
energies of the have-nots are continuously expended to maintain and augment the 
power, status, and wealth of the haves.’
126  Built into capitalist political economy is 
a continual transfer of energies from some social groups to other social groups, 
inhibiting the self-development of the exploited social groups and enhancing the 
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status of the exploiter groups.  This is why structural exploitation is oppressive 
and why it is unjust. 
 
Releasing the concept of structural exploitation from the labour theory of value in 
this  way,  by  conceiving  of  it  as  a  transfer  of  energies  or  powers  from 
disadvantaged  groups  to  advantaged  groups,  allows  us  more  scope  to  discuss 
exploitative relations between non-economic groups.  Indeed, Young uses this 
idea to explain exploitation along the lines of gender and race.   
 
Young  draws  on  materialist  feminist  analyses  that  explain  the  exploitation  of 
women  as  a  group.    She  cites  Ann  Ferguson’s  concept  of  “sex/affective 
production”.  Ferguson challenges the traditional Marxist assumption that human 
need boils down to the means of subsistence, but rather includes emotional and 
sexual nurturance.
127 She argues that given the number of hours women expend 
not  only  in  wage  labour  but  also  in  sex/affective  production,  it  is  clear  that 
‘women do more total work and receive fewer goods and less leisure than men, 
thus allowing men to appropriate a social surplus of goods, sex/affective labour 
and services from women.’
128 
 
Indeed, we saw above that one of Macpherson’s concerns with capitalism is that if 
a man expends all of his productive energy on work that he does not control, this 
impinges upon his extra-productive capacities to engage in pursuits that fulfil his 
developmental potential.  But a materialist feminist analysis can reveal that given 
the “double burden” faced by the majority of the world’s women, in terms of 
having to engage in wage labour and fulfil child-care and domestic duties, and 
sex/affective production responsibilities in the home, that women may indeed be 
“doubly exploited” – transferring their energies not only to capitalists, but to men. 
Young  argues  that  ‘women  undergo  specific  forms  of  gender  exploitation  in 
which  their  energies  and  power  are  expended,  often  unnoticed  and 
unacknowledged, usually to benefit men by releasing them for more important 
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and creative work, enhancing their status or the environment around them, or 
providing them with sexual or emotional service.’
129 
 
Al Szymanski argues that class is necessarily connected to race.  The capitalist 
mode  of  production  reproduces  “races”  for  three  reasons:  to  legitimate  the 
degrading functions of certain social groups, to create hostility among the working 
class deflecting it from capitalists, and to maintain the social structure by divide 
and rule.
130  He argues that, ‘Capitalism continually generates racism against the 
specially exploited menial laborers who are drawn into the lowest rungs of the 
economy.’
131  Young draws on these arguments to suggest that, ‘Wherever there is 
racism,  there  is  the  assumption,  more  or  less  enforced,  that  members  of  the 
oppressed racial groups are or ought to be servants of those, or some of those, in 
the privileged group.’
132  In the contemporary US, jobs such as chambermaids and 
porters, are often filled by African-American and Latino workers.  Young writes, 
‘These jobs entail a transfer of energies whereby the servers enhance the status of 
the served.’
133  We can add to this the role of domestic servants, the majority of 
whom are Asian or Latina immigrant women, which is a racialized and gendered 
form of contemporary structural exploitation.
134 
 
The transference of energy from exploited groups to beneficiary groups can mean 
physical  labour,  as  Marxian  accounts  would  have  it,  but  it  can  also  mean 
emotional labour, and both are expended over time.  If an individual spends their 
time doing physical labour or emotionally supporting others, they will have little 
time  left  to  do  the  same  for  themselves,  while  enabling  more  time  for  the 
exploiter to pursue their own projects as they will be unburdened by the tasks 
fulfilled by the exploited.  The transference of energies functions to enhance the 
status of beneficiary groups and diminish the status of exploited groups.  This 
process  is  structural  because  the  transfers  occur  between  groups  who  are 
positioned in the social structure along the lines of class, race and gender.  Young 
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summarises her conception of structural exploitation, and why it constitutes an 
injustice, as follows: 
 
The injustice of exploitation consists in social processes that bring about a 
transfer  of  energies  from  one  group  to  another  to  produce  unequal 
distributions, and in the way in which social institutions enable a few to 
accumulate  while  they  constrain  many  more.    The  injustices  of 
exploitation cannot be eliminated by redistribution of goods, for as long 
as institutionalized practices and structural relations remain unaltered, the 
process  of  transfer  will  re-create  an  unequal  distribution  of  benefits.  
Bringing about justice where there is exploitation requires reorganization 
of institutions and practices of decisionmaking, alteration of the division 
of  labour,  and  similar  measures  of  institutional,  structural  and  cultural 
change.
135 
 
6.2.3  Sweatshop Labour as Structural Exploitation 
 
Young cites sweatshop labour as an example of global structural injustice, but she 
does  not  explicitly  theorise  sweatshop  labour  as  a  form  of  global  structural 
exploitation.  I will now do this drawing on the account developed in the previous 
section.  In doing this I am departing from the existing normative literature on 
sweatshop labour, which adopts the transactional account of exploitation, as I will 
now show and critique.   
 
Young defines sweatshops as follows: 
 
Conditions  in  such  manufacturing  facilities  vary,  of  course,  but  the 
following are typical.  The vast majority of workers are female, and often 
as young as 13 or 14.  They are often treated in dominative and abusive 
ways by bosses, and sexual harassment is common. Typically, they work 
10- to 16-hour days in peak seasons; if the manufacturer is behind on 
order the workers may be forced to work through the night.  They have 
few bathroom breaks or other opportunities for rest during their long 
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working  day.    Sick  leave  or  vacation  time  are  generally  unavailable;  a 
worker too ill to work is often fired.  Violations of the most basic health 
and safety standards are normal.  Factories are often excessively hot, with 
no ventilation, insufficient lighting, excessive noise, little fire equipment, 
blocked exits, poor sanitation, unhygienic canteens and bathrooms, and 
no access to clean drinking water.  Typically, workers in these facilities 
have  no  freedom  to  organize  unions  to  bargain  collectively  with 
employers.    Workers  who  complain  are  blacklisted,  beaten,  and  even 
killed.    Local  governments  often  actively  or  passively  support  such 
antiunion activity.
136 
 
The  definition  of  sweatshops  offered  here  equates  the  problem  at  issue  with 
human rights violations.  She writes, ‘There should be little doubt that conditions 
such  as  these  violate  basic  human  rights.’
137   If  this  is  the  case,  however,  as 
Margaret Moore points out, ‘to the extent that Young makes use of the problem 
of severe injustice in the global garment case, the ethical issues can be captured by 
the severe and egregious violations of human rights.’
138   
 
As  Matt  Zwolinski  argues,  however,  anti-sweatshop  activists  have  a  broader 
understanding of what is wrong with sweatshop labour.  Everyone can agree that 
human rights violations are morally wrong.  But the debate between libertarians 
and the left hinges on whether sweatshop labour counts as wrongfully exploitative 
if  there  are  no  human  rights  violations  involved.    He  offers  the  following 
definition  instead:  a  sweatshop  is  ‘a  place  of  employment  in  which  worker 
compensation or safety is compromised, child labour is employed, and/or local 
labour regulations are routinely disregarded in a way that is prima facie morally 
objectionable.’
139  Zwolinski argues that this captures the moral disapprobation of 
sweatshops, while leaving open the idea that they might be morally justifiable, and 
accommodates the fact that they exist all over the world but are primarily situated 
in developing countries.
140 
 
                                                 
136 Global Challenges, 165. 
137 Ibid. 
138 Moore, "Global Justice and the Connection Theory of Responsibility," 36. 
139 Zwolinski, "Structural Exploitation," 162. 
140 Ibid. Constructing a Youngian Account of Global Injustice 
  234     
The main claim of anti-sweatshop activists is that sweatshop labour is wrongfully 
exploitative.  Defenders of sweatshops argue that they bring jobs, prosperity and 
growth to developing countries.
141  As Zwolinski points out, a transaction can be 
mutually  beneficial  and  still  exploitative,  but  he  argues  that  the  fact  that 
sweatshops  provide  jobs,  pay  better  wages  than  alternative  jobs,  and  workers 
voluntarily or even eagerly accept these jobs, deflates the anti-sweatshop cause.
142 
 
Zwolinski  argues  that  if  MNCs  didn’t  establish  sweatshops  in  developing 
countries then the benefits that come with sweatshop labour, in the form of jobs, 
higher  wages  and  economic  growth,  would  not  occur:  ‘How,  then,  can  it  be 
permissible to neglect workers in the developing world, but impermissible to exploit 
them, when exploitation is better for both parties (including the workers who are 
in desperate need of betterment)?’
143  This is known in the literature as the “non-
worseness  claim”  (NWC),  which  can  be  summarised  as  follows:  ‘Interaction 
between A and B cannot be worse than non-interaction when A has a right not to 
interact  with B at  all,  and  when  the  interaction  is  mutually  advantageous, 
consensual, and free from negative externalities.’
144 
 
Zwolinski is aware of the critique that the problem with sweatshop labour is that 
it occurs within unjust background conditions, and so he assesses whether this 
makes any difference to the claim as to whether or not sweatshop labour counts 
as wrongful exploitation.  He recognizes that ‘most sweatshops operate within a 
social context that is plagued by longstanding, deep, and massively destructive 
injustice.’
145  He cites the examples of suppression of union organization, seizures 
of land and natural resources, and economic protectionism.
146   
 
However, Zwolinski argues that, ‘Injustice at the structural level is not necessary 
for particular actions to be exploitative.  Nor is it sufficient.’
147  The reason why 
background  structural  injustice  is  not  necessary  or  sufficient  to  argue  that  a 
transaction is exploitative is because exploitative transactions can occur in a just 
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context.
148  Consider Wertheimer’s snow shovel example.  Furthermore, agents 
who perform services for the victims of injustice at a fair price are not exploiting 
them, e.g. a contractor who rebuilds a home destroyed by arson at the normal 
market rate.
149  Zwolinski argues, then, that the presence of structural injustice 
‘does  not  typically  matter  for  determining  whether  a  sweatshop  is  acting 
exploitatively.’
150 
 
Zwolinski’s strategy is to show that the conditions in which a transaction occurs 
do  not  determine  whether  or  not  that  transaction  itself  is  exploitative  on  the 
transactional fairness account of exploitation.
151  What matters for transactional 
fairness  is  simply  whether  or  not  a  specific  transaction  is  fair  according  to  a 
hypothetical baseline.  Liberal attacks on the libertarian defence of sweatshops 
accept this framework. 
 
For instance, Chris Meyers has written an influential rebuttal of the libertarian 
case for sweatshops.  He argues that the libertarian argument rests on the claims 
that a transaction which is a) mutually beneficial, b) consensual, and c) fulfils the 
preferences of the exploited, is not wrongful.
152  He claims that such a transaction 
can be considered wrongful; he calls such transactions “wrongful beneficence”. 
 
Meyers gives the example of Jason and Carole.
153  Carole has been stranded in the 
desert for two days after her car broke down.  She has not seen another car the 
whole time and is running out of water.  Then Jason drives down the road.  He 
offers to drive her to the next town on the condition that she has anal sex with 
him.  Meyers argues that in making this offer Jason does not force or manipulate 
her, he has only added to her options, and Carole is grateful after having been 
                                                 
148 Ibid. 
149 "Structural Exploitation," 172. 
150 "Structural Exploitation," 155.  
151 Zwolinski does consider the idea of systemic exploitation of the Marxist kind, as discussed by 
Onora  O’Neill.    However  he  argues  that  the  structure  that  is  exploitative  is  the  state  (see 
"Structural Exploitation," 175-76.)  He does not develop this theory of state exploitation and it is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to debate this point.  Instead I focus on the way Zwolinski 
argues against the idea that structural injustice is a necessary condition for exploitation.   
152 Chris Meyers, "Wrongful Beneficence: Exploitation and Third World Sweatshops," Journal of 
Social Philosophy 35, no. 3 (2004): 323. 
153 "Wrongful Beneficence: Exploitation and Third World Sweatshops," Journal of Social Philosophy 
35, no. 3 (2004): 324-26. Constructing a Youngian Account of Global Injustice 
  236     
sodomized and driven to town.
154  According to Meyers, this example proves that 
a transaction can meet the three libertarian conditions and still be wrongful.  He 
writes, 
 
it is an exchange, it is an exchange that is unfair and that no one would 
agree to in normal situations.  The exploited only agrees to it because the 
one  making  the  offer  is  taking  advantage  of  the  victim’s  desperate 
situation.
155 
 
Meyers argues, not by analogy but by extension, that the same thing applies in the 
case  of  sweatshop  labour.    The  workers  a)  benefit  from  the  transaction,  b) 
consent to it, and c) their preferences are fulfilled, but MNCs are preying upon 
their desperate situation and that is what makes the transaction wrongful – it is a 
form of wrongful beneficence. 
 
Meyers’ argument does not work, however.  His aim is to show that a transaction 
can meet the three libertarian conditions and still count as wrongful.  Yet the 
example of Jason and Carole does not involve a consensual transaction.  It is 
wrong to argue that Carole consents to anal sex with Jason.
156  Carole is dying.  
Her options are akin to the paradigm example of force – “Your money or your 
life”.  While Jason is not going to actively kill Carole, he can passively kill her by 
letting  her  die  of  dehydration.    Jason  could  easily  rescue  her  at  no  cost  to 
himself.
157  But that is not really the point.  Carole does not want to have sex with 
Jason (anal or otherwise).  This is not consensual sex; it is rape.  It would be 
difficult to find any grounds on which Carole’s consent is meaningful – she is 
experiencing extreme physical discomfort through dehydration and hunger in the 
searing heat of the desert, she is experiencing psychological trauma – fear, anxiety, 
desperation – at the thought of her imminent death, and she knows that her only 
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alternative is death.
158  We saw in Chapter 3 that according to Joel Feinberg when 
a person coerces someone they give the person the option of X or Y, but remove 
the option of the conjunction of X and Y.
159  Carole can choose either to have sex 
with Jason and not die, or to not have sex with Jason and die, but she cannot 
choose to not have sex with Jason and not die.  Therefore, he coerces her into 
sex, which constitutes rape. 
 
And it is not clear why Meyers even makes this case in the first place.  As Robert 
Mayer points out, Meyers fails to distinguish ‘between discretionary and structural 
exploitation.’
160   Jason  practices  discretionary  exploitation  –  he  can  easily  walk 
away from this transaction and has a prima facie moral obligation to do so – but 
sweatshop labour is ‘structural in a rather pure form’.
161  It is not possible to argue 
by  extension  from  the  example  to  sweatshop  labour  because  the  latter  is  an 
example of structural exploitation.  I agree with Mayer that sweatshop labour is a 
form of structural exploitation, but his definition of structural exploitation takes 
an odd turn. 
 
Mayer argues that, ‘Exploitation becomes unfair only when one gains undeservedly 
at the expense of others.  That is the implication in sweatshop exploitation: the 
exploiters gain too much and thus the exploited parties receive less than they 
deserve.’
162  He argues further that, ‘This judgment depends on some standard of 
fairness with which we assess transactions.’
163  Mayer then invokes Wertheimer’s 
argument that a ‘fairness baseline is a counterfactural transaction in which the 
exploitable disadvantage is removed.’
164  Contrary to Meyers, then, Mayer argues 
that what is wrongful in exploitation is not wrongful beneficence, but an unfair 
gain on the part of the exploiter.
165 
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Mayer argues that, ‘Structural exploitation occurs in situations where exploiting 
agents  are  locked  in  competition  with  each  other.    In  intensely  competitive 
markets agents cannot engage in discretionary price setting; they must take price 
as given.’
166  In the competitive global garment industry, MNCs are locked into a 
system  whereby  they  must  exploit  garment  workers  or  go  out  of  business.
167  
Jason has the choice to exploit; in his case, ‘the structural imperative of “exploit 
or fail” does not apply.’
168  By contrast, global corporations are in ‘a kind of dirty-
hands dilemma’.
169  Structural exploitation, he argues, places capitalists in a dirty 
hands situation where they have to do wrong (pay low, non-living wages) in order 
to do right (provide jobs and stay competitive). 
 
This account of structural exploitation argues that the capitalist structure sets up a 
situation  where  capitalists  must  do  wrong  –  exploit  workers,  in  the  sense  of 
gaining an unfair gain from their labour – in order to do right – maintain the 
legitimate capitalist system which benefits the workers.  But this is based on a 
spurious empirical claim.  It is quite easy to show that MNCs do not have to 
extract an unfair gain from the labour of garment workers in order to maintain the 
global garment industry.   
 
In their study of the Indonesian Textile, Footwear and Apparel (TFA) industry 
from 1990-1996, Ann Harrison and Jason Scorse tested the theory that if wages 
were  increased,  employment  would  fall.
170   They  found  that  the  data  did  not 
support this claim.  Due to the combined efforts of minimum wage legislation 
and  anti-sweatshop  activism,  real  wages  for  TFA  workers  manufacturing  for 
export or foreign-owned plants rose by 50%.
171  However, this did not lead to a 
reduction  in  employment.    In  fact,  exporting  and  foreign-owned  TFA  plants 
‘experienced very large increases in employment.’
172  They argue that this can be 
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partly explained by the fact that ‘labour costs only a small fraction of the total 
costs of production.’
173  They write, 
 
To  put  things  in  perspective,  a  nominal  wage  increase  of  100  percent 
implies employers would have to double wages of around 50 cents an 
hour to one dollar an hour.  Given that Nike shoes commonly sell from 
100-200 dollars, this increase in labour costs is not likely to have a large 
impact on profits.  Labour costs typically account for less than 5 percent 
of the sales price of a Nike shoe.
174 
 
Harrison  and  Scorse  qualify  their  findings  by  pointing  out  the  TFA  goods 
produced in these factories would be sold in expensive retail markets in the US 
and Europe, where profit margins are large and brand identity is significant; ‘In 
industries where more firms compete for market share, where profit margins are 
smaller, and there is no brand recognition, anti-sweatshop campaigns may not be 
as effective.’
175  They also suggest that the gains might have been temporary and 
may have occurred because wages were so low in that sector in the first place.
176  
We would need more data on these issues, and on different countries and over 
different time periods, but this study is enough to cast suspicion on the libertarian 
claim that raising wages will necessarily lead to capital flight or businesses going 
bust.  It is a possibility that MNCs will move elsewhere but it is not a certainty – 
there  are  many  variables  involved.    To  determine  whether  capital  flight  or 
bankruptcy is a real possibility will require an empirical assessment of the sector in 
question, the proposed increase in wages in relation to profit, the situation in 
other countries etc.  There is not a necessary and direct correlation between wage 
increases and capital flight or closure.   
 
Furthermore, as Meyers points out there are other areas where corporations can 
find the money to raise the wages of sweatshop workers.  Young and Meyers both 
suggest marketing and advertising as an area where money could be redirected to 
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workers.  Meyers points out that in 1992 Nike paid Michael Jordan more than the 
income of 30,000 Indonesian workers to advertise their shoes.
177  Another area is 
CEO salary.
178  Nike’s CEO, Mark Parker earned $15.4 million dollars in 2013, 
which is down 56% from the $35.2 million he received in 2012 (not due to paying 
workers better salaries, but to a smaller award of stock).
179 
 
Moreover, concerns about the exploitative nature of sweatshop labour are not just 
about wages, but about working conditions.  And improving working conditions 
is potentially even less costly.  As Kimberley Ann-Elliot argues, there are many 
simple, costless things that corporations can do to improve worker safety, like 
ensuring doors are not locked and putting in fire extinguishers.
180  Factory fires 
are common in sweatshops,
181 with 412 workers dying in fires in 2012 alone.
182  
There are one-off investments corporations can make in improving infrastructure, 
and these can entail negligible costs, such as installing firedoors and smoke alarms.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, legally binding agreements, like the Bangladesh Fire 
and  Building  Safety  Accord,  can  level  the  playing  field  to  stop  corporations 
undercutting each other by reducing costs through failure to implement basic fire 
and building safety standards. 
 
In short, the claim that corporations are locked in to paying non-living wages in 
order to compete in the market is simplistic and fallacious.  Mayer’s definition of 
“structural exploitation” is a dangerous red herring.  The focus of an account of 
structural exploitation should not be on how corporations are locked in to paying 
low, non-living wages and perpetuating dangerous working conditions, because 
this is based on a false empirical premise; instead it should be on how power 
relations between groups are structured so as to force the disadvantaged to work 
for these corporations. 
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The upshot of this discussion so far is that the transactional fairness definition of 
exploitation cannot tell us what is wrongfully exploitative about sweatshop labour.  
Zwolinski rejects the idea that structural injustice is relevant to considerations of 
wrongful exploitation on the grounds that unfair transactions can take place in 
just conditions.  Meyers aims to show that transactions can be free, consensual, 
mutually  beneficial  and  yet  still  wrongful;  but  he  fails  to  make  this  argument 
convincingly.  And Mayer argues that corporations do extract an unfair gain from 
workers but that they are locked in to doing so in order to achieve an overall 
good, which I have argued is incoherent.  Meyers and Mayer’s attempts to show 
why sweatshop labour is wrongfully exploitative within the transactional fairness 
framework have failed. 
 
Jeremy  Snyder  criticises  the  Wertheimer-inspired  bent  of  these  discussions  of 
sweatshop labour.  He argues that the literature needs to take seriously the fact 
that even if sweatshop jobs are not harmful but beneficial, ‘that sweatshop labour 
is still one of a very bad range of options for workers.’
183  Low wages result from 
background contemporary and historical injustices, such as colonialism and war or 
unjust trade laws.
184  He argues that,  
 
Whatever the cause, that an exchange is fair in the eyes of the market in 
no way guarantees that the resulting distribution of benefits will not leave 
one party without a decent minimum of well-being.  Wertheimer’s fairness 
standard will miss these background factors, and, more importantly, will 
miss the intuition that wage levels that fall below a decent minimum – 
whether “fair” or not – are morally problematic.
185 
 
He  advances  a  new  concept  –  what  he  calls  “needs  exploitation”:  ‘Needs 
exploitation  takes  place  when  an  exploiter  gains  advantage  from  an  exploitee 
while  disregarding  shortfalls  in  the  basic  needs  of  the  exploitee  which  the 
exploiter has a duty to meet.’
186  He argues that because workers are dependent on 
sweatshop employers to meet their basic needs that employers have a duty to do 
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this.
187  The duty increases the longer workers have worked for that company.
188  
Meeting the employees’ needs does not necessarily have to be in the form of 
increased  salaries.    He  cites  the  examples  of  Adidas-Saloman,  which  has 
developed  the  Health,  Safety,  and  Environment  program  improving  safety 
measures, such as fitting fire escapes and improving access to first aid.
189  Levi-
Strauss offers subsidized, healthy food to employees.
190   
 
Snyder’s  argument  that  corporations  have  a  duty  to  meet  the  basic  needs  of 
dependent  workers  –  especially  if  they  are  fulltime,  long-term  workers
191 - 
generates  an  incentive  for  employers  to  only  employ  workers  on  temporary 
contracts and to turnover staff regularly, to avoid these duties.  But the more 
pressing  problem  from  our  perspective  is  that  even  though  he  critiques  the 
Wertheimer  framework  of  this  debate,  he  continues  to  perpetuate  the 
transactional fairness framework of exploitation – he simply adds a duty to meet 
the basic needs of the vulnerable to avoid wrongful exploitation.   
 
The terms of this debate, I argue, are all wrong.  Libertarians seek to show that 
the transactions between sweatshop workers and employers are not wrongfully 
exploitative because they are freely chosen by the employees who benefit from 
the jobs.  Liberal opponents seek to show that even if the jobs are freely chosen 
and mutually beneficial, that they can still count as wrongfully exploitative, either 
by arguing that exploitation can occur in the form of wrongful beneficence or by 
arguing that there are further duties that need to be met – fulfilling the basic 
needs of dependent staff.  I would argue, however, that any attempt to explain 
what  is  wrongfully  exploitative  about  sweatshop  labour  on  the  transactional 
fairness  account  of  exploitation  will  fail.    The  explanation  of  the  exploitative 
nature  of  sweatshop  labour  requires  a  structural  analysis  of  power  relations 
between groups. 
 
On  the  account  of  structural  exploitation  that  I  have  developed,  what  is 
wrongfully exploitative about sweatshop labour it is that it involves the transfer of 
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energies  from  workers  to  corporations  and  consumers  in  a  way  that  inhibits 
workers’ self-development.  The defender of sweatshops could argue that the 
wages are higher in sweatshops comparative to the workers’ other options, thus 
enabling self-development.  However, they also concede that the wages are lower 
than a living wage.
192  If the wages are lower than is needed to provide oneself 
with basic material needs fulfilment – food, clothing, shelter – then they do not 
provide the opportunity for self-development.  And as Macpherson argued, even 
if basic needs are fulfilled, the process of continually selling one’s labour-power 
inhibits extra-productive power, or the individuals’ capacity for self-development.   
 
In other words, sweatshop workers are oppressed.  They may well be oppressed 
under the other options on offer (subsistence farming, employment with local 
businesses),  but  that  does  not  stop  them  from  being  oppressed  in  sweatshop 
conditions too.  As Reiman pointed out, structural exploitation works to construct 
options as rationally optimal for individuals, thus obscuring the reality that their 
options  are  limited  by  unjust,  exploitative  structures.    The  fact  that  the 
transactions  between  individual  garment  workers  and  individual  factory 
owners/managers  are  a)  mutually  beneficial,  b)  consensual,  and  c)  fulfil  the 
preferences of the exploited is irrelevant.  What matters is that groups of people 
are forced to transfer their energies at the expense of self-development, for the 
sake of enabling the self-development of other groups.  This is a structural, not a 
transactional phenomenon.  Indeed, while Young does not spell this out, she has 
something  like  this  in  mind  when  she  writes,  ‘If  many  workers  endure  these 
[human rights] violations without complaint because they desperately need those 
earnings, this is a measure of the coercive pressures of their circumstances rather 
than of their consent.’
193 
 
Zwolinski aimed to show that the conditions in which a transaction occurs does 
not determine whether or not that transaction itself is exploitative – exploitative 
transactions can occur in just conditions.  But that misses the point of a claim 
about structural exploitation.  My Youngian argument is that exploitation is built 
into the structure of the economic system.  We can still assess discrete transactions 
as fair or unfair, exploitative or not exploitative, on the transactional account of 
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exploitation.  For instance, (aside from the fact that it is a clear-cut instance of 
rape  and  thus  harm)  the  Jason  and  Carole  example  could  be  explained  as 
wrongfully exploitative by the fact that Jason is in a position to exploit Carole 
because of her vulnerability (dispositional exploitation) and he acts on it (episodic 
exploitation).  But this says nothing about whether or not a system is exploitative; 
for  that  we  need  an  account  of  systemic  or  structural  exploitation.    Reiman 
identifies the way in which libertarian and Marxian accounts of exploitation are 
simply  talking  at  cross  purposes:  ‘I  contend  that  what  Marxists  call  capitalist 
ideology boils down to little more than the invisibility of structural force.  And 
libertarian capitalism is the theory that results when the love of freedom falls prey 
to that invisibility.’
194 
 
On my understanding, structural exploitation consists in a transfer of energies 
from social groups structurally positioned so as to have few options, making their 
participation in these practices seem like a free choice.  These groups are then 
constrained in their opportunities for self-development, at the same time enabling 
exploiter groups more opportunities for self-development. 
 
The advantage of this understanding of structural exploitation is that it brings to 
light  salient  issues  of  sweatshop  labour,  which  so  far  this  literature  has  been 
entirely silent on.  As Kang points out, in 2006 there were Export Processing 
Zones (EPZs) in 130 countries, employing 66 million people, 70-80% of whom 
were women.
195  As Diane Elson and Ruth Pearson point out, ‘The situation of 
workers in world market factories cannot… be analysed simply in terms of class 
struggle and national struggle.  It has also to be analysed in terms of gender.’
196 
 
Elson and Pearson suggest that ‘the capitalist exploitation of women as wage 
workers is parasitic upon their subordination as a gender.’
197  There are several 
reasons for this.  Firstly, the gender pay gap.  Women’s wages are 20-50% lower 
than men’s for comparable jobs, so employing women means capitalists increase 
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profits.
198   Secondly,  sexist  imaginaries  of  women’s  ‘innate’  traits  lead  to 
employment in the garment sector – the ideas that women have ‘naturally nimble 
fingers’, are more docile, are less likely to join unions, and are suited to tedious 
and repetitious work.
199  Thirdly, the fact that women bear children is an excuse to 
pay lower wages, hire them at a young age and provides factories the opportunity 
to turnover the workforce, bringing in younger and cheaper staff, as women leave 
for marriage or pregnancy (this is called ‘natural wastage’).
200  Fourthly, because 
women are often trained by female family members to sew from a young age, this 
is seen as a suitable task for women and means they require less training.
201  The 
work is not ‘unskilled’ but it is constructed as such, due to ‘the social invisibility of 
the training that produces these skills.’
202 
 
Race  is  also  not  considered  in  this  literature  on  exploitation  in  sweatshops.  
Sweatshops mainly exist in Asian and Latin American countries.  In other words, 
the majority of sweatshop workers are non-white.  This is a case of menial labour 
being  exported  to  non-white  workers  for  whom  it  is  deemed  appropriate.  
Sweatshop  labour  depends  not  only  on  sexist  imaginaries,  but  racialized 
imaginaries too.  Elson and Pearson quote from a Malaysian investment brochure, 
aiming to attract foreign firms to Malaysia: 
 
“The manual dexterity of the oriental female is famous the world over.  
Her  hands  are  small  and  she  works  fast  with  extreme  care.    Who, 
therefore, could be better qualified by nature and inheritance to contribute to 
the  efficiency  of  a  bench-assembly  production  line  than  the  oriental 
girl.”
203 
 
The injustice of sweatshop labour consists in the fact that it is a form of structural 
exploitation.    The  energies  of  predominantly  non-white,  female  workers  are 
expended to enable corporations to maximise profits and affluent consumers to 
live a certain lifestyle at the expense of the self-development of the workers.  The 
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problem  is  a  systemic  one,  not  a  problem  of  discrete  transactions  between 
particular capitalists and particular workers. 
 
6.2.4  Responsibility for Global Structural Exploitation 
 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse responsibility for global injustice.  It might be 
objected that if structural exploitation is a form of global injustice and it is built 
into  the  capitalist  political  economy,  then  we  cannot  meaningfully  attribute 
responsibility to various agents for structural exploitation – the problem is the 
system.  Achieving global justice will require abolishing capitalism.   
 
Indeed,  as  we  have  seen  in  Chapter  4,  Young  argues  that  all  agents  are 
“objectively constrained” by the system, including large corporations.  However, 
as I have argued both in that chapter and in this chapter against Robert Mayer, it 
is  disingenuous  for  large  corporations  to  claim  that  they  are  objectively 
constrained to the point where they must exploit or go bust.  Large corporations 
within  the  capitalist  system  have  the  elbow  room  to  be  able  to  make  moral 
choices.  They could choose to spend less on advertising or CEO salaries, and 
instead to spend that money on inexpensive improvements in building and fire 
safety.  Furthermore, coordinated efforts in creating legally binding agreements 
would effect structural change across the board. 
 
It  could  be  objected  that  even  if  these  improvements  are  made  structural 
exploitation will continue.  Even if workers have better working conditions and 
better  salaries,  this  does  not  stop  the  continual  transfer  of  energies  from 
disadvantaged groups (predominantly Third World women) to the advantage of 
capitalists and consumers.  All these sorts of improvements would achieve is to 
curtail  the  worst  excesses  of  sweatshop  labour.    Systemic  exploitation  would 
remain in place. 
 
Young herself could go in two directions here.  She could agree that ending global 
injustice  requires  abolishing  capitalism.    In  one  of  her  earliest  essays,  in  her 
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  247     
against the integrated and virulent capitalist patriarchy we live in.’
204  It is only when 
capitalism is abolished that the injustice of structural exploitation will end.  If this 
is the case, however, how can it be that corporations are morally responsible for 
structural exploitation, if overcoming it requires self-destruction? 
 
In  Young’s  later  work,  the  emphasis  is  on  radical  democracy  as  a  way  of 
alleviating oppression.  In Justice  and  the  Politics  of  Difference, the emphasis is on 
workplace democracy as a means to enabling the self-development of workers.
205  
There is a least one hopeful example of this occurring in practice in the TFA 
sector.  Following the 2013 Rana Plaza factory collapse in Bangladesh, in which 
over  1,100  garment  workers  died,  some  of  the  survivors  have  established  a 
cooperative  factory.
206   The  workers  get  paid  the  legal  minimum  wage  (which 
doubled  following  the  disaster),  plus  50%  of  the  factory  profits  are  equally 
distributed  among  them.
207   The  rest  of  the  profit  goes  toward  educating  the 
workers’ children, providing small loans to workers, and providing physiotherapy 
to workers hurt during the factory collapse.   
 
This  is  a  very  small  step  in  a  giant  globalized,  multi-billion  dollar  industry, 
nevertheless  it  suggests  that  the  self-development  of  workers  in  the  garment 
industry does not necessarily have to be inhibited.  If the sector were structured 
so that factories were under worker-control, with democratic working practices 
and profits distributed among workers, then arguably workers could achieve self-
development in these conditions.  This is why some of the political responsibility 
to overcome global injustice falls on victims.  It cannot be expected of large 
MNCs that they will establish these kinds of radical changes.  If workers want to 
establish just working conditions, they will have to rise up and demand them.   
 
I have argued that corporations are retrospectively morally responsible for unjust 
background conditions insofar as they could implement structural changes like 
agreeing  to  a  global  minimum  wage  and  accepting  fire  and  building  safety 
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regulations  universally,  yet  they  have  failed  to  make  such  changes.    But  the 
forward-looking  political  responsibility  for  justice  falls  on  all  the  other  agents 
involves in these practices – consumers, workers, citizens – to struggle for more 
fundamental, transformative change in the structures. 
6.3  Conclusion 
 
I began this chapter by showing how Young situates herself in the global justice 
literature and argued that a better approach would have been to focus on relations 
of  global  injustice  –  domination  and  oppression.    I  then  outlined  Young’s 
preliminary thoughts on alleviating global domination through global democracy. 
 
I have begun to develop an account of global oppression, focusing on one “face” 
of oppression – exploitation.  I outlined the recent literature on “transactional 
exploitation” that focuses on the unfairness of discrete transactions.  I argued that 
a  Youngian  approach  to  “structural  exploitation”  is  closer  to  the  Marxian 
literature that focuses on power relations between groups within the structure of 
the political economy.  I proposed the definition of structural exploitation as a 
transfer of energies from exploited groups to exploiter groups, inhibiting the self-
development of exploited groups and enhancing the status of exploiter groups. 
 
Finally,  I  applied  this  definition  of  structural  exploitation  to  the  problem  of 
sweatshop labour.  I argued that the existing normative literature on sweatshop 
labour  is  using  the  transactional  fairness  account  of  exploitation,  which  is  a 
mistaken approach.  I showed how the Youngian structural exploitation approach 
can  better  account  for  the  wrongfulness  of  sweatshop  labour,  and  can 
accommodate the fact that sweatshop labour is gendered and racialized.  I have 
suggested that responsibility for overcoming structural exploitation falls not only 
on corporations, but also on workers and consumers if structural exploitation is to 
be overcome and not merely reformed. 
 Chapter 7  Defining Connection 
 
 
 
On  the  social  connection  model  of  responsibility,  individuals  bear  political 
responsibility for injustice to which they are connected, such as global structural 
exploitation  in  the  garment  industry.    However,  at  no  point  in  her  work  on 
responsibility is it clear what Young means by connection; more specifically, what 
counts  as  a  normatively  significant  connection  that  generates  political 
responsibility for a particular structural injustice.  There are three options that 
arise throughout Young’s writing on this topic. 
 
The  possibilities  are,  firstly,  existential  connection  –  individuals  bear  political 
responsibilities to others simply by virtue of their existence in structures with 
others  (this  is  inspired  by  Levinas’s  theory  of  responsibility  for  the  Other).  
Secondly,  causal  connection  –  that  individuals  bear  political  responsibility  for 
structural  injustices  to  which  they  causally  contribute.    Thirdly,  dependent 
connection – individuals bear political responsibility towards others upon whom 
they  depend  in  order  to  pursue  their  own  actions  (this  is  based  on  Onora 
O’Neill’s theory of the scope of ethical consideration).  
 
Young argues that the social connection model of responsibility can generalise to 
all forms of structural injustice.  I start with this idea, and suggest that it depends 
upon how we understand connection.  To test the three forms of connection I 
introduce a different form of structural injustice – modern slavery.  Then I look at 
the three forms of connection to structural injustice that might ground political 
responsibility.  I start with existential connection focusing on Levinas’s theory of 
our  responsibility  for  the  Other.    I  argue  that  what  Young  has  identified  in 
Levinas, which is an important and illuminating insight, is that responsibility can 
exist prior to freedom.  This strain of thought is also present in Derrida, Hans 
Jonas and Hannah Arendt, all of whom have influenced Young’s theorising about 
the  social  connection  model.    The  problem  with  the  existential  approach, Defining Connection 
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however, is that it is apolitical and Young wants to tie political responsibility to 
doing or not doing something.
1   
 
So  I  then  assess  causal  connection.    However  I  raise  four  objections  to  this 
premise  for  the  model:  the  attributive  cause  objection,  the  objection  from 
mediated process, the falling-through-the-gaps objection and the victim-blaming 
objection.    I  argue  that  instead  of  thinking  about  causation  of  background 
conditions,  we  merely  need  to  show  that  individuals  reproduce  background 
conditions  through  their  actions,  and  it  is  this  that  grounds  their  political 
responsibility.  I suggest, then, that there is a fourth form of connection – the 
reproduction of unjust structures through individuals’ actions.  I look, finally, at 
dependent connection as another form of connection to structural injustice.  I 
argue that insofar as individuals are dependent upon the exploitation, or other 
forms  of  oppression,  of  others  that  this  too  can  generate  their  political 
responsibility. 
 
7.1  Connection to Structural Injustice 
 
Young argues that individuals have a political responsibility for structural injustice 
to  which  they  are  connected.    To  recap,  structural  injustice  is  distinct  from 
individual  and  institutional  wrongdoing.
2   Structural  injustice  is  the  harmful, 
unintended outcome of agents’ normal economic, social or political behaviour 
and activities.  Structural injustice is not intentional; rather it is the accumulated 
outcome of the actions of diverse, geographically and temporally dispersed agents, 
acting within accepted rules and norms.
3   
 
We  have  also  seen  that  structural  injustice  has  four  features.    Firstly,  objective 
constraint – we experience the material, institutional and social circumstances in 
which we live as imposing constraints on our options for action.  Social structures 
place individuals and groups in different positions, generating different kinds and 
ranges  of  options  for  action.    Social  structures  are  reproduced  by  the  actions  of 
                                                 
1 Iris Marion Young, Responsibility for Justice  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 79. 
2 Responsibility for Justice  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 45. 
3 Responsibility for Justice, 52. Defining Connection 
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individuals.  And the outcomes of social-structural processes can run counter to the 
intentions of participants – counter-finality.   
 
Injustice,  for  Young,  constitutes  oppression  or  domination.    In  the  previous 
chapter, I argued that sweatshop labour is a form of structural exploitation, which 
for  Young,  is  a  form  of  oppression.    Sweatshop  labour  constitutes  the 
transference  of  energies  from  predominantly  non-white  women  in  developing 
countries to MNCs and consumers, in a way that inhibits the self-development of 
the former groups and benefits the latter groups.  Young talks about sweatshop 
labour  as  a  form  of  structural  injustice,  rather  than  focusing  on  particular 
wrongdoings  committed  within  the  garment  industry  or  particular  exploitative 
transactions  within  the  sector,  to  highlight  a  problem  with  the  background 
conditions.  The question for us is what kind of connection to these background 
conditions makes us responsible for them? 
 
Young uses the example of sweatshop labour because she was inspired to think 
about  responsibility  for  global  structural  processes  by  the  anti-sweatshop 
movement.  Through theorising the motivations of this movement, she came to 
the  conclusion  that  individuals  bear  political  responsibilities  towards  structural 
injustices to which they ‘contribute’;
4 this is why anti-sweatshop protestors felt the 
need to campaign against the injustice, because they felt implicated in it.  Their 
claims  ‘struck  a  chord’  with  many  individuals,
5 presumably  because  they  felt 
themselves to be causally implicated in these processes and thus responsible. 
 
There are many kinds of structural injustice in the world, however, and Young 
assumes that her model will apply to all of them.
6  Whether or not this is true, I 
argue, depends upon how we understand connection.  To highlight this problem I 
want to introduce another form of structural injustice that will challenge some of 
Young’s assumptions – modern slavery.   
 
                                                 
4 "Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model," Social Philosophy and Policy 23, no. 
1 (2006): 102. 
5 Responsibility for Justice, 126. 
6 "Responsibility and Global Labor Justice," The Journal of Political Philosophy 12, no. 4 (2004): 388, 
"Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model," 107. Defining Connection 
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Slavery, of course, is illegal – it is outlawed in every country in the world.  When 
talking about structural injustice, Young is interested in the outcomes of normal, 
non-blameworthy  activity  and  how  such  behaviour  can  generate  unintended, 
harmful or unjust outcomes.  However, I would suggest that slavery has become 
part of our normal background conditions in the global economy.  Kevin Bales 
estimates that there are twenty-seven million slaves in the world today.
7  Much of 
contemporary slave labour is in agriculture, but slaves are also used in, 
 
brickmaking, mining or quarrying, prostitution, gem working and jewellery 
making, cloth and carpet making, and domestic service; they clear forests, 
make charcoal, and work in shops.  Much of this work is aimed at local 
sale and consumption, but slave-made goods reach into homes around the 
world.
8   
 
“Slaves” today are not enslaved in the same way as the slaves of two hundred 
years ago; modern slavery is not a matter of ownership.
9  Instead, modern slavery 
is  about  gaining  control.
 10   Slaveholders  are  able  to  achieve  this  by  taking 
advantage of legal loopholes.  The vast majority of modern “slaves” could in fact 
be  described  as  “indentured  labourers.”    Bales  estimates  that  there  are  15-
20million indentured labourers in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal, where 
people sell their labour in exchange for security against a loan, for instance to pay 
for a crisis like crop failure or family illness, or when they inherit debt from a 
relative.
11  The slaveholders do not claim to “own” these labourers; instead, they 
gain control over them through a combination of debt and the threat of violence 
if  they  fail  to  repay  the  debt.    The  second-largest  form  of  modern  slavery  is 
“contract slavery.”  For example, in Thailand young girls are sold by their parents 
or brokers to brothels.  The girls sign contracts with the brothel owners, which 
place them in debt bondage for their purchase price plus interest.  The girls are 
then legally bound by this contract to work for the brothel owner for as long as 
                                                 
7 Kevin Bales, Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy, Revised Edition ed. (London: 
University of California Press, 2012), 8. 
8 Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy, Revised Edition ed. (London: University of 
California Press, 2012), 9. 
9 Disposable People, 5. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Disposable People, 7. Defining Connection 
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the employer decides constitutes a repayment of the debt.
12  Contract slavery is 
practiced in Southeast Asia, Brazil, some parts of India and in some Arab states.
13  
In  fact,  what  we  normally  think  of  as  slavery  –  “chattel  slavery”  –  where 
ownership is asserted, is very rare today.
14  It is rare because it is illegal, whereas 
debt bondage and contract slavery have the appearance of legality.  As Bales puts 
it, ‘Today accepted systems of labour relations are used to legitimate and conceal 
slavery.’
15 
 
Bales suggests that two features of the contemporary world have enabled modern 
slavery  to  flourish.    Firstly,  the  population  explosion  –  since  1945  the  global 
population has expanded from two billion to six billion people, and the countries 
where slavery is flourishing have experienced the greatest population growth.
16  
The  second  factor  is  rapid  economic  and  social  change.    The  shift  from 
subsistence farming to industrialised agriculture, and the destruction of common 
land, has displaced millions of peasants.
17  Bales argues that, ‘For the first time in 
human history there is an absolute glut of potential slaves.’
18   
 
The core of Bales’ argument is that modern slavery needs to be understood not as 
a  criminal  phenomenon,  but  as  an  economic  one;  slavery  is  a  business.
19   He 
argues, 
 
Slavery grows best in extreme poverty, so we can identify its economic as 
well as its social preconditions.  Most obviously, there have to be people, 
perhaps non-native to an area, who can be enslaved as well as a demand 
for  slave  labour.    Slaveholders  must  have  the  resources  to  fund  the 
purchase, capture, or enticement of slaves and the power to control them 
after enslavement.  The cost of keeping a slave has to be less than or equal 
to the cost of hiring free labour.  And there must be a demand for slave 
products at a price that makes slaveholding profitable.  Moreover, the 
                                                 
12 Disposable People, 18. 
13 Disposable People, 20. 
14 Disposable People, 19. 
15 Disposable People, 26. 
16 Disposable People, 12. 
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potential slave must lack perceived alternatives to enslavement.  Being 
poor, homeless, a refugee, or abandoned can all lead to the desperation 
that opens the door to slavery, making it easy for the slaver to lay an 
attractive trap.  And when slaves are kidnapped, they must lack sufficient 
power to defend themselves against that violent enslavement.
20 
 
I suggest, then, that slavery could be understood as a form of structural injustice.  
Modern  slavery  is  enabled  by  a  set  of  normalized  background  conditions.  
Modern slavery is the unintended consequence of a population explosion coupled with 
rapid social and economic change; none of which is coordinated or intended by 
any one, or set of, identifiable agents.  Two billion people in the world live on less 
than $2 per day, and they often live in states that lack the capacity to protect 
them, or have fled from states and exist in a political no-man’s land without any 
form of protection; the social position of these individuals makes them vulnerable 
to offers of fake jobs or loans.  The actors are objectively constrained: the victims have 
minimal  options  for  action;  slaveholders  are  fighting  for  maximal  profits  in 
competitive markets; and governments in developing countries do not have the 
capacity, or perhaps the will given the profitability, to overcome this booming 
business.  Modern slavery is reproduced through individual actions: slavers exploiting 
individuals with offers of fake jobs or loans, and police and government agents 
turning a blind eye.   
 
Bales suggests, ‘We’re facing an epidemic of slavery that is tied through the global 
economy to our own lives.’
21  There are connections between Western citizens 
and consumers and modern slavery, but these connections are less obvious than 
those of sweatshop labour.  When we purchase clothing we might be able to trace 
the supply chain, or we might, through a general knowledge of the practice, be 
aware that sweatshop labour is involved.  Modern slavery, however, is hidden and 
unregulated; the connections are for the most part invisible.  We probably do not 
and cannot know if slave labour has been involved in clearing the forests where 
the cattle were reared for our hamburgers, or if they made charcoal that facilitated 
the making of the steel for our cars, or if the tantalum in our smartphone was 
mined by slaves.  Sweatshop labour is traceable; slavery is not.  But that does not 
                                                 
20 Disposable People, 31-32. 
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mean that we are not connected to modern slavery, as slave-produced goods or 
goods produced using slave-made products, ‘are mixed into the flow of other 
products.’
22   
 
Where sweatshop labour is a visible and traceable form of structural exploitation, 
modern  slavery  is  the  invisible  and  untraceable  form.    It  constitutes  the 
transference  of  energies  from  indentured  labourers  and  contracted  slaves  to 
businesses  and  consumers,  in  such  a  way  that  not  merely  inhibits  their  self-
development, but curtails it.  It is the sharpest end of structural exploitation under 
capitalism, which thrives because it reduces the costs of production and increases 
profits.  As Bales writes, ‘Slavery lowers a factory’s production costs; these saving 
can be passed up the economic stream, ultimately reaching shops of Europe and 
North America as lower prices or higher profits for retailers.’
23  The complexity of 
global supply chains and the processes of production mean that we cannot really 
know to what extent we are connected to modern slavery, but the reality is that 
we are, whether we know it or can trace it, or not.   
 
The  question  for  this  chapter,  then,  is  what  kind  of  connection  to  structural 
injustices,  such  as  sweatshop  labour  or  modern  slavery,  generates  political 
responsibility for them?  I will now look at the options of existential, causal and 
dependent connection. 
 
7.2  Existential Connection 
 
As we saw in Part One of this thesis, Young’s distinction between legal and moral 
responsibility  (the  liability  model)  and  political  responsibility  (the  social 
connection model) derives from Hannah Arendt’s work on responsibility for Nazi 
crimes.
24   Arendt  argued  that  ordinary  German  citizens  were  not  morally 
responsible for the crimes, but they bore political responsibility for the crimes 
                                                 
22 Disposable People, 23. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Young refers to three of Arendt’s texts, Hannah Arendt, "Collective Responsibility," in Amor 
Mundi: Explorations in the Faith and Thought of Hannah Arendt, ed. James W. Bernauer (Dordrecht: 
Martinue Nijoff Publishers, 1987); "Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility," in The Portable 
Hannah Arendt, ed. Peter Baehr (London: Penguin Books, 2000); Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on 
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because citizens had failed to maintain the public-political world for which they 
were all collectively responsible.  Arendt’s is a theory of existential responsibility; 
one  bears  responsibility  by  virtue  of  existence  within  a  political  community.  
Young starts, then, with an existentialist theory of responsibility and she draws 
inspiration from other existentialist theories.
 25 
 
Hans  Jonas’s  theory  of  responsibility  was  also  influential  on  Young.
26   Jonas 
argues that ethics has been thrown into disarray by the onset of the technological 
age, and that the main ethical imperative of our age, which we have by virtue of 
our  existence  within  this  age,  is  to  take  responsibility  for  the  preservation  of 
humankind.   
 
Jonas argues that in traditional ethics only the proximate effects of action in time 
and  space  are  of  ethical  concern.    Technology,  however,  has  rendered  this 
implausible – ‘The containment of nearness and contemporaneity is gone, swept 
away  by  the  spatial  spread  and  time  span  of  the  cause-effect  trains  which 
technological practice sets afoot, even when undertaken for proximate ends.’
27    
Traditional ethics was also anthropocentric and treated the non-human earth as 
ethically  neutral.    However,  technology  is  now  so  powerful  that  nature  is  no 
longer invulnerable to the impermanent projects of humankind.  Instead, human 
projects are harming nature irreparably and in unknowable ways.  The effects of 
technology on the natural world are often irreversible.  And what is especially 
troubling is their cumulative effect: ‘their effects keep adding themselves to one 
another, with the result that the situation for later subjects and their choices of 
action will be progressively different from that of the initial agent and ever more 
the fated product of what was done before.’
28  The new nature of our relationship 
to technology and its effects on the natural world also changes the nature of 
knowledge  in  relation  to  ethics.    Traditionally,  ‘ordinary  intelligence’  could 
determine whether or not an act was unethical.  Now we need to know the effects 
                                                 
25 She talks about the ‘existentialist’ paradigm of moral responsibility in Young, "Responsibility 
and Global Labor Justice," 383, but discusses these ideas more fully in Responsibility for Justice, 118-
20, 61-65. 
26 Young opens her 2004 essay with an extended quote from Jonas’s book The Imperative of 
Responsibility, and he is referenced in all her essays on the topic.   
27 Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age  
(London: The University of Chicago Press, 1985), 7. 
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of our actions and yet we cannot know all the effects of our actions: ‘The gap 
between  the  ability  to  foretell  and  the  power  to  act  creates  a  novel  moral 
problem.’
29 
 
These  changes  in  the  relationship  between  humankind  and  the  natural  world 
mean  that  ethics  must  be  based  on  a  new  imperative:  the  imperative  of 
responsibility.  The focus of humankind must be on preserving the conditions for 
there to be future people.  He writes, ‘The new imperative invokes a different 
consistency: not that of the act with itself, but that of its eventual effects with the 
continuance  of  human  agency  in  times  to  come.’
30   Jonas  argues  that  the 
statesman  has  a  political  responsibility,  which  is  forward-looking  and  other-
regarding, to prioritise this new imperative of responsibility.  Young undoubtedly 
is influenced by these insights and the call to develop a new ethics for our peculiar 
age.    Three  Jonasian  themes  consistently  recur  in  her  treatment  of  the  social 
connection  model:  the  cumulative  effect  of  millions  of  distinct  actions  by 
particular  individuals,  the  unknowableness  of  the  harm  being  caused,  and  the 
sweeping away of the conditions of containment and proximity for ethics.      
 
Another theme that Young has drawn from existentialist theories of responsibility 
is the idea that responsibility can exist prior to freedom; that ‘responsibility is 
prior to and ground for freedom.’
31  She attributes this idea to Derrida, and before 
him to Emmanuel Levinas.
 32   Young interprets Levinas’s theory of responsibility 
for the other as explaining the tension between the responsibilities we have for 
proximate others – the person in front of us, such as the student, the child or the 
friend  – and  the  responsibility  we  have  to  all  the  others  to  whom  we  are 
connected through unjust structures – our responsibility for justice.
33  She writes, 
‘As I read Levinas, this is an irreducible, even tragic, tension in moral life.  We 
must  both  pay  attention  to  justice  and  pay  attention  to  the  immediate  and 
potentially infinite claims of each individual person.’
34  This tension, for Young, 
signifies the irreducibility of our interactive and our structural responsibilities.
35 
                                                 
29 The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age, 8. 
30 The Imperative of Responsibility: In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age, 12. 
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32 Ibid. 
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To some extent, this theme is present in Levinas.  As E.L. Thomas argues, for 
Levinas ethics and justice are two side of the same coin, which are irreducible.
36  
However, the relationship between ethics and justice is more subtle than Young’s 
interpretation  suggests.    Levinas  is  not  arguing  that  we  have  absolute 
responsibilities  to  the  proximate  other  in  front  of  us.    His  theory  about  our 
responsibility that arises in the face-to-face encounter is more complex and more 
profound.    The  self’s  responsibility  for  the  other  exists  prior  to  any  actual 
interaction with another.
37  As Sean Hand puts it, ‘responsibility is a pre-original 
or  an-archic  fact:  it  exists  prior  to  any  act  through  which  one  might  assume 
responsibility  for  a  role  or  action,  and  extends  beyond  my  death  in  its 
implications.’
38  The self’s responsibility for the other is transcendent; it exists 
prior to the self’s acts or the self’s being.  As Darren Ambrose suggests, ‘This is a 
responsibility which is never assumed or heard by the subject, yet which binds it.  
The Saying of this responsibility is a command obeyed despite never having been 
heard.’
39  Recognising one’s responsibility for the other is, ‘the discovery of that 
which is older than and prior to any of the intentional activities of the subject.’
40 
 
We  are  marked  by  a  pre-original  encounter  with  the  Face  of  the  Other  (an 
encounter  that  does  not  actually  take  place)  but  to  which  we  can  connect  in 
moments of profound scepticism, when we sense the absolute responsibility for 
the  Other  that  precedes  all  of  our  conscious  acts  or  consciousness  itself.
41  
Levinas’s theory of responsibility for the other is “first philosophy” – the ethical 
relationship to the other exists prior to everything else.  Levinas describes it as 
follows: 
 
Responsibility for the Other, for the naked face of the first individual to 
come along.  A responsibility that goes beyond what I may or may not 
have  done  to  the  Other  or  whatever  acts  I  may  or  may  not  have 
                                                 
36 Elizabeth Louise Thomas, Emmanuel Levinas: Ethics, Justice and the Human Beyond Being  (London: 
Routledge, 2005), 113. 
37 Michael L. Morgan, Discovering Levinas  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 66. 
38 Emmanuel  Levinas  and  Sean  Hand,  "Introduction,"  in  The  Levinas  Reader,  ed.  Sean  Hand 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989), 88. 
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committed, as if I were devoted to the other man before being devoted to 
myself.  Or more exactly, as if I had to answer for the other’s death even 
before being.  A guiltless responsibility, whereby I am none the less open to 
an accusation of which no alibi, spatial or temporal, could clear me.  It is 
as if the other established a relationship or a relationship were established 
whose  whole  intensity  consists  in  not  presupposing  the  idea  of 
community.  A responsibility stemming from a time before my freedom – 
before my (moi) beginning, before any present.
42   
 
In his later work, to which Young refers, Otherwise Than Being, or Beyond Essence, 
Levinas goes even further.  In “Ethics as First Philosophy”, he uses the terms 
summoning  and  demanding,  to  refer  to  the  Other’s  call  upon  the  self.
43   In 
“Substitution”, Levinas argues that the self is literally substituted by the Other; the 
self  is  held  ‘hostage’  to  the  Other  and  must  self-abnegate  to  the  point  of 
destruction for the sake of the Other.   Levinas writes that ‘The self is a sub-jectum; 
it is under the weight of the universe, responsible for everything.’
44  As Michael 
Morgan argues, the central idea of “Substitution” is that the self is not in the first 
instance an actor or agent, rather the self is, before anything else, responsible for 
the  Other.
45   The  self  is  existentially  responsible  for  the  Other,  and  this 
responsibility animates its being.  This responsibility is not chosen, and thus is not 
a ‘guilt-complex’, and it does not signify a ‘natural benevolence’; it simply is.
46   
 
Young  interprets  the  responsibility  for  the  Other  as  arising  in  the 
phenomenological  interaction  with  an  actual  other.    She  believes  this 
responsibility  for  the  proximate  Other  to  be  in  tension  with  our  political 
responsibility  for  justice.  She  argues  that  Levinas,  ‘thematizes  this  feeling  of 
tension  between  the  general  responsibilities  of  justice  and  our  more  concrete 
responsibilities to particular persons in interaction.’
47  I would argue, however, 
that  this  is  a  slight  misinterpretation  of  Levinas’s  approach.    As  I  have  been 
suggesting, Levinas’s philosophy supposes that we are already, before we interact 
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with another, responsible for the Other in an anarchic, pre-original sense; our 
responsibility for the Other is transcendent.  In our present interactions we are 
faced with a new problem – how to balance this over-riding, existential, radical 
responsibility for the Other with the demands of the present.  It is at this point 
that questions of social justice emerge.  If the self was only in this one-to-one 
relationship with the Other there would be no question of justice; the self is 
absolutely responsible for the Other.  In the real social world – what Levinas calls 
“The Third” – we are faced with many competing responsibilities, between the 
proximate other and all the other others, and we have to choose to act on certain 
responsibilities and neglect others.  Within the Third, Levinas argues that we have 
to “weigh” or “order” our responsibilities.
48  He does not offer any guidelines for 
how to do this, which is one of the main criticisms of his work.
49  Levinas’s point, 
however, is to show that, ‘in the everyday, I am always many things in addition to 
responsible  at  any  given  moment.    But  this  is  what  I  am  primordially  and 
fundamentally, in a sense before I am anything else.  Hence, ethics comes first.’
50  
 
Levinas’s philosophical interest lay in the primordial responsibility for the Other – 
ethics as first philosophy – and so that is what he focused on.  However, he 
realised that more systematic theories of justice or ethics were essential, in order 
to  work  out  how  to  weigh  our  responsibilities  in  the  social  world.
51   Morgan 
argues that if we were to design a Levinasian system of ethics or justice that it may 
look something like utilitarianism.
52  This is because the primary focus is on the 
suffering  and  vulnerability  of  the  other,  and  the  demands  of  beneficence.    A 
Levinasian a theory of ethics or justice ought to be centred on the needs of the 
Other and our responsibility for the Other, rather than the needs or capabilities of 
the  self.
53   Morgan  argues  there  are  parallels  with  Peter  Singer’s  arguments  in 
“Famine, Affluence and Morality”.
54  At the level of first philosophy, Morgan 
writes, ‘we are deluged with responsibility.’
55 
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As we know, Young rejects “cosmopolitan-utilitarian” theories of justice on the 
grounds that they are too demanding and because, ‘It flies in the face of moral 
intuition’ to ignore special duties to our nearest and dearest.
56  For Young, ‘It is 
not enough to say that the others are human.’
57  What generates the need for 
systems of justice, Young argues, are social connections.  This is the great insight 
of social contract theory – that connections give rise to inequalities in power, the 
potential for conflict, exploitation and domination, thus generating the need for 
social institutions and principles of justice.
58  For Levinas, on the other hand, 
there is no need for social connection, the ethical relationship to the Other already 
exists;  the  responsibility  for  all  others  already  exists  and  it  is  a  direct,  not  a 
mediated, responsibility.  We are already responsible for the Other and all the 
Other’s others. 
 
One of the reasons that Young asserts the need for connection, as I interpret her, 
is that she wants to respect the agency of the other.  Rather than owing the other 
care and support out of beneficence, Young thinks that we owe it because of 
justice; because the other is an agent to whom we owe respect.  As David Miller 
argues, there are two sides to humanity: humans are vulnerable and needy, but 
they are also agents worthy of respect who can take responsibility for their own 
actions.
59  It is because Young wants to acknowledge both facets of the human 
subject, I suggest, that she rejects the cosmopolitan-utilitarian emphasis on the 
need to alleviate the suffering of the other out of duties of beneficence.  If we are 
not connected in some way to the other’s suffering then we would be acting out 
of charity, pity or beneficence, but if we are connected then we have duties of 
justice towards the other.     
 
And  so,  at  first  glance  it  seems  that  Young’s  theory  of  responsibility  is 
incompatible with Levinas.  Firstly, Young rejects utilitarian approaches to ethics.  
Secondly,  Levinas  does  not  have  a  connection  theory  of  responsibility.    And 
thirdly,  Levinas  would  reject  Young’s  distinction  between  moral  and  political 
responsibility; for him responsibility for the other is necessarily moral.  Perhaps, 
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then, we should reject the idea that Levinas can teach us anything about the social 
connection model.  This conclusion, however, is too quick.   
 
The distinction between moral and political responsibility is not a fatal blow in the 
relationship  between  Levinas  and  Young’s  theories  of  responsibility.    Levinas 
could  not  endorse  the  Arendtian  distinction  between  moral  and  political 
responsibility,  because  for  Arendt  morality  has  nothing  to  do  with  politics; 
morality is only permitted in politics in emergencies.
60  The moral and the political 
are two separate realms and require two distinct forms of responsibility.  But this 
is not the case for Young.  Her theory of political responsibility is ultimately a 
branch  of  moral  responsibility.    The  distinction  for  Young  is  between  the 
relational  moral  responsibility  we  acquire  by  acting  wrongfully  to  which 
ascriptions of blame are appropriate, and the idea of moral responsibility as virtue 
– that  we  have  a  forward-looking, other-regarding moral responsibility to “be 
responsible” by ensuring the structures by which we are all connected are just.  
Political responsibility is a form of moral responsibility as virtue – it is founded in 
concern for the other. 
 
For Levinas, moral responsibility is infinite, it is limitless; it applies to all people 
everywhere for everyone else.  He does think, however, that when we enter the 
realm of the Third – the social realm – that to be able to realise our ethical 
responsibilities these will have to be limited, although he gives no clues as to how 
to go about doing this.  In a way, Young is doing this.  She is saying that while we 
have moral obligations to everyone, everywhere, the responsibility to act on these 
obligations are triggered by connection to others through social structures.  This is 
a way of limiting the scope of those obligations – to those to whom we are in 
some way connected.  It is not that in theory our moral obligations are limited in 
scope, but our political responsibilities for justice are – they are limited to those to 
whom we are connected – and Young’s is an attempt to parcel that out.  And so, 
while Levinas does not offer a connection theory of our primordial responsibility 
for the Other, Young’s is a connection theory of responsibility within the Third.   
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Despite these possibilities for reconciliation, however, I think that the fact that 
Young wants to establish a political responsibility, as opposed to a metaphysical 
responsibility, means that we need to move beyond the existential approaches.  
We should remember that Young ultimately rejects Arendt’s existential approach 
on  the  grounds  that,  ‘It  is  a  mystification  to  say  that  people  bear  political 
responsibility simply because they are members of a political community, and not 
because of anything at all that they have done or not done.’
61  Young wants to 
ground political responsibility on something more than existence – on something 
individuals have done or not done. 
 
The  insight  that  can  be  gained  from  bringing  Levinas’s  existential  account  of 
responsibility into the discussion, however, is the general idea that responsibility 
can precede freedom.   Levinas, Derrida, Arendt and Jonas argue that simply by 
existing we can have responsibilities towards others.  Even if individuals are not free to act 
as  they  wish,  they  still  bear  responsibilities  toward  others  or  their  political 
community.  This applies to Young’s theory because even though individuals are 
objectively constrained within structures, there may be ways in which we can say 
that they bear responsibility within these constraints.   
 
7.3  Causal Connection 
 
Young invokes causal connection throughout her work on the social connection 
model, and it seems to be her preferred model.  She writes, ‘All the persons who 
participate by their actions in the ongoing schemes of cooperation that constitute 
these structures are responsible for them, in the sense that they are part of the process 
that causes them.’
62  She argues that the social connection model of responsibility 
shares with the liability model, ‘a reference to the causes of wrongs – here in the 
form of structural processes that produce injustice.’
63  Young interchangeably uses 
the  words  participation
64 and  contribution
65,  to  refer  to  individuals’  causal 
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connections to structural processes.  Young, however, does not elaborate on why 
she  thinks  causation  is  the  normatively  significant  factor  in  the  generation  of 
political responsibility. 
 
The phenomenon of causation is extremely complex.  Indeed as Hart and Honoré 
point out, causation refers to a family of concepts.
66  When different people talk 
about causation, they are talking about different things.  The scientist tries to 
understand normal occurrences, such as the growth of plants or the movement of 
the tides, and regards all the necessary factors for these phenomena to occur as 
causes.
67  When the lawyer, the historian or the layperson asks about the cause of 
something, however, they are interested in a departure from the norm.
68  The 
common-sense understanding of causation assumes that left alone objects would 
persist in a certain state; the human intervention that ‘makes the difference’ is the 
‘cause’ of any particular ‘effect’.
69  In ordinary usage, a cause ‘is a difference from the 
normal course which accounts for the difference in outcome.’
70   
 
In  common-sense  understandings  of  causation,  then,  there  is  a  distinction 
between ‘mere conditions’ and ‘causes’.
71  When looking for the cause of a fire, 
the presence of oxygen in the air or the dryness of the building will be considered 
as mere conditions; these factors would be present whether accidents occur or 
not, and so we reject them as the cause of the accident.
72  It is the dropping of a lit 
cigarette that will be considered the ‘cause’ of the fire.  This understanding of 
causation accords with the liability model of responsibility in which we seek, as 
does the lawyer and the layperson, the cause of the deviation from the norm.  We 
assign  moral  or  criminal  responsibility  to  the  agent  who  ‘directly  caused’  this 
deviation, and who did so with voluntariness and knowledge of what they were 
doing.    In  the  cases  of  moral  and  criminal  responsibility  we  are  interested  in 
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whether  or  not  an  agent’s  act  ‘made  the  difference’  against  a  normal  set  of 
background conditions.  
 
By contrast, it is the normal state of affairs rather than deviations from the norm, 
which  is  the  subject  of  the  social  connection  model  of  responsibility.    What 
Young  is  interested  in  is  ‘mere  conditions’  –  the  background  conditions  that 
enable structural injustice to persist.  She writes,  
 
a  model  of  responsibility  derived  from  understanding  the  mediated 
connection that agents have to structural injustices does not evaluate the 
harm that deviates from the normal and the acceptable; rather, it often 
brings into question precisely the background conditions that ascriptions 
of blame or fault assume as normal.
73  
 
On  the  causal  version  of  the  social  connection  model,  we  assign  political 
responsibility to individuals who unknowingly and unwittingly causally contribute 
to  the  background  conditions  that  sustain  and  enable  chronic  injustice.    The 
distinction is that the liability model applies to what agents do to actively and 
directly cause harm to others (including by omission), the social connection model 
applies  to  what  they  do  without  intent  or  even  knowledge  in  contributing  to 
conditions.  Individuals who participate in a political or economic system that 
somehow enables structural injustice do not contribute intentionally and so they 
do  not  meet  the  required  conditions  for  moral  responsibility  on  the  liability 
model.  Even if the agent’s habitual activities are connected to the harm caused in 
the  sense  of  reproducing  the  background  conditions  that  enable  the  harm  to 
occur, we absolve them from moral or legal responsibility because the necessary 
quality of will required for moral responsibility is absent, or the requirements for 
legal responsibility are not met.  This is why Young argues that there is a different 
model of responsibility – the social connection model – to account for the kind of 
responsibility we have for non-blameworthy behaviour and the resulting structural 
injustice.  
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Hart and Honoré make a further distinction, between explanatory causal factors 
and attributive causal factors.
74  Even if a causal factor is necessary to explain a 
phenomenon (e.g. consumer demand for cheap clothes), it does not follow that 
we can attribute causal responsibility to the individual consumers.  The jump from 
explanatory to attributive causation requires answering some further normative 
questions. 
 
When assigning criminal responsibility we think that further conditions need to be 
met for a cause to be attributive rather than merely explanatory.  We cite the cause 
of the fire as the dropping of the lit cigarette because the agent displayed culpable 
negligence – that is the attributive cause because it was faulty.  The presence of 
oxygen and the dryness of the building are merely explanatory causal factors or 
mere conditions.  Young seems to be arguing that if human agency is involved in 
creating  any  background  conditions  then  those  human  agents  are  politically 
responsible.  The kind (intentional/unintentional, voluntary/nonvoluntary) and 
degree of causal contribution does not seem to make any difference to political 
responsibility; all causal contributions are equivalent when it comes to assigning 
political responsibility for causing background conditions.  No further conditions 
need to be met to determine whether or not a causal contribution triggers political 
responsibility.  
 
Young  points  out  that  many  people  found  the  claims  of  the  anti-sweatshop 
movement ‘absurd’ because ordinary individuals, or even bulk buyers of clothing 
like universities, had no control over conditions in garment factories.
75  In other 
words,  even  if  consuming  the  clothing  was  an  explanatory  causal  factor  in 
perpetuating sweatshop labour, a common viewpoint was that it didn’t constitute 
an attributive factor in the sense that buyers have no control over it.  What the 
anti-sweatshop movement pointed out was that consumers are in a position to 
pressure corporations to monitor conditions in the factories where they have their 
clothes produced.
76  So in this case, consumer apathy was attributively causally 
responsible for the injustice; consumers could do something by pressuring the 
companies that made their clothes to implement better working conditions.   
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However, if we take a different kind of structural injustice, like modern slavery, 
these direct causal links cannot be established.  There are some more well-known 
cases of slavery, like rug-making or cocoa picking, where causal connection can be 
traced and there are ways of avoiding buying products that have used slave labour 
– purchasing carpets that carry the rugmark or fair trade chocolate.  But many 
forms of modern slavery are more insidious, intangible and invisible.  Not only 
would it be extremely difficult to convince many ordinary individuals that they are 
causally contributing to the conditions that enable various instances of modern 
slavery, it may even be impossible to work out what the causal connections are, or 
to work out which agents they could put pressure on to do something about it.  
There is not an attributive causal factor, like consumer apathy, that we can point 
to  and  argue  is  causally  implicated.    What  exactly  is  it  that  we  can  assign 
attributive causation to in the behaviour of ordinary individuals for the structural 
injustice of modern slavery? 
 
We saw in the thesis introduction that Young is influenced by Samuel Scheffler’s 
assertion  that  ethical  norms  for  the  global  age  need  to  be  internalizable.
77  
Invoking causal connection to background conditions as the generator of political 
responsibility is not likely to be psychologically motivating, however, if she cannot 
explain why habitual behaviour is more than merely an explanatory causal factor 
in the reproduction of structural injustice.  Not only does Young lack a normative 
story here, but the empirical basis of this argument is questionable.  As Young 
herself  argues,  ‘Because  the  particular  causal  relationship  of  the  actions  of 
particular individuals or organizations to structural outcomes is often impossible 
to trace, there is no point in seeking to exact compensation or redress from only 
and all those who have contributed to the outcome, and in proportion to their 
contributions.’
78   
 
Whether or not one finds objections from psychological feasibility convincing, 
however,  there  are  further  philosophical  reasons  why  Young’s  insistence  that 
political  responsibility  involves  doing  or  not  doing  something  is  problematic.  
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One way of arguing that individuals’ actions are causally implicated in creating the 
background conditions that enable a structural injustice like sweatshop labour to 
exist,  is  to  argue  that  even  the  imperceptible  effects  of  our  acts  are  morally 
significant.    Derek  Parfit  argues  that  two  mistakes  we  often  make  in  moral 
mathematics are to ignore the trivial or imperceptible effects our actions can have 
on large numbers of people.
79  Parfit uses the example of the Harmless Torturers: 
a thousand torturers flick a switch that inflicts an imperceptible amount of pain 
on a thousand victims.  At the start of each day the victims are suffering mild 
pain, but by the end of the day, when each torturer has flicked the switch, they are 
suffering severe pain.
80   
 
The  Harmless  Torturers  example  is  designed  to  show  that  even  though  our 
individual acts have imperceptible effects on others, our acts are wrong because 
together they make large numbers of people worse off.
81  Parfit thinks this can 
explain why we think our actions in the global economy are not morally significant 
(because  the  effects  are  trivial  or  imperceptible)  but  why  this  is  a  mistaken 
attitude.
82  He writes,  
 
It is not enough to ask, ‘Will my act harm other people?’  Even if the 
answer is No, my act may still be wrong because of its effects.  The effects 
that it will have when it is considered on its own may not be its only 
relevant effects.  I should ask, ‘Will my act be one of a set of acts that will 
together harm other people?’ The answer may be Yes.  And the harm to 
others may be great.  If this is so, I may be acting very wrongly, like the 
Harmless Torturers.
83 
 
It is not clear, however, that such arguments can generalize to global structural 
injustice like sweatshop labour or modern slavery, for two reasons.  Firstly, in the 
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Harmless  Torturers  case,  even  though  the  harm  caused  by  each  torturer  is 
imperceptible, the harm is direct.  There is a direct linear connection between the 
torturer’s act and the pain suffered by the victim.  In structural injustice there is 
no  such  linear  causal  connection.    In  the  case  of  sweatshop  labour,  the 
manufacturers  in  conjunction  with  others  involved  in  the  supply  chain  that 
actually produce the goods and bring it to market, these are the agents directly 
causally linked to the harm; they are the Harmless Torturers, not the consumers.  
And of course, this is the distinction Young is getting at by arguing that there are 
agents who are morally or legally responsible for the harm on the liability model 
of responsibility, but that this is different to those who are politically responsible 
for the background conditions which they are perpetuating unintentionally and 
possibly unknowingly. 
 
If this is the case, however, appealing to the wrongness of contributing even 
imperceptible differences will not help her argument.  Perhaps if I buy a T-shirt 
this  will  make  an  imperceptible  difference  to  the  harm  caused  to  sweatshop 
workers.  However, it is not clear that this is true because if I died tomorrow and 
never bought a sweatshop made T-shirt ever again this will make zero difference 
to whether or not the practice of sweatshop labour continues.  The difference I 
make is not trivial or imperceptible; it is non-existent.  This is because it is a 
mediated  process.    The  acts  of  many  other  agents  intervene  between  the 
sweatshop labourer and my buying or not buying a T-shirt from a high street 
shop.  The decisions of thousands of other agents will determine whether or not 
sweatshop labour will continue.  For instance, if all the world’s major clothing 
companies decided collectively to pay garment workers a global minimum wage, 
and  to  implement  legally  binding  safety  agreements,  the  factors  that  make 
sweatshop labour exploitative would be alleviated, which has nothing to do with 
my  personal  shopping  habits.    This  is  the  objection  from  mediated  process.  
Young  herself  points  out  this  difference  as  a  reason  for  needing  the  social 
connection model of responsibility: ‘I have developed a social connection model 
of responsibility as distinct from responsibility as liability precisely because there 
are  good  reasons  to  distinguish  such  direct  connections  from  more  mediated 
connections.’
84 
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A  second  reason  why  the  objection  from  mediated  process  shows  that  the 
Harmless Torturers example is dis-analogous with global structural injustice is that 
there  are  no  clear-cut  implications  as  to  what  consumers  should  do.    In  the 
Harmless Torturers example, there is a clear implication – the torturers should not 
flick the switch and if they do they are doing something wrong.  But there is not 
an  analogous  act  for  consumers.    Consumers  could  ask  themselves  when 
purchasing cheap clothing, “Will my act be one of a set of acts that together harm 
other people?”  And the answer may be yes, but the solution may not be to not 
buy  the  clothing.    As  Young  points  out,  sweatshop  workers  do  not  want 
consumers to boycott because they will lose their jobs.
85  Instead the appropriate 
response will be something like to encourage other consumers to complain to, or 
publically shame, the company into paying the garment workers better wages and 
providing safer working conditions.  This is less of a “do or don’t situation”, and 
more of an “act in a certain way” situation – act in a politically savvy way that 
involves gathering knowledge about the victims’ needs and encouraging others to 
act on it.  This implies using one’s discretion, on-going commitment, and looking 
for  forward-looking  solutions.    This  is  Young’s  point  –  being  politically 
responsible for structural injustice is an on-going way of being, not a question of 
whether  each  particular  act  one  does  is  “right”  or  “wrong”  in  and  of  itself, 
because in reality there is no easy or obvious answer to whether or not many of 
our everyday acts are “right” or “wrong” in the current context.  Thus, arguments 
from imperceptible difference, where refraining from doing the act in question 
will make a difference either over time or in conjunction with others, do not help 
Young.   
 
There  are  two  final  reasons  why  arguing  that  causal  connection  to  structural 
injustice generates responsibility for it is problematic: by relying on causation as 
the source of responsibilities, the model is both too weak and too strong.  It is too 
weak because we might want to claim that people bear responsibility to effect 
change  even  if  they  are  not  connected  to  a  particular  injustice.    Consider  a 
particular instance of modern slavery – the enslavement of northern Thai teenage 
girls, and Lao and Burmese women, in northern Thai brothels.  Bales suggests this 
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growing  practice  of  modern  slavery  is  driven  by  local  economic  conditions 
whereby working-class Thai male labourers have newly-found disposable income 
due to rapid industrialisation; and because of social attitudes that are permissive of 
prostitution,
86 and  the  assumption  that  children  owe  a  debt  to  their  parents 
explaining why parents sell their girl children into slavery.
87  The people directly 
causally  connected  to  this  injustice  –  the  customers/labourers,  parents,  local 
police,  local  and  national  government,  brothel  owners  and  pimps  –  have  no 
interest in eradicating this injustice, indeed they have financial or other interests in 
perpetuating it.  
	 ﾠ
There are, of course, millions of people who are causally implicated in direct or 
indirect ways of perpetuating the enabling conditions for the practice.  Western 
sex tourists are not likely to encounter enslaved teenagers, rather they are targeted 
by commercial adult sex workers; but sex tourism is implicated in this injustice in 
the sense of enabling the conditions, legitimating prostitution both socially and as 
a boon for the economy.
 88  Chinese sex tourists from China, Taiwan, Singapore, 
Malaysia and Hong Kong are purportedly driving demand for sex with virgins to 
avoid HIV and due to the Chinese cultural belief that sex with a virgin delays 
aging.
89  Japan is the biggest importer of Thai women.
90  And there are also people 
in the local communities who benefit indirectly from the business of brothels, and 
the  Thai  population  in  general.    Young  could  argue,  therefore,  that  political 
responsibility falls on these groups who are either directly supporting or enabling 
the practice, or failing to do anything about it.  Not much progress is being made, 
however, mainly because the institutional conditions make it so difficult; police 
corruption is rife and the government tends to turn a blind eye due to the vast 
profits of the sex industry.   
	 ﾠ
In  some  cases  of  structural  injustice,  there  may  be  a  need  for  international 
pressure and solidarity to support those groups who are causally connected to 
struggle  against  particular  injustices.    As  Rahul  Rao  argues,  some  nationalistic 
social  movements  use  a  ‘global  frame’  in  order  to  garner  support  from 
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international civil society, which can help further their struggles at home.
91  There 
are  international  pressure  groups  working  to  fight  sex  slavery,  presumably 
involving people who are in no way causally connected to the practice, who are 
pressuring those with causal connections to do more.  There are organisations 
working on trafficking because they believe that it is a human right to be free 
from  slavery,
92 they  believe  in  feminist  solidarity  and  ending  violence  against 
women,
93 and they believe slavery and exploitation are simply moral wrongs about 
which  all  people  should  be  concerned.
94   These  groups  are  acting  on  the 
assumption  of  other  values,  which  have  nothing  to  do  with  causation.    And 
perhaps it is because they are not causally embedded in this complex structural 
injustice that they are able to support those who are to struggle against it.  My 
suggestion is that without support from groups that are not causally embedded in 
certain structural injustices, these issues may fall through the gaps.  Young might 
argue that these groups are not acting out of political responsibility, rather their 
actions are superogatory, but I’m not convinced that this is how feminist or anti-
slavery campaigners would think of themselves.  
	 ﾠ
Conversely, the social connection model is too strong because some people may 
be  connected  to  the  injustice  but  we  might  want  to  claim  that  they  bear  no 
responsibility for the injustice at all – i.e. the victims.  In the case of global labour 
injustice, Young argues that sweatshop workers can be expected to bear some 
responsibility because they have the greatest interest in combating the injustice.
95  
Garment workers can collectively organise to demand better pay and working 
conditions.  If we apply this to the case of northern Thai sex slavery again, it may 
be the case that individual victims knowingly decided to work in the sex industry; 
others however, will have been duped and coerced.  Surely, we would not want to 
claim  they  bear  any  responsibility  for  the  injustice,  even  if  they  would  most 
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benefit from its cessation.  Unionisation is not a possibility for sex workers in 
most  parts  of  the  world.  And  in  this  particular  case,  the  victims  are  mostly 
children,  so  this  raises  the  question  of  what  age  an  agent  can  bear  political 
responsibility  for  an  injustice  to  which  they  are  causally  connected.    I  doubt 
Young would disagree with any of this, but it shows that in this instance it is not 
the  case  that  everyone  causally  connected  to  the  unjust  practice  bears  political 
responsibility to change it.   
	 ﾠ
Carol Gould argues that Young’s theory verges on victim-blaming.  The reason 
why  we  are  concerned  with  structural  injustice  is  because  the  victims  are 
dominated or exploited and lack the power to change the structures that oppress 
them.
96  The victims participate in these social-structural processes because they 
are  ‘coerced’  to  do  so.
97   Absolving  the  victims  of  any  responsibility  for  the 
structures is not to deny their agency, ‘Indeed, it is because of our recognition of 
the importance of their agency that normatively it is necessary to rectify these 
exploitative systems’.
98 
 
Young can and does respond to the victim-blaming objection.  She argues that on 
the liability model of responsibility, arguing that the victims bear responsibility for 
their plight would be victim-blaming and would absolve the other participants in 
the processes.
99  On the social connection model, however, there is no blame.  
Political responsibility is not like moral or legal responsibility; it does not entail 
blame.  Instead, the victims along with all the other participants in the processes, 
‘can be called to a responsibility they share with others in the structures to engage 
in  actions  directed  at  transforming  the  structures.’
100   Political  responsibility  is 
non-blameworthy and non-isolating; it is shared and distributed among all those 
who are causally implicated in the processes.  The example I have given, however, 
of  northern  Thai  sex  slavery  implies  that  there  must  be  further  conditions.  
Political responsibility would apply only to adults.  Furthermore, some persons 
can be absolved even of this responsibility.  While history is full of slave rebellions 
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– instances of slaves taking up and acting on their political responsibility – this is 
less likely to occur among modern slaves.   
 
As Bales argues, modern slavery is not like the legalised forms of slavery that were 
abolished two hundred years ago.
 101  At that time, slaves were at a premium; they 
were expensive to buy and keep.  Owners asserted their legal ownership over their 
slaves, they provided for them when they were young, old or ill, and they justified 
their ownership of slaves by asserting ethnic superiority. Nowadays, slavery is 
illegal everywhere so legal ownership is not asserted, instead people are enslaved 
through debt bondage or fake employment contracts.  Ethnic differences are not 
asserted; anyone living in poverty is vulnerable.  And because there are so many 
potential slaves, they are cheap and disposable.   These conditions make it more 
difficult to collectively organise because a) it is short-term, so there is not much 
time, b) it may not be obvious who to collectively organise with because slavery is 
covert  and  hidden,  rather  than  a  legal  open  practice,  c)  slaves  are  dispersed 
offering little opportunity to organise, c) there is not an obvious target to rally 
against such as the law, d) slaves are disposable, so have little incentive to organise, 
and e) many slaves are experiencing psychological trauma.  As Bales points out, in 
the  case  of  northern  Thai  girls  enslaved  in  brothels,  they  are  usually  utterly 
traumatised by their experiences and it takes a long time to readjust to normal life, 
making taking up political responsibility extremely arduous, if not impossible.
102   
 
Young’s  theory  that  everyone  connected  to  a  structural  injustice,  like  modern 
slavery,  is  politically  responsible  for  it,  is  thus  too  strong  because  slaves  are 
causally connected to the injustice of modern slavery in the sense that slavery 
would not exist if there were no slaves; but this does not mean that they bear a 
responsibility for it, even a political responsibility.  There are circumstances in 
which we can excuse individuals who are causally connected to structural injustice 
from political responsibility. 
 
I have argued that it is problematic to understand political responsibility as being 
triggered by causal connection to injustice.  The first reason is that the attributive 
cause objection: it goes against the grain of common-sense understandings of 
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responsibility  to  hold  individuals  responsible  for  causal  contributions  to 
background  conditions  that  enable  harm.    Secondly,  structural  injustice  is  a 
mediated process: it is not necessarily the case that individuals are contributing 
imperceptible or trivial amounts to a harm because intermediary agents have the 
power and capacity to stop the harm, and there are no clear implications for 
individual behaviour.  Finally, it is too weak – some injustices fall through the 
gaps – and too strong – it includes the victims. 
 
However, I think some of these problems could be dealt with by moving away 
from the language of causation.  While Young says that the social connection 
model of responsibility shares with the liability model ‘a reference to the causes of 
wrongs – here in the form of structural processes that produce injustice’;
103 what I 
think  she  means  is  that  simply  by  acting  within  unjust  structures  we  are 
reproducing those structures.  We are not causing structural injustice, but we are 
continually  perpetuating  injustice  by  virtue  of  acting  within  the  current  global 
economic and political system.  As we have seen, one of the features of structural 
injustice  is  that  it  is  reproduced  through  the  actions  of  individuals.    It  is  the 
reproduction  or  perpetuation  of  unjust  structures  that  grounds  political 
responsibility. 
 
On existentialist accounts of responsibility, we can bear responsibilities towards 
others by virtue of existence.  I would argue that on the Youngian conception of 
political responsibility we bear responsibility for the unjust structures in which we 
act.  We do not have to have directly or indirectly caused structural injustice; our 
responsibility arises because our actions reproduce and perpetuate these unjust 
structures.  We necessarily have a political responsibility to work to ensure the 
justice of those structures in which we act.   
 
Young calls this responsibility political, even though it is grounded in an ultimate 
moral responsibility for the other, because she wants to retain the useful and 
established  concept  of  moral  responsibility  to  apply  to  instances  where  an 
individual or group knowingly and voluntarily caused harm to identifiable others.  
As per Arendt’s insight, it is important to maintain this concept because it enables 
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legal process and means we can single out particular persons for moral censure.  
The concept of political responsibility also classifies a different way of relating to 
structural  harm,  which  is  to  tacitly  support  and  unconsciously  reproduce 
background conditions in which harm to others can occur.  An individual may not 
contribute in any significant way to the background structure, but simply by acting 
within  it,  one  is  reproducing  those  structures.    This  generates  a  political 
responsibility to struggle against these unjust structures.  From the existentialist 
accounts we learn that political responsibility is prior to freedom; even though we 
are  objectively  constrained  by  the  structures  in  which  we  act,  we  still  bear 
responsibility for them.  However, it is a guiltless responsibility because it is not 
chosen.  It is simply unavoidable in the modern world.   
 
This interpretation of the social connection model does not have to engage in the 
controversies about what counts as causation of harm in complex processes, or 
what counts as a significant enough contribution to harm to gain responsibility for 
it.    The  attributive  cause  objection  is  no  longer  relevant,  because  political 
responsibility is conceived of as a responsibility for explanatory causal factors that 
arise through human activity.  The objection from mediated process would not 
apply  because  it  does  not  matter  that  there  are  other  agents  and  processes 
involved;  individuals  still  have  political  responsibility  for  acting  within  unjust 
structures.    The  falling-through-the-gaps  objection  would  not  apply  because 
everyone  is  connected  in  the  contemporary  world  by  the  global  capitalist 
economy, including slaves and the bottom billion (the losers from the economy); 
whenever  we  act  within  the  global  economy  we  are  reproducing  capitalist 
economic relations.  
 
Does this interpretation of social connection not also suffer from the victim-
blaming objection?  I have suggested that slaves are causally connected to slavery 
because there would not be slavery without slaves.  It is also true that through 
their actions, slaves are perpetuating the structural injustice of modern slavery.  
Here I must bite the bullet.  In the case of slaves, I would argue that if they are 
capable agents (that is adults, who are not severely mentally impaired) they do 
bear  political  responsibility.    However,  the  conditions  are  such  that  they  are 
unable to act upon that responsibility, and so they are excused.  Just as we can Defining Connection 
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excuse individuals from moral responsibility under certain conditions, it may also 
be appropriate to excuse individuals from political responsibility (although the 
conditions will be extreme).  It would be wrong to consider individuals who are 
enslaved as non-agents; they are agents and thus can bear political responsibility, 
however, their conditions are such that it is extremely difficult or impossible to 
act on that responsibility, thus excusing them.  I agree with Young that this is not 
victim-blaming because political responsibility does not entail blame.   
 
7.4  Dependent Connection 
 
Another  form  of  connection  that  Young  suggests  could  ground  political 
responsibility  is  dependent  connection.    This  argument  is  inspired  by  Onora 
O’Neill’s  theory  of  the  ‘scope  of  ethical  consideration’.    Young  interprets 
O’Neill’s argument as follows: we have obligations towards others, ‘to the extent 
that we depend on them, as demonstrated by how we assume they are acting in 
specific ways as the basis of our actions.’
104  Because we are dependent upon 
others,  these  others  come  within  our  scope  of  ethical  consideration.    Young 
applies this idea to sweatshop labour: 
 
By the simple act of buying a shirt I presuppose the actions of all those 
people  who  are  involved  in  growing  the  cotton,  making  the  cloth, 
gathering the cutters and sewers to turn it into garments, the cutters and 
sewers themselves, and all the agents involved in shipping the garments 
and making them easily available to me.  Normally these people are not 
within the scope of my concern, but if asked I will acknowledge that but 
for them there would be no ready-made shirts here before me.  When I 
look for less expensive shirts, I presuppose all those practices of pressure 
and  competition  that  minimize  labour  costs,  as  well  as  those  that 
purportedly increase productivity of production and distribution.  To the 
extent that these practices result in harming workers, my intention to buy 
cheap shirts is implicated in that harm, even though I do not intend the 
workers harm, and even when I plausibly judge that my own constrained 
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circumstances make it necessary for me to buy either inexpensive clothes 
or none at all.  Because my actions assume all these others are acting to 
the result that there are clothes in nearby stores, these others come within 
the scope of my obligation, whether I like it or not.
105 
 
When  applied  to  the  specific  case  of  sweatshop  labour,  this  approach  to 
connection seems somewhat convincing; because I depend on the labour of all 
these people, and on structural practices like economic competitiveness, in order 
to  buy  a  shirt,  all  these  people  objectively  come  into  my  scope  of  ethical 
consideration.  Consider, however, on this view the number of people that come 
into my scope of ethical consideration in order for me to do anything in the 
contemporary world.  Take a simple example, like my coming to the library today 
to study.  Not only are all the people who were part of the process of creating my 
clothing and getting it to the shops where I purchased it involved (and consider 
that each item of clothing comes from a different source, so if I am wearing jeans, 
trainers,  underwear,  a  t-shirt  and  jumper,  each  of  these  items  will  involve  a 
completely different set of people), but there numerous other processes involved.  
There are also the people who produced the food that I ate.  The fruit and cereal I 
have eaten for breakfast have been grown, picked, processed, distributed etc. by 
countless individuals in different countries.  The water I drank from the tap has 
been  cleaned  and  purified  by  processes  involving  not  just  those  who  do  the 
filtration,  but  by  the  people  who  built  the  equipment  to  do  that,  the 
administrators who keep these sites running, the sewer operators etc.  All of this is 
before I get on the bus, where I am dependent not only on the bus driver, but the 
people who made the bus itself – the seats, the fabric on the seats, the engine, the 
bodywork etc.; not to mention those involved in the oil extraction process, those 
who convert it into petrol for the bus and those who distribute the petrol.  I then 
get on a train and the same issues apply.  I get to the library, which is staffed by 
hundreds of people, air-conditioned by machines developed and built by other 
individuals, the electricity used is generated and distributed by countless numbers 
of people, and my computer on which I am typing has had some of its raw 
materials, probably, dug from a mine in Africa and shipped to China where it is 
converted into usable materials, other computer parts built by others, the product 
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put together by many people in a factory chain, the design and internal systems 
decided upon by whole other teams of people in another country.  I purchased 
the computer on a website, staffed by other people, and it was shipped to me 
involving  a  distribution  service.    A  few  months  ago  my  computer  stopped 
working and I took it to a store where it was fixed by some other people I never 
met. 
 
And so, what looks like a simple act – my going to the library to study – which 
seems to be dependent only upon my own admirable self-discipline, turns out to 
be dependent on potentially tens of thousands of other acts by other people.  
Some of their acts will have contributed more or less, e.g. the bus driver’s driving 
the bus may be more significant than the computer designer’s labour.  While it is 
impossible to determine which acts counted the most in this process, we can ask, 
what counts as enough of a contribution to generate a duty of justice towards 
those others?  Every little mundane and negligible thing that an individual does 
everyday, from turning on the light to drinking water, to watching TV or using a 
computer, is dependent on the efforts of thousands of other people.  And some 
of their contributions will be intangible or negligible and yet still contribute to my 
ability to turn on the light or use a computer.  So where does the scope of ethical 
consideration actually begin and end on this view?  This is the objection from 
delimitation – we cannot know where our political responsibility begins and ends 
if it is based on dependency.  In the global economy we have no idea who the 
agents are upon whom we depend.  Young argues that these ‘presuppositions of 
activity do not need to be present to an agent’s consciousness in order to hold as 
assumptions.  These relationships are objective.’
106  But even objectively, how do 
we know what these relationships are? 
 
The scope of ethical consideration is supposedly a practical understanding of the 
scope of ethics.
107  Yet the objection from delimitation suggests it is not especially 
practical.    There  are  two  further  philosophical  problems  with  the  idea  of 
dependent connection.  Firstly, the paradigm examples of dependents in ethical 
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debates are children, the severely disabled and the severely mentally impaired.
108  
These  persons  depend  upon  others  for  their  survival,  and  yet  we  ordinarily 
exempt them from moral responsibilities on the assumption that they do not have 
the capacity to make informed beliefs about the world and to cohere their actions 
to those beliefs, and thus do not have the capacity to bear moral responsibility.  If 
the paradigm examples of dependency do not generate obligations on the part of 
the dependent, why would dependency create obligations in other cases?  
 
Secondly, while sweatshop labour seems to be a clear-cut case of dependency, it is 
not actually so straightforward.  As pointed out before, sweatshop workers do not 
necessarily want consumers to boycott the goods they produce.  This is because 
they are dependent upon demand for those goods in order to have jobs.  The 
relationship is, therefore, not one-way.  Instead it seems to be a case of mutual 
dependency.  How does this affect the theory of dependent connection?  Does it 
mean that the sweatshop workers bear moral responsibilities towards consumers 
because they are dependent upon them?   
 
Young deals with the mutual dependency problem by arguing that the obligations 
are asymmetrical, because some are rendered more vulnerable to coercion and 
domination by the processes – ‘those institutionally and materially situated to be 
able  to  do  more  to  affect  the  conditions  of  vulnerability  have  greater 
obligations.’
109  However, the issue, I suggest is not that some groups are rendered 
vulnerable by structural injustice, but that privileged groups are dependent on their 
exploitation.  
 
My  being  able  to  purchase  cheap  clothing  does  not  signal  merely  that  I  am 
dependent on sweatshop labourers, but that I am dependent upon them being 
exploited.    Similarly,  the  practices  of  modern  slavery  are  so  embedded  at  the 
bottom of the global supply chain that it is likely that I am dependent upon the 
exploitation of indentured labourers or contracted slaves.  Sweatshop labourers 
and indentured labourers may be dependent on affluent consumers for their jobs, 
but they are not dependent on the exploitation of consumers, thus they do not 
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bear the same responsibilities towards them.  This also explains why the paradigm 
examples of dependents – children and the severely mentally impaired – do not 
bear  these  responsibilities;  they  are  not  dependent  on  the  exploitation  of  their 
carers.   
 
If I am connected to others by virtue of being dependent on their exploitation, I 
bear political responsibility towards them.  I am not blameworthy, as I am not 
directly causing the exploitation, I may not know I am dependent on it, and I 
might have no choice but to participate in it because I am objectively constrained 
by the structures myself.  Yet the fact of my dependency on the exploitation of 
others generates political responsibility to struggle against it.   
 
There is a further objection against this approach, however, that I raised against 
the causal connection argument – the falling-through-the-gaps objection.  I may 
be dependent upon sweatshop labourers for my clothing, but am I dependent 
upon all those suffering from structural injustice?  I might be dependent upon 
slaves for some needs (the tantalum for my smartphone, or the charcoal for my 
barbeque)  but  there  are  many  millions  of  slaves  where  dependent  connection 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to trace.  There are also the world’s poorest 
people – the bottom billion – who make little or no contribution to the global 
economy,  living  subsistence  lives.    If  nobody  is  dependent  upon  them,  does 
nobody have moral or political responsibilities towards them?   
 
Onora O’Neill’s view of connection is more expansive than Young’s.  She argues 
that if we act based on mere assumptions about others’ behaviour then those 
others come into our scope of ethical consideration.  For instance, citizens of 
affluent countries assume that ‘poor and distant foreigners will not attack or be 
permitted to settle in their part of the world, and more generally that outsiders will 
not be permitted to undercut local wages.’
110  The fact that the affluent make these 
assumptions  about  the  behaviour  of  the  poor  means  that  these  people  come 
within their scope of ethical consideration.  This is still problematic when we 
consider  the  bottom  billion,  however,  since  they  are  not  the  ones  with  the 
resources to emigrate.  O’Neill argues further, however, that all that matters is the 
                                                 
110 O'Neill, Toward Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning, 114. Defining Connection 
 
  282     
possibility of connection to others.  If, for instance, there is an isolated remote tribe 
that can be contacted even if no interactivity takes place, these people come into 
the scope of ethical consideration for those who could contact them, as they act 
based on assumptions about those tribes people.
111  On O’Neill’s very weak view 
of  connection  then,  which  requires  only  the  possibility  of  connection  or 
assumption about the activities of others, presumably there are no people on earth 
who fall without the scope of ethical consideration of at least some others. 
 
We could tie political responsibility to O’Neill’s weaker or more expansive view, 
then; or I suggest we could retain the concept of dependency and expand it to all 
forms  of  oppression.    Recall  that  exploitation  is  one  form  of  oppression  for 
Young;  the  others  are  marginalisation,  powerlessness,  cultural  imperialism  and 
violence, and there may be other forms of oppression within the international or 
global spheres.  In this thesis I chose to focus on one form of oppression – 
structural exploitation.  The argument could extend that if I am dependent on the 
oppression of others, in the other forms of oppression, I would bear political 
responsibility to struggle against that oppression.  For instance, the bottom billion 
are experiencing marginalisation from the global economy.  As O’Neill points out, 
we depend on their marginalisation insofar as it allows us to assume they will not 
attack, move to affluent countries, or undercut our jobs.  Our dependency on 
their marginalisation generates our political responsibility for this injustice.   
 
7.5  Conclusion 
 
I have suggested two ways in which we can conceive of connection to structural 
injustice: by acting within unjust structures we are reproducing those structures, 
and to the extent that we are dependent on the exploitation of others, we are 
connected to them in a way that generates political responsibility.  One objection 
that I have not dealt with that would apply to both interpretations is the objection 
from delimitation: where do our political responsibilities begin and end?  I suggest 
that in the contemporary world our political responsibility is limitless. 
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Hans  Jonas  argued  that  we  need  to  think  of  ethics  in  terms  of  responsibility 
specifically  in  this  age  because  of  humankind’s  newfound  ability  to  affect  the 
natural  world  in  irreversible  ways  due  to  advances  in  technology  and  rapid 
industrialisation.  But it is not only the rise of technology and industry and their 
effects on the environment that we need to be concerned about.  The highly 
interdependent, globalised economy means that cumulative human activities can 
impact on millions of geographically dispersed people in deeply harmful ways 
(such  as  modern  slavery  or  sweatshop  labour).    It  is  because  of  these  new 
conditions that the need for political responsibility arises – the imperative to “act 
responsibly”  to  minimise  one’s  contribution  to  or  reproduction  of  harmful 
structures and to try to act with others so as to contribute to the improvement of 
structures.  This necessity to pay attention to the background conditions in which 
we act is a result of the contemporary conditions of advanced capitalism; if we 
continued  to  live  in  self-sustaining,  self-contained  political  and  economic 
communities with minimal environmental impact, it would not be necessary.  It is 
a burden placed on every individual by virtue of acting in these new conditions, 
because in these conditions we cannot help but reproduce the unjust structures or 
avoid  dependency  on  the  oppression  of  others.    It  may  be  that  political 
responsibility is a peculiarity of the advanced capitalist world.   
 
Our political responsibility might be limitless, but as we have already seen, Young 
suggests ways in which we can reason about the extent of our personal political 
responsibility and how to exercise it.  The extent of our political responsibility 
depends on our social position within unjust structures.  And we should think 
about  how  to  exercise  our  political  responsibility  depending  on  how  much 
privilege, interest or collective ability we have in relation to a particular structural 
injustice. 
  
Chapter 8  Conclusion 
 
8.1  Summary 
 
I began this thesis by suggesting that Iris Young’s social connection model of 
responsibility  is  underdeveloped  and  that  analytic  political  philosophers  have 
found it difficult to understand.  By reconstructing and clarifying certain elements 
of the social connection model, I hope to have made progress in addressing these 
problems. 
 
I have traced the origins of the distinction between responsibility and guilt to 
Hannah Arendt’s work and looked at how Young has modified the distinction.  I 
argued that the appropriation of Arendt’s distinction has generated conceptual 
problems  that  Young  failed  to  resolve.    One  such  problem  is  the  distinction 
between moral and political responsibility. 
 
I have distinguished two concepts of moral responsibility in Young’s work: moral 
responsibility as virtue (being a morally responsible person), of which political 
responsibility  is  a  particular  kind;  and  relational  moral  responsibility  (the 
appropriate conditions for blame).  I constructed a Youngian account of relational 
moral  responsibility.    I  argued  that  her  conception  of  relational  moral 
responsibility is a “reasons responsive” account, according to which if an agent 
has a range of epistemic options for action, and if they choose to directly cause 
harm with intent and knowledge, then they bear moral responsibility for the harm 
done; they are blameworthy.  Individuals can be exempt from moral responsibility 
if they cannot, in general, reason about the world and cohere their actions to their 
reasons – if they do not know what they are doing.  Individuals can be excused 
from moral responsibility if they are temporarily unable to reason and respond to 
the world: if they are temporarily physically incapacitated, or if they caused harm 
inadvertently,  or  due  to  coercion,  necessity  or  duress  –  if  they  did  not  act 
voluntarily.  I argued that individuals acting in the global economy are contributing Conclusion 
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to harm inadvertently, unintentionally or unavoidably and so can be excused from 
moral responsibility. 
 
Not all agents can be so excused.  Powerful agents – agents with the capacity to 
change unjust structures – do know what they are doing and perpetuate injustice 
voluntarily.  These agents ought to be held to account.  They are blameworthy on 
the liability model of responsibility. 
 
Political  responsibility  refers  to  the  responsibilities  individuals  have  for  the 
background conditions in which they act.  It is a responsibility to combat structural 
injustice,  construed  as  oppression  or  domination.    I  have  shown  that  Young 
understands  structure  as  an  all-encompassing  phenomenon;  that  it  includes 
institutional  rules  and  norms,  but  also  the  outcomes  of  individuals’  attitudes, 
habits and norms.  Individuals have a responsibility to engage in collective action 
to challenge unjust structural outcomes that accumulate from these processes.  
Youngian “dualism” refers to individuals’ responsibilities to reason morally about 
both their interactions with particular others and how their actions and attitudes 
affect  structures,  rather  than  the  better-known  dualist  distinction  between 
individual and institutional responsibilities. 
 
I have constructed a Youngian account of global injustice, arguing that the global 
garment  industry  constitutes  a  form  of  structural  exploitation  in  which  the 
energies of disadvantaged groups, mostly non-Western women, are transferred to 
advantaged groups – MNCs and consumers – in a way that inhibits their self-
development and enhances the status of the already advantaged.  I have described 
the relevant form of “connection” to such a structural injustice as the reproduction 
of  the  unjust  processes  merely  by  virtue  of  acting  within  these  structures,  or 
dependency on the exploitation, or other forms of oppression, of others. 
 
In  engaging  in  this  conceptual  labour  I  have  developed  the  model  more 
thoroughly than Young.  I have situated it in relation to existing literatures on 
these  topics,  making  it  more  intelligible  and  potentially  more  persuasive  for 
analytic political philosophers.  I have made several contributions to the social 
connection model by more fully developing the distinction between moral and Conclusion 
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political responsibility, by developing Youngian conceptions of relational moral 
responsibility, power and structural exploitation, and by defining connection.  I do 
not think that this work is complete, but I do think it is an improvement on 
Young’s initial statement of the social connection model.  I will now outline the 
implications of this thesis and highlight immediate areas for further research. 
 
8.2  Implications 
 
a)  Changing contours of global justice theory 
 
Iris Young challenged contemporary justice theory when she argued in Justice and 
the Politics of Difference that we should focus on injustice rather than justice.  Until 
recently  the  global  justice  debates  have  focused  on  justice,  but  again  this  is 
beginning to be challenged.  For example, Amartya Sen has distinguished between 
‘transcendental’  and  ‘comparative’  theories  of  justice.
1   Sen  argues  that  the 
transcendental  approach,  which  he  associates  with  Rawls,  has  had  ‘a  seriously 
negative effect on practical discussion of justice in general and global justice in 
particular.’
2  Sen argues that the transcendental approach will not help to make 
comparisons of various alternatives for actualizing justice; instead we ought to 
make comparative assessments of real-world injustice and potential solutions.
3  As 
I pointed out in Chapter 6 critical theorists, such as Nancy Fraser, Cécile Laborde 
and Rainer Forst, are also beginning to develop theories of global injustice.  This 
thesis can be read as contributing to this emerging area of research. 
 
Another implication for global justice theory is the re-emergence of Marx.  I have 
suggested that understanding injustice like structural exploitation can benefit from 
using Marxian analysis.  This has revealed the importance of discussing global 
capitalist economic relations in relation to global injustice.  It has also revealed 
that we can think about global injustice in terms of inequality between groups – 
conceived  of  as  classes,  but  also  along  gender  and  race  lines  –  instead  of 
                                                 
1 Amartya Sen, "Global Justice," in Global Justice: Critical Perspectives, ed. Sebastiano Maffettone and 
Aakash Singh Rathore (London: Routledge, 2012), 127. 
2 "Global Justice," in Global Justice: Critical Perspectives, ed. Sebastiano Maffettone and Aakash Singh 
Rathore (London: Routledge, 2012), 132. 
3 "Global Justice," 131. Conclusion 
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comparing the resource holdings of isolated individuals.  There is much scope, I 
suggest, for critical and Marxist theories of global injustice. 
 
b)  Virtue 
 
Another area that has emerged in this thesis, which is rarely explored by global 
justice theorists, is virtue.  When thinking about ethics and global justice, the 
debate  usually  hinges  on  deontological  approaches  versus  consequentialist 
approaches.  This thesis has suggested that a missing component in the discussion 
may be virtue ethics. 
 
This derives from concerns that have been highlighted by trying to act ethically 
within  the  global  garment  industry.    A  deontological  response  to  sweatshop 
labour  may  be  to  adopt  the  Poggeian  approach  –  do  not  uphold  unjust 
institutions.  However, as Young pointed out, boycotting sweatshops is not the 
relevant  duty  as  this  has  consequences  counter  to  the  interests  of  workers.  
Obeying  a  specific  moral  duty  may  have  undesirable  consequences  in  the 
contemporary globalized economy. 
 
And this leads to consequentialist approaches, because the consequentialist will 
argue that we should do the act that will have the best consequences.  But, as I 
argued in Chapter 7, there are no clear-cut implications as to what this act would 
be in relation to sweatshop labour, and because sweatshop labour is a mediated 
process, there are agents further along the supply chain than consumers, who 
would have to act first.  Moreover, we simply cannot know the consequences of 
all our acts in the contemporary world.  An interesting example is a practice that 
occurs at the end of the clothes’ life cycle: many people in the EU and US give 
their old clothes to charity shops believing this to be an act that will have good 
consequences.    However,  this  practice  has  created  an  enormous  second-hand 
clothing industry in Africa, which has undercut local employment in textiles and is 
destroying traditional African clothing culture.
4  Doing the act that one believes 
will have the right consequences – donating to charity – also has nefarious and 
unpredictable outcomes.   
                                                 
4 Robyn Curnow and Teo Kermeliotis, "Is Your Old T-Shirt Hurting African Economies?," CNN, 
12 April 2013. Conclusion 
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These  examples  from  the  garment  sector  show  that  the  consequences  of  our 
actions  are  extremely  unpredictable  in  the  contemporary  globalized  capitalist 
economy.  We cannot know the consequences of our actions, and so obeying 
specified duties on the basis of deontological or consequentialist moral grounds 
are not particularly helpful ways of understanding our actions in this context.  
Instead, cultivating a responsible attitude to behaviour in the global economy may 
be a more appropriate solution.  This is demanding – it requires being considerate, 
informed,  listening  and  keeping  abreast  of  developments  communicated  by 
NGOs and trade unions, and changing tack should the approach one is currently 
taking becomes out-dated or is having harmful consequences.  This is why I have 
suggested that political responsibility is related to virtue. 
 
Larry May argues that ‘responsibility’ lies somewhere between justice and virtue: 
 
The concept of responsibility does not neatly fit the division of justice-
oriented obligations and virtue-oriented ideals.  Like justice, responsibility 
is  thought  to  generate  moral  requirements.    Like  virtue,  responsibility 
often  concerns  who  one  is  and  not  just  the  effects  of  the  intentional 
actions  one  has  taken  in  the  world.    Responsibility,  like  justice,  is 
sometimes backward-looking, concerning the harms (personal as well as 
social) that one has caused or the harms that one could have prevented.  
But  responsibility,  like  virtue,  is  also  forward-looking,  concerning  the 
character traits, attitudes, and dispositions that one needs to develop to 
minimize future harm.
5 
 
I have suggested that the backward-looking forms of responsibility – moral and 
legal  responsibility  –  refer  to  what  an  agent  has  done  or  failed  to  do.    The 
forward-looking form of responsibility – political responsibility – is a kind of 
virtue, in that it relates to the kind of attitudes and behaviour that are required to 
minimize or overcome injustice in the contemporary world.  Young’s political 
responsibility  involves  engaging  in  collective  action,  but  the  first  steps  are 
acquiring  knowledge  of  the  problem,  listening  to  the  claims  of  victims, 
                                                 
5 Larry May, Sharing Responsibility  (London: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 34. Conclusion 
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encouraging  others  to  act  with  you;  in  other  words  “being”  a  conscious  and 
engaged, politically responsible person.  The sense of “responsible” here is thus 
different from when we talk about whether or not an agent is causally responsible 
for a harm that has occurred or is occurring.  It is about assuming an on-going 
role  and  being  responsible  within  that  role  –  it  is  a  virtue  understanding  of 
responsibility. 
 
Garrath Williams has pointed out that the word “responsibility” is modern in 
origin; the English noun “responsibility” didn’t appear in philosophy until the late 
nineteenth century.
6  It arose and became increasingly important because within 
Victorian society, and even more so in twentieth century liberal democracies, a 
person’s  roles  multiplied.    The  plurality  of  normative  demands  faced  by  the 
modern  agent  requires  a  normative  response,  which  is  the  concept  of 
responsibility.
7  Specifically, because of the roles any one individual plays within a 
complex, interdependent society, each individual has some degree of power to 
affect others.  The virtue of responsibility delimits and intensifies the normative 
demands upon each of us.
8  I believe we can extend this reasoning to support the 
idea that we need a way of understanding how to behave responsibly given the 
new set of conditions in which we find ourselves today.  Political responsibility is 
an evolution of the concept of responsibility as a virtue within the globalized 
world.   
 
A thoroughgoing analysis of virtue ethics has been beyond the scope of this work.  
I do believe, however, that it is the correct realm for future development of the 
concept of political responsibility. 
 
c)  Historical contingency 
 
I have suggested that political responsibility is historically contingent; it has arisen 
because of the conditions of late capitalism.  It might be objected, that arguing 
that the social connection model of responsibility, and the political responsibility 
it gives rise to, is historically specific is not good enough.  We want a theory of 
                                                 
6 Garrath Williams, "Responsibility as a Virtue," Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11, no. 4 (2008): 
456. 
7 "Responsibility as a Virtue," Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 11, no. 4 (2008): 459. 
8 "Responsibility as a Virtue," 466. Conclusion 
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responsibility that is timeless.  However, no analytic theory of responsibility is 
timeless, even those theories of responsibility that we consider to be irrefutable.   
 
As Nicola Lacey points out, legal conceptions of responsibility are a product of 
social and historical conditions and available legal apparatus.
9  For instance, the 
concept of capacity responsibility (the idea that an agent can be held criminally 
responsible for a wrongdoing only if they had the mental capacity to understand 
what they were doing and the physical capacity to act it out) only emerged in the 
nineteenth century, because ‘it depended on a complex institutional infrastructure 
which developed over time.’
10  It required laws of evidence and the capacity for 
evidence-gathering, legal representation, law reporting, and a system of appeals.
11  
It  was  not  until  the  early  twentieth  century  that  all  these  conditions  were  in 
place.
12  And so, a concept that we take for granted as a central part of criminal 
responsibility is in fact historically contingent – it arose from changes in social, 
economic and institutional circumstances.  
 
To assert that our received conceptions of responsibility are historically specific 
could seem pessimistic – that if the concept of responsibility arose due to specific 
historical circumstances maybe there is no such thing as responsibility at all.  But 
it  could  also  be  read  as  an  invitation  –  an  appeal  to  think  of  theories  of 
responsibility  that  are  adequate  to  our  complex  and  perplexing  times.  
Responsibility is a relatively new concept and an evolving concept.  Indeed it is 
not one concept at all but rather a family or cluster of concepts.
13  So within this 
multi-faceted and evolving conceptual family there is surely room for developing 
accounts  of  responsibility  that  fit  the  prevailing  needs  of  the  socio-historical 
context, which is indeed how various conceptions of responsibility have emerged 
in the past.   
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Nicola Lacey, "Institutionalising Responsibility: Implications for Jurisprudence," Jurisprudence 4, 
no. 1 (2013). 
10 "Institutionalising Responsibility: Implications for Jurisprudence," Jurisprudence 4, no. 1 (2013): 7. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Mark  Bovens,  The  Quest  for  Responsibility:  Accountability  and  Citizenship  in  Complex 
Organisations  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 22. Conclusion 
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d)  Uncertainty 
 
In Chapter 2, I outlined the distinction between “responsibility” and “duty”, and I 
suggested  that  political  responsibility  is  a  forward-looking  role  responsibility, 
which  means  it  is  obligatory  but  discretionary,  scalar,  and  revisable.    An 
individual’s political responsibility is tied to their social position, and an individual 
can  work  out  the  extent  of  their  responsibility  depending  on  their  collective 
ability, privilege or interest in relation to a particular structural injustice. 
 
This is not a neat, clear-cut and prescriptive theory.  It does not specify “duties” 
that individuals have in relation to global injustice; such as all individuals should 
donate all spare income to charity or all individuals should not uphold unjust 
institutions.    Instead,  it  generates  quite  a  lot  of  uncertainty:  how  does  one 
objectively assess one’s social position in relation to different structural injustices?  
How does one decide what to do in relation to structural injustice?  It might be 
objected to the Youngian approach to responsibility for global injustice, that it 
leaves too much uncertainty.   
 
Young  offers  the  “parameters  of  reasoning”  to  help  individuals  with  these 
questions,  but  it  has  been  argued  that  these  parameters  of  reasoning  are 
‘disappointingly’ vague, because they fail to deliver clear-cut prescriptions as to 
how we should act.
14  However, Young leaves space for individual discretion for a 
number  of  valid  reasons.    Firstly,  because  developments  in  the  globalized 
economy are so rapid what might have been a relevant intervention in 2006, when 
she  was  writing,  would  not  necessarily  be  in  2014;  what  taking  up  political 
responsibility means will depend on the circumstances and part of it is staying 
informed  and  engaged  in  current  political  debate.    Secondly,  it  has  to  be  a 
democratic  process,  specifically  taking  into  account  the  views  of  the  victims.  
Thirdly,  being  political  can  take  different  forms  in  different  contexts;  in  one 
country, or in relation to a particular structural injustice, pressuring the state might 
be  effective,  but  in  other  countries  or  situations,  action  in  civil  society, 
                                                 
14 Robert Jubb, "Social Connection and Practice Dependence: Some Recent Developments in the 
Global  Justice  Literature:  Iris  Marion  Young,  Responsibility  for  Justice.  Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 2011; and Ayelet Banai, Mariam Ronzoni and Christian Schemmel, Social Justice, 
Global  Dynamics.  Oxford:  Routledge,  2011.,"  Critical  Review  of  International  Social  and  Political 
Philosophy 16, no. 5 (2013). 2705 Conclusion 
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campaigning or protesting against non-state or supra-state actors, or setting up 
independent associations, may be more appropriate.
15   
 
Time, context and democratic debate will affect political responsibility, and so it 
will necessarily be an open, amorphous concept.  This can seem jarring to the 
analytic political philosopher who prefers precision, clarity and coherence.  But 
the value in this conception of political responsibility is that it responds to the 
contemporary world which is increasingly complex, and where the outcomes of 
our actions are often unknowable.  “Being responsible” in this context, seems 
more appropriate than “do or don’t do specific acts”.  When we cannot know the 
results of our actions and when we do not know how the world is going to 
change, being responsive to the ever-changing circumstances is perhaps the best 
we can do. 
 
8.3  Further Research 
 
I have already tacitly indicated several areas for further research in outlining the 
implications of this thesis: critical and Marxian theories of global injustice, and the 
role of virtue.  This thesis has raised many other questions that I have not been 
able to address.  I will firstly raise two issues that Young does address, but which I 
excluded,  and  then  three  further  issues  that  emerge  from  my  re-working  of 
Young’s theory. 
 
a)  Historic injustice 
 
Many contemporary forms of structural injustice are rooted in past injustice.  In 
the final unfinished chapter of Responsibility  for  Justice, Young argues that when 
thinking  about  historic  injustice  we  should  adopt  the  forward-looking  social 
connection  model,  enjoining  all  those  connected  to  the  harm  to  focus  on 
remedying current problems, rather than argue over blame and reparation for past 
wrongs.
16 
                                                 
15 See Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), Chapter 
5 for Young’s discussion of different types of civil society organisations. 
16 Responsibility for Justice  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), Chapter 7. Conclusion 
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Young recognises, when discussing reparations for slavery in the United States, 
that we cannot simply ignore the past, because an account of the continuities 
between past and present can develop understanding of how current injustices are 
structural.  But she rejects reparations on the grounds that reparations claims use 
the  liability  model  of  responsibility  –  looking  for  agents  to  blame  or  hold 
financially liable – for historic injustice, which in cases where all the participants 
are now dead, is not possible to do.  She further rejects the idea that the US 
government is the appropriate agent to target for reparations for slavery, because 
while it legally sanctioned slavery and failed to deliver a Reconstruction package to 
freed  slaves,  it  also  emancipated  the  slaves  and  has  tried  to  help  African 
Americans since, passing bills including the Civil Rights Act.  
 
I  think  Young’s  treatment  of  this  example  of  historical  injustice,  however,  is 
wanting.  As Young has pointed out, the social connection model is designed to 
supplement the liability model; they are not mutually exclusive.
17  There is no 
reason why we cannot employ the liability model to argue for reparations from 
the state and simultaneously employ the social connection model to show how 
other parties bear forward-looking responsibilities to engage in collective action 
for change.   
 
Using only one of the models of responsibility in relation to historic injustice will 
lead to problematic results.  The liability model lets too many agents off the hook.  
It would, as Catherine Lu points out, result in a ‘zero-sum’ game whereby the 
responsibility of other parties who participated in slavery would be occluded.
18  
Using only the social connection model, however, allows agents who ought to be 
held  to  account  for  past  wrongs  to  evade  their  reparative  responsibilities;  for 
instance, even if the American state has done some good, this does not absolve it 
of responsibility for the harms it has done.  There is further research to be done, 
then, in a) working out if there are outstanding reparative obligations for historic 
injustice  on  the  liability  model  of  responsibility,  b)  assessing  how  the  social 
                                                 
17 Responsibility for Justice  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 100.  
18 Catherine Lu, "Colonialism as Structural Injustice: Historical Responsibility and Contemporary 
Redress," The Journal of Political Philosophy 19, no. 3 (2011): 16. Conclusion 
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connection model would relate to these obligations, and c) analysing how this 
would impact on responsibility for global injustice more generally. 
 
b)  Psychological motivation 
 
In  Chapter  6  of  Responsibility  for  Justice,  “Avoiding  Responsibility”,  Young 
acknowledges that many people will try to evade, downplay or simply ignore their 
political responsibility.  She identifies four reasons why individuals might do this: 
by  thinking  of  social  structures  as  reified  and  unchangeable,  by  denying  their 
connections to distant others, by only addressing the demands placed on them by 
proximate others, or simply by arguing ‘it’s not my job’.
19 
 
Jacob Schiff argues that these constitute excuses.  The most pressing problem for 
political responsibility is three dispositions that individuals have, which will make 
acknowledgement  of  both  structural  injustice  and  political  responsibility 
psychologically difficult.
20  The first disposition is thoughtlessness.  Just as Arendt 
pointed  out  that  the  institutional  conditions  of  Nazi  Germany  facilitated 
Eichmann’s  thoughtlessness,  Schiff  argues  that  the  conditions  of  global 
capitalism,  that  distance  and  obscure  harm,  can  do  so  too.
21   The  second 
disposition is ‘bad faith’ – a form of lying to oneself.
22  Schiff argues that, ‘In the 
case of structural injustice, bad faith entails concealing from ourselves the ways in 
which  our  everyday  consumption  patterns,  for  instance,  implicate  us  in  the 
domination and exploitation of sweatshop workers.’
23  This is compounded by 
Young’s structural approach, because arguing that the system is to blame allows 
us to lie to ourselves about our implications in the processes; it invites excuses 
such as what can I do about global capitalism?
24   
 
Schiff argues, however, that it is not that we are actively lying to ourselves that we 
will fail to acknowledge our political responsibility for structural injustice, but that 
                                                 
19 Young, Responsibility for Justice, Chapter 6. 
20 Jacob Schiff, "Confronting Political Responsibility: The Problem of Acknowledgement," Hypatia 
23, no. 3 (2008): 103. 
21 "Confronting Political Responsibility: The Problem of Acknowledgement," Hypatia 23, no. 3 
(2008): 104. 
22 "Confronting Political Responsibility," 105. 
23 "Confronting Political Responsibility," 106. 
24 "Confronting Political Responsibility," 107. Conclusion 
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these practices have become so normalized through our repetitious participation 
in  them  that  they  have  disappeared  from  view.
25   Bourdieu  argues  that  there 
comes a point when social relations become “doxic”; in which “the natural and 
social  world  appears  as  self-evident”.
26   Structural  injustice,  such  as  sweatshop 
labour, appears as self-evident and, ‘To the extent that these arrangements recede 
from awareness, so does our implication in their persistence.’
27 
 
Given  that  there  are  many  excuses  people  can  employ  to  avoid  political 
responsibility, and indeed, the institutional and ideological conditions in which we 
live  imbue  us  with  the  dispositions  to  fail  to  acknowledge  our  political 
responsibility,  we  need  to  think  about  ways  in  which  individuals  can  be 
encouraged to take up their political responsibility.  I have not treated these issues 
in this thesis for several reasons.  Firstly, I think that Schiff has done a good job 
of exposing the problems of acknowledgement.  Secondly, I wanted to focus on 
the validity of the theory of the social connection model of responsibility rather 
than the practice.  Thirdly, I felt that theories of psychological motivation were 
beyond my expertise and the remit of this thesis.   
 
However,  I  stated  from  the  outset  that  Young  intended  her  theory  to  be 
“internalizable”.  If this goal is to be achieved, these issues of acknowledgement 
need to be addressed because they potentially present problems for the social 
connection model.  And so I highlight the issue of psychological motivation as an 
area for further research. 
 
c)  Other forms of global oppression 
 
In Chapter 6, I suggested that a thoroughgoing Youngian approach would assess 
both  prongs  of  injustice  –  domination  and  oppression  –  at  the  domestic, 
international and global levels. 
 
Young does discuss global domination and global democracy, but there is scope 
for further research in this area.  Young did not begin to theorise her five faces of 
                                                 
25 "Confronting Political Responsibility," 108-09. 
26 "Confronting Political Responsibility," 111. 
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oppression in the international or global contexts; and indeed, there may be more, 
fewer, or different faces of oppression in these contexts.  I have suggested one 
form of global oppression – structural exploitation – and looked at this in the 
context  of  the  global  garment  industry.    There  is  huge  scope,  however,  for 
analysing marginalisation, powerlessness, violence and cultural imperialism in the 
global  and  international  contexts;  and  also  for  working  out  if  these  are  the 
relevant forms of oppression in these contexts or if they need to be revised. 
 
d)  The role of states 
 
Matt Zwolinski complains about the focus by Young and others on the role of 
corporations in perpetuating sweatshop labour, to the exclusion of states.
28  It is 
the state that creates the conditions for exploitation, he argues, and so structural 
exploitation is the fault of the state.  While I disagree with Zwolinski’s conception 
of structural exploitation, I admit that the omission of state responsibilities in an 
account of responsibility for global justice is a serious one.  There are two main 
reasons why I have not said much about state responsibility in this thesis. 
 
The first reason is that much of the global justice literature does focus on states.  
For many theorists, states are the only “agents of justice” (to use Onora O’Neill’s 
term).
29  Young wanted to establish what responsibility individuals have in relation 
to  global  injustice,  without  falling  into  the  cosmopolitan-utilitarian  trap  of 
assuming  that  these  are  universal  moral  obligations  that  apply  to  all  humans 
equally.    She  saw  individuals’  responsibilities  as  in  some  way  mediated,  as 
differentiated, and as relating to structures.  There is a lot of work to do in this 
area and so I have focused on it here. 
 
I have, however, said quite a lot about the responsibility of MNCs – much more 
than Young did.  Part of the reason for this is the lack of attention on non-state 
actors in the global justice literature.  Omitting states was not to deny that states 
have responsibilities, but to highlight that once one escapes the strictures of the 
cosmopolitan/statist debates and focuses on global injustice, then we can begin to 
                                                 
28 Matt Zwolinski, "Structural Exploitation," Social Philosophy and Policy 29, no. 1 (2012): 175-77. 
29 Onora O'Neill, "Global Justice: Whose Obligations?," in The Ethics of Assitance: Morality and the 
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assess the responsibilities of other actors that exist in the global sphere.  MNCs 
are a useful proxy for starting to think about that.  But more than that, in some 
parts of the world MNCs are more powerful than states.  In situations where 
there are weak or failed states, MNCs may be the most powerful actors around.
30  
And even in industrialised countries, large, powerful MNCs can wield significant 
power. 
 
Zwolinski is right that we cannot exclude the role of the state in creating the 
conditions  for  exploitation,  but  we  also  cannot  exclude  MNCs  who  wield 
significant power and can pressure (particularly states in developing countries) 
into  making  certain  decisions  in  their  favour  or  turning  a  blind  eye  to  their 
activities.  Further research is required on a) the responsibility of states in the 
Youngian model, b) interactions between states and powerful non-state actors, c) 
the relationship of individuals’ political responsibilities to the state. 
 
e)  Division of responsibility within corporate agents 
 
In Chapter 4, I suggested that when we look inside states or corporations, we will 
find  a  “many  hands”  situation,  that  is,  a  situation  in  which  many  agents  in 
different departments and positions will have contributed to a decision-making 
process or to actualising a company’s or state’s directives.  In Chapter 3, we saw 
that Eichmann tried to shirk responsibility by arguing that he was merely obeying 
orders, which he considered to be a virtue.   
 
An  area  of  further  research  would  be  to  analyse  the  necessary  and  sufficient 
conditions for arguing that a person within a collective agent is more than a mere 
“cog” in the machine.  When can employees or functionaries legitimately say that 
they were not responsible for the group’s wrongdoings, or the harmful outcomes 
of a group’s activities, and when can they not?  When is the excuse “I was just 
doing my job” a valid excuse and when is it not?  When we have answers to these 
questions we can then ask the further questions as to whether these individuals 
bear moral or legal responsibility in relation to particular structural injustices, and 
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Deen K. Chatterjee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 252. Conclusion 
 
  299     
whether  or  not  these  responsibilities  will  entail  sanctions,  and  what  those 
sanctions might be. 
 
We can also ask what does forward-looking political responsibility entail in an 
individuals’ capacity as an employee or a functionary.  Do these roles generate 
specific  duties  in  relation  to  structural  injustice  that  are  more  stringent  than 
political responsibility?  Is there a moral duty to “blow the whistle” if an employee 
or  functionary  knows  that  a  corporation  or  state  is  actively  causing  harm,  or 
failing to alleviate structural injustice when it is in their power to do so?  Further 
analyses, then, of responsibility within corporate agents would be complementary 
to the work of this thesis. 
 
* 
 
Iris Marion Young’s theory of responsibility for global injustice was unfortunately 
unfinished.  A deeper analysis of this theory has revealed interesting implications 
for global justice theories and for theories of responsibility.  It has also raised 
several areas of further research.  Of course, I cannot put any of this to Iris 
Young herself.  As Martha Nussbaum suggested in the foreword to Responsibility 
for  Justice,  in  Young’s  absence  ‘it  remains  for  all  of  us  to  try  to  continue  the 
argument  as  best  we  can.’
31   I  hope  that  in  some  small  way,  my  thesis  has 
contributed to this conversation. 
 
                                                 
31 Martha C. Nussbaum, "Foreward," in Responsibility for Justice, ed. Iris Marion Young (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2011), xxv.  
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